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Abstract 
Microfinance, the delivery of microcredit to low income people, is a popular 
development approach among governments in both the developing and developed 
world. The approach encourages mainly the poor to pursue self-employment by creating 
micro and small enterprises. Most microfinance institutions, the main providers of 
microcredit in developing countries, are seemingly taking a minimalist approach in their 
operations. Against this background it is feared that provision of business development 
services (BDS) to owner managers of micro and small enterprises is likely to be reduced 
or neglected.  Previous attempts to evaluate the association of microfinance practices 
with the performance of poor people‟s micro and small enterprises have resulted in 
mixed results with little theoretical underpinning.   
 
Within the context of the current poverty reduction discourse, this study investigates the 
association of microcredit and concurrent provision of business development services 
with micro and small enterprise performance in a developing country. The key question 
investigated is whether, given access to microcredit, there is a difference in owner-
managers‟ self-assessed performance of their micro and small enterprises contingent on 
receipt of business development services. 
 
This thesis employs two relational conceptions, Pierre Bourdieu‟s (1977) critical theory 
on practice and neoinstitutionalism (see Scott, 2008), to isolate and situate the 
contending logics in the field of microfinance within the anti-poverty discourse. In so 
doing the thesis provides insights on the existence and nature of forces behind practice 
variations in the field of microfinance, notwithstanding the claim of poverty alleviation 
as being the underlying mission. Further, the thesis uses a Q-Squared approach to 
analyse the views of stakeholders.  Stakeholders include micro and small enterprise 
owner-managers as users of either or both business development services and 
microcredit.  
 
With regard to the primary hypothesis - whether there is a difference in owner-
managers‟ self-assessed performance of their enterprises contingent on their use of both 
business development services and microcredit - the findings are in the affirmative. 
Compared to their counterparts who use either or neither business development services 
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or microcredit, perceptions of micro and small enterprise owner-managers in receipt of 
both business development services and microcredit with respect to the performance of 
their enterprises are generally higher. The findings indicate that, in general, micro and 
small enterprise owner-managers in receipt of business development services report 
skill development as the main benefit accruing. Additionally, for owner-managers of 
micro and small enterprises who report satisfaction with the delivery of business 
development services, most record higher scores on self-rated performance of their 
enterprises. Further micro and small enterprise owner-managers raise concerns that 
current microcredit terms are not only stringent, but also constrain the operations of 
their businesses. However in general most micro and small enterprise owner-managers 
in receipt of microcredit perceive that this access improves the performance of their 
enterprises. 
 
In terms of the theoretical frameworks underpinning this thesis, these results mean that 
from a Bourdieusian perspective, MSEs belonging to owner managers who concurrently 
have access to both economic and cultural capital appear to enjoy a synergistic benefit 
compared to MSEs belonging to owner managers with access to economic capital alone. 
Further, it appears that combined provision of cultural and economic capital is likely to 
lead to better perceived MSE performance than supply of cultural capital on its own.  
However MSE owner managers with exclusive access to cultural capital (BDS) 
compared to their counterparts with exclusive access to economic capital (microcredit), 
are likely to report higher performance for their enterprises.  From a Bourdieusian point 
of view, it could be argued that access to cultural capital (BDS) enables MSE owners to 
acquire the necessary management skills that can enhance their habitus and 
consequently enlighten their decision making. 
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1.0 Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
At the turn of the current millennium, debate on what high-level goals are worthy of 
pursuit generated many issues; among them the need to improve the conditions of life 
for the majority of people around the world. Following the United Nations‟ resolutions 
now referred to as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), several developing 
countries, including Kenya, drafted their own version of wealth creation strategies 
within their main national socio-economic policy blueprints. Characteristic of these 
policy statements was the emphasis placed on poverty alleviation among the lower 
income class of people in developing countries (United Nations, 2000). So important is 
the issue that poverty reduction is ranked first in a list of eight MGS comprising the 
2015 development agenda of the United Nations (2009).  
 
Currently, in practice, most poverty alleviation efforts by states and major development 
agencies attempt to facilitate take up of an entrepreneurial culture rather than a reliance 
on relief efforts (Shaw, 2004). Such an orientation to development is driven arguably by 
several forces; first is that micro and small enterprises (MSEs) inevitably form the bulk 
of economic activity of the poor since they are the only forms of economic engagement 
poor people can afford. Second these enterprises are thought to require minimal training 
to run successfully; although this is debatable. Third and most important, there is 
seemingly a correlation between the existence of MSEs and certain aspects of economic 
development, particularly employment generation (e.g. Arch, 2005, Cook and 
Belliveau, 2004a).  
 
The evolution of the micro enterprise is significantly intertwined into theories of 
entrepreneurship and especially those that focus on the individual person, referred to as 
the entrepreneur (e.g. Hisrich and Peters, 1998). It is the entrepreneur who out of his or 
her psyche or intuition seizes an opportunity and sets up a platform to exploit it. The 
propensity to engage in enterprise, according to Arch (2005), is determined by a 
collection of both psychological and behavioural attributes of human beings. Arch 
proposes a model that depicts existence of an opportunity (enabled by government 
polices), ability to engage in enterprise (measured in terms of an individual‟s potential 
for entrepreneurial and business skills), and certain socio-economic factors; as being the 
antecedents to the eventual creation of a new enterprise. 
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Upon identification of an opportunity, the personality traits of an individual play a 
critical role in the decision to engage in enterprise activity or not to. It is human nature 
that some people are more willing to take a risk and innovate while others are risk 
averse and harbour a wait and see attitude. The model emphasises the need to create an 
enabling environment through legislative efforts by governments and enactment of 
institutional policies that encourage innovation. However it is worth noting that the 
newly created enterprise may either not survive for long or run successfully without 
access to the necessary financial and technical support. Lack of start up capital remains 
one of the leading barriers to entrepreneurial activity among would-be entrepreneurs in 
developing economies (Arch, 2005, Atieno, 2001b).  Access to affordable quality 
training is another. The concept of microfinance
1
, and especially microfinance when it 
is accompanied by the development of business skills, has developed partly as an 
institutionalised response to this challenge. 
 
Stated broadly, the purpose of this study is to examine users‟ perceptions of the 
significance of microcredit and business development services (BDS) in their 
association with MSE development in a developing country, Kenya, contextualised 
within the current poverty reduction discourse.  This broad purpose is achieved by 
focusing on four specific objectives to be examined through the viewpoint of MSE 
owner-managers; namely to: 
 assess the perceived costs and benefits of BDS to micro and small enterprises; 
 assess the perceived significance of microcredit provision to micro and small 
enterprise performance; 
 evaluate the perceived effectiveness of BDS delivery to micro and small 
enterprises; and 
 evaluate the strategic fit between currently supplied BDS and MSE owner 
managers‟ (market) needs. 
 
The purpose of the following sections is to provide background information about the 
social-economic profile of Kenya, microfinance activities around the world, and more 
particularly in Kenya. The aim is to posit the research questions and set the scene for 
assessing the impact of access to microcredit and BDS on the performance of owner 
                                                 
1
 Microfinance refers to programmes that promote self-employment of very poor people by providing 
technical assistance to business, credit, and other financial services (Micro Credit Summit, 1997). 
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managers‟ MSEs.  The subsequent sections present discussions on the justification for 
the study, in particular stating its motivation and contribution.   
 
1.2 Context – preview of Kenya’s social-economic status 
Kenya lies on the eastern part of the Sub-Saharan Africa region. Like most other 
countries in this region Kenya is a low income nation. As at 2007 the UNDP Human 
Development Report classified Kenya among the “medium human development” 
countries of the world, ranking it 148
th
 out of 182 countries (UNDP, 2009). As at 2009, 
Kenya‟s national population was approximately 39 million people (up from 28.7m 
reported in the 1999 national census) and growing at a rate of about 2.7 per cent 
annually (CIA, 2010). This population is spread across more than forty different ethnic 
communities. The 2009 estimates show Kenya with a GDP per capita of US$ 1,600 
compared to a GDP per capita of US$ 38,800 in the case of Australia (CIA, 2010). The 
gap between the rich and poor in Kenya is significant with an estimated Gini
2
 
coefficient of 0.477 (UNDP, 2009a). The rate of unemployment averages 40 per cent 
and current trends on the proportion of the population living below the poverty line (i.e. 
US$ 1.25 a day) range between 52 per cent (UNDP, 2009b) and 56.4 per cent (KBC, 
2010).  However literacy levels among Kenyan adults average at 73.6 per cent (UNDP, 
2009). According to Kenya‟s economic survey of 2007, the key sectors that make a 
significant contribution to the country‟s GDP are tourism, commerce, transport and 
communications, and financial services (GOK, 2007a).  
The features described above make Kenya attractive for micro and small enterprise 
activity and consequently present great potential for microfinance operations. Kenya‟s 
microfinance industry is arguably the most developed within the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region and is host to not only the first MFI reported in Africa, but also to Equity Bank, 
voted the Emerging Markets most sustainable bank of the year (2009) in Africa and the 
Middle East (IFC, 2009). With most previous microfinance impact studies carried out in 
Asia and, to a lesser extent, in Latin America, situating this study in Kenya is timely and 
deserved, since it brings the Sub-Saharan region into the equation of developing 
economies.  
 
                                                 
2
 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of income distribution within a country‟s population. It 
ranges from zero to one; where zero implies perfect equality and one indicates absolute inequality (World 
Bank, 2010).    
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1.3 Background: Overview of Microfinance and MSE Development 
Microfinance is a popular instrument for promoting socio-economic development 
among poor people in the developing world. The roots of the modern method of 
microfinancing are commonly traced back to the 1980s and linked to the operations of 
the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. This development instrument has been adopted 
readily by several developing countries including in Africa and Latin America.   
 
As reflected in Table 1, as of 2007 there were more than 3,500 microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) collaborating with the secretariat for the Microcredit Summit Campaign, and the 
number appears to be on the increase. Globally MFIs are reported to have reached close 
to an estimated 155 million clients and impacted on nearly 550 million poor family 
members (Daley-Harris, 2009). Whereas these figures are a testimony that in terms of 
its reach microfinance is no longer „micro‟, poverty, its enduring mission, still persists 
widely (Daley-Harris, 2009).   
 
While global trends (for the period before 2007) in poverty reduction have been 
dominated by rapid growth in China, East Asia and the Pacific region; in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where GDP per capita shrank by 14 per cent, poverty rose from 41 per cent of 
the population in 1981 to 46 per cent in 2001, resulting in an additional 150 million 
people living in extreme poverty (Arch, 2005, World Bank, 2008, Muyanga et al., 
2007). Following the recent (2008) global financial crisis, an estimated 55 to 90 million 
more people than was anticipated before the crisis are likely to be living in extreme 
poverty (United Nations, 2009) with large regional disparities expected.  
 
Table 1: Global state of Microfinance 
 
 2006 2007 Change 
Number of MFIs reporting since 1997 3,316 3,552   7.1% 
Number of MFIs reporting in 2007 & 2008 only 873 861 - 1.4% 
Poorest clients by MFIs reporting in 2007 & 2008 only 807 (92.4%) 718 (83.4%) - 11% 
Total number of clients 133,030,913 154,825,825  16.4% 
Total number of poorest clients reached 92,922,574 109,898,894  18.3% 
Total number of poorest women  reached 79,130,581 (85.2%) 106,584,679 (96.9%)  34.7% 
Number of poorest family members affected
±
 464,612,870 549,494,470 18.3% 
(Source: compiled from various „State of Microcredit Summit Campaign Reports) 
 
± 
assumes a five-member family size. 
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From a regional perspective, although more than half of the people of the Sub-Saharan 
Africa live on less than US$ 1.25 per day (United Nations, 2009), the region has only 
935 (27 per cent) of the more than three thousand MFIs operating in the developing 
world (see Table 2). In contrast, the Asia-Pacific region houses 1,727 (51.4 per cent) of 
MFIs in the developing world.   
 
In terms of outreach, as at 2007, MFIs operating within the Sub-Saharan Africa region 
had a client base estimated at slightly more than nine million, representing 6 per cent of 
all MFI clients from the developing world, compared to the Asia-Pacific region with 
more than 129 million (86 per cent) clients. Table 2 further shows that of the 106 
million poorest clients reached by 2007; nearly 91 per cent were from the Asia-pacific, 
while Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and Caribbean accounted for 6 per cent 
and 2 per cent respectively. The MFI-client ratio in the Asia-Pacific region is 1: 74959, 
compared to a ratio of 1: 12679 and 1: 9828 for Latin America and the Caribbean and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. In general MFIs in the Asia-Pacific region appear to 
exhibit greater outreach compared to their counterparts in Sub-Saharan Africa, other 
factors notwithstanding.  Whether or not it can be claimed they are subsequently more 
efficient or effective, however, is another issue and is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Table 2: Regional outlook of Microfinance  
 
Region Number 
of MFIs 
reporting 
Total number of  clients Number of poorest clients 
2006 2007 2006 2007 
Sub-Saharan Africa 935 8,411,416 9,189,825  6,182,812 6,379,707 
Asia and the Pacific  1,727 112,714,909 129,438,919 83,755,659 96,514,127 
Latin America & Caribbean 613 6,755,569 7,772,769 1,978,145 2,206,718 
Middle East & North Africa 85 1,722,274 3,310,477 755,682 1,140,999 
Developing World Totals 3,360 129,604,168 149,711,990 92,672,298 106,241,551 
North America & Western Europe 127 54,466 176,958 25,265 109,318 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  65 3,372,280 4,936,877 225,011 233,810 
Industrialized World Totals 192 3,426,746 5,113,835 250,276 343,128 
(Source: adapted from the „State of Microcredit Summit Campaign Report‟, Daley-Harris, 2009, pg,26) 
 
Although progress was made, as Table 1 shows, the target set by delegates to the first 
Microcredit Summit (1997) to reach approximately 100 million poor people with a 
microloan by the year 2005 was not achieved until two years later. Nevertheless 
according to World Bank estimates as at 2005, the microfinance industry posted a 
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turnover of more than US$ 2.5 billion globally (Arch, 2005). Three years later (2008), 
the figure rose to US$ 11.7 billion, nearly a quadruple increase, with 53 per cent of the 
investment funds coming from donors at below market rates (The Economist, 2009).  
 
Consistent with the financial sustainability, poverty alleviation and feminist 
empowerment themes encompassed in Mayoux‟s (2000) taxonomy3 of the practice of 
microfinance, MFIs offer a diverse cluster of services. For example, microfinancing 
programmes run by development-conscious organisations such as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) mobilise member savings and integrate BDS in the delivery of 
microcredit to MSE owner-managers, akin to the „gold standard‟ followed by the 
Grameen bank. On the contrary, operations of most MFIs owned by private firms 
pursue a minimalist approach offering mainly microcredit. Some of the other services 
offered by institutions under the microfinance umbrella include microinsurance, 
micropensions, and microleasing. Regardless, to date the main features distinguishing 
microfinancing from mainstream financial institutions are; first the granting of smaller 
loans, averaging US$ 100, although this varies by country. Second, poor women tend to 
be the primary market for MFI loans whereas mainstream financial institutions often 
shun lending to the poor. Third, MFIs encourage their clients to start income generating 
activities and discourage use of loans for personal consumption. Fourth, applicants for 
micro loans are not required ordinarily to have tangible collateral and finally, savings 
tend to be a precondition for accessing microcredit (Khandakar and Constantine, 
2004a,b), whereas this is not necessarily the case for mainstream financial institutions.  
 
1.3.1 Microfinance and MSE development in Kenya – a Synopsis 
Micro and small enterprises contribute about 18 per cent of Kenya‟s GDP and provide 
72 per cent of employment (Ministry of Planning and National Development - Kenya, 
2006, ILO, 2008). MSEs are spread widely across the country, with two thirds of them 
located in rural areas (Ministry of Planning and National Development - Kenya, 2006, 
ILO, 2008). This sector appears critical; firstly in respect of the growth of the Kenya‟s 
                                                 
3
 Mayoux‟s (2000) taxonomy outlines three pillars that shape the design and delivery of microfinance 
services; namely financial sustainability, poverty alleviation and feminist empowerment. Whereas the aim 
of the advocates of the financial sustainability school of thought is to promote individually-owned 
enterprises, they encourage group-based lending as a risk mitigating mechanism. Proponents of the 
poverty alleviation view seek to enable a communitarian self-organised development of the poor people. 
For its part, the feminist empowerment paradigm is geared towards dismantling structures that oppress 
women both in the patriarchal order and within the working class (Edward and Olsen, 2006, Mayoux, 
2000).  
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economy and secondly as an avenue towards poverty alleviation (Liedholm, 2002, 
Kibaara, 2006). Despite their large aggregate contribution, returns to individual MSEs 
vary tremendously. Among those MSEs that represent the sole source of income for 
households, 72 per cent make less than the absolute poverty line in urban areas and none 
of the MSEs in rural areas make above the absolute poverty line (Daniels, 1999). MSEs 
are engaged in a variety of business activities. In most parts of the world and 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, MSEs are involved mainly in commerce, being 
basic trade either at wholesale or retail level (Liedholm, 2002). Similar observations 
were made by Richardson, Howarth & Finnegan (2004). With regard to Kenya, a 
significant number of MSEs engage in commerce with 74 per cent and 66 per cent in 
urban and rural areas respectively (Liedholm, 2002). Others are involved in agriculture, 
manufacturing, tourism, transport, telecommunications, and other services (ILO, 2008). 
 
There are many challenges that stifle the operations of MSEs in various parts of the 
world. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa in general and Kenya in particular, access to 
affordable credit is one of the main challenges facing MSEs despite efforts directed to 
the sector over the years (Hulme, 2000, Rogerson, 2001, Craig, 2005, World Bank, 
2005a, Kibaara, 2006, Argwings-Kodhek et al., 2004b, GOK, 2006). Some of the other 
challenges facing MSEs in Kenya range from lack of access to markets, a weak legal 
framework, high interest rates, to limited access to non-financial services especially 
business advisory services, among others (Craig, 2005, Dondo, 2003, GOK, 2006, 
World Bank, 2005a).  
 
In response to the credit challenge facing MSEs in Kenya, a number of financial models 
have emerged within MFIs or MFI-like organisations. These include the “...community 
owned rural financing models, private commercial bank led model, government led 
rural finance model, donor guarantees-input supply model, managed SACCOS-beach 
banking model and informal group based rural financing model” (Kibaara, 2006, pg, ii). 
Currently the number of known MFIs operating in Kenya is approximately close to 100 
serving over four million clients with an outstanding loan portfolio of more than KES 
2.3 billion (US$30 million) (Aron, 2010). The majority of Kenya‟s MFIs are set up and 
appear to operate under the auspices of non government organisations (NGOs). The 
MFIs serve an ever-increasing number of poor clients, but the demand for their financial 
services still far outstrips their capacity (Argwings-Kodhek et al., 2004b, ILO, 2008).  
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Despite the large number of players in Kenya‟s microfinance sector, the existing 
products and service delivery methodologies appear to fall below market demand. 
Discriminative practices and rationing behaviour among both formal and informal 
lenders continues to limit access to credit for most MSEs (Atieno, 2001b). For example 
the 1999 National Baseline Survey of MSEs in Kenya revealed that only 10.4 per cent 
of MSEs had received financial support from any source, including from MFIs, 
commercial banks, and money lenders. In addition, the reality is that MSEs need more 
than short term credit (Dondo, 1999).  
 
One of the challenges to providing longer term credit to MSEs in Kenya is legislative. 
Restrictions in Kenya‟s Banking Act have had far reaching implications for the 
operations of the MFI sector. Because of the legal restrictions, most MFIs operating in 
the country are either legally set up as NGOs or private limited companies, limited by 
shares or guarantee (Argwings-Kodhek et al., 2004b). As a result, most Kenyan MFIs 
operate as credit-led programmes, offering short term credit mostly and in part along the 
Grameen bank group-based model
4
, thus limiting the extent to which these institutions 
can mobilise deposits to enhance their sustainability (Dondo, 1999). Some of the newer 
product offerings in the microfinance sector available in other locations, for example, 
microinsurance, micropensions and microleasing services, are yet to be launched.  
 
On the whole there has been minimal innovation in both products and delivery methods 
for microfinance services in Kenya. Currently, most MFIs offer a single product 
(microcredit) to a single MSE customer segment, through a single methodology, thus 
reaching a limited segment of the potential market. This approach has left out important 
segments of the poor, for example smallholder agricultural activities, which the majority 
of the poor in rural Kenya depend on for their livelihood (Atieno, 2001a, Johnson et al., 
2006, Dondo, 1999).  
                                                 
4
 The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh has successfully pioneered group-based lending primarily targeting 
Women in the MSE sector. The model has been widely replicated by MFIs operating in several 
developing countries e.g. Bolivia, India, and Kenya among others. 
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1.3.2   Statement of the problem 
Since the nineties there has been a significant increase in the number of MSEs in Kenya, 
especially in the urban areas like Nairobi, Eldoret, Kisumu and Mombasa.  This trend is 
bound to continue due to factors such as rural – urban migration, employee 
retrenchment and the persistent high rates of unemployment. Despite the sector‟s rapid 
expansion, most of these enterprises remain outside the formal banking sector due to 
their perceived high risk. 
 
This structural isolation of MSEs from mainstream banking has lead to the 
establishment of a significant number of MFIs (now close to 100), which claim to 
provide various forms of support to MSEs, including short term credit, management 
training and other related BDS. The purpose of this study is to assess owner-managers‟ 
perceptions of the role of BDS and or microcredit, in the context of microfinance, in 
promoting the performance of micro and small enterprises in Kenya.  Specific 
hypotheses are developed in chapter three, but in order to provide the reader with some 
idea of the areas covered in this thesis, the following research questions are posed for 
examination in the context of the geographic location of Kenya: 
1) What services do external support agencies offer MSE owner-managers 
currently? 
2) Which support services do MSE owner-managers most commonly use? 
3) What are users' perceptions of the usefulness and limitations of BDS and 
microcredit on the performance of their enterprises?  
4) Given inclusion in a microfinance programme, is there a difference in the 
owner-manager self-assessed performance of micro and small enterprises 
contingent on receipt of BDS? 
5) How satisfied are MSE owner-managers with current BDS delivery? 
Research Questions 1 and 2 are answered descriptively, whilst Research Questions 3, 4 
and 5 are developed (see chapter three) into substantive hypotheses to be tested both 
univariately and multivariately. The next section expands on why providing answers to 
the research questions presented above is important and will make a contribution to the 
stock of knowledge in the subject area of this thesis. 
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1.4   Motivation 
Most poverty alleviation efforts have a bias towards encouraging entrepreneurial 
activity to try and bridge „the dollar gap‟. According to authors (Cook and Belliveau, 
2004a, Arch, 2005), economists have long suggested, and empirical evidence supports, 
that there is a positive relationship between extent of MSE activity and employment 
creation, among other aspects of economic development in a country.  
 
Although microfinancing has become popular as a development instrument only in the 
last two decades, it has attracted considerable research interest among policy makers, 
practitioners and academics alike. A survey of literature on the significance of 
microfinancing on MSE development shows a variety of themes. While some 
researchers have had interest in understanding the dynamics of gender and power with 
regard to control over use of loan funds (e.g. Goetz and Gupta, 1996); mechanisms 
behind the microfinance promise (e.g. Morduch, 1999, Edward and Olsen, 2006);  and 
the moral and political philosophical perspectives to microfinance (Khandakar and 
Constantine, 2004b); others have had a focus on the effects of microfinancing on 
development policy in general (e.g. Arch, 2005) and third world development in 
particular (Khandakar and Constantine, 2004a). Additionally researchers have made 
attempts towards elaborating principles for „best practice‟ in microfinance 
(Ledgerwood, 1999, Remenyi, 2002, Gibson, 1997). Yet others question not only the 
ethics behind a commercialised approach to microfinance (Schmidt, 2010, Young, 
2010) but also its appropriateness, specifically in post-conflict environments (Shaw and 
Clarke, 2006), and its application across cultural ideologies and material conditions in 
particular locales (Shakya and Rankin, 2008). 
 
Equally varied are studies on the impact of microfinance on either the poverty situation 
in poor communities or the development of their enterprises. With the household as a 
locus for most impact studies (e.g Morduch, 1998, Khandker, 2005), few use the 
enterprise as the unit of assessment, with studies such as that by Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2008) being important exceptions. Some studies however do assess impact 
of microfinancing at either the specific programme or individual participant level. 
Notable among these are programme evaluation studies commissioned by the World 
Bank such as Pitt and Khandker (1998) and the series by USAID -  Assessing the 
Impacts of Microenterprise Services (AIMS) conducted in India, Zimbabwe, and Peru 
11 
 
(Goldberg, 2005). Yet other researchers are concerned with the methodology of 
assessing impact (e.g. Hulme, 2000, Khalily, 2004, Wright and Copestake, 2004). In 
general while some of these studies report a positive impact of microfinance on 
household income (e.g. Pitt and Khandker, 1998, Khandker, 2005), this claim is also 
disputed (e.g. Morduch, 1998, Khandakar and Constantine, 2004a). 
 
With regard to the significance of BDS on micro and small enterprise development, an 
overview of the literature shows few relevant studies. Researchers have so far examined 
the influence of human capital attributes and viability of strategies for enterprise 
education (Cook and Belliveau, 2004a, Pittaway and Hannon, 2008); use of consultants 
and entrepreneurs‟ attitudes towards training and support initiatives (Faoite et al., 2004, 
Boter, 2005, Klyver, 2008); and contemporary training – awareness, interest and 
implementation in small businesses (Matlay, 2004, Eikebrokk and Olsen, 2009, 
Jayawarna et al., 2007). The subject of MSE growth has also attracted a few researchers 
(2007, Kotey and Sheridan, 2004, Masakure et al., 2009); for example Sievers and 
Vandenberg (2007) explore the benefits of linking microcredit with BDS using 
secondary data  from selected MFIs  while Berry & Sweeting (2006) look into effects of 
external advice on micro and small enterprise performance.  
 
Research on the impact of BDS on MSEs is scanty, and where impact has been 
assessed, the results appear inconclusive. Matlay (2004) observes that while small 
business owner managers are aware of the existence of training opportunities (especially 
those sponsored by governments),  their usage of such services has remained low. More 
importantly, however, “...none of these initiatives appears to have made a significant 
impact upon the skill levels and/or the competitiveness of smaller firms” (Matlay, 2004, 
pg, 512) . This may be due to a mismatch between small business training needs and the 
services offered by trainers. Nevertheless the necessity for micro and small enterprise 
support cannot be questioned. Authors (Matlay, 2004, Porter, 1998, Faoite et al., 2004, 
Sievers, 2007, Boter, 2005) observe that where governments have established policy 
measures that support innovative training initiatives, as is the case in France, Germany, 
Japan and the USA, growth in the SME sector has been recorded. 
 
Until the mid 1990s most MFIs sourced loan funds from donors who share in the 
mission of alleviating poverty. In the pursuit of efficient allocation of resources, the 
donor community is putting pressure on MFIs to move towards financial self-
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sufficiency in their operations (Boter, 2005). Following this development, there is now 
fear of a possible „mission drift‟ (Christen, 2000) and that provision of BDS may be 
neglected (Boter, 2005, Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). With most of the BDS studies 
reported here conducted in the context of developed economies, especially USA and 
Europe, there is a need to reveal more about BDS needs and supply in the developing 
world. A brief preview of the study findings is presented next. 
 
1.5  Overview of Findings 
In general the study finds that MSEs receive two forms of facilitation from external 
MSE support agents. Firstly, are microcredit services provided primarily by MFIs and, 
to a lesser extent, by other related providers of financial services such as commercial 
banks, and SACCOs. On the surface the findings show that MFIs are the primary source 
of microcredit for MSEs in need of extra funds for working capital purposes, acquisition 
of business assets, and expansion of operations, among other needs. In the Kenyan 
context, provision of savings facilities to MSEs is found to be a frequent feature across 
most microfinancing operations. Other microfinance products like insurance, 
micropension schemes, and microleasing are not commonly reported among Kenyan 
MFIs.  
 
On average, the quoted interest rate for an MFI loan is reported as being higher than that 
of mainstream commercial banks, with the lower bound starkly beyond ten points of the 
government‟s base lending rate.  Although most microcredit users perceive its cost to be 
affordable, this might arguably be more an expression of lack of a better alternative than 
anything else. The findings further reveal that, surprisingly, in contrast to the literature 
surrounding MFI practices and received wisdom, some form of tangible collateral 
remains a requirement for MSE owner managers applying for microcredit, even when 
lending is group-based. MSE owner-managers report also that current terms and 
conditions surrounding access to microcredit are not only stringent, but also a major 
constraint to their business operations. However the findings do reveal that in most 
cases MSE owner-managers with access to microcredit perceive that this access 
improves the general performance of their enterprises. 
 
Besides microcredit, the second most commonly reported form of MSE facilitation is 
human capital development and various forms of technical services, which are both 
provided under the banner of business development services (BDS). Provided mainly by 
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NGOs and private consultants, in its various forms BDS is reported as accessible to 
MSE owner-managers either singly or jointly with microcredit. Generally the findings 
show that MSE owner-managers‟ BDS preferences revolve around facilitation in 
financial management, marketing, and to a lesser extent technical operations. It is 
however noted that predominantly, MFI-linked BDS takes the form of training in group 
dynamics, moral support, and general advisory services in business management; 
aspects that partly serve to address the hurdles of credit delivery among MFIs but which 
are notably unmatched to BDS needs of the clients – at least for the sample MSE owner-
managers examined in this study. 
 
The findings indicate that, in general, MSE owner-managers in receipt of BDS report 
skill development as the main benefit accrued, even though some express fears of 
potential breaches of privacy. Additionally, although the cost of BDS is perceived to be 
modest, especially when BDS is sought jointly with microcredit or partly subsidised, 
MSE owner-managers perceive it as unaffordable when sourced singly from private 
consultants unaffiliated to either MFIs or NGOs. In general however, the study reports 
satisfaction with BDS delivery amongst MSE owner-managers, most of whom record 
high scores on self-rated performance by their enterprises. Apart from access to BDS 
and microcredit, MSE owner-managers‟ gender and education level are among other 
factors that influence perceptions on the performance of their MSEs. Compared to their 
male counterparts, female MSE owner-managers report higher performance ratings for 
their enterprises, regardless of access to microcredit or BDS. It can be inferred from 
these findings that MSE owner-managers with higher levels of education are better 
placed not only to identify the need for particular advice, but also possess the initiative 
to apply the skills learned in managing their enterprises. 
 
In terms of whether there is a difference in owner-managers‟ self-assessed performance 
of their enterprises contingent on their use of both BDS and microcredit - the findings 
are in the affirmative. Compared to their counterparts who use either or neither BDS or 
microcredit, perceptions with respect to the performance of their enterprises by MSE 
owner-managers in receipt of both BDS and microcredit are generally higher. The next 
section discusses the contribution made by this study. 
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1.6  Contribution of the Study 
The contribution of this thesis to knowledge and to the literature falls into three 
categories; namely theoretical, practical and regulatory. Theoretically the thesis 
examines and applies two frameworks (Bourdieu‟s theory of practice and neo-
institutionalism) that together can explain the relationship between observed practice in 
microfinance and progress made in promoting MSE development, both of which are so 
important in the anti-poverty campaigns within developing economies. Previous studies 
of this relationship have been mostly atheoretical; take a suppliers‟ perspective (e.g. Pitt 
and Khandker, 1998, Snodgrass and Sebstad, 2002, Khandker, 2005); and tend to focus 
on institutionalisation and the outreach of microfinance programmes, making claims 
about the expected economic benefits to households (e.g. Morduch, 1998, Seibel and 
Kumar, 1998, Remenyi, 2002).  The thesis firstly employs Pierre Bourdieu‟s critical 
theory on practice to isolate and situate the contending logics in the field of 
microfinance within the anti-poverty discourse. In so doing the thesis provides not only 
evidence of but also insights to the existence and nature of seemingly parallel forces 
behind practice variations in the field of microfinance, notwithstanding the claim of 
poverty alleviation being the underlying mission.  
 
Secondly, the thesis extends existing literature on BDS/training and its impact on MSE 
performance by empirically examining this relationship from the broad perspective of 
the poverty reduction discourse and specifically in the context of MSEs operating in a 
developing economy. Thirdly the study adds to the qualitative literature by eliciting 
from MSE owner-managers their perceptions of the costs and benefits associated with 
access to BDS and microcredit, both jointly and separately.  It then goes on to test 
empirically whether the benefits cited are associated with superior self-rated 
performance of their enterprises. To achieve this, in addition to focusing on the 
enterprise as the unit of assessment rather than households, the thesis adopts a user‟s 
perspective to the inquiry about the relationship between microcredit and BDS, and 
MSE performance in the context of poverty alleviation.  
 
Against this background, the thesis uses a Q-Squared
5
 approach to concurrently collate 
views of stakeholders and more importantly of MSE owner-managers, as users of both 
or either BDS and microcredit, on the perceived performance of MSEs as one of the 
                                                 
5
 A Q-squared methodology is a mixed methods approach to scientific inquiry that combines qualitative 
and quantitative techniques (Kanbur and Shaffer, 2005).  
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principal economic units available to the poor. It is worth noting that the adoption of a 
Q-Squared design in this type of study is reasonably rare since most previous studies on 
the impact of microfinance use quantitatively analysed surveys. Sharma and 
Buchenrieder  (2002, pg, 231) and Habib (2008) provide a list of such studies. By 
blending quantitative analysis with interview data from both demand and supply side 
stakeholders in the microfinance field, triangulation occurs and more insights are 
provided when interpreting the results. Lastly, informed by the empirical literature and 
Pierre Bourdieu‟s conceptions, augmented by neo-institutionalism, this thesis develops 
a conceptual framework that can be applied to future studies on microfinancing both as 
a field and a practice. 
 
From a practical perspective however, while the benefits that might accrue to MSEs 
with access to either microcredit or BDS have been documented (Dawson, 1997, 
Bennett and Robson, 1999, Remenyi and Quinones, 2000, Berry and Sweeting, 2006, 
Anami, 2009), there is scant evidence of testing for their synergistic value (Sievers and 
Vandenberg, 2007). The literature appears to portray provision of BDS to MSEs as an 
unnecessary cost burden to MFIs seeking financial self sufficiency, especially given 
claims of lack of demand for the same (Sievers and Vandenberg, 2007) .  With the help 
of primary „user-based‟ data, this study‟s findings help to dispel such claims; first it 
demonstrates that demand for BDS among MSEs in developing countries exists whether 
BDS is linked to access to microcredit or not. Second, though it may not be in the 
interest of MFIs pursuing financial self-sufficiency, this study tests specifically for the 
perceived impact of the use of BDS and microcredit on the owner-manager self-rated 
performance of MSEs, an attempt that has been previously overlooked. This study 
therefore not only helps quantify the benefits associated with access to microcredit and 
BDS as correlates, jointly and severally, on MSE performance, in the context of 
developing countries. It also informs debate on the demand for and supply of BDS 
provision among MSEs, especially those with potential for growth within the context of 
poverty alleviation. 
 
Further, the study‟s findings may serve to enlighten microcredit providers and their 
BDS counterparts on bottlenecks surrounding access to and use of microcredit and/or 
BDS in light of the specific growth needs and preferences of MSE owner-managers.  
Such insights could go a long way in shaping either revision or future development of 
new products and mechanisms for the delivery of pro-growth microcredit and BDS. In 
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essence this may facilitate achievement of an improved strategic fit between 
microfinance policies and practices on the one hand, and MSE needs on the other. This 
thesis is the first of its kind to use data from Kenya to not only undertake empirically a 
comprehensive inquiry of stakeholders‟ views on BDS provision to MSEs but also, and 
more importantly, test for its complementary value to the perceived performance of 
MSEs in receipt of microcredit.  
 
In regulatory and public policy terms, this study contributes by providing insights that 
might better inform debate on the role of BDS in microfinance practices aimed at 
alleviating poverty through the MSE environment. With current trends seemingly 
pointing towards pursuit of a more commercial and minimalist approach to 
microfinancing, better understanding of the synergistic benefit of BDS to  the growth 
and performance of MSEs, will inform policy makers, practitioners, and regulators of 
microfinancing at a time when the future of BDS supply appears uncertain.  The study is 
therefore likely to provide strategic insight to governments and development agencies 
working in developing economies on ways to improve BDS delivery, within the current 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) policy framework
6
. Additionally it may 
facilitate the establishment of more effective policy guidelines and appropriate 
regulatory frameworks for microfinance operations.  
 
In a nutshell this study examines the subject of BDS delivery and MSE development, as 
embedded in microfinance programmes, using empirical data based on MSE owner-
manager stakeholder perceptions in the context of Kenya, representing developing 
countries where the bulk of MSEs and MFIs are found. The study contributes to 
bridging the knowledge gap (with respect to developing economies) in respect of this 
important field. It does so by creating a conceptual framework that can explain variation 
in the practice of microfinance in any region, particularly in relation to the supply of 
BDS in conjunction with microcredit. Further, eliciting and then analysing the 
                                                 
6
 The PRSP approach is a joint initiative of the IMF and the World Bank towards achieving a comprehensive 
country-based strategy for poverty reduction. In this framework,  poverty reduction strategies should be; country-
based, emphasizing a broad participation of civil society and other key stakeholders in national economic policy; 
results oriented, targeting  outcomes that are likely to benefit the poor; holistic in recognition of the multidimensional 
nature of poverty; and with a long-term perspective (www.imf.org).  
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experiences of both MSE owner-managers and representatives of their BDS support 
agencies, it examines issues in a holistic manner.  
 
1.7 Structure of Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows; chapter two opens with a brief 
background on the socio-economic situation in Kenya before discussing the state and 
significance of MSE development, and the role of microfinance in the country. This 
chapter presents also a review of literature related to BDS and MSE development. This 
is followed by chapter three, which posits two concurrent theoretical frameworks 
providing guidance to a critical discussion of the literature on the emergence, practice 
variation, and trends that have marked the development of modern day microfinancing.  
This chapter closes by outlining the study‟s hypotheses for testing. 
 
Chapter four offers methodological considerations for the thesis. It provides a detailed 
account of the design, practical specifications, and justification for methods employed 
to guide sampling, choice of tools and techniques for data collection and analysis 
adopted in the study. Next, chapter five introduces data analyses by statistically 
presenting a detailed profile of the study‟s sample. This is followed by chapters six and 
seven, both of which are devoted to more in-depth analysis, interpretation, and 
discussion of findings with regard to the posited research questions. These two chapters 
provide also the results of tests of hypotheses using univariate as well as multivariate 
techniques. A summary of the findings, conclusions, and suggestions for further 
research are presented in chapter eight. Following this introduction is chapter two which 
is next presented. 
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2.0 Chapter Two: Further Background and Related Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
After the brief introduction to the topic in the previous chapter, this chapter draws out 
detailed information on the study‟s context, specifically the characteristics and 
dynamics of the micro and small enterprise (MSE) sector in Kenya. The chapter 
provides also a review of literature relating to business development services (BDS) and 
performance of MSEs. This chapter is organised into three major sections. Following 
this introduction is section one which examines the current state of the MSE sector in 
Kenya. In this section the focus is on the economic significance and the general 
attributes of Kenya‟s MSEs, including their size, ownership and nature of business 
activity, among others. The section also provides insights into the main challenges faced 
by MSEs in Kenya as reported in recent literature. The second section of the chapter is 
devoted to outlining the contribution of Kenya‟s microfinance sector towards the 
development of the country‟s MSEs. In particular, the section presents a synopsis of 
services offered by Kenya‟s microfinance institutions (MFIs) and discusses the 
responses of Kenya‟s MSEs to this development. Followed by a conclusion to the 
chapter, the third section presents a review of literature on the association between 
access to BDS and MSE performance. 
 
2.2 MSE development in Kenya: the Role of Microfinance  
Before discussing the outlook of the MSE sector in Kenya a brief review of the 
country‟s economic status is warranted as it sets the context within which the sector 
operates. With a population close to 39 million people and a per capita income of 
US$770 (Library of Congress, 2007, World Bank, 2009b), Kenya is categorised as the 
20th poorest country in the world (Sabana, 2005). As of the year 2005/6, economic 
estimates indicate that more than half of Kenya‟s population (52 per cent) lives in 
poverty
7
 with more than three quarters (85 per cent) of the poor living in rural Kenya 
(UNDP, 2009a).  
                                                 
7
 As at 2006 the overall rural and urban poverty lines are approximately US$0.75 and US$1.40 
a day per person respectively. These figures are inclusive of provisions for both food and non-
food expenditure (World Bank, 2009). 
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The main pillar of Kenya‟s economy is agriculture. As at 2004, the contribution of 
agriculture to the county‟s GDP was estimated at 25.7 per cent (World Bank, 2009a). 
Between 2001 and 2006 the average growth in Kenya‟s agricultural sector was 2.5 per 
cent (Wambugu et al., 2009). According to Table 3 below, the significance of 
agriculture seems to be declining, registering a GDP contribution of 21 per cent in 2008 
compared to 32 per cent in 2000. Kenya practices mainly rain-fed agriculture the 
productivity of which is susceptible to frequent droughts. The other sectors with 
significant GDP contributions include; services (e.g. trade,  tourism, transport and 
communications) and industry (e.g. manufacturing, building and construction) (Library 
of Congress, 2007, World Bank, 2009a). As reflected in Table 3 below, the average 
GDP contribution of these two sectors between 2000 and 2008 was 56.5 per cent and 
16.8 per cent in favour of services. The services economic cluster within which MSEs 
are included is gaining prominence over time. The most recent government policy 
strategy on wealth creation (2003-2007) seems to point to this direction with increasing 
emphasis being placed on telecommunications, financial services and MSEs (GOK, 
2006).  
 
Table 3: Economic data profile- Kenya 
   2000 2005 2007 2008 
Social indicators 
Population, total (millions) 31.25 35.60 37.53 38.53 
Population growth (annual %) 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Surface area (sq. km) (thousands) 580.4 580.4 580.4 580.4 
GNI
8
 per capita, Atlas method (annual current US$) 420 520 660 770 
General & Sectoral 
GDP (current US$) (billions) 12.69 18.77 26.95 34.51 
GDP growth (annual %) 0.6 5.8 7.0 3.6 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 6.1 5.2 4.7 27.0 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 32 27 26 21 
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 17 19 18 13 
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 51 54 56 65 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 22 28 26 25 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 32 36 37 39 
 
 
(Source: adapted from various annual reports from Central Bank of Kenya; The World Bank 
Group, 2009) 
 
Kenya‟s informal sector is the second largest most significant source of self 
employment, following agriculture. As at 2005/6, among the Kenyans who were 
engaged in various forms of self-employment, 4.3 million were in the informal sector 
compared to 6 million in the agricultural sector. During this period there were only 1.7 
million reported to be engaged in formal sector employment. This reflects 36 per cent, 
                                                 
8
 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is the average gross income for every individual Kenyan 
citizen. It is calculated by taking the annual countrywide GNI divided by national population. 
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50 per cent and 14 per cent of the employed population respectively (Wambugu et al., 
2009). Among other factors, high levels of poverty combined with low rates of 
economic growth continue to push most Kenyans into self-employment in the informal 
sector. In Kenya as is the case elsewhere, self-employment usually takes the form of 
setting up a micro or small business. 
 
The significance of the MSE sector in Kenya is self evident. According to a 1999 
baseline survey of Kenya‟s MSE sector (the only one of its kind to date), the sector‟s 
contribution to the country‟s GDP stood at 18 per cent as at 1999, up from 13.8 per cent 
in 1993. This sector is host to an estimated 72 per cent of employment opportunities in 
the country represented in agricultural, trade and other forms of informal business 
activities (Ministry of Planning and National Development - Kenya, 2006, GOK, 2005). 
With two thirds (65.6 per cent) of MSEs located in the rural parts of Kenya (Ministry of 
Planning and National Development - Kenya, 2006), MSEs are a prominent 
characteristic across the country. The sector is important not only as concerns the 
growth of the country‟s economy but also as a channel towards poverty alleviation 
(Liedholm, 2002, Kibaara, 2006, GOK, 2005).  
 
The MSE sector in Kenya is fast growing and is likely to continue to be so in the 
foreseeable future. There are a number of factors responsible for this scenario; namely a 
contracting formal sector, evidenced by massive staff retrenchments, low economic 
growth, and poor implementation of economic policies on the part of the government, 
among other factors. Results of the baseline survey conducted on the MSE sector by the 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) in 1999 reflected that 2.4 million Kenyans 
were actively employed in the sector (see Table 4 below). This figure grew to 5.1 
million people in the year 2002, implying an additional 675,000 jobs were created in 
this sector every year (GOK, 2005). 
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Table 4: Total number of Kenyan MSEs and their corresponding nationwide employment share 
 
National 
Strata 
National 
Population 
share of 
strata 
No. of 
MSEs 
% of 
MSEs 
No. 
Employed 
% 
Employed 
Average Size 
of MSEs 
(no. 
employed) 
Nairobi & 
Mombasa 
9.7 204,280 15.8 399,498 16.9 2.0 
Other major 
towns 
6.2 157,533 12.2 279,431 11.8 1.8 
Smaller towns 2.1 81,320 6.3 133,086 5.6 1.6 
Rural areas 82.0 845,879 65.6 1,556,389 65.7 1.8 
Total 100.00 1,289,012 100.0 2,368,404 100.0 1.8 
(Source: „National MSE Baseline Survey‟, KNBS, 1999, pg, 18) 
 
As at the year 2002, the MSE sector in Kenya shouldered more than 74 per cent of the 
employed population and contributed about 13 per cent to national income (GOK, 
2005). Despite their large contribution as a whole, returns to individual MSEs vary 
tremendously. Among those MSEs that represent the sole source of income for the 
household, 72 per cent make less than the absolute poverty line in urban areas and none 
of the MSEs in rural areas make above the absolute poverty line (Daniels, 1999). 
 
MSEs are engaged in a variety of business activities. On the whole, MSEs in most parts 
of the world and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa are involved mainly in commerce 
i.e. basic trade either at wholesale or retail level (Liedholm, 2002, Richardson et al., 
2004). With regard to Kenya, a significant number of MSEs engage in commerce with 
74 per cent and 66 per cent in urban and rural areas respectively (Liedholm, 2002). 
Additionally results of the government‟s National Baseline (1999) Survey show that 
64.3 per cent of the MSEs engage in trade, 14.8 per cent in services, while 13.4 per cent 
are involved in various forms of manufacturing activities (GOK, 2005). The following 
table, Table 5, reflects the diverse nature of MSEs in Kenya in comparison with other 
selected countries from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Table 5: Characteristics of MSEs in selected countries from Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
 Kenya Botswana Zimbabwe 
Sectoral breakdown of urban MSEs (%) 
Manufacturing  18 15 64 
Commerce 74 71 30 
Sectoral breakdown of rural MSEs (%) 
Manufacturing  27 34 75 
Commerce 66 64 16 
Share of female owned MSEs (%) 46 75 66 
Share of MSE employment -age 15-64 (%) 18 17 27 
Share of one-person MSEs (%) 47 65 69 
Share of MSEs with 10-50 workers (%) 2 3 2 
MSE average annual employment growth
9
   (%) 29 8 7 
[Adapted from (Liedholm, 2002) pg. 229] 
    
 
From Table 5 it is clear that as at the year 2002, Kenya had more MSEs engaging in 
commerce
10
 (74 per cent for urban based and 66 per cent for rural based MSEs) than 
other countries in the Sub-Saharan African region. Within this same period it is 
observed that Kenya had fewer female owned MSEs (46 per cent) compared to 
Botswana (75 per cent) and Zimbabwe (66 per cent). While this may be true, the 
concept of ownership may vary across national cultures. For example some married 
women in Kenya may not take full title of ownership of their enterprises as this goes 
against social and cultural values (Mutuku, 2005). With regard to the size of MSE, as 
indicated by staff numbers, within the Sub-Saharan region most MSEs are small, 
employing less than ten workers. However Kenya appears to have fewer one-person 
enterprises (47 per cent) compared to Botswana (65 per cent) and Zimbabwe (69 per 
cent).  It is noted that MSEs‟ share of national employment for the population aged 15-
64 is similar (17-18 per cent) across the region, except for Zimbabwe (27 per cent). 
Additionally and in general terms, MSEs in Kenya have higher employment growth (29 
per cent) than other countries across the two regions (7-8 per cent). However, This does 
not necessarily mean that Kenyan MSEs are expanding in real terms. 
 
                                                 
9
 Simple average calculated as follows; [(current employment- initial employment)/initial 
employment]/age of enterprise. 
 
10
 In the Kenyan context MSEs mainly undertake retail trade in e.g. farm produce, household 
commodities, furniture, small scale manufacturing, clothing, electronics, telecommunications services, 
bars & restaurants, butcheries, music & entertainment services, and public transport, repairs & 
maintenance services, pharmacy/drug stores, beauty services, among other activities.  
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Despite the significance of MSEs to Kenya‟s economy there are several challenges that 
limit the sector‟s growth potential. These challenges may be grouped into three 
categories namely; unfavourable regulatory and policy environment, limited access to 
credit and technical services, and under-developed infrastructure. Most of the facts 
presented in the following discussion are drawn from the most recent Sessional Paper 
No. 2 of 2005 on „Development of Micro and Small Enterprises for Wealth and 
Employment Creation for Poverty Reduction‟ of the Republic of Kenya.  Each of these 
factors is discussed next. 
 
2.2.1 Unfavourable regulatory and policy environment 
Although MSEs have been traditionally a significant sector in Kenya‟s economy, 
successive governments have not come up with a comprehensive policy framework to 
guide the sector. For example in its Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1992, the Government of 
Kenya noted the potential of the MSE sector in creating jobs and helping in the fight 
against poverty. However this acknowledgement was not followed by an effective 
supportive framework to see it to fruition (GOK, 2005, GOK, 2006). To date the only 
officially recognised comprehensive survey of the MSE sector in Kenya was conducted 
in 1999.  Results from this survey continue to be the benchmark the government is 
using now more than a decade later
11
 .  
 
Fifteen years later, the government of Kenya revisited the MSE issue in its Sessional 
Paper No. 2 of 2005 in which several policy and regulatory bottlenecks were outlined. 
The first among these challenges relates to the fact that attempts to design an all 
inclusive policy framework have been stymied with conflicts of interest among 
stakeholders, which serve to the derail the process. The second challenge pertains to the 
laws and regulations which have often been seen to be holding back the development of 
the MSE sector in the country. In most local councils‟ by-laws on, for example; site and 
business registration, connection to utilities, tax, and license fees and levies are not 
standardised (GOK, 2005, GOK, 2008). Thirdly, complex bureaucracy in dealing with 
multiple government agencies for matters pertinent to MSEs and their informal nature 
make the day to day operations even more costly. For example, in licensing a restaurant 
the site requires approval of the Ministry of Local Government and the local council 
administration, business name registration from the Registrar of Companies, connection 
                                                 
11
 This is the only MSE survey report that appears in the official web site of the Kenya National Bureau 
of Statistics, www.knbs.go.ke. 
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to utilities by Ministries of Energy and Water, while the Ministry of Health handles the 
trade license. 
 
The fourth policy-related challenge faced by Kenyan MSEs has to do with harassment 
from „law enforcement‟ agents. It is common knowledge among MSE owners that one 
of the competencies for success in their businesses is to find a way of managing 
authorities, especially local council „askaris‟ (Swahili word for local council agent- 
soldiers). Managing local authority agents usually takes the form of giving bribes, a 
practice so common and frequent that it could be officially recognised in the „books of 
accounts of both entities‟. This challenge is made worse by the fact that the judicial 
system is complex with an etiquette far removed from the realities of MSEs (GOK, 
2005).  
 
Fifthly the current tax regulation is more of a hindrance rather than a facilitator of MSE 
growth. The regime does not encourage MSEs to apply for tax registration. Due to the 
high costs associated with tax compliance in Kenya, most MSE owner-managers shy 
away from formalising their businesses (GOK, 2005). In addition there is laxity on the 
part of tax authorities to enforce anti-dumping tariffs on imported wares, which poses 
unfair competition on local MSE products (GOK, 2007c, GOK, 2008). Lastly most 
MSE owner-managers‟ lack security of tenure, either in the form of title deeds or lease 
arrangements for their business sites and premises. As a result, most MSEs operate in 
temporal structures often under the threat of demolition by local authorities.  This not 
only makes it difficult to invest in the long term development of the business entity, but 
also limits access to credit (GOK, 2005), an issue discussed later in this section. 
 
2.2.2 Under-developed infrastructure 
Some of the challenges included in the category of under-developed infrastructure are 
poor physical infrastructure, lack of access to markets, limited access to strategic 
information, poor linkages with the large corporations, and occupational health hazards. 
Kenyan MSEs, indeed as may be the case for all businesses operating in the country, are 
subjected to the poor state of the road network (GOK, 2008, GOK, 2005). Some of the 
other physical infrastructure related problems facing Kenyan MSEs are inaccessibility 
to tenured land or workspace and costly and unreliable supply of water and electricity 
(Wambugu et al., 2009). These infrastructural challenges contribute significantly to cost 
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of production and marketing of goods and services by MSEs in Kenya, rendering them 
uncompetitive in the face of imported substitutes (GOK, 2005, WWB, 2009).  
 
Aggregate demand for goods in Kenya is low due to low incomes and the situation is 
made worse by ineffective regulatory practices on dumping of imported wares, which 
serves to saturate the local market. While this may be due partly to poor access to up to 
date market information, which is often lacking, Kenyan MSEs may not yet be ready to 
compete in a liberalised global market economy. Due to the duplication of business 
efforts, the intensity of competition often results in high MSE mortality rates in addition 
to capped profit margins for those that remain (GOK, 2005).  This situation is 
compounded by the fact that there is minimal collaboration between MSEs and large 
corporations, and indeed the public sector, in the country (Akoten, 2007a). This is 
evident from the weak sub-contracting arrangements and poor technological learning, 
which subsequently partly influences the graduation of MSEs into the next phase of the 
growth cycle (Akoten, 2007a, Anami, 2009). Although the lack of information on 
market opportunities, local and foreign, government regulations and production 
technology could be overcome through access to the internet, currently this may be 
unaffordable to most MSEs in Kenya.  
 
Among the other infrastructure constraints is exposure to occupational health hazards 
that may affect the expansion and productivity level of an enterprise. Most worksites of 
Kenyan MSEs are not covered under the appropriate legislation i.e. Factories and Other 
Places of Work Act-Cap. 514 (GOK, 2005). As a result workers in the sector are 
subjected to a myriad of occupational hazards e.g. fires, hazardous gases and waste, and 
bodily injuries caused by equipment and materials used, since most of them do not even 
wear protective clothing. 
 
2.2.3 Limited access to credit and technical services 
Limited access to affordable financial resources is one of the major issues afflicting the 
growth and development of MSEs in Kenya. Traditionally financial institutions in 
Kenya, as may be the case in other parts of the world, perceive MSEs as a high risk 
market (WWB, 2009, GOK, 2005). In the Kenyan context, the perceived riskiness of the 
MSE sector is made worse by the informality of its operations and often the lack of 
tangible valuable assets that could be used as loan collateral, yet these are some of the 
key items in the lending criteria of most commercial banks in Kenya (GOK, 2005). As a 
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result, the cost of capital is high and most MSEs continue to miss out on access to credit 
because they are not in a position to change the policy framework to be more responsive 
to their peculiar circumstances.  
 
The second issue that accounts for lack of access to credit among Kenyan MSEs is lack 
of appropriate regulatory framework - a fact that was alluded to earlier in this section. 
Before the enactment of the recent Microfinance Act (2008), credit lending institutions 
in Kenya operated under several acts; e.g. the Banking Act, Savings and Cooperatives 
Societies (SACCOS) Act, and the Post Office Act, which allowed minimal flexibility 
and innovativeness in lending to MSEs (GOK, 2005, GOK, 2006c). Additionally the 
government does not have an institutionalised mechanism for channelling funds from 
the mainstream formal financial sector to MSEs, either through MFIs or otherwise 
(GOK, 2005, Akoten, 2007a). Although the Microfinance Act is a step towards 
directing more resources to the MSE sector, its implementation will determine the 
extent to which this goal is achieved.  Currently the outreach of MFIs to MSEs, 
especially in rural Kenya, is highly constrained by their minimal capital base and 
limited institutional capacity to deliver a wide variety of financial services to their 
clientele (GOK, 2005). On the contrary however, although the commercial banks have a 
better resource endowment, they lack the expertise in handling MSE clients because of 
their highly formalised banking procedures (GOK, 2005).  
 
The second major challenge in this category is lack of adequate access to appropriate 
technology. Kenya‟s MSEs often use inappropriate technology because their ability to 
innovate or adopt  modern technology is limited by the scarcity of funds to invest in 
research and development (GOK, 2005, Akoten, 2007a). This may partly be as a result 
of lack of access to information as well as low education levels among most of the MSE 
owner-managers and poor collaboration between stakeholders in the MSE sector. The 
situation is likely to have severely hampered the productivity and competitiveness of the 
sector because most of its products could be perceived to be of poor quality compared to 
imported substitutes.  
 
Thirdly most owner managers of MSEs in Kenya lack „best-practice‟ technical 
knowledge and skills required to run their enterprises (GOK, 2005, WWB, 2009, GOK, 
2008). This is because they probably do not have prior technical training or do not have 
access to technical training on a regular basis. Further, market-based technical training 
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institutions either lack the expertise and/or are not strategically designed to handle the 
demands of the MSE sector (Akoten, 2007a). Even where expertise is available, the 
exchange of information between MSE owner-managers and technical service providers 
may be either weak or nonexistent.   
 
Fourthly and related to the previous challenge is lack of access to business management 
skills. This is a major setback in the development of the MSE sector in Kenya given the 
fact that most entrepreneurs, as may be the case elsewhere, may not have formal 
business training prior to venturing into business. Although business education is part of 
the curriculum in the country‟s education programme, its focus is very basic, generalist 
and generic (Akoten, 2007a). Additionally most of the consulting firms operating in the 
country lack competence and/or capacity to train in the range of trades relevant to the 
MSE sector (GOK, 2005). Notwithstanding, the training fees charged by most of the 
consultants are out of reach to most MSE owner-managers. As a result therefore most 
MSE owner-managers are more than likely to consult with their friends and other 
business colleagues. A partnership launched in October 2009  between Barclays Bank 
(Kenya) and the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK) to train the 
bank‟s SME clients in financial management (Oyuke, 2009), is further evidence of the 
lack of management skills among Kenya‟s MSEs. 
 
The following table, Table 6, reports an extract from the MSE National Baseline Survey 
of 1999, outlines a summary of the constraints reported by MSE owner-managers 
sampled in the survey. As already discussed above, the main challenges which were 
identified then and continue to exist (IFC, 2009b, GOK, 2008) include poor 
infrastructure and lack of access to markets, credit, and business training. 
28 
 
 
Table 6: List of constraints faced by MSEs in Kenya (percentage) 
 
 All MSEs  Urban MSEs  Rural MSEs  
Lack of access to  markets 34.1 61.5 38.5 
Lack of credit 18.1 56.3 43.7 
Lack of training 9.1 48.0 52.0 
Poor roads 7.2 34.4 65.6 
Shortage of raw materials 6.3 50.6 49.4 
Interference from authorities 6.0 80.8 19.2 
Poor security 3.1 60.0 40.2 
Lack of worksites 2.5 77.7 22.3 
Lack of skilled manpower 0.6 49.55 50.5 
Inadequate supply of  electricity 0.6 100.0 0 
Poor access to reliable water supply 0.5 40.8 59.2 
Total 88.1  
[Adapted from the National MSE Baseline Survey 1999,  
(Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 1999, pg, 71)] 
 
In summary the business environment in Kenya is one full of challenges. This is a fact 
reflected in the most recent global rankings on ease of doing business carried out by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), in which Kenya ranked 95 out of 183 
economies (see figure 1 below) (IFC, 2009b). 
 
Overcoming most of the challenges that hinder the growth of the MSE sector in Kenya, 
discussed above, will require concerted and sustained efforts on the part of the 
Government. Although attempts have been made, as outlined in its most recent policy 
initiative, the Vision 2030 (GOK, 2007c, GOK, 2008), this policy guideline  arguably 
largely incorporates earlier policy proposal [ including the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP)] hype but with little real action. Against this background, while the future 
and growth of Kenya‟s MSE sector depends largely on integrated efforts by the sector‟s 
stakeholders, market forces will partly influence the contribution of some of the critical 
services to Kenya‟s MSEs, for example access to credit through MFIs, discussed next.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Ease of doing business: a comparison of good practice  
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     between Kenya and selected economies  
 
 
[Source: International Finance Corporation (IFC), 2009, pg, 2] 
 
 
2.3 Kenya’s Microfinance sector, State and Contribution to MSE Development 
This is the second section of the chapter which examines the significance of the MFI 
industry towards the growth and development of Kenya‟s MSE sector. The section 
opens with a brief account of the evolution of the country‟s financial services sector, 
with an emphasis on the MFI sub-sector. It then discusses the sub-sector, proceeds to 
discuss its size and the array of legal frameworks represented by the major institutions 
operating in the sector. This is followed by a discussion of the nature of services offered 
by Kenya‟s MFIs and a detailed account of how the sector‟s  operations have influenced 
Kenya‟s MSEs.  
 
2.3.1 Evolution of microfinance in Kenya 
In their book entitled „Indigenising Foreign Seed on African Soil - The Story of K-rep‟, 
Fowler and Kinyanjui, (2004) provide a comprehensive account of the evolution of 
financial services in Kenya. This source informs most of the discussion in this section.  
The history of the development of microfinance in Kenya dates back to pre-colonial 
times. This is especially the case if one embraces the fact that „various communities in 
Kenya had their credit systems that enabled them to cope with adverse conditions as 
well as stress from seasonal changes experienced from time to time‟(Fowler and 
Kinyanjui, 2004, pg, 22). These indigenous systems of providing credit services were 
not only ignored but largely suppressed by the British colonial government under the 
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pretext that they were peasantry. Nevertheless these traditional systems of social-
economic mutual support continue to thrive well into the post- independence Kenya 
which demonstrates their relevance and resilience (Fowler and Kinyanjui, 2004, Atieno, 
2001b). 
 
In the period starting from the late 1950s to late 1970s, credit policies focused mostly  
on smallholder agriculture and the Africanisation of trade and commerce (Fowler and 
Kinyanjui, 2004). In order to promote access to agricultural credit the government of 
Kenya transformed a number of already existing institutions [e.g. Kenya Farmers 
Association (KFA), Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC), and Kenya Coffee 
Producers Union (KPCU), which exclusively served large-scale white farmers], to 
extend credit to smallholder African farmers as well. The table below, Table 7, provides 
a summary of institutions that helped shape the implementation of government policy 
on improving access to credit in the period preceding Kenya‟s economic and social-
political challenges starting mid 1980s
12
.  
 
                                                 
12
 This is a period when Western allies put pressure for political reforms in Kenya. Notable among was 
need to introduce multiparty democracy and implement Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
spearheaded by the World Bank. The SAPs required reduction in public spending through privatisation of 
state corporations, for example the agricultural and commercial credit systems discussed here. 
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Table 7: Selected list of public institutions established to promote access to credit  
   between 1960s and 1970s 
 
Credit category 
& Name of 
Institution 
Year 
Established  
Purpose Achievements and Limitations  
Agricultural Credit 
Agriculture 
Finance 
Corporation 
(AFC) 
1963 Offer loans to small-
scale and large-scale 
farmers to finance 
seasonal crops, 
irrigation, ranching, 
farm rehabilitation, and 
land purchase.  
- Mission largely realised in the 
initial years, operations well 
managed, and clients received 
technical assistance of 
professional standards. 
- Later became unable to collect 
debt due to political influences 
- Biased credit delivery to farmers 
producing dairy and cash crops. 
Kenya Tea 
Development 
Authority 
(KTDA) 
1964 Provide inputs and 
extension services in 
the production, 
processing and 
marketing of tea, to 
smallholder producers.  
- Developed smallholder production 
of tea, becoming a major player in 
the tea industry accounting for 
more than a third of tea exports in 
1970s. 
- Farmers‟ loan repayment was 
linked to payments for tea already 
sold by KTDA.  
- System adopted by other credit 
institutions targeting small-scale 
tea producers. 
Agriculture 
Development 
Corporation 
(ADC) 
1965 Promote development 
of agriculture through 
transfer of land to 
indigenous Kenyans, 
and provide technical 
assistance in improving 
seeds and animal breeds 
through research. 
- Assisted in transfers and 
rehabilitation of several forms 
across the country. 
 
- ADC programmes eventually run 
down due to political patronage. 
Commercial Credit 
Development 
Finance 
Company of 
Kenya (DFCK) 
1963 Promote Africans 
participation in the 
industrial sector by 
investing in industrial 
and agricultural 
enterprises. 
- DFCK financed public and 
privately incorporated enterprises 
but not individuals which led to 
the establishment of its subsidiary 
„Small Enterprises Finance 
Company- SEFCO‟ to provide 
financial and technical assistance 
to indigenous Kenyan 
entrepreneurs for expansion and 
modernisation of existing 
enterprises.   SEFCO extended 
credit to rural craftsmen and 
women. 
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Credit category 
& Name of 
Institution 
Year 
Established  
Purpose Achievements and Limitations  
- Programme offered credit based 
on collateral and required clients 
to finance part of its project costs.  
Kenya 
Industrial 
Estates (KIE) 
1967 Develop small-scale 
enterprises by providing 
industrial sheds, credit, 
extension services and 
training.  
- As at 1978/79, KIE had 227 
projects, distributed an estimated 
KES. 92 millions (AUD 1.8 
million). 
- KIE failed to target the small- 
scale sector, instead offered loans 
with amounts averaging KES 
760,000 (AUD 15,200) a pattern 
which continued well into the 
1980s.  
[Compiled from various sources; (Fowler and Kinyanjui, 2004, Akoten, 2007b, 
Kibaara, 2006)]. 
 
While the objectives of the credit institutions cited in Table 7 above were noble, the 
implementation of their programmes may have left a lot to be desired. For example, 
those involved in offering agricultural credit, besides political interference their 
programmes structurally discriminated against smallholder farmers because they did not 
have title to their farmland, or their parcels fell below the required threshold. 
Additionally credit from these institutions was biased towards funding cash crop 
farming, and not trade or food crop production where, incidentally, most women were 
involved (Fowler and Kinyanjui, 2004). Notably this was a clear policy oversight, a 
practice that has become characteristic of government initiatives meant to benefit MSEs 
as previously discussed in section 2.2 above. With regard to the commercial credit 
institutions the situation was not different either. Firstly, the institutions adopted credit 
delivery methods that did not distinguish between social and business services. 
Secondly, collateral was a key requirement in most loan applications and thirdly, like 
their counterparts engaged in agricultural credit; access to credit was closely linked to 
political nepotism (Fowler and Kinyanjui, 2004). As a result of the developments cited 
above, it could be argued that both agricultural and commercial credit systems failed to 
deliver credit to those who needed it most, the MSEs. 
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Aware of the shortcomings of the state run credit programmes some donor agencies
13
, 
notable among them; GTZ, ILO, SIDA,USAID, UNIDO, and UNDP,   set up credit 
initiatives targeting small scale entrepreneurs in Kenya by the late 1970s. For example 
through the major commercial banks, the USAID, WWB, the Dag Hammarskjold 
Foundation, and the IFC among other agencies channelled funds for the development of  
Kenya‟s informal sector (Fowler and Kinyanjui, 2004).  
“However these efforts through the banks were very limited in their scope, and 
were entirely dependent on donor assistance. The major local banks were not 
interested in the informal sector because of the perceived high risks and 
expenses involved in management of small and medium loans. Their insistence 
on security for loans made it unfeasible for them to provide financial services 
to the informal sector ” (Fowler and Kinyanjui, 2004, pg, 33). 
 
Despite the prejudices of commercial banks on lending to MSEs, the role of donor 
agencies in funding development of Kenya‟s MSEs, through local and international 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) arguably became more pronounced starting 
late 1980s under the auspices of the then new development orientation, the SAPs. This 
shift in development agenda was demonstrated by the emergence and increased 
involvement of several church and civil society NGOs e.g. World Vision, Care 
International, Kenya Women Finance Trust (KWFT), FAULU- Kenya, Women 
Enterprise Development (WED), and the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK),  
in promoting MSE development in Kenya (Fowler and Kinyanjui, 2004). Alongside 
these institutions were women groups, business associations, community based 
organisations (CBOs) and various industry based savings and co-operative societies 
(SACCOs), whose main objective was to promote the social-economic welfare of their 
members through enterprise development (Atieno, 2001b, Kibaara, 2006).  These 
events, as it were, mark the „birth‟ of microfinance in Kenya.  
 
In a summary institutionalising the microfinance concept in Kenya, as may be the case 
in other developing economies, has had many twists and turns as reflected in the 
account above.  While in principle the concept of microfinance is not foreign to most 
                                                 
13
  GTZ = German Agency for development Co-operation; IFC  = International Finance Corporation;  
ILO = International Labour Organisation; SIDA = Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency; UNIDO = United Nations Industrial Development Organisation; UNDP = United Nations 
Development Programme; USAID = United States Agency for International Development;  
WWB = Women‟s World Banking. 
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indigenous Kenyans, it took the convergence of both local and external factors to bring 
it to the attention of policy makers. 
 
2.3.2 Status of Kenya’s Microfinance sector 
From the time of independence in 1963, the number of institutions established to offer 
credit to MSEs has continued to grow. These institutions are set up under different Acts 
of the Kenyan law and as result possess different legal identities including; state run 
corporations under respective ministries, NGOs, commercial banks, MFIs, SACCOs, 
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAS), and accumulating savings and 
credit associations (ASCAs) among others (Akoten, 2007b, Dondo, 2003, Argwings-
Kodhek et al., 2004b). Given the proliferation of legislations under which microcredit 
institutions operate in Kenya it is not currently possible to tell the total number of 
players in this sector.  
 
However according to the Central bank of Kenya, as at 2008, there were four 
commercial banks engaged in microfinance business in Kenya namely; Equity Bank, K-
REP Bank, Co-operative Bank and the Family Finance Bank. The number is likely to 
increase over time with the current trend where most mainstream commercial banks are 
establishing SME banking operations (Akoten, 2007b, Ngugi, 2009). Available statistics 
show that the Association of Microfinance Institutions (AMFI) has 36 registered 
member institutions, of these 27 are engaged in retail microfinance lending operations 
controlling close to 800 branches with an outstanding loan portfolio of KES 4.6 billion 
(AUD 92 million). As a whole AMFI member institutions constitute an estimated 1.2 
million savers and 300,000 borrowers (CBK, 2008).  By the end of the year 2007, there 
were a total of 5,122 registered SACCOs with a membership approximating 3.3 million. 
The SACCOs had an estimated KES 110 billion (AUD 2.2 billion) outstanding loan 
portfolio and KES 1.3 billion (AUD 26 million) in shares and deposits.  On its own the 
Postbank (a state run corporation offering microfinance credit) has approximately 1.3 
million customers, spread across a network of 80 branches and 395 outlets all over the 
country, with savings amounting to KES 12 billion (AUD 240 million) (CBK, 2008). In 
sum by mid of 2008, all institutions engaged in various forms of microfinancing i.e. 
commercial banks, MFIs, SACCOs, and the Postbank held more than 8 million savings 
accounts (CBK, 2008). The practical implications of this are reflected on the changes in 
access to financial services (among population aged more than 18 years) in general as 
reflected in the following table. 
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Table 8: Access to financial services among Kenyans (percentage) 
 
Source of financial services 2006 2009 
Formal banking institutions (e.g. commercial banks) 18.9 22.6 
Formal non-banking institutions (e.g. MFIs and SACCOs) 7.5 17.9 
Informal financial service providers (e.g. ASCAs, ROSCAs) 35.2 26.8 
Excluded from access to financial services 38.4 32.7 
[Compiled from Financial services‟ access survey (sample based) data,  
(CBK, 2009,   pg, 11] 
  
The table above shows that in general there is an increase in the use of financial services 
especially those provided by banks (22.6 per cent for 2009, from 18.9 per cent in 2006) 
and MFIs (17.9 for 2009, from 7.5 per cent in 2006). Reliance on informal financial 
services (e.g. ROSCAs) among adult Kenyans appears to be declining standing at 26.8 
per cent in 2009 down from 35.2 per cent in 2006. Additionally during this period the 
unbanked population declined from 38.4 per cent in 2006 to 32.7 per cent in 2009.  
 
With regard to the use of credit facilities, Table 9 below shows that the period between 
2006 and 2009 recorded an increase in the population using credit services. For 
example, in 2009 among the urban population use of credit increased to 41 per cent 
compared to 30.2 per cent in 2006, while for rural population in Kenya use of credit in 
2009 is 36.9 per cent up from 30.8 per cent in 2006. Irrespective of location, the 
population of those who never had access to credit appears to be declining with 39 per 
cent and 50 per cent for urban and rural, respectively in 2009, compared to 59.8 per cent 
and 61.7 for urban and rural, respectively in the year 2006. 
 
Table 9: Access to credit among Kenyan adults 
 
 2006 2009 
Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Currently using a credit 
product 
30.8% 30.2% 36.9% 41% 
Never used a credit product 
 
61.7% 59.8% 50% 39% 
[Adapted from Financial services‟ access survey (sample based) data, (CBK, 2009, pg, 
15] 
 
Table 10 below shows the main sources of credit used by Kenyans as reported in the 
financial services access survey of 2009 include; informal sources e.g. shop owners 
(24.3 per cent), SACCOs (3 per cent), and banks (2.6 per cent). There is however a 
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noticeable increase in the proportion of people using MFIs credit services (1.8 per cent 
for 2009) from 0.8 per cent in 2006.  
 
Table 10: Sources of credit commonly used by Kenyans  
 
Source of credit  2006 (%) 2009 (%) 
Commercial banks 1.8 2.6 
SACCOs 4.1 3.0 
MFIs 0.8 1.8 
ASCAs 1.7 1.8 
Retail shop owner 22.8 24.3 
[Adapted from Financial services‟ access survey (sample based) data,  
(CBK, 2009, pg, 15] 
 
 
Although the figures on access to financial services reflected above (in Tables 6, 7, and 
8) specifically relate to the sample population of adult Kenyans, the situation may not 
be significantly different for MSEs owner-managers. 
 
2.3.3 Microfinance approaches: influence on MSE development in Kenya 
The contribution of the MFI sector to the growth and development of Kenya‟s MSEs 
depends largely on the nature of the services offered and the effectiveness of their 
delivery. Although MSEs may often be perceived as an economic preoccupation of 
women, this section is not based on such a premise.  The service portfolio of MFIs 
could, to a large extent, be determined by their legal identity and ownership structure, as 
pointed out in the previous section (see section 2.3.2). Given the fact that MFIs are 
established primarily in response to increasing demand for credit among MSEs, delivery 
of credit is still the core product offered by most MFIs in Kenya (Dondo, 2003). 
Consistent with their diverse legal structures, Atieno (2001b) identifies four major 
approaches to credit delivery practiced by Kenya‟s MFIs; namely group-based 
minimalist credit schemes, the individual lending model, lending to community-based 
enterprises, and the integrated credit delivery model. 
 
The minimalist
14
 model entails MFIs providing credit without any other forms of 
assistance to borrowers. In this case, credit is offered to individuals within a group set-
up (Atieno, 2001b, Dondo, 2003). There are variations of this model of credit delivery 
                                                 
14
 The minimalist approach to credit delivery is modelled on the Bangladesh  Grameen bank group 
lending practice established by the 2006 Nobel Peace Laureate Prof. Muhammad Yunus  (Akoten,2007). 
In the case of the Grameen bank, lending is mainly restricted to women in groups. In Kenya however 
there are two variations of this practice in that even though most MFIs lend to women some lend to men, 
besides, credit is delivered in a group set-up or individually. 
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whereby individual borrowers may access credit even without being affiliated to a 
group; however this is an exception rather than the norm. The minimalist group-based 
lending rests on the premise that lack of access to credit is the main constraint to 
enterprise growth. As such the model seeks to maximise credit access through extensive 
outreach to the target clientele. In this approach, social cohesion
15
 among group 
members is used as alternative collateral to the credit advanced, in addition to group 
savings held with the lending MFI (Atieno, 2001b). Given the fact that the 
responsibility for selecting potential clients, appraisal, and loan administration is mostly 
held by group members, it is likely that transaction costs of lending on the part of the 
MFI are reduced significantly. The minimalist model is notably the main credit delivery 
approach used by most MFIs in Kenya. This model could be credited for the growth and 
popularity of MFIs and the increased access to credit among Kenya‟s MSEs, especially 
those owned by women both in rural and urban areas. Additionally a number of social 
benefits, for example, social inclusion and improved political awareness political 
(Habib, 2008) are associated with the group-based model of credit delivery commonly 
practiced by MFIs.  
 
There are a several limitations associated with the minimalist model of credit delivery. 
Firstly, the stringent credit terms used in this model, e.g. frequent group savings, 
immediate and frequent (usually weekly) loan repayments (Akoten, 2007), leaves little 
room for borrowers to grow working capital for their businesses. Secondly, it could be 
argued that the minimalist model in its basic form is discriminating on a gender basis 
since it is biased towards lending to women. Thirdly, the model has potential to raise 
social tension amongst dominantly patriarchal communities. Fourthly, the persistent use 
of a group lending methodology could, over time, dissipate the social cohesion and trust 
that once existed in the community, owing to pressure directed to members who renege 
on repayment of their loans.     
 
The second approach to credit delivery is a variation of the minimalist model (discussed 
above) in which borrowers access credit as individual persons without affiliation to a 
group. In this approach, access to credit is a privilege of the few entrepreneurs who can 
                                                 
15
 Traditionally women in Kenya carry out their most of their work in a communal mode (groups). 
Groups are seen as an integral part of the lifestyle of rural women which offers them an opportunity to 
bond and help each other through life challenges, social or otherwise. For example through groups, rural 
women in Kenya manage weddings, burials, raise school fees, and undertake farm work, among other 
activities. 
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raise some tangible and marketable collateral to secure a loan, in the absence of which 
borrowers often have to raise guarantors and/or organise chattel mortgages. In Kenya, 
collateral-based individual lending is practiced mainly by SACCOs, the Postbank, and a 
few MFIs that have adopted a commercial banking orientation in their delivery of credit 
services. A few mainstream commercial banks have since 2007 set up SME banking 
services which to some extent, target MSEs with a much higher growth potential 
(Akoten, 2007b, Ngugi, 2009) than has been the case in the past. Often the model 
requires lending institutions to set up multiple branches and agency networks to reach 
out to as many potential clients as possible.  In addition, borrowers must hold an 
account (mostly savings) with the lending institution, usually in the name of their 
designated formal business. In this regard commercial banks in Kenya have an 
advantage over their competitors given their branch network covering key urban centres 
(Atieno, 2001b). Nevertheless, being pioneers in credit delivery to MSEs, MFIs may 
pride themselves on having experience and „best practice‟ skills, notwithstanding their 
extensive representation in rural Kenya where approximately 78 per cent of MSEs are 
found (Atieno, 2001b). 
 
Although the freedom permitted by the individual borrowing associated with the above 
model may be highly welcome by MSE owner-managers in Kenya, the demand for 
tangible collateral may be a major setback to a significant proportion of them with 
regard to accessing credit. In the first place it is the demand for collateral that alienates 
MSEs from bank credit (see discussion in section 2.3.1 above).   
 
The third approach to credit delivery is the community-based enterprise model. In this 
approach credit is offered to those MSEs which are designated as being wholly owned 
and managed by community groups. In Kenya, this approach to credit delivery is 
practised mainly by ROSCAs and ASCAs, run by for example NGOs, Community 
based Organisations (CBOs), and women‟s self help groups (SHGs). The model has 
several variations (Kibaara, 2006) but the most notable is financial services associations 
(FSAs), otherwise known as village banks. Village banks are established by registered 
CBOs and SHGs whose members come from the same local community. A minimum  
of 300 shareholders are required to set up a village bank and all members are required to 
hold at least one share valued at between KES 300 to 400 (AUD 5 to 8), as at 2005. The 
bank is regulated by an elected board of eight members and a donor agency (usually an 
NGO), which provides institutional support in the form of staff training and in some 
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cases insurance services. Besides various loan products, shareholders in a village bank 
have access to a range of other services including; savings, a fixed deposit facility, 
transfers of money, and custodial services.    
 
With their extensive national network it is likely that village banks have been 
instrumental in mobilising savings and improving chances of access to credit among the 
rural population in Kenya. Data is scanty, but as at 2005 village banks in Kenya had 
more than 58,897 shareholders with an estimated KES 1.4 billion (AUD 28 million) in 
savings, outstanding loans amounting to  KES 524 million (AUD 10.5 million) and a 
share capital of KES 82 million
16
 (AUD 1.64 million). Among the major limitations of 
the community-based credit model is high administrative costs given the multiple 
parties involved to make it operational. The model has been criticised also for delivering 
low returns to its community members despite registering high returns to the respective 
community groups (Kibaara, 2006). 
 
The fourth model is the integrated credit model in which credit delivery is accompanied 
by some form of training and/or technical assistance to clients. In this model, unlike the 
first and third models discussed above, access to credit is on an individual basis rather 
than group-based. Although tangible collateral is not required of the borrowers, to 
mitigate against the possible risk of default, lending institutions require at least one 
guarantor to guarantee the loan – a consigner. In Kenya the integrated model of credit 
delivery, especially the aspect of training, was the original model practised by most 
MFIs, especially those owned by NGOs and churches pursuing a poverty alleviation 
mission.  
 
The push for financial sustainability that has engulfed donor funded MFIs since late 
1990s (Morduch, 2000, Morduch, 1999) could be responsible in part for the shift in 
operational mechanisms adopted by MFIs around the world, including in Kenya. 
Currently only a few MFIs run the integrated model, and even then it could be argued 
that their technical assistance and training services have been significantly scaled down 
due to transaction cost pressures. This is evident from the results of a survey conducted 
by the Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) in 2004 
(Akoten, 2007b), where out of 123 donor funded MSE support programmes in Kenya, 
                                                 
16
 These figures relate to village banks associated with a leading village bank‟s support network in Kenya, 
the K-rep development agency. 
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only 22 per cent provided training and financial services compared to 54 per cent which 
focused on microcredit services only, while the rest were involved in infrastructure 
development (11.5 per cent), information and technology (6.9 per cent) and MSE policy 
development (5.4 per cent).  
 
Although the inclusion of training and technical assistance to credit delivery may in the 
short term appear to increase the cost of accessing credit among MSEs, compared to the 
other three models, the integrated credit delivery model arguably may improve the 
performance of clients‟ enterprises in the long run. This is because most entrepreneurs 
in Kenya, as noted previously (see section 2.2.3), enter into business without adequate, 
if any, business management training. Therefore access to training is likely to improve 
their entrepreneurial and management skills. These factors coupled with competitive 
pressure from the „credit only‟ models, necessitate the development of an appropriate 
policy and regulatory framework to govern the MFI sector in Kenya within the PRSP 
policy framework.  
 
Given the structural and operational differences reflected in credit delivery models 
discussed above, the MFI sector in Kenya, as is the case in other countries within the 
Sub-Saharan region, is divided between formal and informal segments whose operations 
are independent of each other (Atieno, 2001b). According to Atieno (2001) the apparent 
fragmentation of the financial services sector, including MFIs, in Africa could be 
explained by either policy or institutional factors. With regard to policy on financial 
services, fragmentation results from inappropriate policies which lead to preferred 
clients accessing credit at competitive rates from regulated formal „oligopoly type‟ 
markets, while others source credit at high interest rates from uncompetitive informal 
„monopolistic type‟ markets. Often in such a scenario, excess demand for funds is 
culled through alternative criteria e.g. risk assessment rather than by interest rates. This 
leads to emergence of unregulated informal money markets with uncontrolled interest 
rates.  
 
An alternative explanation to fragmentation is provided from an institutional 
perspective, in that;   
“imperfect information on creditworthiness, as well as cost of screening, 
monitoring and contract enforcement among lenders, results in market failure 
due to adverse selection and moral hazard, which undermines the operation of 
financial markets. As a result, lenders may resort to credit rationing in the face 
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of excess demand, thus establishing equilibrium even in the absence of interest 
rate ceilings and direct allocations. Market segmentation then results. Market 
segments that are avoided by the formal institutions due to institutional and 
structural factors are served by informal agents who use personal 
relationships, social sanctions and collateral substitutes to ensure repayment. 
An extended view of this explanation is that structural barriers result in 
monopoly power, which perpetuates segmentation” (Atieno, 2001b,pg, 8). 
 
While both factors may help explain the situation in Kenya‟s MFI sector, it is mostly 
policy inadequacies that are responsible for the fragmentation. 
 
Fragmentation of the MFI sector in Kenya, coupled with increased demand for credit 
among MSEs, has seen an increase in informal players in the sector. This is made worse 
by the lack of a clear policy on MSE development which could guide and regulate the 
sector‟s operations. As it is, operations of the MFI sector in Kenya are largely 
uncoordinated, which further promotes informality. Some of the most likely 
consequences of such an environment are; duplication of efforts, lack of innovation in 
service delivery, gaps in meeting the demand for credit
17
 and training, and „criminal18‟ 
like activity. As noted earlier in this section, short-term credit is the only main product 
offered by most MFIs operating in Kenya. Although there is a significant number of 
SACCOs and ASCAs providing savings opportunities, training/technical support, 
insurance, micropensions, and microleasing services and other microfinance-related 
services are either totally lacking or offered on a limited scale. 
 
2.3.4 Kenya’s microfinance legislation 
As part of an effort to minimise fragmentation and improve on the formality of 
operations in Kenya‟s MFI sector, the Government enacted the Microfinance Act 
(hereafter the Act) which came in force in May 2008 (CBK, 2008). The Act seeks to 
regulate both deposit-taking and non deposit-taking MFIs in Kenya with a view to 
enhancing orderly growth, stability and efficiency in microfinance operations (CBK, 
2008, GOK, 2006c). Following this development, MFIs that choose to transform and 
apply to be licensed under the Act are expected to draw several benefits including; 
increased access to additional sources of loanable funds, ability to offer a diverse set of 
                                                 
17
 According to the 2009 Financial Services Access Survey reported by the Central Bank of Kenya, nearly 
one third (32.7%) of Kenyans aged above 18 years do not have access to credit (CBK, 2009). 
18
 The absence of a specific Act to regulate the operations of MFIs in Kenya was blamed for plunging the 
sector into chaos after the massive collapse of numerous deposit-taking outfits (ponzi schemes disguised 
as MFIs) in 2007 (CBK, 2007; Ombati, 2007).   
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financial products, and enhanced corporate governance through improved internal 
controls, among others (CBK, 2008).  
 
Notwithstanding the benefits noted above, the Act comes with a number of limitations. 
Firstly, according to section 3(3) of the Act; banks, building societies, and the Post 
Office Bank of Kenya are not subject to it (GOK, 2006c). Perhaps in the government‟s 
view these are adequately covered by their respective Acts of Kenyan law. However 
their exemption provides potential for unfair competition given the fact some of them 
are already engaged in microfinancing activities anyway. As discussed previously in 
this chapter (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2) some banks and indeed the Post Bank engage 
in microfinance activities. Secondly, the Act [section 4(1)] stipulates that MFIs can be 
legally established only under three options; namely limited company, wholly-owned 
bank subsidiary, and as MFIs (GOK, 2006c). Although the diverse legal frameworks 
under which MFIs currently operate arguably should not be encouraged, limiting to 
three options appears to be overly restrictive. For example the Act precludes MFIs that 
are operating as SACCOs, NGOs, CBOs, Church based programmes, and Trusts mostly 
engaged in wholesale microfinance. If these institutions are to continue undertaking 
microfinance activities, including taking deposits, they are expected to transform into an 
„appropriate legal form‟ which arguably could lead to unnecessary and costly structural 
reorganisations with potential for conflict of interest and loss of focus.  
 
Thirdly, section 14(1) of the Act (GOK, 2006c) states that MFIs are not permitted to 
offer the following products; issue third party cheques, operate current accounts, 
facilitate foreign trade operations, undertake trust operations, and underwrite securities. 
These provisions seem to contradict the potential to diversify financial products (stated 
above) and, as such, arguably leave MFIs with little flexibility for much desired product 
innovation. Fourthly, within the Act the Minister appears to have excessive powers in 
regulating the affairs of the MFI sector in the country. For example, the Minister is 
responsible not only for prescribing the categories of MFI activity
19
 (section 7 of the 
Act), an issue that goes to the heart of the entire Act, but also amending the minimum 
                                                 
19
 In exercising his duties under the Microfinance Act 2008, the Minister published the „Microfinance  
(Categorization of Deposit-taking Microfinance Institutions) Regulations‟, 2008 that sought to clarify 
what constitutes deposit-taking MFIs by creating two categories i.e. national and community MFIs 
(www.kenyalaw.org). Whereas national MFIs have branches spread across the country, community MFIs 
have a network operating in one administrative division in a city or district. This classification arguably 
grossly misclassifies MFIs operating in communities across more than one district. 
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capital
20
 required to run an MFI; an action with a direct effect on liabilities applicable to 
an MFI. 
 
Fifthly, the Act [section 16. (2)] provides that a person seeking a loan should provide 
evidence of ability to repay, yet section 17(2) prohibits MFIs from using client deposits 
and/ or shares as loan security. This provision has two implications, firstly in order to 
access credit MFI clients will need to raise tangible collateral, which essentially goes 
against the vision of microfinancing. Secondly, it appears MFIs are likely to have 
increased access to loanable funds from accumulated client savings, but that their clients 
will not benefit from their own savings. This is likely to be the case for MFIs operating 
as SACCOs, ROSCAs, and ASCAs; which rely mainly on clients‟ savings and shares as 
alternative collateral for loans.   
 
Although the purpose of the Act is to regulate and improve on the coordination of MFI 
activities in Kenya, its current provisions on legal identity for MFIs appear to favour 
deposit-taking credit only MFIs with a commercial orientation and not other forms of 
microfinance. Perhaps the limitations discussed here could be part of the reasons why 
there has been a slow uptake on licensing applications as required under the act. As at 
October 2008, five months after the act came into force
21
, only two MFIs had applied 
for licensing with the CBK (Ondari, 2008). In addition the AMFI has not only 
petitioned the minister to be accorded regulatory rights, in the spirit of promoting self-
regulation within the microfinance industry, but also raised concerns about the plight of 
those MFIs which fail to meet the stringent requirements of the act (Ondari, 2008). In 
this regard, unless the Act is revised appropriately, the future of MFIs operating on the 
integrated credit delivery model, for example NGOs and Church programmes with a 
poverty alleviation objective, appears bleak. 
 
From the foregoing it is clear that Kenya‟s MFI industry, as a pillar towards promoting 
growth and development of MSEs, has come a long way. Although the number of 
institutions offering microfinance services has increased over the years, this appears not 
                                                 
20
 At the time of writing, as per the „Minimum capital requirements‟ Schedule of the Microfinance Act 
2008 part (d), Kenya‟s  MFIs are required to hold KES 60 million (AUD 1.2 million ) as core capital 
(GOK, R. O. K. (2006c) The Microfinance Act. Kenya gazette supplement no., 103.. This figure is 24% 
and 30% of the core capital levied on Kenyan financial institutions and banks, respectively. 
21
 This leaves MFIs that wish to be licensed as deposit-taking financial institutions, under the act, barely 
seven months before expiry of the twelve months‟ transition period provided under the new legislation 
Ibid.. 
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to have been matched by an expansion in the service portfolio in line with the diverse 
needs of MSEs. Notwithstanding this, access to microfinance services among Kenya‟s 
MSEs, for example, affordable credit and training, is arguably undermined by the lack 
of an appropriate and effective policy framework for both the MSE and MFI sectors 
alike. From an empirical perspective, although access to credit among Kenya‟s MSEs 
has been studied [for example, (Akoten, 2007b, CBK, 2009, Atieno, 2001b)], 
assessment of the contribution of BDS provision to MSE development in Kenya is 
scant. This study seeks to assess whether MSE owner-managers with access to BDS 
enjoined with microcredit, experience significant improvement in the performance of 
their enterprises. The next section examines this issue from a broader perspective.  
 
2.4 Review of Related Literature 
As a research subject, development of either micro, small or medium enterprises 
(MSEs/SMEs) has attracted a number of scholars with development often being 
operationalised in terms of growth or performance (see Martina Battisti et al., 2010, 
Gibb, 2006b, Berry and Sweeting, 2006, Masakure et al., 2009, Storey, 2004, Sievers 
and Vandenberg, 2007). Some of the studies in this field have been undertaken in the 
context of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member 
countries, for example, USA, UK, and Japan (Storey, 2004).  At a regional level 
however, most studies on SME development are carried out within the EU (for example, 
see Berry and Sweeting, 2006, Eikebrokk and Olsen, 2009, Jayawarna et al., 2007). 
Outside the OECD group of countries, a few studies have been undertaken in China and 
south east Asia (for example, Chi et al., 2008, Gibb, 2006b, King-Kauanui et al., 2006) 
and, of particular relevance to this thesis, within the Sub-Saharan Africa region (see 
Masakure et al., 2009, Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lal, 2006, Rogerson, 2001). 
 
Across regions, the focus of studies on MSE development through training or education 
of owner-managers is varied. For example, within the developed economies especially 
the EU, initially studies sought to assess either the attitude of SME owner-managers 
towards entrepreneurship training (Faoite et al., 2004) or evaluate its take-up (Matlay, 
2004, Boter, 2005). Using a sample of 54 SME owner-managers, Faoite et al, (2004) 
use interviews to compare training experiences of Irish and Dutch entrepreneurs and 
find differences in training source preferences. Although no results of statistical tests are 
availed, the authors claim that generally Irish entrepreneurs prefer formal sources of 
entrepreneurial support usually in the form of training, incubation services and funding 
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whereas their Dutch counterparts are inclined towards the less formal modes of SME 
facilitation, for example mentoring and networking.  
 
In a closely related study, and with a significantly larger sample (6,000 SMEs), Matlay 
(2004) combines telephone and in-depth interview techniques to evaluate the impact of 
six voluntary industry training organisations. In this study the author concludes that 
there is low awareness and that few SME owner-managers show interest in the training 
provided by these organisations. In particular, the usage rate of training across micro, 
small and medium-sized businesses was below 15 per cent. On the basis of these results, 
the author argues that there could be a mismatch between the type of training on offer 
and SME owner-managers‟ training needs (Matlay, 2004). Similar findings emerge 
from a study conducted among Swedish SMEs (Boter, 2005). Unlike the previous two 
studies discussed, which are highly descriptive in nature, Boter (2005) uses a logistic 
regression algorithm to bring out the influence of contextual factors, for example size 
and industry type, on the significance of training to SMEs. These contextual factors 
appear to be important mediating factors in assessing the relationship between training; 
defined simply as the process of bringing an employee to an expected level of 
competence (O‟Regan et al., 2010, pg, 172); and MSE performance (see Eikebrokk and 
Olsen, 2009, Jayawarna et al., 2007).  
 
From a theoretical perspective, Storey (2004) offers two explanations for the possible 
low take-up of training among SMEs. The first is „ignorance‟ in that SME owner 
managers are thought to underestimate the benefits of training to their businesses. In this 
regard governments try to persuade entrepreneurs to increase their participation in 
training programmes by claiming that increased management training is likely to 
improve the performance of their enterprises (Storey, 2004). The second explanation is 
based on the „market‟ phenomenon. In this case, Storey (2004) argues that in 
comparison to large firms, the cost to benefit ratio of training appears unfavourable to 
SMEs. Therefore, against this premise it should not be a surprise that SME owner-
managers appear to minimise their involvement in training activities. The results of this 
study are likely to provide further evidence on the cost and possible benefits of training 
to MSE owner-managers.   
 
On the part of developing countries, the focus of MSE development research is equally 
varied. While some scholars have sought to explore factors that shape or influence the 
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development and productivity of MSEs (Roy and Wheeler, 2006, Rogerson, 2001, 
Akoten, 2007a), others assess training programmes, training markets and transfer of 
skills (Suzuki, 2002, Hallberg, 2006, Lepenies, 2004, Mukulu, 2004), and yet others 
examine collective learning and adoption of new technology (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and 
Lal, 2006). In particular Hallberg (2006) carried out an ex post evaluation survey with 
more than 300 training providers and MSE trainees taking part in the Kenya Voucher 
Training Programme, funded by the World Bank. Although the author claims to have 
found positive impact on participating MSEs, no details are provided pertaining to the 
specific impact measures and the evaluation techniques employed.  Similarly based on 
qualitative interviews with 13 participants representing government officials, trainers, 
and trainee MSE owner-managers involved in chemical processing in Kenya, Mukulu 
(2004) concludes that, to a great extend, trainees transferred skills to their enterprises. 
However the author reports limited transfer of training from MSE owner-managers to 
their employees and attributes this to the fear of loss of staff once trained. 
 
In a narrower sense however some seek to evaluate the impact of human resources 
management practices on SME performance (King-Kauanui et al., 2006), the link 
between firm‟s resources and its performance (Masakure et al., 2009), and the impact of 
entrepreneurial characteristics on MSE performance (Adegbite et al., 2007). The results 
of most of studies in the latter category (targeting MSE performance), conducted within 
developing economies, appear to portray a mixed picture as do studies conducted 
elsewhere. For example, King-Kauanui et al., (2006) assess the impact of various 
human resources practices, i.e. training, performance appraisal and incentive-based 
compensation, on performance among some 200 manufacturing SMEs in Vietnam. The 
authors claim to find evidence that all the three aspects have a positive effect on 
performance. On the contrary Masakure et al., (2009) do not find any positive 
association between apprenticeship completion and the performance of manufacturing 
MSEs in Ghana. According to Masakure et al., (2009) it appears that the performance of 
MSEs, particularly in terms of profitability, is influenced mainly by characteristics of 
the owner-manager, attributes of the enterprise, its location and the specific sector 
where domiciled.  As later discussed in chapter four, most of the control variables used 
in this study are consistent with the observations above.  
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2.4.1 Evaluating BDS and MSE performance relationship 
Recent studies (from 2006) on the BDS-MSE performance relationship subject appear 
directed towards substantiating the assumed relationship between access to business 
development services (or simply training) and SME performance (see Berry and 
Sweeting, 2006, Jayawarna et al., 2007, Chi et al., 2008, Eikebrokk and Olsen, 2009). 
Notwithstanding their atheoretical nature, results of most of these studies are equivocal 
(Storey, 2004).  While some authors (for example, Berry and Sweeting, 2006, 
Jayawarna et al., 2007) claim to find a positive relationship between take-up of training 
and SME performance (in terms of turnover growth), others (see Chaston, 2008, Chi et 
al., 2008, Wood, 2006) hold a contrary view. 
 
For their part Berry and Sweeting (2006), while assessing the effect of business advisers 
on the performance of SMEs, conducted face-to-face interviews with 140 SME owner-
managers in Manchester city in the UK. The findings reported in this study indicate that 
in general there is an association between access to business advice and SME turnover 
growth. In particular the authors conclude that in instances where SME owner-managers 
use a range of business advice they experience higher levels of growth. Although the 
conclusion in this study implies the possible existence of a causal relationship between 
use of business advice and SME growth in turnover, the specific direction of influence 
is not ascertained. It could be argued that SMEs that experience high growth are more 
likely to demand business advice than otherwise. In effect it appears that there could be 
potential for a spurious relationship between use of business advice and SME growth. In 
addition although Jayawarna et al.,(2007) similarly report a positive association between 
training commitment and performance, especially among SMEs engaged in 
manufacturing, they caution that such an association in only significant on account of 
formal training unlike either informal or more generic training solutions. 
 
Indeed within the SME development literature it appears that the nature of training and 
its access mode is in itself a subject of concern. While some studies assess the 
institutional aspects of entrepreneurship training in general (see Pittaway and Hannon, 
2008, Schmidt and Kolodinsky, 2007, Cook and Belliveau, 2004b), others examine 
training as a subset of a wider practice of human resources management (see O‟Regan 
et al., 2010, King-Kauanui et al., 2006, Kotey and Sheridan, 2004) or organisational 
learning (see for example, Michna, 2009). Although the common finding among these 
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studies is that access to training is associated with improved business performance, 
there is emphasis that different training models may be valuable in different contexts 
(Pittaway and Hannon, 2008). This could imply that the effect of standardised formal 
management training on SME performance may be minimal given the diverse nature of 
SME activity (Matlay, 2004, Kotey and Sheridan, 2004).  
 
Specific aspects of entrepreneurship training, for example, intensity, mode of delivery, 
and its relationship to skills competence, have been studied also (see Jayawarna et al., 
2007, Eikebrokk and Olsen, 2009). Authors Jayawarna et al.,(2007) conclude that 
formal training, unlike informal training, being a targeted activity is likely to make a 
significant contribution to SME performance, in terms of average turnover,   among 
manufacturing SMEs in the UK. This claim may however not hold much given the fact 
that in this study the effect of training intensity and turnover (used to measure 
performance) is not statistically significant, although the authors report that the pattern 
of results is in the predicted direction.  
 
Similarly, Eikebrokk and Olsen (2009) report a positive relationship between training, 
competence, and performance among SMEs involved in e-business activities. This study 
used a sample of 339 SMEs drawn from three European countries, Norway, Finland and 
Spain. Based on their empirical analyses, the authors claim that “training explains 
variances in e-business competences and performance in terms of efficiency, 
complementarities, lock-in and novelty” (Eikebrokk and Olsen, 2009, pg, 92). Clearly 
although the authors of this study had intended to link training, competence on the one 
hand, and SME performance on the other; it appears they ended up assessing the 
„means‟ rather than the end itself. It could be argued that the link between their 
measures, efficiency, complementarities, lock-in and novelty, as surrogates of SME 
performance is not apparent. 
 
Defined in various ways, performance, the extent to which objectives set by business 
managers are met (O‟Regan et al., 2010,pg, 169), appears to attract some specification 
challenges especially when it is used as a dependent variable in SME development 
research. As a result some researchers resort to simplistic use of single measures of 
performance, for example, total sales (Chi et al., 2008), growth in turnover or firm size 
(Jayawarna et al., 2007, Berry and Sweeting, 2006, Kotey and Sheridan, 2004), and 
profit or profitability index (see Michna, 2009, Masakure et al., 2009). It is likely that 
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among SME owner-managers financial measures are often seen as indicators of better 
performance or success in business. Consequently it is not surprising that financial 
indicators of performance are used commonly in development studies. This is especially 
so for those seeking to attribute SME performance to either operational or contextual 
factors (see O‟Regan et al., 2010, Michna, 2009, Masakure et al., 2009).  
 
The intuitive use of financial performance measures notwithstanding, entrepreneurs are 
quick to point out that other motives, for example, survival and status, are equally if not 
more important drivers of their involvement in business (Wood, 2006). It would appear 
that such revelations partly may be responsible for the ongoing call among researchers 
to combine financial and non-financial indicators when measuring SME performance 
(O‟Regan et al., 2010, Wood, 2006, Murphy et al., 1996). Indeed in a review article on 
„measuring performance in entrepreneurship research‟ Murphy et al.(1996) finds that 
empirical studies with an aspect of small business performance (between 1987-1993) 
used as many as 71 measures which could be argued to fall into eight dimensions of 
performance including; efficiency, growth, profit, size, liquidity, success/failure, market 
share, and leverage. Consequently the authors argue that use of diverse performance 
measures in SME studies, and inconclusiveness of results, could be due to a lack of 
validity of the performance construct. However, although the level of performance 
specification may depend on the context of a particular study,  Murphy, Trailer et al. 
(1996) recommend that researchers in the SME field need to use multiple dimensions 
(financial and operational) and multiple measures within each dimension to improve on 
performance validity. Similarly O‟Regan et al., (2010) encourages use of a combined 
regime of performance measures, especially in cognisance of the fact that small 
businesses are modelled differently in different contexts (Wood, 2006), although they 
may appear similar.  It is worth noting that in this study (as explained later in chapter 
four) multiple measures of MSE performance, the key dependent variable, are employed 
to create a single composite measure. Therefore the methodology for this study takes 
account of previous criticism of single performance measures (Murphy 1996; O‟Regan 
2010) and hence its results are likely to be robust. 
 
The common pattern of findings among studies that employ a single measure of 
performance points to the notion that access to training among SME owner-managers is 
associated closely with improved performance, in terms of profitability or turnover 
growth (Michna, 2009, Jayawarna et al., 2007, Berry and Sweeting, 2006). Nevertheless 
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there is little consensus in the results among studies that use more than one measure of 
performance. For example, while  Eikebrokk and Olsen (2009) and King-Kauanui et al 
(2006) conclude that training has a significant positive effect on the performance of e-
business and manufacturing SMEs respectively, on the contrary Wood (2006) concludes 
that, in the short run, investment in training is unlikely to improve performance among 
SMEs in the events sector in the UK. Given the fact that most of the studies in the latter 
category, not only employ multiple performance measures, but also adopt sophisticated 
quantitative modelling techniques, it would appear that contextual factors wield 
significant influence on the findings. This implies that, as Masakure et al., (2009) notes, 
factors embodied in the microenterprise, its target market and the specific 
sector/industry where it operates, determine the extent to which training influences SME 
performance.  
 
Is summary therefore it appears that context matters. It is important to note that most of 
the studies reviewed here are conducted within OECD member countries, particularly 
the UK, and examine small and medium enterprises, defined by the EU commission as 
firms employing between 10 and 250 employees (Official Journal of the European 
Union, 2003). In most of the studies therefore microenterprises, those employing less 
than ten employees, are excluded. Various entrepreneurship scholars have emphasised 
that firm size matters (see Boter, 2005, Murphy et al., 1996). It could be argued that by 
the time an enterprise acquires fifty or more staff, it possibly already has established a 
formal administrative infrastructure to facilitate management. For enterprises with less 
than ten staff (microenterprises), their management systems are unlikely to be 
sophisticated and careful execution of the controlling role by the owner-manager may 
suffice. This thesis extends the training/MSE performance literature by examining 
owner-managers‟ perceptions of the effect of inclusion of business development 
services within microcredit provision on the performance of their micro and small 
enterprises, in the context of a developing country.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter the characteristics and dynamics that have marked the development of 
both the MSE and MFI sectors in Kenya are discussed. The chapter notes that most 
Kenyan MSEs are relatively small, employ less than ten workers, and engage in trade. 
Despite being a significant source of employment to Kenyans in both urban and rural 
areas, growth and development of the MSE sector is hampered by several factors, for 
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example, lack of appropriate and effective policy, poor infrastructure, and lack of access 
to affordable credit and training/technical services. With regard to Kenya‟s MFI sector, 
the chapter observes that the concept of microfinance has been informally practised 
since time immemorial. Efforts to promote microfinance operations in Kenya, led by the 
government and NGOs, have seen an increase in the number of players since the 1990s 
and, as a result, access to credit among Kenyan adults, including MSE owner-managers, 
has improved.  However, lack of an appropriate policy for both MSE and MFI sectors 
appears to limit innovation in the design and delivery of microfinance services in 
Kenya. Most Kenyan MFIs offer credit through a minimalist approach and few practice 
the integrated model of microfinance, although the latter is arguably better in prompting 
MSEs‟ development. A review of literature on BDS and MSE performance reflects 
equivocal conclusions. With most of the studies atheoretical and undertaken in the 
context of developed countries, the results of this study, which is carried out among 
MSEs owner-managers‟ in a developing country, are likely to make a significant 
contribution to literature. A discussion on the theoretical underpinnings and hypotheses 
behind the study follows next.  
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3.0 Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis 
Development  
 
3.1 Introduction 
“Microcredit looks like a miracle. It involves providing unsecured small loans to poor 
people in developing countries whom most banks would turn away. Yet these small 
borrowers almost always repay their loans (and the fairly steep interest charges) on 
time, which suggests that they find productive uses for the money. The industry's 
backers make some big claims as a result: Mohammad Yunus, the founder of Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh and the father of microfinance, reckons that 5 % of Grameen 
Bank's clients exit poverty each year. Yet economists point out that there are 
surprisingly few credible estimates of the extent to which microcredit actually reduces 
poverty. This would not matter too much if all microfinance funding were raised via 
the market (as an increasing proportion is). As long as investors were satisfied with 
their returns, there would be no cause for concern. Yet despite growing interest from 
private investors, 53 % of the $11.7 billion that was committed to the microfinance 
industry in 2008 still came at below-market rates from aid agencies, multilateral 
banks and other donors. Given that there are other things that aid money could be 
spent on, and that the rationale for subsidising microcredit is its effectiveness as an 
anti-poverty tool, it is important for donors to know whether it has the advertised 
effects (The Economist, 2009, pg. 76).” 
 
As alluded to in the previous two chapters, starting from the mid eighties the concept of 
microfinance, the main context of this study, was conceived as a response mechanism to 
the poverty situation afflicting millions of people around the world. So remarkable has 
been the success of microfinance that 2005 was declared the year of microcredit by the 
general assembly of the United Nations. The declaration called for the establishment of 
all-inclusive financial markets and strengthening of the often unrecognised deposit of 
entrepreneurial spirit by providing financial and business support services to poor 
communities around the world. In the year 2007, more than 100 million poor families 
received a microloan, marking the attainment of a decade old benchmark set by the 
Microcredit Summit in Washington, DC in 1997 (Daley-Harris, 2009). The commitment 
to support microfinancing has been virtually without question. As the world was 
grinding slowly into a global financial crisis in 2008, donors committed $11.7 billion to 
the course of microfinancing (The Economist, 2009).  
 
To date, microfinancing can be associated with dynamism and innovativeness as 
reflected in its application in various countries, especially in the developing world. The 
phenomenon of microfinance is however complex, a feature that is often reflected in its 
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economic as well as socio-cultural dimensions wherever it is implemented.  Further, 
results of research into the impact of microfinancing on poverty have been mixed. 
Whereas commissioned programme evaluators suggest that microfinancing is having a 
substantive positive impact on poverty (e.g.Pitt and Khandker, 1998, Robinson, 2001, 
Snodgrass and Sebstad, 2002), a contrary view tends to be held by independent analysts, 
especially economists and academics (e.g. Edward and Olsen, 2006, Morduch, 2000, 
Schmidt, 2010). Some academics claim that the extent to which microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) can enable poor people to exit poverty sustainably is not yet 
established (Gibb, 2006b).  
 
As indicated in chapter two, so far most studies on microfinance have been 
predominantly atheoretical with emphasis on assessing its impact and outcomes using 
surveys, interviews and to a lesser extent econometric modelling. With the exception of 
a few studies there has been limited application of theoretical conceptions to research on 
the microfinance phenomenon.  Dorado-Banacloche (2000) who employs a social 
entrepreneurship view to explain the emergence of microfinancing in Bolivia, 
Khandakar and Constantine (2004a) who look into motives for and means of MFIs 
using an infant industry and social consciousness driven capitalism view, and Mayoux 
(2000) who develops a taxonomy of microfinance practice are exceptions. This limited 
theoretical underpinning is particularly the case when it comes to understanding 
variation in the practice of microfinance. This lack of theoretical conceptualisation may 
arguably be part of the reason for the ambiguity in the results of microfinancing studies, 
especially those focusing on effects of microfinance programmes, and in particular of 
business development services (BDS) on MSE development, as seen in chapter two. 
 
This chapter of the thesis makes an attempt to overcome the previously predominantly 
atheoretical nature of research surrounding microfinance and microfinance models, 
including those that encompass concurrent BDS. The chapter puts forward a critical 
theoretical conception to explain the practice variation that is observed and through 
which to interpret findings. In particular, the chapter employs a relational framework 
informed by Pierre Bourdieu‟s conception of „a theory of practice‟ (1977) in addition to 
the closely related neo-institutional theory (e.g. Wry, 2009, Özen and Küskü, 2009, 
Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007b). These two theories are being applied increasingly in 
business practice research (see Özen and Küskü, 2009, Everett, 2002, Benson, 2006, 
Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007b, Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). In so doing, this study 
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contributes to microfinance  literature not only by demonstrating the universality of 
Bourdieu‟s views and their complementary value to neo-institutional theory, but also 
more importantly by helping to outline the pressures behind the variations in 
microfinance programmes which seemingly have led to an apparent lack of consensus 
on „best practice‟ in microfinancing and criticisms of its so-called „mission drift‟(e.g. 
Christen, 2000).  
 
Following this introduction is an overview of the two theoretical pillars put forward as a 
conceptual underpinning for microfinance practice, i.e. neo-institutional theory and 
Bourdieusian views. Next is an explanation of the evolution and state of microfinance 
practice as a social structure, the operations of which appear to be guided largely by a 
relational scheme. In particular the section applies the proposed theoretical concepts to 
discuss the emergence of practice variation, and the logics that inform delivery of both 
microcredit and BDS as embedded in various microfinance practices. The following 
section then examines the position-taking behaviour of those involved in the 
microfinance „industry‟ and the regulatory challenges facing governments and 
microfinancing, and poses the hypotheses tested in this study.  
 
3.2  Theoretical Framework: an Overview  
This section begins the formulation of a theoretical framework by discussing 
Bourdieusian and neo-institutional perspectives on social relations in order to set the 
scene for later explanation of the dynamics of microfinance practice. Specifically the 
two views are explored in order to explain how social structures (institutions) come into 
being, acquire stature and meaning, and direct activity in society.  The section starts 
with neo-institutionalism and later turns to Bourdieu‟s theory. 
 
3.2.1 Neo-institutional theory   
Scott (1987) points out that organisations are technical mechanisms devised to attain set 
goals. If organisations seek to transform into institutions
22
 they probably need to choose 
how they interact and adapt to forces within their operating environment. In so doing 
they acquire a more organic character, which may often propel them to seek meaning 
and legitimacy in the societies in which they operate. Institutionalisation therefore is the 
                                                 
22
 “Institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott, 2008; pg. 48). 
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process of instilling value and intrinsic worth to a structure (organisation) which 
possesses initially only technical utility (Scott, 1987, Scott, 2008).  
 
Institutional theory has evolved as a systematic synthesis of concepts aimed at 
explaining not only how organisational structures and processes become 
institutionalised over time, but also how they earn legitimacy from society (e.g Scott, 
2008, Oliver, 1997, Lounsbury, 2007a, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Conceptually the 
theory has two leading versions; old institutionalism, known popularly as isomorphism, 
and new institutionalism named neo-institutionalism. In its extant view, institutional 
theory sought primarily to examine how external social and economic pressures 
influence an organisation‟s structures, policies and systems (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991, Scott, 2008, Khadaroo, 2005). Specifically the older conception of institutional 
theory focused on explaining apparent isomorphism in the structure, culture, and 
organisational output among organisations in a field (Kondra and Hurst, 2009, 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In their classical work, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
describe three mechanisms through which structural isomorphism in organisations can 
be explained; namely coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes, and normative 
pressures. 
 
Coercive isomorphism relates to “..formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural 
expectations in the society within which the organisations function” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; pg. 150). Although coercive forces may be applied upon organisations in 
either a direct or indirect way, their primary purpose it to prescribe acceptable behaviour 
(Kondra and Hurst, 2009). For example, whereas stakeholders (e.g. donors and 
shareholders) expect microfinance institutions (MFIs) to design programmes aligned to 
their ideologies, the community of poor, to which microfinancing is targeted, expects 
programmes to serve their needs. Mimetic pressures derive from uncertainty in the 
operating environment.  When the future seems turbulent and goals appear vague, 
organisations tend to model their systems along those of other organisations they regard 
as successful in their field. By doing so, organisations hope to increase the certainty of 
outcomes of their operations while avoiding the risk associated with the process of 
innovation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Kondra and Hurst, 2009). For example, since 
the setting up of the group-based lending mechanism in Bangladesh by the popular 
Grameen bank, in the 1980s, other microfinance institutions that have followed often 
56 
 
have designed their own microcredit programmes along this model. Similarly the 
minimalist approach followed by some leading MFIs seeking financial sustainability 
(see discussion in chapter two section 2.3.3) appears to have attracted a significant 
contingent of MFIs faced with dwindling donor funds. 
 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), normative pressure is the third mechanism 
through which organisational structures in a field become homologous. Normative 
pressures are associated with professionalisation. In this regard organisations will tend 
to adopt structures and systems that are highly similar as a reflection of some shared 
ideology, e.g. membership of an industry association bound by a common ethos. In 
addition common professional training of management staff across a field may lead to 
largely shared cognitive positions which may, in turn, lead to structural isomorphism 
among organisations.  For example firms in the same industry tend to adopt similar 
administrative structures as a show of solidarity and, more importantly, as a mechanism 
towards improving operational efficiency. While the isomorphic diffusion framework 
has helped greatly in shaping our understanding of the apparent similarities in 
organisational structures and processes, it has been criticised for being highly 
deterministic and failing to account for change and strategic choice-making behaviour 
among organisations in a field (e.g. Lounsbury, 2007; Scott, 2008, Kondra and Hurst, 
2009). 
 
Neo-institutionalism, the new version of institutional theory, however focuses more on 
logic and rationality and not the taken-for-grantedness that engulfed much of old 
institutionalism (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007b, Wry, 2009, Lounsbury, 2007a).  Neo-
institutionalism seeks to explain change, innovation, and more specifically practice
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variation within institutions in a field (Lounsbury and Ventresca, 2003; Ma and Tyles, 
2009). This new version of institutional theory however appears to have many variants 
within it which emphasise different concepts [for example power, culture, and social 
context (e.g. Oliver, 1997; Lounsbury and Ventresca, 2003; Ma and Tayles, 2009)] that 
are expected to account for the dynamics of both intra-institutional and inter-
institutional behaviour. Regardless of these different concepts, practice variation 
remains the key research focus of most neo-institutional theorists.  
 
                                                 
23
 “Practice refers to activity patterns across actors that are infused with broader meaning and provide 
tools for ordering social life and activity” (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007b, pg. 995).  
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Practice differences among institutions in a field, as Lounsbury (2007) outlines, may be 
due to two conceptual approaches to rationality in decision-making. Firstly rationality 
may be exercised strategically. Proponents of this view contend that organisational 
analysts should examine the different strategic choices organisations make in response 
to institutional pressures. For example, Khadaroo (2005) notes that while some 
institutions choose to compromise with stakeholders‟ demands, others may resort to 
avoidance, manipulation, or outright deviance or ignore the existence of institutional 
pressures. For instance in the field of microfinance, some institutions appear to defy the 
widely acclaimed group-based lending mechanism in favour of an individual model of 
lending.  Some provide microcredit without training which is a strategic component of 
microfinancing aimed at developing human capital for poverty reduction, yet others do 
not. 
 
Secondly, rationality of institutional behaviour can be explained „institutionally‟ rather 
than instrumentally as seen in the case above. In this perspective institutional behaviour 
is a function of rationalised myths
24
. Advocates of this view posit that, in most cases, 
institutional environments are pluralistic, hosting multiple forms of rationality, which in 
essence explains practice variation among organisations in a field (Lounsbury, 2007). 
As reflected in chapter two (section 2.4), the myth that MSE owner-managers are 
ignorant about the benefits of BDS to their enterprises engulfs much of the formal 
entrepreneurship support programmes run by state authorities. However while some 
MSE owner-managers buy the idea and often participate in such programmes, the 
majority do not see the cost-benefit ratio to be in their favour (Storey, 2004). 
 
In addition to the rationality concept, neo-institutionalists have also employed the notion 
of logics, a concept closely related to rationality, in their attempt to explain practice 
variations across organisations.  Institutional logics refer to a broad set of cultural 
beliefs that direct cognition and influence decision-making among actors within a field 
(Lounsbury, 2007a). It appears that institutional logics (as social constructs) are 
embedded within a social context of the wider social space (Ma and Tayles, 2009). 
These logics manifest themselves via patterns of material practices, values, and rules 
through which individual organisations not only orient and justify action (Wry, 2009), 
                                                 
24
 Rationalised myths are “…impersonal prescriptions that identify various social purposes as technical 
ones and specify in a rule like way the appropriate means to pursue these technical purposes rationally. 
..are highly institutionalised and thus in some measure beyond the discretion of any individual participant 
or organisation” (Lounsbury, 2007, pg. 5). 
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but also make their social reality meaningful (Lounsbury, 2007b). It is important to note 
that although logics confer the principles against which institutional behaviour takes 
shape; their manner of influence is not predictable (Wry, 2009). Against this premise it 
may not be difficult to imagine how multiple institutional logics exist and compete, as a 
result of which divergent practices among organisations within a field become apparent. 
A case in point in the microfinance field may be that in the pursuit of poverty alleviation 
(a social reality) some institutions are inclined to engage in developing human capital (a 
social logic) while others are given to a minimalist approach of money exchange, 
embracing a more commercial logic. 
 
Besides explaining variations in „field‟ operations, the notion of institutional logics 
helps organisational researchers realise that the motivation behind human activity 
incorporates social obligations over and above economic ends. Arguably the chances of 
survival of an organisation are determined largely by its responsiveness to societal 
expectations, implying that those organisations that meet social expectations are 
rewarded by way of access to resources and increased legitimacy (Oliver, 1997; Scott, 
2008). Oliver (1997) notes that an organisation can acquire a competitive advantage by 
exercising its differential ability to manage strategically the institutional context of its 
key resources.  
 
Logics in practice variation aside, attention is turned often to how institutions respond to 
change as they strive to sustain legitimacy. Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott (2002) report 
three major sources of pressure on institutionalised practices; namely functional, 
political and social sources. While functional drivers of change relate to dissatisfaction 
with an organisation‟s performance levels and are linked to wider changes in the 
operating environment (for example increased competition for resources), political 
pressures pertain to changes in interests and underlying power proportions. Shifts in 
political power may occur as a response to performance crises or environmental 
uncertainties that could force management of an organisation to become critical of the 
legitimacy of existing structures and practices. Institutional change may be engineered 
also by social pressures stemming from discordant beliefs (Ma and Tayles, 2009), for 
example, a shift in social expectations that may constrain a set of organisational 
practices. Therefore the above pressures arguably compel organisations to 
deinstitutionalise current structures and practices (re-invent themselves) and create a 
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new balance (higher levels of legitimacy) between their practices and the exigencies of 
key stakeholders. 
 
Unlike the old institutionalism, neo-institutionalism arguably lacks a solid conceptual 
framework which could help harmonise the different notions aimed at explaining 
practice variation among actors in a field. This absence notwithstanding, social reality 
encompasses multiple structures and logics which actors can draw on to critique extant 
practices; eventually design new alternative practices that not only become 
institutionalised but which are suitable also to the prevailing social context (Wry, 2009). 
In essence, neo-institutionalists posit that efficiency is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the survival of an organisation. Legitimacy in the eyes of the society is a 
better reward towards enhancing survival of organisations in a field (Khadaroo, 2005). 
In summary, neo-institutionalism has evolved as an interactive and holistic theory that 
seeks to explain how organisations become transformed into institutions with an 
enduring reality and value. The theory incorporates the notions of logic and rationality 
in practice related decision-making, both within and between institutions in a field, in 
order to promote legitimacy and hence achieve greater economic and social fit (Scott, 
2008). 
 
While neo-institutionalism appears to account for the more macro-level environmental 
forces that may wield influence on institutional behaviour, it does not adequately 
explain dynamics within a social space, particularly variations in practice occasioned by 
power struggles amongst institutions in an industry.  To this effect Bourdieu‟s theory 
can be employed as an alternative yet a complementary conception in explaining 
practice variation in microfinancing. 
 
3.2.2 ‘Theory of practice’ by Pierre Bourdieu 
In his formulation of a theory of practice, Bourdieu (1977) perceives institutions as 
representing structured positions in social space. Collectively institutions make up a 
society of social systems and sub-systems which take the form of hierarchies that tend 
to reflect similar laws (DiMaggio, 1979). The hierarchies arguably represent structural 
networks that are nurtured by relatively enduring social patterns. In turn these social 
patterns depend on systematic misrecognition of their oppressive nature by both 
dominators and dominated. For example, and in Bourdieu‟s perspective, the 
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misrecognition is inculcated by differential socialisation of children of different social 
classes in advanced societies (Bourdieu, 1977).  
 
For institutions however (DiMaggio, 1979), misrecognition of oppressive behaviour 
camouflages itself through rationalisations of processes advanced both within and about 
the fields in which they are actively represented. In addition, either consciously or 
unconsciously, institutions engage in routine self-censorship of communication to make 
it appear legitimate according to the relative positions occupied by their target audience 
in a field. The multidimensional space within which institutions operate is one marked 
by struggle and position-taking behaviour (power games) with various actors resorting 
to „language‟ and symbolic activities to enhance chances of their reproduction and 
dominance over time (Everett, 2002, Lounsbury, 2008). For example, even when MFIs 
run by NGOs transform into commercial banks, some may still claim to be committed 
to microfinancing in order to access capital from donors at concessionary rates.  At the 
heart of Bourdieu‟s view of the dynamics of power contests within and between social 
structures are three concepts; fields, capital and the habitus.  
 
In the context of social space, fields are networks of social relations, structured systems 
of social positions within which struggles occur over stakes and access to resources 
(Oakes et al., 1998, Everett, 2002, Bourdieu, 1990).  As structured spaces of positions, 
fields are occupied by two opposing sets of players, the dominant and the dominated, 
who constantly engage in manoeuvres to control both the processes through which the 
field reproduces itself and its most significant power (Everett, 2002, Emirbayer and 
Johnson, 2008). In the case of microfinance, some stakeholders especially donors and 
shareholders, as patrons of capital appear to wield significant dominance on the design 
of microfinance programmes. From a relational perspective therefore such acts in effect 
influence directly the nature and quality of services accessed or not accessed by the poor 
(the dominated). A case in point, while human capital development, through provision 
of BDS was initially seen as key to poverty reduction among MSE owner-managers (see 
discussions in chapter one sections 1.3 and 1.4) lately in practice it appears provision of 
microcredit in the absence of training is more important.  
 
Shenkin and Coulson (2007) observe that a number of fields may be at play in any given 
social interaction, especially if one is cognisant of the complex nature of the social 
world in which we live. As such, different fields pursue various levels of freedom while 
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attempting to provide unique and field driven solutions to a common social problem. 
For instance, economic discrepancies within members of a community may attract 
multiple solutions from say the political, cultural, and the market spheres; each of which 
is a field in itself with its own unique view of the problem. In this regard it appears 
social space in any society may comprise of so many fields that it might be difficult to 
fathom a state of amicable co-existence.  Therefore it would appear that some form of 
classification is required so that analysts can understand what is a relevant or not so 
relevant field (or actors within a field) in a given social problem. 
 
According to Bourdieu, fields may be categorised as restricted or widespread production 
(Everett, 2002).  Whereas the output of widespread production fields is targeted at the 
consuming public in general, restricted production fields target their output to producers 
of similar goods within the hierarchy. As such the performance of the latter tends to be 
legitimatised on the basis of field-specific and „technical‟ terms whereas the former are 
evaluated through a non-field specific criterion. Everett (2002) contends further that in 
some cases the widespread field may tend to dominate the operations of the restricted 
field. Where significant domination is witnessed, the restricted field lacks autonomy in 
its practice. In broad terms and in any economy, financial services institutions represent 
widespread production, the performances of which are measured generally in non-field 
specific terms e.g. financial ratios. On the contrary, MFIs account for a restricted form 
of production in that they not only target their services to the poor, but their 
performance is expected to be measured arguably on a largely poverty reduction 
criterion, in line with their acclaimed mission. 
 
In sum therefore, to perceive institutions as fields, one would need to recognise the 
relational contexts within which they are positioned as well as the particular 
discourse(s) to which they contribute.  In a sense given their claims, MFIs are engaged 
arguably in a poverty reduction discourse.  Beyond the interactions between various 
actors, fields represent an interplay of relations amongst positions that the different 
actors occupy in a social space.  It is the symbolic positions (occupied by field actors) 
that collectively make up a dialectical state of power relations; one in which an actor‟s 
endowment with the relevant resources determines access and position sustenance, or 
even ascent to a more influential position (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). 
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Much as the dynamism exemplified in a field is about power relations, at the core of the 
contest is an urge towards a strategic control of the most influential set of resources 
within the field. Bourdieu conceptualises the most critical resource(s) within a field 
symbolically as capital, which in essence is reflective of “ ...attributes, possessions, or 
qualities of a person or a position exchangeable for goods, services, or esteem, [and 
which] exists in many forms – symbolic, cultural, social, or linguistic, as well as 
economic” ( DiMaggio, 1979, pg. 1463). It is important to note that, in Bourdieu‟s 
view, the notion of capital does not hold any significant meaning or effect other than in 
relation to a specific field (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). To Emirbayer and Johnson 
(2008) this implies that the relative position held by an institution (or a group of 
institutions) within a field at any given time is reflective of the capital species associated 
with it (or them).  
 
Although Bourdieu‟s notion of capital is all encompassing, two main forms of capital 
exist under his paradigm.  Economic capital particularly refers to material possessions. 
These would include ordinarily money, physical assets, and other indicators of 
productive capacity in a field. The second form of capital is cultural capital
25
 which 
represents less tangible, yet worthy assets to institutions; for example, access to 
knowledge and skills, and taste.  Other institutionally significant forms of capital 
include social and symbolic capital (Everett, 2002).  
 
To Everett (2002) social capital implies the powers and resources potentially which are 
accessible to a person or an institution by virtue of membership of a group. Further 
social capital offers individuals and possibly institutions a favourable social identity that 
could translate into improved trust, cooperation and access to accurate information 
(Baron and Markman, 2003). Symbolic capital is a composite form of capital derived 
from other forms of capital discussed above. Symbolic capital is deemed to be 
constituted and becomes critical if and when the other forms of capital assume 
legitimacy among critical actors within a field. To Bourdieu, symbolic capital is the 
most valuable state of capital because in it rests the basis on which wealth, the 
foundation of power, acquires symbolic authority exerting lasting influence (Everett, 
                                                 
25
 Cultural capital manifests itself in three ways; embodied, objectified, and institutionalised cultural 
capital. Whereas embodied cultural capital refers to long-lasting dispositions and forms an integral 
appropriation of an institution‟s external wealth; objectified cultural capital reflects itself in cultural goods 
like instruments and machines. Institutionalised cultural capital refers to an institution‟s officially 
recognised competence handed down through a process of certification (Everett, 2002, pg. 62). 
63 
 
2002, Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). As applied in the field of microfinance, social 
network groups formed of MSE owner-managers are clearly a form of social capital. It 
is this social capital that MSE owner-managers (as members of a group) leverage to 
access MFIs‟ supplied microcredit and BDS, representing economic and cultural forms 
of capital respectively. 
 
Further, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008, pg, 13) state that “ the interplay of a variety of 
different species of capital (including symbolic capital) leads to the emergence within 
any organisational field of a capital specific to the particular field, which enables the 
dominant(s) within the field to exercise power over the field as a whole .”  Therefore 
power contestations among field actors concern the legitimacy of valuations of the 
various types of capital for which respective actors are deemed to be well endowed. As 
such, institutions will strive to discredit the form of capital upon which the influence of 
their competitors holds and promote the grain of capital they possess or cherish. 
Additionally the species of capital held by an institution influences not only its position 
in a given social space but significantly also its identity (Everett, 2002).   
 
In correspondence with an institution‟s capital profile and identity, the common thread 
that arguably explains the position-taking behaviour of institutions within social space is 
the habitus. Defined variously, habitus is for example seen as a system of lasting and 
transposable dispositions (DiMaggio, 1979, pg, 1464); as dispositions generative of 
action strategies (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008); and as a construct which contains and 
reflects the politics that influence an agent‟s way of interpreting and acting on social 
space (Shenkin and Coulson, 2007, pg, 302). The habitus has been described also 
simply as a worldview which helps to integrate the notions of field and capital at an 
individual level (Dobbin, 2008, pg, 58). Notwithstanding these multiple views, in 
Bourdieu‟s original conception, the habitus is the established principle of regulated 
improvisations; a system of structured and structuring dispositions which is found in a 
field (Bourdieu, 1977). From the foregoing it could be inferred that the habitus is an 
interpretative frame that institutions use to guide their decisions and make sense of the 
developments within a field. For example, it appears that increased demand for 
microfinance services among the poor in developing countries coupled with donor 
resource constraints are forcing MFIs to be more innovative in the design and 
configuration of their programmes. In this regard, while a few MFIs remain committed 
to serving the poor by offering microcredit, BDS and other support services, the 
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majority appear to have given in to normative pressure (in the form of commercial 
banking principles).  As such, they have embraced practices that closely resemble those 
of their counterparts in the „widespread production‟ targeting the general public. Such 
acts are indicative of the various habituses at play within the microfinance field. 
 
The habitus, as a matrix of perceptions, enables institutions to direct their actions 
towards more practical functions facilitating the achievement of infinite and diverse 
tasks within the limits of structured social space (DiMaggio, 1979, Shenkin and 
Coulson, 2007). In other words, the habitus helps also in structuring the perceptions of 
possible position-taking behaviours within a field; separating actions that are judged 
more legitimate and desirable from the illegitimate and undesirable ones (Emirbayer 
and Johnson, 2008). Though enduring the habitus is not static; it changes in response to 
the dynamics and more specifically to the evolving nature and proportions of capital 
within a field (Everett, 2002).  
 
Conceptually, based mainly on Bourdieu‟s views, microfinance as a field of practice 
may be mapped as depicted in Figure 2. As the Figure shows, actors in the microfinance 
field may be grouped into three categories i.e. support agencies, microfinance 
practitioners, and clients. It is important to note that the relationship among these actor 
groups is seen as being interactive in nature as reflected in the capital flows. Actor 
interrelationships are expected also to be shaped by the individual actor habitus. Guided 
largely by this framework, the next section applies the concepts introduced in section 
two above to assist in understanding developments in the microfinance field.  
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Figure 2:  Diagrammatic Representation of a Conceptual Framework  
(a Bourdieusian perspective) for Microfinance 
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3.3 Microfinance as a Field: Emergence, Practice variation, and Position-taking               
 behaviour 
The growth and development of MSEs is seen as critical to improving the conditions of 
life, especially among poor people in developing countries (Arch, 2005, Morrison et al., 
2003, Hartungi, 2007, Sievers, 2007, Gibb, 2006, Boter, 2005).  This goal has however 
been hampered by lack of access to affordable credit and other supporting services, for 
example training, available to MSEs (Morrison et al., 2003, Khandakar and Constantine, 
2004b). Growth in the popularity of microfinancing since the 1990s (Lont and Hospes, 
2004), in most parts of the developing world, was partly driven by it being seen as a 
mechanism for improving access to support services, especially microcredit, among 
poor households and their microenterprises. This section of the chapter  employs the 
theoretical framework presented in Section 2 above to examine literature relating to the 
conception, practice variation, and the dynamics that characterise the broad practice of 
microfinancing as an instrument for MSE development. 
 
3.3.1 Microfinance evolution: a case of an emerging ‘Field’  
Over the years the struggle to overcome poverty, the lack of means of livelihood (Lont 
and Hospes, 2004), and the underlying discourse of social reality (Bourdieu, 1977) has 
persisted with limited levels of success. A progress report on global poverty submitted 
by the World Bank at the G8 summit in Okinawa – Japan in the year 2000, indicated 
that although improvements in health and education levels had been witnessed in the 
previous century, an estimated 1.2 billion people were still living on less than US $1 a 
day and 3 billion lived on less than US $2 a day (World Bank, 2000). However for the 
period between 1990 to 2005, the number of people living on less than US $1.25 a day 
dropped from 1.8 billion to 1.4 billion (World Bank, 2008).  
Further, following the recent (2008) global financial crisis, an estimated 55 to 90 
million more people are likely to be living in extreme poverty than was previously 
anticipated (United Nations, 2009). In the words of Bourdieu this puzzling state of 
deprivation among the „dominated‟ is on display apparently amidst outstanding 
economic prosperity for the few - the „dominant‟ (Arch, 2005, Bourdieu, 1977).  
 
Most poverty alleviation efforts emphasise the need for increased entrepreneurial 
activity among the poor in a bid to bridge „the dollar gap‟. According to authors (Cook 
and Belliveau, 2004a, Arch, 2005) and backed by views of economists using empirical 
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data, it is posited that a positive relationship between existence of SMEs and certain 
aspects of economic development, for example employment generation, exists. 
However it is worth noting that this expected positive impact may not be sustained 
without the necessary support in the form of either financial and/or technical skills 
required to run a business successfully. Lack of start up capital and access to quality 
BDS remain  critical  barriers to entrepreneurial activity among would-be entrepreneurs 
in most developing economies (Arch, 2005, Lont and Hospes, 2004, Akoten, 2007a).  
 
The genesis of the microfinance movement can be traced back to the 19
th
 century. 
Writing on microfinance and development Arch (2005) traces some form of 
microfinance operations back to the German credit union movement that was popular 
for the better part of the century. The movement was established on the basis of charity, 
reflecting a form of social development „logic‟ that underpins a significant proportion of 
microfinance programmes even to date. There were similar organisations in most parts 
of Europe as well as in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa-especially Kenya (Folwer and 
Kinyanjui, 2004) as previously reported in section 2.3.1 of chapter two. The bulk of 
microfinance activities had their humble beginnings in the non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) world, driven by the desire to alleviate poverty, a form of social 
structure (Bourdieu, 1990) that engulfs the livelihoods of poor people in nations all over 
the world (Remenyi and Quinones, 2000, Arch, 2005, Lont and Hospes, 2004, 
Khandakar and Constantine, 2004b).   
 
As a practice, microfinancing has attracted various interpretations. The term 
microfinance has been coined to represent arguably a wide array of concepts and 
activities; including microcredit schemes, training and social empowerment 
programmes undertaken by, for example, NGOs and community based organisations 
(CBOs); village banking, networking and loan schemes of self help groups (SHGs) and 
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs); and small and medium enterprises 
(SME) banking services offered by national and regional banks, among other related 
services. Seibel and Kumar (1998) offer a comprehensive definition, according to their 
view, of what microfinance means; 
“Microfinance is defined as a sector of formal and nonformal financial 
institutions providing microsavings, microcredit and microinsurance services to 
the microeconomy, hereby allocating scarce resources to microinvestments… In a 
narrow sense, microfinance institutions are small local financial institutions. In a 
wider sense, they may also comprise national or regional banks with 
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microfinance services for small savers and borrowers …The microeconomy 
includes such target populations as microentrepreneurs, small farmers and the 
landless, women and the poor.” (Seibel and Kumar, 1998, pg, 4) 
 
It is clear from the foregoing that the concept of microfinancing is designed as a 
framework to promote entrepreneurial activity among poor people or the micro sector of 
a national economy. A typical microfinance institution provides a mechanism through 
which „poor‟ people can access small sums of money to enable them to take part in 
economic activities that would otherwise be unavailable to them (Arch, 2005). As 
Kibaara (2006) observes, the principal objective of microfinance programmes is to raise 
incomes and broaden financial markets by providing financial services to small-scale 
entrepreneurs who ordinarily would not have any access to established capital markets. 
However as Edward and Olsen (2006) note, although provision of microcredit and other 
forms of financial services intermediation underpin most microfinance programmes. 
However social empowerment of women, training and other forms of business 
development facilitation appear to be part and parcel of microfinancing as a broad 
mechanism of poverty alleviation (see Morduch and Haley, 2002, Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2010, Microcredit summit campaign, 1997). As later discussed in this section 
of the chapter, this mission appears to have changed significantly over the years.  
 
The primary target market for microfinance services has been the low income class of 
the economy or simply the poor, although there are criticisms about whether the truly 
poor are really being reached (e.g.Morduch, 1999, Khandakar and Constantine, 2004a, 
Lont and Hospes, 2004, Schmidt, 2010) . This low income category includes groups of 
people who run micro, small-scale and medium enterprises (Arch, 2005, Edward and 
Olsen, 2006, Hartungi, 2007, Argwings-Kodhek et al., 2004a). The sizes of the 
businesses may vary widely from one location/region to another and even among 
countries in the same region. As a result, most MFIs prefer to organise their clients in 
groups based on shared characteristics. More importantly however, group membership 
provides a form of social capital that serves as alternative collateral to cushion lenders 
against the risk of possible loan defaults. Additionally group lending has an economic 
principle behind it in that there are economies of scale that accrue when handling groups 
of people (representing several microenterprises) as opposed to serving directly each 
one of them. Group lending has been applauded arguably as the most successful way of 
handling MSEs all over the world, as evidenced by the mimetic isomorphic diffusion 
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(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) referred to earlier in this chapter (see section 3.2.1) that 
has greeted the practice since the 1990s.  
 
Over the years, various actors in the field of microfinance, including governments, 
donors, NGOs and other international development agents have come to realise the 
critical role microenterprises can play in both national and regional economic frontiers. 
Given this, these actors have time and again either formulated, or supported the 
formulation of, structures (for example microcredit and training schemes), to nurture 
entrepreneurial activity (Lont and Hospes, 2004, Khandakar and Constantine, 2004ab). 
For example in early 1980s, with the support of donor agencies, Professor Muhammad 
Yunus (Nobel Laureate 2006), established the now famous Grameen bank in 
Bangladesh, which is acclaimed as one of the most successful microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) in the field of microfinance (Khandakar and Constantine, 2004a). The bank was 
set up as a NGO offering relatively small loan amounts (e.g. $100) to poor rural women 
against social trust; an example of social capital, secured through peer group member 
guarantees.   
 
Enhancing cultural capital – inclusion of BDS in microcredit programmes 
 
As already alluded to, alongside microcredit schemes, BDS, a composite form of 
cultural capital, has emerged also as a structure that MSE support agents (e.g. MFIs) 
appear to emphasise as critical towards promoting entrepreneurship among the poor 
(Edward and Olsen, 2006). Since the birth of MSEs, traced back to the era of industrial 
revolution (Matlay, 2004), skill shortages or lack of access to training has been noted in 
many parts of the world to affect their survival rates, growth and performance (see 
detailed discussions in section 2.4.1 of chapter two) (Faoite et al., 2004). Many people, 
including academics, government agencies and business practitioners, recognise the 
importance of training in equipping entrepreneurs with the necessary skills to establish 
and manage their own businesses (Sievers, 2007). The term BDS is used as a 
representation of various concepts, all referring to non-financial services targeted at 
improving the performance and survival (institutionalisation) of MSEs. Some of the 
related concepts include; technical assistance/support, business counselling, business 
advisory services, training, and entrepreneurship education, among others (Faoite et al., 
2004). 
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Since the 1960s, the focus of support initiatives for MSEs has experienced some major 
swings and turns. From the start, state governments and donor agencies, motivated by 
the desire to promote industrialisation through private enterprises, offered both credit 
and some form of BDS to MSEs (Sievers, 2007). For the better part of the 1970s and 
early 1980s, BDS was provided mainly by development banks, government departments 
and other development agencies, especially NGOs. At this stage the nature of BDS 
offered was mainly basic management training with particular emphasis on preparation 
of business plans. BDS was offered as a pre- or co-requisite for credit by a majority of 
micro-lenders or MFIs at that time
26
. Notably most development support agents 
encouraged MFIs to provide training to their clients to ensure profitable use of 
microcredit (Sievers, 2007, Goldmark, 2006). 
 
Authors (e.g. Matlay, 2004, Faoite et al., 2004) observe a notable increase in the use of 
BDS  by MSEs over the years. As alluded to in section 2.4 of chapter two, in addition to 
their credit providers, entrepreneurs are most likely to seek advice/support from a wide 
range of formal and informal sources. Some of these include trade associations, 
government agencies, professional service firms (consultants), third-level educational 
institutions, mentorship networks, clients, suppliers and even other individuals 
connected with the business. Bennett and Robson (1999), present a review of some 13 
previous studies on sources of business advice in Britain and consider that sources of 
business advice can be grouped into six categories; Professional specialists, Professional 
generalists, Market contacts, Social contacts, Business associates, and Government 
agencies (Berry and Sweeting, 2006). The specific participants involved in the provision 
of advice to entrepreneurs include auditors/accountants, credit officers and bankers, 
legal advisers, business counsellors, marketing/management consultants, market 
contacts/business associates, friends and family, academics, and business support 
agencies (Boter, 2005). It is important to note that in the case of developing countries, 
many of these sources of business advice may not be accessible to MSE owner-
managers (Hallberg, 2006, Suzuki, 2002).  
 
Delivery of BDS tends to adopt either a structured curriculum, as is the case in 
institutions of higher education offering entrepreneurship training, or an informal 
                                                 
26
 Some examples of MFIs that claim to offer BDS as a complement to microcredit services include 
Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and Kenya Rural Entrepreneurship 
Programme (K-rep). 
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arrangement. As Hisrich and Peters (1998) observed, in the case of structured training 
emphasis is on developing technical skills (for example operations and production 
abilities), business management and improving a person‟s entrepreneurial attributes 
(Faoite et al., 2004). Within this framework financial management, marketing and 
general business management topics are more popular than other subjects in 
entrepreneurship programmes (Faoite et al., 2004). The informal SME support 
initiatives are offered as a complementary package to the formal entrepreneurship 
training. Authors (Faoite et al., 2004, Berry and Sweeting, 2006) note that among 
MSEs, informal skill development initiatives often take the form of 
seminars/workshops, internships/mentorships, coaching, business counselling and 
general networking opportunities. Given the resource constraints among microfinance 
practitioners and their donors, it is likely that of the two arrangements noted above, the 
informal framework of BDS delivery is most commonly practised.  
 
In view of the range of services and actors involved, BDS appears to constitute an 
important sub-field within the field of microfinance. This is the status accorded to BDS 
in this study. In short, BDS practices (within the field of microfinance) appear to 
represent a broad mechanism for building and enhancing both cultural capital and social 
capital among target MSE owner-managers, aspects that are later exchanged for 
economic capital – microcredit. While the development of cultural capital is arguably 
important in helping MSE owner-managers build essential skill sets in business 
management, social capital is of strategic interest to MFIs which use it as alternative 
collateral for loans.  
 
Following the remarkable success of the Grameen bank, the concept of microfinance as 
a tool for social economic development for the poor has diffused mimetically among the 
developing economies in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America [for example, 
Bank Rakyat of Indonesia (BRI), Kenya rural entrepreneurship programme (K-Rep) 
Bank of Kenya,  and BancoSol of Bolivia (Arch, 2005, Schmidt, 2010)]. The 
establishment of Grameen America in 2008 (Grameen America, 2010) is evidence that 
microfinancing has even permeated the developed world, targeting low-income people 
within that world. 
 
The growth and development of the modern microfinance sector has depended to a large 
extent on aid. As a form of financial support, aid can be argued to be a form of symbolic 
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capital used coercively to shape relations among actors in the field of microfinance. As 
noted previously, most of the first generation MFIs (especially most of those set up 
either before or in the early 1990s) were NGOs, which received extensive financial 
support from governments and donors. The funds were then passed on to MSEs as small 
loans to be repaid, supposedly with minimal interest. NGOs by their very nature are 
mostly not-for-profit establishments. All their activities, including microfinance 
programmes, are geared to achieving a social objective. In the case of microfinance, the 
social objective is to alleviate poverty or simply to improve the standard of living of 
poor people by way of promoting entrepreneurship.  It is likely that the pursuit of 
development, a social logic of improving the livelihoods of the poor, has won 
microfinance practitioners legitimacy among donors, poor MSE owner-managers 
(clients), and the general public at large. So strong has the appeal of microfinancing 
been that normative pressures and voices of critics (Schmidt, 2010, Khandakar and 
Constantine, 2004a, Morduch, 2000) appear to be ignored consistently.  
 
Actors in the microfinance field  
In broad terms and on account of their respective roles, actors in the field of 
microfinance may be grouped into three categories as reflected in Figure 2. The first 
group represents support agencies which offer financial and/or institutional assistance to 
microfinance practitioners. Included in this category are state authorities, donor 
organisations (e.g. USAID), international NGOs (e.g. Opportunity International, World 
Vision), and traditional development agencies (The World Bank‟s and UN‟s) through 
their affiliate organisations – Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and United 
Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) respectively. In this category also are 
organisations established specifically to serve the microfinance sector, such as 
Women‟s World Banking (WWB), Foundation for International Community Assistance 
(FINCA) and Americans for Community Co-operation in Other Nations (ACCION). 
Private investors, for example venture capital firms and hedge funds, are among other 
actors in this category (Arch, 2005, Schmidt, 2010). 
 
The second category of actors in the field of microfinance comprises the practitioners 
themselves. Although the nature of services and extent of formality varies, the unifying 
factor among these actors is the fact that most of them claim to be serving the MSE 
sector in one respect or another. Broadly the practitioners may be grouped into two 
categories, i.e. financial service and non-financial service, providers. As previously 
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reflected (see section 2.3.2 in chapter two) and according to Ledgerwood (1999), actors 
providing financial services to MSEs may further be grouped into formal institutions 
(e.g. development banks, commercial banks, and MFIs), semiformal institutions (e.g. 
NGOs, credit unions, and savings and credit co-operative societies (SACCOS ), and 
informal providers (e.g. rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), self-help 
groups (SHGs), and moneylenders) (CBK, 2009). It is important to note that some of 
these practitioners, for example NGOs and some MFIs, provide both financial and non-
financial services (Schmidt, 2010, Sievers and Vandenberg, 2007). The last group of 
actors represents the clients. As a target market for microfinance services, clients may 
constitute MSE owner-managers both as individuals and in groups, medium to large- 
sized private businesses, private persons, and households.  The next section examines 
the forces behind the divergence in practice among microfinance providers. 
 
3.3.2 Practice variation in the field of microfinance: logic and capital struggles 
This section explores two contending logics; that is, the social and commercial 
approaches to microfinancing that appear to shape operations in the field of 
microfinance. The social development logic is first examined. Discussions in this 
section are aimed at eliciting the forces behind variations in the practice of 
microfinancing; i.e. the rationale driving either social or commercial logic as well as the 
various forms of capital contestations amongst actors in the field of microfinance.  
 
As mentioned previously, NGOs have played host to the modern view of 
microfinancing driven by the mission of poverty reduction in the developing world. The 
habitus of NGOs, their history of commitment to development, especially in the 
developing world, informs their embrace of an integrated approach to microfinancing 
(see discussions in section 2.3.3 of chapter one) in the pursuit of poverty alleviation. 
Firstly, in line with observations made in chapter two section 2.4, the rationale behind 
the approach is that improved access to microcredit without the requisite technical 
support is unlikely to contribute significantly to growth and performance of MSEs 
owned by the poor, a position hypothesised and tested in this study. Secondly it could 
be argued that entrepreneurship (as an instrument of poverty alleviation) is a 
multifaceted phenomena which calls for a broad, but coordinated, mechanism of 
intervention if the situation of the poor is to improve. For example, the survival of the 
poor (and especially their enterprises) depends not only on their access to various forms 
of capital including economic (credit), social (networks), and cultural (know-how), but 
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is determined indirectly also by their access to a functioning communications 
infrastructure and health, and education facilities.   
 
As a result, microfinance programmes designed by most NGOs, following mimetically 
the lead from Grameen Bank‟s original model, usually incorporating training and other 
forms of social empowerment (predominantly for women) within their microcredit 
schemes (Gobbi, 2005, Hartungi, 2007). More often than not MSE owner managers are 
permitted to apply for and access microcredit after undertaking some preliminary 
training (Goldmark, 2006). Thereafter, MSE owner–managers, driven by the specific 
needs of their enterprises, are encouraged to draw on various BDS aspects which are 
available either from the host MFI (as is the case for Grameen bank clients) or its 
affiliate institutions.  
 
The salient features
27
 that distinguish microfinancing, as a restricted field, from 
traditional commercial banking (representing widespread production) are reflected in 
differing proportions across practitioners in the microfinance field. For example, MFIs 
that offer BDS appear to encourage their clients to pursue self-employment by 
undertaking income generating activities (Khandakar and Constantine, 2004a). It is 
these income generating activities-MSEs that the MFIs then target with both microcredit 
and BDS services. The MFIs go to great lengths to discourage clients from using credit 
for household consumption purposes amongst other diversionary tendencies.  For 
example, during regular meetings with clients, field staff lead members to recite 
citations to the effect that they will not waste money but instead collectively undertake 
bigger investments for higher incomes, one of the „sixteen decisions‟ of the Grameen 
Bank (Shakya and Rankin, 2008, Grameen, 2010). This issue is examined through in-
depth interviews with MFI representatives in this study, but such actions may be 
reflective of MFIs‟ attempts to influence their clients‟ habitus to bring it in line with 
economic rationality.  
 
                                                 
27
 Unlike conventional banks, MFI‟s credit schemes are characterised by; small loan sizes (averaging US$ 
100), primarily to poor rural women who constitute the primary target market; promote self-employment 
activities; loans are collateral free; and savings mobilisation is encouraged (Khandakar and Constantine, 
2004a; 2004b). 
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Even within the socially oriented MFIs, there are two variants to service delivery. First, 
as earlier noted is group-based methodology
28
. As (Bennett, 1998) noted, a key premise 
of the group-based approach is that with the necessary training, members are prepared 
to invest and take responsibility not only to institutionalise local practices but also and 
more importantly, to manage their own enterprises effectively. This appears to be an 
innovative mechanism of service delivery where MSE owner-managers join with their 
peers in groups of five to eight members. It is in this group setting that members then 
receive training on group cohesion, venture creation/management, and financial 
discipline, among other issues, for an initial period ranging between a few weeks to six 
months. Once established fully, each group opens a savings fund with the host MFI 
which then advances microcredit to member applicants in rotation. The training is 
important as earlier noted, because it helps breed trust through solidarity and creates 
social capital, a valuable asset both to the potential clients and microfinance 
practitioners.  
 
In this arrangement, on the one hand, clients enhance their deposit of social capital 
through social networks of peers which they arguably in return trade for technical 
support (in the form of BDS) and microcredit (forms of cultural and economic capital 
respectively) that they can use to promote their enterprises. On the other hand, MFIs use 
group members‟ social capital as a means to not only minimise administrative costs but 
also, and more importantly, as an instrument for mitigating risk against loan defaults. It 
is noted (Shakya and Rankin, 2008) that most MFIs that use this model approve a 
member‟s loan application only upon successful repayment of previous loan balances 
held by fellow group members
29
.  This means that within a group there is one 
outstanding loan only at any given time. Against this background it is no wonder that 
repayment rates reported by most MFIs that use this model average 95 per cent and 
above (e.g. Arch, 2005). To date, examples of socially conscious MFIs that employ a 
group-based methodology include Bangladesh‟s Grameen Bank, PRODEM - a division 
                                                 
28
 Within the field of microfinance, group-based service delivery is practised in two versions. Firstly by 
NGOs delivering Grameen-type microfinance programmes to women only groups of about five members. 
Secondly by village banks set up and run by CBOs of 15 to 30 local community members (Shakya and 
Rankin 2008). While the institutional outlook of NGOs‟ microfinance programmes may give an 
impression of sustainability, the village banks run by CBOs appear to offer a certain level of informality 
and flexibility that members may hold with high regard.   
29
 A group guarantee can either be implicit or actual. Whereas in implicit guarantees, group members can 
access loans only if fellow members are not in arrears, in actual guarantees group members are 
collectively held responsible if and when a member defaults (Ledgerwood 1999). 
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of the BancoSol group of Bolivia, and K-rep Development Agency - of the K-rep group 
in Kenya. 
 
However, over time concerns have been raised about the group-based microfinancing 
methodology (Gibb, 2006b, Faoite et al., 2004, Boter, 2005, Berry and Sweeting, 2006). 
One of the issues is that because groups are formed on a self-selection basis, poorer 
women are likely to be excluded from joining borrower groups for fear of possible 
default. As (Shakya and Rankin, 2008) note, such practices serve only to exacerbate 
already existing socio-economic disparities among communities, which essentially 
mitigates against the original sociological values of solidarity. Additionally when social 
capital is exchanged for economic capital within the microfinance framework, groups 
appear poised to experience social tensions due to the materialistic nature of the latter. 
For example in Nepal, accounts of defaulting women being subjected to extreme 
anxiety, restriction on individual freedoms and public shame, are common (Shakya and 
Rankin, 2008, Lont and Hospes, 2004, Smets and Bahre, 2004).  
 
Finally the group model appears biased towards female entrepreneurs (in SHGs). 
Women, especially in rural areas, through the ages and in most developing countries, 
have operated in groups. More often than not the groups are formed to help members in 
carrying out farm work and in some cases to champion the social-economic 
empowerment agenda for women (Mayoux, 1998, Jakimow and Kilby, 2006). When 
MFIs designed the delivery of their services through groups, the development appears to 
have come as a natural blessing for women who are widely perceived to be more 
responsible than men (Edward and Olsen, 2006). Nevertheless this issue is declining in 
importance given that some new forms of MFIs do offer services to individual 
entrepreneurs irrespective of gender or group affiliations (Edward and Olsen, 2006). 
The concerns discussed in this and the preceding paragraphs demonstrate clearly how 
economic capital appears to exert dominance over other forms of capital, in this case 
social and cultural capital. 
 
The second method used in delivering microfinance services among socially oriented 
MFIs is individual-based. This methodology has grown partly out of criticisms extended 
to the group-based microfinancing approach discussed above. As would be expected in 
the absence of social capital, in the individual-based approach MSE owner-managers 
are required to raise loan collateral either in the form of land, business machines, 
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consigners
30
, and or chattels (Ledgerwood, 1999). However the individual method of 
microfinancing is still not clearly asset- and/or document-based as traditional financial 
institutions, i.e. widespread production, would have it. While a significant part of the 
risk is covered arguably by borrower consigners and chattel pledges, loan officers are 
held responsible (on a performance basis) for the entire loan granting and recovery 
process (Schmidt and Zeitinger, 1998). In essence therefore it would appear the risk of 
default is shared between the individual borrower and the MFI‟s staff representatives. 
One clear advantage of this model is that individuals are likely to keep their dignity and 
social position in society while at the same time accessing microfinance services suited 
to the peculiar circumstances of their enterprises.  
 
Given the collateral demands, the individual-based model of microfinancing is by 
default likely to target the marginally poor and hence exclude the core poor from 
accessing either microcredit and/or BDS. Some examples of MFIs that use individual-
based microfinancing include Association for the Development of Microenterprises 
(ADEMI) of the Dominican Republic, Kenya Women Finance Trust (KWFT) of Kenya, 
and Share microfinance of India.  
 
Self-sufficiency – commercial logic and microfinancing 
The period beginning in the early 1990s marked a new dawn in the field of 
microfinance. It appears that the legitimacy of the social logic driven approach to 
microfinancing had begun to be questioned, especially by resource-constrained donors. 
There were concerns that the altruistic-like approach to microfinance was either too 
expensive and/or not sufficiently effective in alleviating poverty (Morduch, 1999, 
Schmidt, 2010). Seemingly this development led to the adoption of a commercial logic 
to microfinancing by donors in general and consequently by practitioners in what 
appears to be a strategic response to coercive pressure from providers of seed capital. 
The rationality behind the new paradigm is that financial self-sustenance is imperative 
in institutionalising microfinancing practises. One key implication of the notion of 
financial sustainability is that, henceforth, MFIs need to streamline their operations, cut 
down on costs, and improve efficiency.  MFIs can then begin to tap into private and 
public resource markets (the perceived sustainable option used by most business 
enterprises) and hence lessen the funding burden on donors.   
                                                 
30
 Consigners are private individual persons who choose to act as guarantors to loan by an applicant who 
is not affiliated to a group.  
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The introduction of a commercial logic in the microfinance field saw practitioners shift 
significantly their delivery of both credit and BDS to MSEs. Goldmark (2006) reveals 
that use of BDS was no longer a prerequisite for MSE owner-managers‟ access to 
microcredit for many MFIs. As such, BDS was not seen to be a critical part of the 
MFI‟s service portfolio, although a few still strongly encouraged it. This development 
was led partly by claims, mostly by MFIs taking up a commercial outlook, of a general 
lack of demand for BDS among MSEs (a claim which appears consistent with earlier 
observations in literature, see chapter two section 2.4). This account is probably an 
example of coercive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), social and political pressure (Ma 
and Tayles, 2009) among lenders and borrowers alike. In addition some MFIs that had 
began as NGOs traded up to become mainstream commercial banks
31
 and, as such, had 
to comply with the strict financial sector regulations that demand separate accounting 
for credit and BDS, or requirements that financial institutions should not offer non-
financial services such as BDS. Under such circumstances, it is likely that microfinance 
practitioners would succumb to normative pressure and focus on exclusive provision of 
economic capital (microcredit) at the expense of other aspects of human capital 
development such as BDS.  
 
Regardless, coercive pressure is arguably the main reason behind commercialisation of 
microfinancing, partly driven by donor apathy and economic capital constraints. 
Following early indications of only marginal financial sustainability for MFIs operating 
in Latin America and parts of Asia, most donor agencies felt that BDS was an 
unnecessary cost in the interest of ensuring full financial sustainability of MFIs 
(Sievers, 2007). As Webster, Riopelle & Chidzero (1996) noted, during this period there 
was a general perception among practitioners that the ratio of cost to benefits of BDS 
provision was poor. As noted earlier similar sentiments appear common among MSE 
owner-managers, albeit for different motives. It is important to note that the apparent 
de-institutionalisation of BDS as a form of cultural capital in the field of microfinance is 
a clear example of devaluation of cultural capital and, more importantly, in the language 
of Bourdieu (1990), an act of symbolic violence being practised by agents of economic 
capital.   
 
                                                 
31
 Examples of MFIs that have become commercial banks include Kenya‟s K-rep bank, Share 
Microfinance of India, Bolivia‟s BancoSol, and Compartamos of Mexico, among others.   
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In an effort to reclaim legitimacy, policy makers and BDS practitioners under the 
auspices of the Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development 
(CDASED) took the sustainability challenge (functional pressure) positively and 
invented a new market development paradigm for BDS in the late 1990s (Sievers, 
2007). The new approach for BDS provision had two distinguishing characteristics in 
that it was both market-oriented and client-led; attributes that seem congruent with the 
existing socio-economic context.  In line with the new BDS paradigm, Goldmark (1999) 
noted that marketing services (especially those relating to inputs and outputs) and 
technology access services were both found to have some chance of sustainability. 
Demand for vocational skills training among micro start-ups was also indicated to be 
relatively high compared to more established enterprises.   
 
Following this development, several BDS programmes have been piloted and/or set up, 
mainly in developing countries; for example Bangladesh, Bolivia, India, Kenya, Mali 
and Zambia. This has been done mainly under the umbrella of the Emerging Markets 
Group (EMG) sponsored by various development agencies including The World Bank, 
USAID, Department for International Development (DFID), International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), 
among others. The programmes provide BDS interventions along the product value 
chain in specific sectors. For example in Kenya, BDS programmes have targeted sectors 
like horticulture, dairy, and fishing (KenyaBDS, 2007).  The current thinking is that in 
order to ensure sustainability, BDS practitioners need to develop products that address a 
distinct business weakness or provide a service that the enterprise cannot generate 
internally (Klyver, 2008, Matlay, 2004, Faoite et al., 2004, Boter, 2005, Berry and 
Sweeting, 2006, Sievers, 2007). In the words of Scott (1987)  such an effort could be 
seen as a case of BDS providers trying to not only re-invent their product to attain 
greater legitimacy among stakeholders, but also improve the cost-benefit ratio of BDS 
among MSE owner-managers. 
 
On the part of microcredit programmes, the proliferation of the commercial logic 
appears to have spurred a wave of „innovations‟. Firstly NGOs began to transform into 
quasi-financial institutions ushering in a commercial banking mode of practice into 
microfinancing (Young, 2010, Khandakar and Constantine, 2004a). Secondly, a 
minimalist approach in which credit is the only product becomes the modus operandi 
across the microfinance field. Except for a few highly principled MFIs, for example, 
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BRAC of Bangladesh, CARE, and Pro Mujer of Latin America (Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2010), savings, insurance and BDS do not appear to be part of the portfolio in 
most other cases. Thirdly, private investors (e.g. venture capitalists and hedge funds) 
have become active actors in the microfinance field as lenders (Schmidt, 2010). 
Fourthly, recently (2006) some MFIs went public
32
, listing on stock markets in order to 
enlarge their capital bases (Schmidt, 2010). If policy makers who championed self-
sustenance of microfinancing had a social consciousness-driven motive, then it appears 
they got more than they had hoped for. Clearly the entrance of venture capitalists and 
hedge fund managers to the scene of microfinance is a clear demonstration that the once 
development-conscious field is turning into an asset-class platform, driven by sheer 
profiteering. It is important to note that the latter category of „investors‟ are arguably 
largely to blame for the most recent (2008) global financial crisis whose full 
consequences are yet to come to bear, especially in the books of MFIs. 
 
Critics of the commercial approach to microfinancing abound (e.g. Schmidt, 2010, 
Khandakar and Constantine, 2004b, Morduch, 2000, Gibb, 2006b, Edward and Olsen, 
2006, Young, 2010). Using case data from India to inform a critique of paradigms and 
reality in the context of MFIs, authors (Young, 2010, Edward and Olsen, 2006) bring to 
the fore the downside of microfinance commercialisation. A similar view is shared by 
Gibb (2006b) who contributes to the literature on MSE development and the current 
debate on the sustainability of support services from a Chinese context. These authors 
argue that the future of the pillars that saw the birth and growth of microfinancing - 
empowerment and poverty alleviation, is seemingly bleak. The financial sustainability 
school of thought currently appears dominant in the complex poverty scene. First and 
foremost, the ideology behind the empowerment paradigm encourages an activist mode 
of participation in which women and perhaps men to a lesser extent, question, reflect 
on, and change the social structures in which they find themselves (Mayoux, 1998, 
Edward and Olsen, 2006, Young, 2010). In contrast the financial sustainability 
paradigm views empowerment is a means of educating women “..to be  compliant and 
efficient actors within the established structures of an expanding market economy” 
(Edward and Olsen, 2006, page 36).  Originally however the rationale behind the 
empowerment paradigm was to encourage an activist mode of participation. Therefore 
                                                 
32
 For example, Compartamos of Mexico, Equity bank of Kenya, and BRI unit Densa of Indonesia. 
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to some extent proponents of commercial logic driven microfinancing appear to have 
distorted the meaning of empowerment. 
 
Further critics point out that the positive results witnessed so far relate more to regular 
savings by clients and not their access to microcredit as such. In fact the dominance of 
the financial sustainability paradigm among MFIs has not only led to excessive interest 
rates but also the exclusion of the very poor, both in market targeting and delivery of 
services (Schmidt, 2010, Khandakar and Constantine, 2004b). At this stage it is 
important to note that the extent to which MSE support services can become sustainable 
(in the conventional break-even sense) while serving the very poor has not been 
established (Sievers and Vandenberg, 2007, Gibb, 2006b, Edward and Olsen, 2006).  
 
The proponents of the financial sustainability ideology argue that MFIs should adopt a 
neo-liberal market orientation and compete with mainstream commercial banks that 
have now introduced financial products targeting low income people (Ngugi, 2009).  
However one cannot help but wonder whether the once „un-bankable‟ have now become 
so „bankable‟ that financial institutions scramble for them! The next section explores 
briefly how various habituses appear to influence institutionalisation and regulations in 
microfinancing. 
 
3.3.3  Position-taking behaviour and the regulatory challenge in microfinancing 
As the microfinance field approaches maturity, the contestations of dominance between 
the proponents of either social or commercial logics, appear to become more 
pronounced. Although both camps may claim to be committed to the original mission of 
„fighting poverty‟, this may be largely a symbolic position aimed at legitimising actor 
practises. The symbolism arguably permeates actor behaviour across the entire field; for 
example, actors advocating the social logic favour adoption of a holistic approach to 
poverty reduction with the simple rationality that credit access is a necessary but not 
sufficient end in itself. Consequently, bilateral and multilateral donors who promote the 
social logic of microfinancing are likely to impress upon collaborating MFIs to design 
programmes that attend to the broad agenda for development, and in particular human 
capital development, among the poor in developing countries. While in the long-run 
financial sustainability appears to be encouraged, it is not the overriding principle in 
pricing microfinance services to the proponents of this school. On the contrary, 
commercialists favour a minimalist approach to microfinancing, probably expecting a 
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trickle-down effect for the economic benefits accruing from increased access to money 
among the poor. In this regard, on-lending practices adopted by affiliate MFIs are more 
often than not likely to be positioned for financial self-sustenance, a principle which not 
only serves the self-interests of the MFIs but also a key interest of the capital suppliers.  
 
The institutionalisation of microfinancing practises among various actors appears to be 
influenced largely by individual actor‟s habitus embedded within the specific logic at 
play. This is reflected arguably in the diversity of legal structures adopted by 
microfinance practitioners. With the genesis of microfinancing anchored in the world of 
NGOs, it is not surprising that the NGO structure and other semi-formal structural 
positioning (e.g. SACCOS, ROSCAs, and CBOs) appear favourable to most MFIs 
advocating for an altruistic approach to social-economic development of the poor. 
Given an habitus nurtured within a not-for profit environment, these institutional forms 
pride themselves on unmatched simplicity, flexibility and innovativeness in supplier–
client collaborative approach to service delivery, which makes them ideal for 
microfinancing among the poor. For MFIs and promoters of the commercial agenda to 
microfinancing, a formal, or towards formal, positioning behaviour informs their legal 
structural preferences. For example, MFIs targeting private capital markets often 
establish themselves as private limited liability companies. This is not surprising; 
because in a sense it is a reflection of a habitus that is congruent with market economics 
– for profit. Given this scenario it is not surprising that in Kenya, for instance, MFIs are 
affected by eight different statutes of law
33
 (see discussion in chapter two section 2.2.3).  
 
Although the position-taking behaviour displayed by the range of organisational 
identities adopted by MFIs may be credited partly for innovativeness in the design and 
delivery of services, it poses a major regulatory challenge. Just as the underlying logics 
are discordant, so are the ownership and governance principles of the various structural 
positions. On the one hand are the open-ended membership outfits like SACCOs and 
CBOs, while on the other are the closed gate institutional types run by boards of private 
companies. If all actors were to act in „good faith‟ in the interest of fighting poverty, 
governance would not be an issue. Unfortunately the good mission of microfinancing 
has not been spared by fraudsters.   
                                                 
33
 In Kenya MFIs are registered by eight different statutes of law which include; Non Governmental 
Organisation Co-ordination Act; Building Societies Act; Trustees Act; Societies Act; Co-operative 
Societies Act; Companies Act; Banking Act; and The Kenya Post Office Savings Bank Act (Omino, 
2005). 
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Numerous concerns have been raised in various parts of the world about the exploitative 
behaviour of some actors, for example the Compartamos case
34
 in Mexico (Schmidt, 
2010) and in Kenya, cases of MFIs operating pyramid-like schemes (Central Bank of 
Kenya, 2007). In addition, in some cases the manner in which loan recovery is 
administered has drawn accusations of taking a „mob-justice‟ approach even to the 
extent of involving police, as though defaulters were criminals [see cases in India and 
Bangladesh reported in (Young, 2010) and (Smets and Bahre, 2004) respectively]. More 
importantly the promotion of credit among poor people without sufficient support in 
knowledge and skills to run profitable businesses arguably amounts to loading the poor 
with an additional burden – debt. Besides the MFIs, position-taking behaviour is 
reported also among poor clients. For example in Nepal, subversive practices geared to 
transgressing MFI‟s protocols have been reported (Shakya and Rankin, 2008) among 
clients. Field interviews undertaken by these authors captured clients‟ testimonies of 
their engagement in loan swapping (repaying debt with debt), „illicit investments‟, and 
deliberate evasion of MFIs‟ guidelines. Such client activities are likely to be indicative, 
in the language of Bourdieu (1990), of symbolic violence, directed towards the 
normative pressure embedded in existing practices in the field of microfinance. 
 
Microfinance regulatory initiatives  
Various countries have adopted diverse legal frameworks to address the regulatory 
challenge of microfinancing. On the one hand are countries which adopt a prudential 
regulatory system, while on the other hand are those which favour non-prudential 
regulation. The aim of prudential regulation is twofold; one to avoid the risk of collapse 
of a country‟s financial system and two, to protect the economic interests of small 
depositors (Christen et al., 2003, Satta, 2004).  This is the regulation accorded 
mainstream commercial banks and deposit-taking MFIs in most developing countries. 
In contrast, non-prudential regulation is geared to streamlining the conduct of the 
business of microfinancing. In this regard, the regulations focus on a wide range of 
issues, for example enabling establishment of MFIs, crime prevention, credit rating, 
                                                 
34
 In the mid 1990s, Mexico inflation rate increased to about 100%.  Comapartamos, a Mexican MFI, 
acted prudently and adjusted its interest rates in order to keep its real rate positive. However after a 
relatively short period the inflation fell to its usual level below 10%, unfortunately Comapartamos did not 
revise its interest rates accordingly, which consequently lead to a stream of supernormal profits for its 
initial investors after an IPO in 2007 (Schmidt 2010).    
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setting guidelines on interest rates and sources of capital, and limitations on foreign 
ownership, among others (Christen et al., 2003, Omino, 2005).  
 
Where the above regulatory framework has been set up, the uptake rate among MFIs 
has not been encouraging. According to Satta (2004) in Tanzania as at 2003, there was 
not a single NGO – based MFI that had come forth to be licensed under the 
government‟s newly established prudential framework. A similar experience is observed 
in Kenya (see discussions in the previous chapter section 2.3.4) where as at the end of 
2009 only one microfinance NGO (Faulu Kenya) appeared to be making effort towards 
getting licensed under the Microfinance Act 2008.  
 
These accounts may be in part a reflection of either lack of will to question the 
legitimacy and de-institutionalise current structures or a strategic response mechanism 
to state-led coercive pressure adopted by MFIs. More importantly however, the above 
accounts demonstrate the apparent position-taking behaviour embedded in the diverse 
institutional structures in the field of microfinance. Alongside the prudential regulations 
being introduced are strict supervisory guidelines to be undertaken either by central 
banks or specially created state departments in the respective countries. With the 
exception of a few commercially oriented MFIs, the emergent regulatory environment 
does not appear „in sync‟ with either the habitus or the social contexts within which 
most MFIs operate currently. It is important to note that the choices an MFI makes with 
regard to structure and nature of practice (i.e. its service portfolio) cannot be isolated 
from its institutional context, because microfinance actors and their interests are 
constructed institutionally (Özen and Küskü, 2009).  
 
Away from the theoretical underpinnings of the practice of microfinance, attention turns 
to empirical investigations of the extent to which the various approaches to 
microfinancing impact on the poverty situation of the poor. As already stated in chapter 
one and reflected in discussions in this chapter, evaluators of the impact of 
microfinancing on poverty apply varied methods and their results are contested. As a 
reflection of microfinance practice variation and the contending logics (being social and 
commercial) discussed previously in this chapter, poor MSE owner managers in 
developing countries find themselves in one of four categories with respect to 
microcredit and BDS receipt as shown in figure 3 below.  
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Figure 3: Categorisation of MSE owner-managers on account of access to  
     microcredit and BDS 
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In view of the foregoing and the literature in this and chapter two, this study is 
motivated to test the following hypotheses; 
 
H1:  MSEs with no access to either microcredit or BDS perform more poorly, on 
 owner- managers‟ self reported score of performance, compared to MSEs that 
 have access to  both microcredit and BDS. 
 
H2:  MSEs with access to microcredit without BDS perform more poorly, on owner-
 managers‟ self reported score of performance, compared to MSEs that have 
 access  to both microcredit and BDS. 
 
H3: MSEs with access to BDS without microcredit perform more poorly, on owner-
 managers‟ self reported score of performance, compared to MSEs that have 
 access  to both microcredit and BDS. 
 
H4: MSEs that have access to either microcredit or BDS perform better, on owner-
 managers‟ self reported score of performance, compared to MSEs with access to 
 neither microcredit nor BDS.  
 
From a Bourdieusian view, hypotheses H1, H3, and H4 test for the differential effect of 
access to cultural and/or economic capital on MSE performance. Hypothesis H2 
provides a test on the two competing logics (being social and commercial logics, from a 
neo-institutional perceptive) in the field of microfinance.  
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In developing countries the poor venture into business initially for survival purposes 
rather than conscious effort to practice entrepreneurship (Wood, 2006). As a result most 
MSE owner-managers lack basic business management skills to run their enterprises 
successfully (Akoten, 2007a). For reason of limited access to information more often 
than not MSE owner-managers are unlikely to solicit for BDS from MFIs or other 
sources in the market. MFIs have tended to use a group-based mode of service delivery 
in the interest of accessing and enhancing the networks of social capital. MFIs 
practising an integrated approach to microfinancing often offer BDS in-house, with 
minimal collaboration with experts if any, and as a pre-requisite to microcredit access. 
Under this arrangement it is unlikely that the quality and delivery of BDS adequately 
addresses the diverse needs and skills gap among MSE owner-managers, however basic 
(Boter, 2005, Chi et al., 2008).  
 
It could be argued that in a situation where MSE owner-managers‟ BDS needs are met, 
skills are likely to improve and possibly as a result the performance of the enterprise. 
Hence;  
H5:  Participant MSE owner managers in receipt of BDS that is perceived to 
be more effectively delivered are more likely to be satisfied with 
currently supplied BDS, compared to participant MSE owner managers 
in receipt of less effectively delivered BDS. 
 
H6:  Participant MSE owner managers who are satisfied with currently 
supplied BDS are more likely to report higher self-rated performance 
scores for their businesses, compared to participant MSE owner 
managers who are not satisfied with currently supplied BDS. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter proposes a theoretical framework that can be used to explain the 
emergence and the dynamics that mark the development of microfinance practice. Two 
complementary relational conceptions; Pierre Bourdieu‟s theory of practice and Neo-
institutionalism are put forward. Notably the notions of field, capital, and habitus of 
Bourdieu are used to outline the various actors and the networks at play in 
microfinancing. Similarly, neo-institutional conceptions of institutions and logic, 
legitimacy, and isomorphic and other forces of institutional change are suggested  as 
appropriate to  explain structural and technical variations in the practice of 
microfinance. 
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The chapter employs the above theoretical framework and related concepts to discuss 
and provide a critique to literature relating to the genesis, practice, and the logics that 
influence delivery of not only microcredit but also BDS embedded in various 
microfinance programmes. Two contending logics, social and commercial, are noted to 
influence practice variation in the field of microfinance. The practice variations 
discussed in this chapter demonstrate how innovative MFIs have been in their strategic 
attempts to institutionalise their practices in the context of MSEs – their target market. 
Consequently the chapter outlines this study‟s hypotheses for which methodological 
considerations and tests are presented in the following chapters. 
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4.0 Chapter Four: Methodology for the Study 
4.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this is study is to evaluate MSE owner-managers‟ perceptions of 
the impact of microcredit and various forms of business development services (BDS) in 
their association with the performance of their micro and small enterprises (MSEs). This 
chapter presents a detailed description of the methodology adopted in this study to 
achieve the above objective.  
 
The chapter begins with an exposition of the various methodologies used in recent 
studies in the field of microfinance. This is followed by a description of the specific 
study design chosen. In this section justification of the chosen design as well as 
exposition of its limitations is provided. The subsequent section discusses the 
population, the sampling frame and selection of participants. This is followed by a 
detailed account of data collection tools and procedures. The section also provides a 
description of the nature of the instruments used to collect data. The last section in this 
chapter explains the techniques used in analysing data. 
 
4.2 Methodological options in Microfinance Research   
In recent years impact assessment has become an increasingly important aspect of 
development activity as agencies, and particularly micro-credit donors, seek to ensure 
that their funds are well spent. There is little doubt that MFIs are becoming an important 
component of strategies to reduce poverty by promoting the development of micro and 
small enterprises (Hulme, 2000). However knowledge about the achievements of 
microfinance initiatives remains not only partial but also contestable. As Hulme (2000) 
further notes, on the one hand are studies arguing that microfinance leads to beneficial 
economic and social impacts (e.g. Remenyi, 1991; Otero and Rhyne, 1994;  Schuler et 
al., 1997; Khandker, 1998), while on the other hand there are writers who caution 
against such optimism pointing to the negative impacts that microfinance may have (e.g. 
Buckley, 1997; Montgomery, 1996; Rogaly, 1996 and Wood and Sharrif, 1997). Given 
this state of affairs, impact assessment of microfinance operations remains an important 
issue for both academic and development researchers, in general, and to poverty 
alleviation policy-makers in particular.  
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This section provides a review of the methodological options for assessing the impact of 
microfinance services. Before examining the specific methods adopted in recent 
microfinance research it is important to understand the context of impact assessment in 
microfinance studies. 
4.2.1 Context of microfinance research 
Impact assessment studies, unlike routine microfinance program evaluations, focus on 
the outcomes of microfinance interventions on the livelihoods of clients, rather than the 
association between institutional inputs and outputs. The main objective of impact 
assessment studies is to integrate the notions of „proving‟ impacts and „improving‟ 
microfinance interventions (Hulme, 2000). In this regard impact assessment studies are 
encouraged by both donors and microfinance practitioners so that they can learn what is 
being achieved and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their services. 
Specifically for donors, impact assessment studies are an avenue for getting more 
information about program effectiveness than is available from the normal progress 
reports written by MFIs. Such information can help in meeting the increasing 
accountability demands of their parent-state authorities and, more specifically, in 
confronting anti-aid ideologists.  
In assessing the impact of microfinance services the choice of conceptual frameworks 
has tended to focus on three main elements; a model of the impact chain that the impact 
assessment study is to examine, specification of the unit(s) or levels at which impact is 
assessed, and the specification of the types of impact that are to be assessed (Hulme, 
2000, Schmidt and Kolodinsky, 2007, Wood, 2006).  Models of impact chains 
distinguish between two main schools of thought; the „intended beneficiary‟ school and 
the „intermediary‟ school (Hulme, 2000). Proponents of the intended beneficiary school 
aim to reach as far down the impact chain as possible to assess the impact of MFI 
programs on individuals and households. On the contrary, the focus of the intermediary 
school is mainly on the very beginning of the impact chain, examining the outreach and 
institutional sustainability of MFIs.  
Depending on the school of thought, the unit(s) of assessment in impact assessment 
studies may be the household (or individuals), the enterprise, microfinance programs, or 
the broader institutional environment within which relevant MFIs operate. Across these 
diverse units of assessment, impact may be assessed on either economic variables, such 
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as income, expenditure, consumption and assets; or socio-political attributes, such as an 
individual‟s control over resources and his or her involvement in decision-making at the 
household or community level.  
4.2.2 Impact assessment methodologies  
While the impact assessment issue (i.e. what needs to be measured) has been outlined 
clearly in the literature, the appropriate methods for analysis are not so explicit.  At the 
core of impact assessment studies is the challenge to establish a cause-effect 
relationship. In this regard impact assessment methods need sufficient evidence for the 
attribution of specific effects (impacts) to specific causes (microfinance interventions). 
Assessors use a variety of methods currently none of which can claim supremacy over 
the others. In general, impact assessment methodologies may fall in either of three 
broad categories namely; scientific, behavioural, or participatory approaches (Hulme, 
2000, Wood, 2006).  These approaches are explained next. 
 
Scientific approach 
The scientific method seeks to demonstrate a cause-effect relationship in microfinance 
interventions to the poverty situation facing poor communities around the world. The 
methodology holds on the premise that effects can be attributed to causes through a 
systematic experimentation process. For example, a particular stimulus (e.g. micro 
credit) to a particular object (e.g. a microfinance client) in a rigorously controlled 
environment is judged to be the cause of the observed effect.  
 
As Hulme (2000) observes, with its roots in the physical sciences, this classical 
experimental approach is impractical in microfinance impact assessment because of the 
social nature of the subject matter. In the natural sciences it is possible statistically to 
prove attribution to an outcome with certainty, but it is not so easy in the behavioural 
sciences. Wood (2006) encountered the attribution challenge when studying the internal 
predictors of business performance in small firms. Using a logistic regression the study 
sought to identify the factors that account for improved performance for small 
businesses in the UK.  The study established that internal factors may explain up to 
twice as much variance in small business performance as external economic factors. 
Wood assessed small business performance by measuring return on investment, profits, 
turnover or number of customers. The parameters used in Wood (2006) were mostly 
financial in nature. However, it should be noted that financial criteria on their own do 
91 
 
not necessarily adequately cover the diversity and complexity of goals followed by 
many owner-managers of small firms. Besides profits, other goals pursued by small 
firms often include survival and business stability. Sometimes owner-managers may 
even pursue more personal aims related to status and pride (Curran et al., 1997). Such 
non-quantifiable variables make it difficult to measure business performance in typical 
impact assessment studies that use the scientific approach.  
 
The most popular methodology used in impact assessment studies currently is quasi-
experimental design – a variation of classical experimental setting – designed to suit 
human activity (Khalily, 2004). Unlike true experiments, quasi-experiments seek to 
compare the outcomes of an intervention with a simulation of what the outcomes would 
have been, had there been no intervention. For example in microfinance impact 
assessment this means ordinarily that borrowers serve as the experimental group while 
non-borrowers are the control group. In a typical quasi-experimental setting, impact is 
assessed by making a before - after comparison of a population that received 
microfinance services and an identical population that did not receive the services.  
 
Whilst the above procedure is the methodology adopted in this study and this may be a 
major improvement to the scientific method in handling human activity, there are still 
several challenges to it. For instance given the level of business education, the accuracy 
and adequacy of borrowers‟ records or memories may be questionable when interviews 
or surveys request information from these borrowers. This means that effects that may 
be attributed to access to micro credit may have little to do with borrowing; for instance 
they may have more to do with enforced savings that generally precede the ability to 
borrow. This study does not attempt to audit the accuracy of MSE business records; 
rather it assesses the impact of BDS and microcredit on MSE performance based on 
owner-managers‟ perceptions of reality in their businesses. 
 
It is important to note that sometimes the poor can be tempted to borrow informally 
from multiple sources and, as such, may not be in a position to account for the use of 
specific funds.  As such, impact assessment studies using experimentation, in general 
are likely to face problems of sample selection bias and misspecification of underlying 
causal relationships (Khalily, 2004). For instance, selection bias may occur for several 
reasons, including incongruence between treatment and control groups used, the 
Hawthorne effect resulting from short-term positive response from the treatment group, 
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and inseparability of study elements in both groups within the same locality. Sometimes 
biases may occur as a result of fungibility of the treatment (e.g., when a loan is 
transferred from a borrower to someone else or when the loan is not used in the planned 
way (Khalily, 2004). 
 
While fungibility has been acknowledged as a major drawback in impact assessment 
studies (see Khalily, 2004), some of the recent researchers in this field do not hold this 
position. For example, Hulme (2000) observes that for studies looking at the community 
or the household economic portfolio, fungibility is not a problem for the researcher, but 
it is a vital strategy for the client. The most important returns on investment could be on 
consumption (in terms of developing human capital through school fees and doctors‟ 
bills, or buying food at a time of crisis when credit terms from traders may be extremely 
high). From this perspective the assessor needs to appreciate the fact that 
microenterprises are firms whose inputs and outputs are not only difficult to identify but 
which also cannot be measured precisely.  The assessor should therefore not attempt to 
control for fungibility (to prove impact) but rather recognise that fungibility may be a 
process to be encouraged as a way to improve the assessment. It is acknowledged that 
loan fungibility is a problem, especially for studies focusing on the enterprise (Hulme, 
2000, Khalily, 2004), as is the case in this study. However the objective of this study is 
not to control for fungibility with the aim of „proving‟ impact; rather the aim here is to 
test for the existence of an association between use of BDS and/or microcredit and 
performance of MSE owner-managers‟ businesses, irrespective of the number of credit 
sources used or the individual or household use to which borrowed funds might be put.  
 
The misspecification of underlying causal relationships often arises due to the 
assumption that causality is unidirectional. While this may hold for the physical 
sciences, it is unlikely to be the case for interventions involving human activity. There 
are cases where path modelling, a unidirectional technique, is used to measure the 
extent and strength of causal relationships. For instance, Schmidt and Kolodinsky 
(2007) while examining factors that lead or mediate client success in a microenterprise 
development program, used path analysis to examine the relationships between 
microfinance client characteristics, program activities, and impacts. The study used a 
reflexive control design in which participant outcomes after microenterprise 
development training were compared to the baseline collected at intake before receiving 
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microfinance services.  The findings indicate that program participants‟ experience 
increased income, reduced public assistance, job creation, and asset development. 
At face value these findings may seem robust; however one needs to understand the 
limitations of path analysis, the technique used to generate the results. Although path 
analysis can evaluate causal hypotheses, and in some (restricted) situations can test 
between two or more causal hypotheses, it cannot establish the direction of causality. 
We need to understand that path analysis is mostly useful when we already have a clear 
hypothesis to test, or a small number of hypotheses. The technique has little use at the 
exploratory stage of research. Besides path analysis can be used only in testing 
unidirectional relationships.  
 
In microfinance programs, as is the case with most forms of human activity, causation 
may also run from impact back to the intervention. Mosley (1997) illustrated this with 
an example of a microfinance program where field staff put pressure on a borrower to 
repay a loan. The strategy was a success in the short term because the borrower sold 
assets (machinery, land) to repay the loan, however it should be noted that such pressure 
does not reduce the probability of non- repayment in the longer term. Selling productive 
assets is hardly the way to improve future enterprise performance. Hulme (2000) 
concurs with this view and cautions that such reverse causation need not necessarily be 
negative, and from the perspective of more process-oriented analytical frameworks, is 
essential if MFI programs and their staff are to continually learn from their experience 
and improve (rather than prove) their impact. 
 
Behavioural approach  
The main feature of the behavioural approach to impact assessment is an inductive 
approach. The behavioural method does not try to prove impact within statistical limits 
of probability. Rather, the method seeks to provide an interpretation of the processes 
involved in the intervention and of the impacts that have a high level of plausibility. The 
behavioural approach recognises that there are usually different, and often conflicting, 
accounts of what has happened and what has been achieved by a microfinance program.  
Hulme (2000) acknowledges that impact assessment studies usually cannot demonstrate 
a causal link as they are not able to generate a clear cut control group without 
microfinance program influence. Instead, causality is inferred from the information 
about the causal chain collected from intended beneficiaries and key informants, and by 
comparisons with data from secondary sources about changes in out-of-program areas 
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(Schmidt and Kolodinsky, 2007, Wood, 2006).  Problems also arise because often the 
terms „survey‟ and „case study‟ are applied to work which has been done in an ad hoc 
manner and does not achieve minimum professional standards in terms of sample or 
informant selection and the rigour of data collection and analysis. This is most likely the 
case with impact assessment studies that base data collection only in program areas that 
are performing well, survey clients with high loan repayment rates, and/or infer that the 
data collected in one area apply to all clients without explaining or testing this 
assumption. This study is designed with these limitations in mind as discussed in the 
next section.  
 
Participatory learning and action approach 
The proponents of participatory learning and action (see Hulme, 2000) believe that there 
are multiple realities in microfinance interventions. They emphasise the fact that before 
any impact assessment is undertaken, the individuals concerned must ask themselves 
„whose reality is most important?‟. It could be argued that the answer to this question is 
that the perceived reality of the poor is supreme if microfinance is about empowering 
the poor. As a result the first step towards empowerment is then to ensure that the poor 
take the lead in problem identification and analysis and knowledge creation (Hulme, 
2000). 
 
The accuracy and reliability of participatory methods varies widely, just like scientific 
surveys. The reliability of the results depends largely not only on the motivation and 
skills of facilitators, but also on those being investigated and the ways in which their 
perceptions of the research process are addressed (Mayoux, 1997). From a scientific 
perspective, impact assessment studies have had difficulties in conceptualising impact, 
to the extent of being able to identify common variables and measures of impact that 
may permit comparison of results. One of the outstanding features of the participatory 
learning and action method is its involvement of program participants in all aspects of 
microfinance impact assessments. Being qualitatively oriented, the technique 
encourages participation of program participants in design, analysis and interpretation 
of assessment results (Hulme, 2000). While involvement of program participants is in 
all respects important, one needs to be aware of the problem of respondents‟ motivation 
and representation. Beneficiaries may be the easiest group to approach because they 
may generally feel obliged to take part in surveys hoping to improve the service quality 
of their microfinance programs.  
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Hulme (2000) observes that motivation is a more challenging issue. This is because, 
ideally, control groups have no connection with a microfinance program and as such 
they have no incentive to cooperate in a research exercise. In many cases, however, the 
amusement value of being interviewed could prove to be an important psychological 
reward. The problems of response sufficiency increase significantly if longitudinal data 
are collected, as second and third interviews have much less amusement value and 
response rates may drop below acceptable limits, which may render the validity of 
participatory learning and action studies questionable. 
 
In summary the desire of MFIs, donors and impact assessors to produce results that 
provide evidence of microfinance impact at high levels of statistical confidence has 
often driven the design of impact assessment studies. As a result Hulme (2000) cautions 
against the danger of exaggerated extrapolation of impact assessment results from small 
sample surveys. In this thesis it is advocated that impact assessment effectiveness 
should not be equated with the level of causality that a study can claim. While all 
studies must pursue rigour, whether the work is quantitative or qualitative, the 
effectiveness of an impact assessment methodology will depend on how well it achieves 
a fit between its objectives, techniques, results and most importantly its context. There 
may not be an optimal methodology for impact assessment in the field of microfinance.  
Combining the aspects of scientific, behavioural, and the participatory learning and 
action approaches may be the most appropriate approach. 
 
4.3.  Study Design  
This study takes a Q-Squared (mixed methods) approach to investigating the 
hypotheses. As a result two samples of participants are used. The main sample (mostly 
used for quantitative analyses) consists of MSE owner-managers while the second is 
made up of independent researchers, microfinance and BDS agency representatives. 
Although the study adopts a predominantly quantitative orientation, qualitative data is 
collected (mainly from participants in the second sample) in order to triangulate the 
evidence of perceived impact of the use of BDS and microcredit on the growth and 
performance of MSEs. With regard to the quantitative aspects of the study, the focus is 
on the scientific method and it specifically adopts a quasi-experimental research design 
(see Creswell, 2003, Cooper and Schindler, 2006, Shadish et al., 2002). Participants are 
classified into four groups (see Figure 4 below) on the basis of their use of BDS and 
microcredit so that control groups can be created. 
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Figure 4: Participant categories 
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Category one (c1) is made up of those MSE owner-managers who use both microcredit 
and BDS. This is arguably the cohort of MSE owner managers who appear to benefit 
from the social logic driven mode of microfinancing. The second category (c2) consists 
of MSE owner-managers who use microcredit without BDS, being beneficiaries (by 
choice or otherwise) of commercial logic driven microfinancing. The third category (c3) 
comprises MSE owner-managers who use BDS but do not use microcredit. These are 
participant MSE owner managers who only have access to cultural capital but not 
economic capital. The fourth category (c4) represents MSE owner-managers who do not 
use either microcredit or BDS, being users of neither social nor commercial logic driven 
form of microfinancing. While participant MSE owner-managers in categories c1, c2 
and c3 comprise the quasi-experimental groups, participant MSE owner-managers in 
category c4 represent the control group. In the absence of a true baseline for all 
participant MSE owner-manager businesses, an ex post facto procedure (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2006) is employed in which only one set of observations is taken across all 
participants. A visual model of the quasi-experimental research design appears on 
Figure 5 below.    
 
The study employs haphazard sampling in which participant MSE owner managers are 
selected in no particular predetermined sequence. Participants are then placed into the 
respective experimental categories based upon the characteristics of their microcredit 
and BDS uptake (see Figure 4). In testing Hypotheses 1 – 4, which are derived from 
Research Question 4, multiple regression is applied to observations from the appropriate 
experimental categories.  In this way perceived MSE performance is tested as a function 
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of attributes of participant category cohorts and demographic characteristics as informed 
by the literature (see chapter two).   
 
Thus in testing H1, which posits that MSEs without microcredit or BDS perform more 
poorly compared to MSEs that have access to both microcredit and BDS, owner-
managers‟ self reported performance score is regressed on indicator variables for 
participant categories c1 and c4, and control variables.  In testing H2, which posits that  
MSEs with access to microcredit without BDS perform more poorly compared to MSEs 
that have access to both microcredit and BDS owner-managers‟ self reported 
performance score is regressed on indicator variables for participant categories c1 and 
c2 and control variables. In testing H3, which posits that MSEs with access to BDS 
without microcredit perform more poorly compared to MSEs that have access to both, 
owner-managers‟ self reported performance score is regressed on indicator variables for 
participant categories c1 and c3 and control variables. In testing H4, which posits that 
MSEs that have access to either microcredit or BDS perform better compared to MSEs 
with access to neither microcredit nor BDS, owner-managers‟ self reported performance 
score is regressed on indicator variables for participant categories c1, c2, c3 and c4 and 
control variables.  
 
Figure 5: Visual representation of experimental design  
R X1 O1 E1    = (O1 - O4) 
R X2 O2 E21  = (O2 - O4) 
E22  =  E21 - E1
35a 
R X3 O3 E31  = (O3 - O4) 
   E32   =  E31 - E1
35b
 
R  O4  
Legend: 
R = random selection of participants and then assignment of participant MSE owner-managers across the four 
participant categories; X1 = use of both microcredit and BDS; X2 = use of microcredit; X3 = use of BDS; O1 = 
owner-manager self-rated performance scores for c1 MSEs; O2 = owner-manager self-rated performance 
scores for c2 MSEs; O3 = owner-manager self-rated performance scores for c3 MSEs; O4 = owner-manager 
self-rated performance scores for c4 MSEs; E1 = perceived effect of X1; E21 = perceived effect of X2; E22 = 
perceived effect of X2, less the effect of X1;  E31 = perceived effect of X3; E32 = perceived effect of X3 less the 
effect of X1. 
 
Whereas most of the previous impact assessment studies have used a quasi-
experimental design to assess the impact of microcredit at either the institutional or 
program level (Hashemi et al., 1996, Mustafa et al., 1996, Pitt and Khandker, 1998, 
                                                 
35
a & b : E22 and E32 measure the perceived effect of use of MFI credit without BDS and use of BDS 
without MFI credit, respectively. Due to sample size limitations these parameters are only tested for 
significance on a univariate basis as later reported in chapter six. 
98 
 
Coleman, 1999, Dunn and Arbuckle, 2001), this study seeks to assess impact at the 
microenterprise-level. It is argued here that the enterprise or rather the MSE is the 
engine of economic empowerment in the fight against poverty (Arch, 2005). With their 
focus on outreach and institutional sustainability (Hulme, 2000, Khalily, 2004), it is 
likely that institutional-level impact assessments provide an aggregate picture of 
microfinance impact with partial (if any) account of how access to BDS or microcredit 
affects the lives of ordinary people. On the contrary, the MSE may be seen as the only 
major economic entity that has direct relevance to the individual and, by extension, the 
household. While targeting the MSE and its performance rather than program outcomes, 
this study provides an opportunity to directly and specifically assess the impact of BDS 
and microcredit not only on the user, but also from a user‟s perspective. 
 
Most studies that examine impact limit it to microcredit only (e.g. Dunn and Arberkle, 
2001; Khandker , 2005; Goldberg, 2005; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2008), with a few 
extending it to other complementary services like training (for example, Sievers and 
Vandenberg, 2007). This study examines the impact of not only microcredit but also 
BDS on the performance of MSEs. The study assesses the possibility of synergistic 
benefits that might accrue to MSEs that use both services. In this way, the study 
represents an attempt to assess the impact of both BDS and microcredit empirically 
from a user‟s perspective rather than that of the provider of either or both services, 
although qualitative interviews with MFI institution representatives do take place also. 
 
4.3.1 Justification for study design   
Behavioural and participatory learning and action approaches to impact assessment by 
their nature require involvement and cooperation of multiple parties to be successful. 
Besides the complex procedures involved in these approaches, it is expected that any 
study adopting either approach has to be longitudinal in its orientation. Adopting a 
longitudinal approach is arguably inappropriate for this study for a number of reasons.  
 
Firstly, a longitudinal approach is impractical due to time and resource constraints, in 
that it would require a significant time lag between the initial and subsequent 
measurement of treatment effects.  Secondly, a longitudinal design by its nature 
demands a before-after experimental setting, which is likely to introduce several validity 
threats (e.g. testing, instrumentation, maturation, and mortality) to the study. Thirdly, 
involvement of multiple parties (as is the case for behavioural and participatory learning 
99 
 
and action designs), although rich in ideas, runs the risk of breeding conflicts of interest 
besides breaching the bounds of anonymity, a key requirement for University Human 
Ethics Research Committee approval. Lastly, the accuracy of data gathered through 
structured interviews (as is the case in this study) depends largely on trust between the 
researcher and participants. While it could be straightforward to secure trust for the 
initial interview with a participant, this may prove difficult with subsequent interviews, 
especially where multiple parties are involved. Subsequent interview sessions have the 
potential to raise suspicion on the part of the participants as to any vested interests of the 
researcher, which is likely to confound study results. This is so because it would be 
obvious to the participants that anonymity does not exist, more of the participants‟ time 
would be requested, plus there may be heightened fear that longitudinal information 
may be followed up by authorities (e.g. tax, occupational health and safety, and labour 
rights).  In light of these reasons, the cross-sectional approach adopted by this study is 
the most appropriate.  
 
As seen in the previous section, quasi-experimental design has been commonly 
preferred when assessing the impact of microfinance (see Morduch, 1999, Khalily, 
2004). Compared to the other two approaches, behavioural and participatory learning 
and action, the quasi-experimental design is the most economical yet effective in 
addressing the primary objective of this study. With the random selection of and 
subsequent placement of participants to the respective categories on account of their use 
or otherwise of microcredit and/or BDS, the design enables comparison of MSEs‟ 
performance across the four participant categories. 
 
As noted above (in section 4.2.2), impact assessment studies in microfinance face three 
key limitations especially where an experimental design is used; namely selection bias, 
misspecification of underlying causal relationships and fungibility of credit. First to 
minimise the effect of selection bias as well as other relevant threats to internal validity 
[e.g. history, maturation, testing, and instrumentation (Cooper and Schindler, 2006)], 
participant MSE owner-managers are selected at random with haphazard sampling to 
maximise the possibility of equivalence of all four required categories. It is only after 
this random approach to potential participants and their agreement to participate that 
effort is devoted to place participant MSE owner-managers to the relevant participant 
category. In addition, as explained later in this chapter, all participants in the MSE 
owner-manager interviews are owner-managers of MSEs that have no more than ten 
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employees. In this regard therefore all participants‟ businesses are similar in size. 
Although there may be slight variation in size and/or nature of economic activity, these 
variations can reasonably be expected to be randomly distributed across all participant 
groups, irrespective of the use or non-use of either microcredit or BDS. In this way the 
study design effectively minimises the effect of most of the threats to internal validity 
including selection bias. 
 
Second, the potential for misspecification of the direction of the causal relationship (i.e. 
use of both BDS and microcredit leads to improved MSE performance) is 
acknowledged. It is plausible that owner-managers of MSEs that are doing well are 
likely to seek BDS and credit because they can better afford to and in order to further 
improve their fortunes. It is important to note that with a highly equivalent control 
group, the reverse direction of influence is not a major problem because the 
phenomenon (if present) is likely to occur randomly in the population. Notwithstanding, 
in this study the emphasis is not on „proving‟ impact, which cannot be accomplished 
other than in highly controlled experimental conditions. Rather it is in testing for a 
positive association between use of both BDS and microcredit, and performance of the 
participant owner managers‟ enterprises. 
 
Third while fungibility of credit is acknowledged, its presence may not necessarily 
confound the relationship under investigation in this study. This is so because while 
most of the other impact assessment studies focus on a particular program or 
institution(s) (e.g. Zohir and Martin, 2004), this study does not limit itself in such a 
way. The emphasis here is on impact of the use of BDS and microcredit on MSE 
performance using data from users of multiple providers of either. This industry-wide 
approach is consistent with the methodology adopted by Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 
(2008), who examined the impact of microfinance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further, 
in the interview protocol, attempts are made to not only capture information about 
multiple sources of credit but also to specify the motive for borrowing (see Annex 2). 
This information is then used to control for fungibility of credit in the multivariate tests 
of hypotheses reported in later chapters of this study. Of course use of such control 
variables is dependent on honest answers being received to the interview questions, but 
this is true of any such research. However the assured and unambiguous anonymity 
offered to participants (no names were requested) and the fact that the author is 
independent of any MFI or BDS provider should assist with eliciting truthful responses.  
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In summary with random selection of completely anonymous participants, classification 
of participants into the respective cells until the targeted number is reached for each, the 
creation of a control group, coupled with the control for fungibility of credit in 
multivariate testing, the design of this study keeps the effects of the above limitations at 
a minimum. In so doing the design not only helps to elicit the participant MSE owner-
managers‟ perceptions of the impact of the use of BDS and/or microcredit, but also is 
likely to provide evidence of the contribution of BDS and microcredit to MSE 
performance, jointly and singly.  
 
4.4 Study site and Population  
The study is cast in Kenya, a country in the Sub-Saharan region of Africa. Kenya 
portrays a typical developing economy with MSEs making up 18 per cent of the 
country‟s GDP and employing up to 72 per cent of the work force (Ministry of Planning 
and National Development – Kenya, 2006). Kenya is host also to one of the most 
established and fastest growing MFIs in Africa, Equity bank. This bank was the winner 
of the International Finance Corporation‟s (IFC) award for the most sustainable bank in 
Africa and the Middle East, 2009 (Larsen, 2009). This study recruits as participants 
MSE owner-managers in four purposively selected cities in Kenya, Nairobi, Nakuru, 
Eldoret, and Machakos (see Annex 1 for a study site map) and their environs. Nairobi is 
chosen because it is the metropolitan capital and represents a wide range of MSE 
activity. By contrast, the other three sites capture MSEs more likely to be associated 
with either agriculture (a key pillar of Kenya‟s economy) or other semi-urban types of 
enterprises. Additionally these sites also represent a critical mass of Kenya‟s ethnic 
diversity. Discussion as to the suitability of Kenya as a study site is found in chapter one 
(see section 1.2) of this study. 
 
The primary objective of this study is to test whether integration of microcredit with 
BDS is associated with the performance of MSEs as perceived by MSE owner-
managers. The decision to use or not to use either credit or BDS is the prerogative of the 
individual owner-managers in their respective MSEs, presuming both are accessible. It 
is noted that in the developing world and especially for countries within the Sub-
Saharan Africa region, the size threshold commonly used for MSEs is ten employees 
(see Masakure et al., 2009). As a result therefore this study‟s sampling frame comprises 
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owner-managers of MSEs in Kenya with not more than ten employees including the 
owner manager.  
 
Unit of analysis 
The unit of observation for the main analysis in this study is the perceptions of owner-
managers of micro and small enterprises as economic entities. Interviews with all four 
categories of participants are intended to track the importance of their decisions 
(individually as owner-managers) about the use of microcredit and/or BDS in the 
performance of their respective MSEs.  
 
4.5 Recruitment of Participants  
This study entails two separate samples. The first sample consists of a total of 160 
randomly selected (using haphazard sampling) MSE owner-managers recruited from 
across the four study sites described above. This is the main sample used in testing the 
hypotheses in this study. Initially, efforts were made to involve MFIs in recruiting 
participants, especially participant MSEs owner-managers in receipt of microcredit with 
or without BDS; this was however not fruitful, perhaps a blessing in disguise in that the 
author could claim complete independence of MFI and BDS providers.  The 
managements of MFIs approached were reluctant to enlist their clients in an exercise 
that would pitch their MFI directly against their competitors. As a result it proved 
impractical to construct a comprehensive sampling frame of MFI members. This 
difficulty was worsened by the absence of a list or database of MSE owner-managers in 
Kenya. This meant that systematic random sampling could not be employed in this 
study and hence convenience sampling was used to recruit participants.  
 
What is meant by convenience sampling here is that upon visiting any one of the study 
sites, the author would enter a market centre and randomly interview MSE owner-
managers on a voluntary basis
36
, paying attention to the diversity of their business 
activities. Before proceeding with the interviews, potential participants were requested 
to answer two screening questions about whether they were in receipt of BDS and /or 
credit, which allowed potential participants to be stratified on the basis of their use of 
credit and/or BDS. In addition the information on the relative maturity of the MFI to 
                                                 
36
 As a result there is potential bias in that only willing participants are included in the study. However the 
author is not aware of any reason to believe that non-participants are more likely to be over-represented in 
any of the four categories examined or to have particular characteristics that might lead to bias in the 
results reported. 
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which participants belonged was elicited. Their responses to these questions then 
enabled the interviewer to correctly classify the recruits to the respective participant 
categories. In this way potential misspecification and threats to internal validity, for 
example, sample selection bias and effects of history were minimised. In general 40 
participant MSE owner-managers were targeted for each of the four participant 
categories. The entire sample of 160 MSE owner-managers was distributed 
proportionately across the four sites. 
 
The second sample comprises qualitative interviews with 19 purposively selected 
willing participants. These participants were constituted as follows; eight 
representatives of BDS firms targeting MSEs, nine representatives of MFIs, and two 
researchers in private practice with an interest in the MSE sector in Kenya. The purpose 
of selecting this sample was to triangulate
37
 the views of MSE owner-managers with 
those of other stakeholders or experts with regard to the usefulness of both BDS and 
microcredit in the operations of MSE enterprises.  
 
4.6 Data collection - Tools and Procedures 
In order to achieve the objectives of this study, data are collected through protocol-
guided interviews with MSE owner managers, representatives of MFIs and BDS 
agencies and independent researchers in the MSE sector in Kenya. With regard to the 
main sample for the study (MSE owner-managers), a semi-structured interview protocol 
(see Annex 2) is the instrument used to gather data. A similarly structured set of 
interview protocols (see Annexes 3 and 4) is used in facilitating interviews with 
representatives of both MFIs and BDS agencies, whereas the interview guide used in 
collecting the views of independent researchers is open-ended (see Annex 5).  
 
All three instruments are subjected to a peer review before being administered. Peer 
reviewing is conducted for two main reasons; one being validation of the instrument and 
the other to minimise the internal validity threat of instrumentation. Five peer reviewers 
from diverse disciplines were used for the peer review. One of the peer reviewers is an 
economist and researcher from a leading multi-sectoral research institution in Kenya, 
while the others include two country directors with international NGOs (with interest in 
                                                 
37
 Triangulation is a term used to describe the combination of qualitative and quantitative data collection 
methods in order to improve the quality of research (Cooper and Schindler, 2006). It is also a process of 
collating evidence from different sources with the aim of building a coherent justification for a research 
theme (Creswell, 2003). 
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microfinance) in Uganda and the southern Sudan, an information systems manager with 
a multinational company in Kenya, and a business management professor from an 
Australian university. Peer reviewers‟ comments on the suitability of the research 
instruments were used to revise the instruments before commencing field work. A 
notable modification of one of the instruments (the MSE owner-manager interview 
protocol) was the use a five-point rather than a four-point Likert scale. None of the peer 
reviewers is included among the study participants during actual data collection. 
 
The MSE owner-managers‟ interview protocol is divided into five parts, identified as 
Parts A to E. The scales used in measuring the various concepts in this instrument are 
designed by the author guided by literature in the field of microfinance. Whereas all 
participant owner-managers are requested to provide data on all variables included in 
Parts A, D, and E, variables included in parts B and C relate only to participant owner-
managers in receipt of microcredit and BDS respectively. Part (A) relates to information 
on the general profile of the participant MSE owner-managers‟ enterprise. The variables 
included here range from nature of business activity, ownership and size, to the 
perceived state of business establishment, among others. Most of the variables in this 
Part are used as control variables in testing the main hypotheses of this study.  
 
Part B consists of questions intended to collect information on participant MSE owner-
managers‟ perceptions on use of microcredit and their assessment of the terms and 
conditions surrounding its delivery. Examples of variables included here are source and 
type of business credit, motive for accessing credit, and interest rate charged.  This Part 
also addresses users‟ perceptions on how microcredit is impacting on their businesses. 
Likewise questions in Part C capture issues relating to use of BDS. Among the variables 
included here are source and type of BDS used, mode of BDS delivery, BDS fees, 
benefits perceived as accruing from using BDS, and users‟ satisfaction with BDS 
delivery. The data from these two Parts of the instrument are used to test for the study‟s 
hypotheses. This means that differences in participant MSE owner-managers‟ self-rated 
business performance is arguably explained by the extent of their use of either BDS 
and/or microcredit. 
 
Part D contains questions addressing the dependent variable for the study i.e. MSE 
performance. The construct MSE performance was measured using a five point Likert- 
type scale consisting of six perception-based variables including; sales growth, 
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profitability, business savings and cash flow, and levels of stocks or service orders. The 
perception-based MSE performance measure used here is in part consistent with 
previous studies (for example, King-Kauanui et al., 2006). During interviews, 
participants were advised to base their assessment of the performance of their 
enterprises on their experience in the last one to two years.  
 
Part E is the last section of the MSE owner-managers‟ interview protocol. This Part of 
the instrument was intended to be used to gather information on the personal attributes 
or demographics of the participant MSE owner-managers. Some of the variables 
captured here include; gender and age of participant MSE owner-managers, level of 
education, indicators of personal wealth (e.g. income, ownership of a house or car), and 
years of experience in business. Some of the variables in this section, for example 
education, gender, age and experience in business, are used as control variables in this 
study. Most of these variables have been previously used in MSE performance studies 
(see Masakure et al., 2009, Adegbite et al., 2007, Akoten, 2007a) and as such are  
expected to help in explaining variations in self- performance ratings of participants‟ 
businesses.  
 
The other interview protocols used in collecting views from representatives of MFIs and 
BDS agencies on the usefulness of microcredit and BDS among MSEs were partially 
open-ended. The variables covered in each of the two protocols include; nature of 
services offered by the representative‟s institution, target market, terms and conditions 
of service delivery, service benefits to MSEs, and challenges faced in serving MSEs. 
The interview guide for gathering private researchers‟ views on the subject matter of 
this study generally focused on the dynamics of the MSE sector in Kenya. In particular, 
these expert researchers‟ views on the perceived contribution of microcredit and BDS to 
the performance of MSEs in Kenya were sought.  
 
Interviews with MSE owner managers were undertaken with the assistance of three 
assistants with a business knowledge background. Two of the assistants were university 
graduates while the other had a tertiary diploma certificate. Before deployment the 
assistants were trained on how to administer the instrument through personal structured 
interviews.  Assistants were used to minimise the time period over which owner-
manager interview data was collected and to reduce safety risks with the author being 
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from a different area
38
.  Since all travelling within a city was on foot and since a variety 
of business types were desired, more than one interviewer was needed to minimise the 
time period across which the data was collected and also to ensure that the economic 
environment remained relatively constant with no changes in interest rates or 
agricultural seasons.  Additionally, it was important for reasons of cost to limit the time 
the author of this thesis spent in the various locations.   
 
During the training, the main objective of the study was not revealed to the assistants. 
This was done to not only avoid assistants preempting answers to questions during 
interviews and in a way to make the interview process blind, but also to control for 
effects of instrumentation. Assistants also conducted a mock interview session in the 
presence of the author. Results from mock interviews are not included in data analyses. 
Except for interviews with MFI and BDS agency representatives, and independent 
researchers, where consent is sought in written form, consent for interviews with MSE 
owner-managers was verbal and completely anonymous, consistent with the Human 
Research Ethics approval.  
 
Interviews with MSE owner-managers were conducted within the business premises of 
the individual participants in order to closely match their perceptions to the specific 
business situations and therefore minimise the effects of history to the phenomena under 
investigation. Given the setting, disruptions during interviews could not be avoided; the 
effects of maturation, e.g. fatigue, were kept at minimum by keeping the interview as 
short and focused as possible. Most of the interviews with MSE owner-managers lasted 
between thirty to forty-five minutes, while the other interviews were limited to a 
maximum period of one hour. No incentives of any kind were used to secure 
participation in any of the interviews. The author supervised the entire itinerary of field 
interviews for MSE owner-managers. At the end of each field day, discussions were 
held with each assistant to edit field notes. Field work was conducted over a two and 
half month period spanning from January to mid-March 2009. 
 
                                                 
38
 At the time of data collection, some parts of Kenya had become somewhat unstable after the election 
held in December 2007. It was a condition of Human Research Ethics Committee approval that certain of 
the more dangerous areas (e.g. Kisumu city which was initially among proposed study sites) were not 
visited and that steps were undertaken to minimise risks. 
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4.7 Techniques for Data analysis and Presentation 
In order to test the hypotheses posed in this study a variety of statistical techniques are 
used to analyse data. Analysis of scale-based perception and more categorical 
demographic quantitative data gathered through interviews with MSE owner-managers 
includes both univariate and multivariate techniques. Theoretical concepts introduced in 
chapter three are applied to augment explanations to results of various analyses. The 
statistical software (SPSS) version 17 is used to perform quantitative analysis.  
 
Univariate analysis entails use of descriptive statistics and cross tabulations in exploring 
the properties of all key explanatory variables (in raw form) in the study. In most cases 
results are presented in tables and pair-wise comparisons are made between participant 
MSE owner-managers in the treatment and control groups. The significance or 
otherwise of the differences between participant categories across most independent 
variables is tested using both parametric (for continuous variables) as well as non-
parametric tests (for categorical variables).  
 
Content analysis (using NVivo software version 8) is performed on the qualitative 
transcripts resulting from interviews with both MFI and BDS agency representatives 
and the independent researchers. For triangulation purposes, results from content 
analysis are presented concurrently with the results of univariate analysis of the MSE 
owner-managers‟ views to provide deeper insights and potential explanations to results. 
Additionally results of univariate analysis are used to identify variables that need to be 
controlled for in the subsequent multivariate analysis where the main hypotheses for this 
study are tested. 
 
Multivariate analysis techniques, logistic and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, 
are used to test the main hypotheses of the study as posed in chapter three. For example 
the logistic regression technique (used for dichotomous dependent variables) is used to 
test for the odds of continuing to use microcredit and of reporting satisfaction with BDS 
among participant MSE owner-managers. With regard to the question on the usefulness 
of microcredit, participant MSE owner-managers‟ intention to continue using 
microcredit is the dependent variable whereas satisfaction with currently supplied BDS 
is the dependent variable used in testing for the perceived usefulness of BDS 
(Hypothesis 5) among participant MSE owner-managers. In both cases the explanatory 
variables used relate to the terms and conditions surrounding access to either service. 
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For example participant MSE owner-managers‟ intention to continue using MFI sourced 
credit is expected to be explained by type of loan, loan term, the motive for seeking the 
loan, and loan interest rate among others (Roslan and Karim, 2009, see Godquin, 2004).  
 
With regard to participant MSE owner-managers‟ likelihood of satisfaction with 
currently supplied BDS, the explanatory variables used include the source and type of 
BDS, its mode of delivery, perceived competence of BDS agency staff, and the MSE 
owner-manager‟s level of education among others (Faoite et al., 2004, Kotey and 
Sheridan, 2004). Justification for and details of measurement for all variables included 
in the multivariate analyses are presented in the relevant subsequent chapters which 
report the results of data analysis. 
 
The OLS regression technique is used to test for the extent of covariance between 
receipt of microcredit and/or BDS, or neither, and MSEs‟ performance (Hypotheses 1 
through 4). The dependent variable in these tests is MSE performance, which is a 
composite measure derived from participant MSE owner-managers‟ self-rated business 
performance on six financial attributes as indicated in the previous section (4.6). Before 
computing the MSE performance score, first the reliability of the five indicators used to 
measure MSE performance is assessed using Cronbach‟s Alpha test. Secondly, raw 
scores across the five attributes underlying performance are normalised (using Blom‟s 
formula). Normalisation is a re-scaling processes whereby Likert type ordinal scores are 
transformed into scores with approximate standard normal distribution properties i.e. 
resulting scores have a mean close to zero and standard deviation as close to one as 
possible (Gow, 2010). This means that the resultant MSE performance scores assume 
the attributes of standard continuous variables and are therefore more amenable to the 
least squares regression procedure unlike the Likert type ordinal scores.  
 
In testing for MSE performance differentials across the four participant categories (as 
reflected in Hypotheses 1 to 4), consistent with the literature (see Masakure et al., 
2009), several control variables are used; namely age, gender, owner-managers‟ 
education level and business affiliated family background, type of business activity, and 
how well established the business is. The extent of a business‟ establishment is a proxy 
for firm size, a factor that is commonly used (see Jayawarna et al., 2007, Kotey and 
Sheridan, 2004) in MSE performance studies. Controlling for other extraneous variables 
is crucial while testing for the impact of use of microcredit and or BDS on MSE 
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performance. This is because the beta coefficient in respect of each independent 
variable entered into the OLS model reflects singly the expected influence of the 
variable on MSE performance. In such a comparative manner it is possible to single out 
the most significant contributor to MSE performance while at the same time testing for 
the extent to which the entire model explains MSE performance. 
 
The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) technique is used in testing for Hypothesis 
6, assessing the fit between currently supplied BDS and MSE owner-managers‟ BDS 
needs. In this case the test is whether there is a significant difference in mean 
performance scores (the dependent variable) between participant MSE owner-managers 
who are satisfied with current BDS and those who are not satisfied (the factor).  
 
In addition the sample size of 160 MSE owner-managers participating in this study is 
considered adequate for correlation-based multivariate analysis. In testing for all the six 
hypotheses, collinearity is assessed through bivariate Pearson‟s correlation analysis. The 
decision rule in hypotheses tests in this study follows the conventional 95 per cent 
threshold.  
 
4.8  Conclusion  
This chapter provides a description of the methodology employed in investigating the 
main research question for this study; that is to assess the association of microcredit and 
BDS with the owner-managers‟ self-reported performance of their micro and small 
enterprises. The chapter notes that recent studies assessing the impact of microfinance 
have used different research designs, which may be classified into three categories; 
scientific, behavioural, and participatory action learning. Unlike the scientific approach, 
which is quantitatively oriented, the two other approaches are generally qualitative in 
nature. This study adopts a mixed method approach, triangulating quantitative data 
gathered from participant MSE owner-managers with results of qualitative interviews 
with MFI and BDS representatives and independent researchers working in the area.  
Specifically the study adopts a quasi-experimental design, with use of a control group 
and having an ex post facto orientation.  
 
The sample analysed quantitatively consists of 160 haphazardly sampled participant 
MSE owner-managers operating from within four purposively selected cities in Kenya. 
That is, the unit of observation and analysis relates to MSEs, not households or 
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individuals as is the case with most MFI impact studies, even though it is the 
perceptions of individuals intimately involved with these MSEs that are sought. The 
participants fall into four categories in respect of their use or non-use of microcredit 
and/ or BDS. There are approximately forty participants in each of the participant 
categories. Observations, that is self-reported MSE owner-manager performance 
ratings, from participant MSE owner-managers who do not use either microcredit or 
BDS are used for control purposes. The main analysis directed to achieving the purpose 
of this study is to compare these non-users with observations from their counterparts in 
each of the other three categories in testing for the impact of use of microcredit and/or 
BDS on the performance of MSEs, where performance is self-rated.  Other analyses are 
conducted using, for instance, participant profile information.  
 
In the chapter it is noted that quantitative data from MSE owner-managers is gathered 
through a semi-structured interview protocol while views from MFI and BDS 
representatives and independent researchers are collected through open-ended 
interviews. All data collection instruments are validated by way of peer review with 
experts. As noted in this chapter, both univariate and multivariate analyses are 
performed on the quantitative data with the aid of SPSS and NVivo software is used for 
the qualitative data. Detailed reporting of the sample profile and results of data analysis 
relating to the research questions and tests of hypotheses for this study appear in the 
next three chapters.
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5.0 Chapter Five: Sample Description 
5.1 Introduction 
As explained in the previous chapter, this study recruited participants from four 
different study sites
39
 in Kenya namely; Nairobi, Nakuru, Machakos and Eldoret. 
Although these study sites are located in varied agro-ecological zones, participants who 
are owners of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) are generally likely to possess similar 
socio-economic characteristics. With the aim of investigating the possible association of 
access to business development services (BDS) and microcredit with enterprise 
performance, participants were categorised into four groups as explained in chapter four 
(see section 4.3).  Participant classification was based on their receipt or not of 
microcredit and/or the consuming of business development services (BDS. 
In total the sample size (N) is 160 MSE owner-managers. The first category (c1) 
comprises MSE owner-managers with access to microcredit as well as BDS. There are 
42 participants in this category. The second category (c2) consists of 38 MSE owner-
managers in receipt of microcredit but not BDS. The third category (c3) is made up of 
42 MSE owner-managers who use BDS but have no access to microcredit. The fourth 
and last participant category (c4) comprises 38 MSE owner-managers without access to 
either microcredit or BDS.  
This chapter provides a detailed description of the socio-economic characteristics of the 
participants in the main sample (Sample I) comprising MSE owner-managers. The 
chapter is organised into two major sections. Section one provides a profile of 
participants‟ social characteristics, in particular their demographics, while section two 
looks at their economic attributes. The participants‟ demographic attributes reflected in 
these two sections form the basis for the controls later used in tests of perceived MSE 
performance related hypotheses in chapter seven. The chapter concludes with a brief 
description of the participants in the second sample; Sample II, which consists of MFIs 
and BDS agency representatives and independent researchers, and which is used to 
triangulate views elicited from MSE owner-managers.  
                                                 
39
 See the map of Kenya in annex 1 attached for a view of selected study sites. 
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5.2 Participants’ Demographic Profile [Sample I] 
In terms of gender, Table 11 below shows that male participants constituted 63.8 per 
cent of the entire sample and this distribution is not in any way unique to this study 
(Liedholm, 2002, ILO, 2008). This shows that with regard to gender, the study‟s sample 
is representative of the MSE owner-manager population in Kenya. Proportionately 
males are highest in respondent categories c3 (69.0 per cent) and c4 (68.4 per cent) and 
lowest in category c1 (credit and BDS) (57.1 per cent). The table also shows that 46.9 
per cent of all participants are aged between 31 – 40 years. This trend is common across 
all the four respondent categories. It is however important to note that of all participants 
in category c1 (credit and BDS), 59.5 per cent are aged between 31-40 years and make 
up one third of all participants in this age bracket. In total 69.4 per cent of the sample is 
40 years of age and below. These figures reveal that the MSE sector is dominated by 
young adults.  
 
Table11 further reveals that a significant majority of the participants are married.  In 
total these represent 69.4 per cent of the sample. The remaining 30.6 per cent are 
singles, most of whom have never married, or who are widowed or separated for various 
reasons. Slightly more than 60 per cent of the participants have a tertiary level of 
education. Of these, four in every six observations have attained college level education. 
In other words, in the Kenyan context these participants have completed a post high 
school trade certificate or diploma in some technical field either at a polytechnic or an 
institution of similar status. However this does not include attainment of a university 
degree. The same picture is repeated when we look at the education of spouses. Nearly 
67 per cent of participants‟ spouses are either tertiary certificate holders or university 
graduates. Of all cases, a significant 80.8 per cent is engaged in business as a full time 
occupation whereas the remaining 19.2 per cent identified as having a professional job 
besides operating their own business. This table also shows that the average family size 
for the entire sample is 3.87 people with a standard deviation of 2.17. That is, on 
average the families of participants comprise approximately 4 members.  
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Table 11: Participants‟ demographics: all categories [c1 – c4] 
 
     Participant category  
Total 
(N=160) 
Variable     c1 
[credit and 
BDS] 
c2  
[credit 
only] 
c3 
[BDS 
only] 
c4 
[no credit 
no BDS] 
Response category (n=42) (n=38) (n=42) (n=38) 
 
Gender 
male  24 23 29 26 102 
 (57.1%) (60.5%) (69.0%) (68.4%) (63.8%) 
 
 
30 years and below 3 9 12 12 36 
(7.1%) (23.7%) (28.6%) (31.6%) (22.5%) 
Age 31-40 25 16 16 18 75 
(59.5%) (42.1%) (38.1%) (47.4%) (46.9%) 
 41-50 13 12 11 6 42 
(31.0%) (31.6%) (26.2%) (15.8%) (26.3%) 
 above 50 years 1 1 3 2 7 
(2.4%) (2.6%) (7.1%) (5.3%) (4.4%) 
Marital 
status 
married 32 
(72.2%) 
26 
(68.4%) 
31 
(73.8%) 
22 
(57.9%) 
111  
(69.4%) 
Education 
level 
primary 1  
(2.4%) 
4  
(10.5%) 
1  
(2.4%) 
5  
(13.2%) 
11 
(6.9%) 
high school 4  
(9.5%) 
7  
(18.4%) 
5  
(11.9%) 
12 
(31.6%) 
28  
(17.5%) 
vocational  6  
(14.3%) 
10 
(26.3%) 
9  
(21.4%) 
7  
(18.4%) 
32  
(20.0%) 
college 21 
(50.0%) 
13 
(34.2%) 
19 
(45.2%) 
12 
(31.6%) 
65  
(40.6%) 
graduate 10 
(23.8%) 
4  
(10.5%) 
8  
(19.0%) 
2  
(5.3%) 
24  
(15.0%) 
Spouse‟s 
education  
primary 3  
(7.1%) 
2  
(5.3%) 
1  
(2.4%) 
5  
(13.2%) 
11  
(9.9%) 
high school 6  
(14.3%) 
8  
(21.1%) 
6  
(14.3%) 
6  
(15.8%) 
26  
(23.4%) 
vocational 1  
(2.4%) 
5  
(13.2%) 
2  
(4.8%) 
3  
(7.9%) 
11  
(9.9%) 
college 8  
(19.0%) 
10 
(26.3%) 
17 
(40.5%) 
7  
(18.4%) 
42  
(37.8%) 
graduate 14 
(33.3%) 
1  
(2.6%) 
5  
(11.9%) 
1  
(2.6%) 
21  
(18.9%) 
Occupation business only 32 
(76.2%) 
30 
(78.9%) 
29 
(76.3%) 
35 
(92.1%) 
126  
(80.8%) 
Family size 
 
Mean  4.05 3.89 3.95 3.58 3.87 
Std. deviation 1.90 2.25 2.30 2.15 2.17 
Legend: 
  c1= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit and BDS 
  c2= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit without BDS 
  c3= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of BDS without microcredit 
  c4= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of neither microcredit nor BDS. 
   
 
Looking at demographic profiles across categories, Table (12a) below presents a paired 
comparison between respondent categories c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 (no credit no 
BDS). This is important because while c1 represents MSE owner-managers who have 
accessed credit as well as BDS, participants in category c4 have not accessed either 
service. As such c4 serves as a control group.  
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The total number or participants in these two categories is 80. Of these, a majority (53.8 
per cent) belong to the age group 31-40 years, reflecting the general trend in age 
distribution within the larger sample as noted earlier. However 63.2 per cent of the 
participants in category c4 (no credit no BDS) belong to age brackets 31-40 and 41-50 
years compared to 90.5 per cent of participants in category c1 (credit and BDS). Using a 
Chi-Square test the difference between these two categories is found to be significant 
(Chi² =9.28, p<.05).  This is an indication that, on average, category c1 (credit and 
BDS) (users of credit and BDS) participants are more mature than those in the control 
group category c4 (no credit no BDS). Table 12a also shows that 62.5 per cent of the 
participants are male and that 67.5 per cent of them identified themselves as married. 
Although there are no significant gender differences, the social attribute of marital 
status presents a weakly significant difference between participants in categories c1 
(credit and BDS) and c4 (no credit no BDS) (Chi² = 3.04, p<.10). 
 
Table 12a further reveals that more than half of the cases have attained either college 
level education or higher. This is the case with 56 per cent of participants in the two 
categories c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 (no credit no BDS) and a similar percentage with 
regard to the education of their spouses. In both scenarios education is a significant 
(Chi² = 14.37, p<.05; Chi² = 11.34, p<.05 respectively) differentiator between 
participants in the two categories.   Participants in categories c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 
(no credit no BDS) are different also with regard to their residential status. Nearly half 
(42.9 per cent) of the category c1 (credit and BDS) participants live in rental houses 
compared to a significant majority 89.5 per cent in category c4 (no credit no BDS) (Chi² 
= 19.14, p<.001).  
 
Given the fact that all participants are owner-managers of their businesses it may be 
implied that running the business is a full time occupation. However as already reflected 
in the larger sample, this is the case for only 83.8 per cent of participants in categories 
c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 (no credit no BDS). The incidence of taking up business as a 
full time occupation is more pronounced (92.1 per cent) for participants in category c4 
(no credit no BDS) compared to 76.2 per cent in category c1 (credit and BDS) (Chi² = 
3.71, p<.10). In this category the remaining 23.8 per cent, though in business, is 
engaged also in some form of salaried employment.   
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Table 12a: Participants‟ demographic profile: pair-wise comparisons [c1 vs. c4] 
 
 
 
 
Variable  Participant category  
Total 
(N=80) 
Pearson  
Chi-Square  
value 
c1 
[credit and 
BDS] 
c4  
[no credit 
no BDS] 
Response category (n=42) (n=38) 
 
 
Age 
30 years and below 3  
(7.1%) 
12 
(31.6%) 
15 
(18.8%) 
 
 
 
9.28** 
31-40 25  
(59.5%) 
18  
(47.4%) 
43  
(53.8%) 
41-50 13  
(31.0%) 
6  
(15.8%) 
19 
(23.8%) 
above 50  years 1  
(2.4%) 
2  
(5.3%) 
3  
(3.8%) 
Gender male 24  
(57.1%) 
26  
(68.4%) 
50 
(62.5%) 
1.08 
Marital status married 32  
(72.2%) 
22  
(57.9%) 
54 
(67.5%) 
3.04* 
Education level 
 
primary 1  
(2.4%) 
5  
(13.2%) 
6  
(7.5%) 
 
 
 
 
14.37** 
high school 4  
(9.5%) 
12  
(31.6%) 
16 
(20.0%) 
vocational  6  
(14.3%) 
7 
(18.4%) 
13 
(16.3%) 
college 21  
(50.0%) 
12  
(31.6%) 
33 
(41.3%) 
graduate 10  
(23.8%) 
2 
(5.3%) 
12 
(15.0%) 
Spouse‟s education  primary 3  
(7.1%) 
5  
(13.2%) 
8  
(14.8%) 
 
 
 
 
 
11.37** 
 
high school 6  
(14.3%) 
6  
(15.8%) 
12 
(22.2%) 
vocational 1  
(2.4%) 
3  
(7.9%) 
4  
(7.4%) 
college 8  
(19.0%) 
7 
(18.4%) 
15 
(27.8%) 
graduate 14  
(33.3%) 
1  
(2.6%) 
15 
(27.8%) 
Residence own house 23  
(54.8%) 
4  
(10.5%) 
27 
(33.8%) 
 
19.14*** 
rental  18  
(42.9%) 
34 
(89.5%) 
52 
(65.0%) 
mortgage 1  
(2.4%) 
 1  
(1.3%) 
Occupation business only 32  
(76.2%) 
35 
(92.1%) 
67 
(83.8%) 
3.71* 
Relevant business 
training 
formal training 16  
(38.1%) 
9  
(23.7%) 
25 
(31.3%) 
 
 
 
4.03 
on-the-job 16  
(38.1%) 
23  
(60.5%) 
39 
(48.8%) 
family background 10  
(23.8%) 
6  
(15.8%) 
16 
(20.0%) 
* **   significant at p<0.10;  ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.001 
Legend:  c1= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of  microcredit and BDS 
               c4= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of neither  microcredit nor BDS. 
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Within these two categories c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 (no credit no BDS) nearly one 
third of participants reported to have had some formal training prior to starting in their 
business. However the majority of them (68.8 per cent) indicated to have on-the- job 
experience, either directly by running their own businesses or through a family business 
background.  In other words, they acquired their business skills by „doing‟ rather than 
through formal training. With a Chi² = 4.03 the two categories are not significantly 
different. In summary, participants in categories c1 (microcredit and BDS) and c4 (no 
credit no BDS) appear to differ on most demographic variables, with the exception of 
gender. 
 
Turning attention now to participants belonging to categories c2 (credit only) and c3 
(BDS only), Table 12b below reports the demographic profile of the 80 participants in 
these groups.  It is important to note that participants in these categories serve as 
alternative control groups. In a sense, characteristics of participants in categories c2 
(credit only) and c3 (BDS only) are expected to relate closely with characteristics of 
MSE owner-managers who have not used integrated credit and BDS.  
 
Table 12b shows that 40 per cent of participants in categories c2 (credit only) and c3 
(BDS only) belong to the age group 31-40 years compared to 26.3 per cent and 28.8 per 
cent for the age groups 30 years or less and between 41-50 years respectively. There are 
no significant age differences between participants in the two categories (Chi² = 1.28). 
The same is true for gender (Chi
2
 = 0.64) and marital status (Chi
2
 = 0.28). Table 12b 
also reveals that of all participants in categories c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS only), 65 
per cent are male and 71.3 per cent identified themselves as married at the time of the 
interview. Again most participants reported as having tertiary level education. 
Specifically 55 per cent of participants in categories c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS only) 
are either college certificate holders or graduates. A similar observation is made with 
regard to spouse‟s education (57.9 per cent of the cases).  
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Although previously education differences were clear between participants in categories 
c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 (no credit no BDS), this is not the case for the c2 (credit 
only) versus c3 (BDS only) cohort. Nevertheless, in relative terms participants in 
categories c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS only) have slightly higher levels of education 
compared to their counterparts in categories c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 (no credit no 
BDS). For example, 72.6 per cent of cases in categories c1 and c4 have either tertiary 
level education or higher whereas in categories c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS only) this 
represents 78.8 per cent.   Additionally, spouses with a similar level of qualification 
represented 70.1 per cent for category c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS only) participants 
compared to 63 per cent of participants in categories c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 (no 
credit no BDS).   
 
Looking at residential status, Table 12b reflects that the majority (67.5 per cent) of 
participants in categories c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS only) lived in rental houses. In 
terms of occupation, 77.6 per cent of participants in the two categories identified 
business as their primary occupation. The distribution of cases between the two 
categories in both cases is approximately even. Again in statistical terms there is no 
significant difference between these two respondent categories as regards residence or 
occupation.  
 
Pertaining to training, before venturing into business, on-the-job experience is dominant 
representing 50 per cent of the cases in categories c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS only). 
Among these cases however, 60.5 per cent are drawn from category c2 (credit only) 
alone. Participants in categories c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS only) differ in a weakly 
significant way on account of possession of relevant business training prior to starting 
business (Chi² = 4.98, p<.10). In summary, contrary to the demographic differences 
observed between participants in categories c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 (no credit no 
BDS), participants in categories c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS only) do not differ 
significantly from each other in demographic terms.  
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Table 12b: Participants‟ demographic profile: pair-wise comparisons [c2 vs. c3] 
 
Variable  Participant category  Pearson 
Chi-Square  
value 
c2 
[credit 
only] 
c3 
[BDS 
only] 
Total 
Response category (n=38) (n=42) 
 
 
Age 
30 years and below 9  
(23.7%) 
12  
(28.6%) 
21  
(26.3%) 
 
 
 
1.28 
31-40 16  
(42.1%) 
16  
(38.1%) 
32  
(40.0%) 
41-50 12  
(31.6%) 
11  
(26.2%) 
23  
(28.8%) 
above 50 years 1  
(2.6%) 
3  
(7.1%) 
4  
(5.0%) 
Gender male 23 
 (60.5%) 
29  
(69.0%) 
52  
(65.0%) 
0.64 
Marital status married 26  
(68.4%) 
31  
(73.8%) 
57  
(71.3%) 
0.28 
Education level 
 
primary 4  
(10.5%) 
1  
(2.4%) 
5  
(6.3%) 
 
 
 
4.46 
high school 7  
(18.4%) 
5  
(11.9%) 
12 
 15.0%) 
vocational 10  
(26.3%) 
9  
(21.4%) 
19  
(23.8%) 
college 13  
(34.2%) 
19  
(45.2%) 
32 
 40.0%) 
graduate 4  
(10.5%) 
8  
(19.0%) 
12  
(15.0%) 
Spouse‟s education primary 2  
(5.3%) 
1  
(2.4%) 
3  
(5.3%) 
 
 
 
 
5.99 
high school 8  
(21.1%) 
6  
(14.3%) 
14 
(24.6%) 
vocational 5  
(13.2%) 
2 
(4.8%) 
7  
(12.3%) 
college 10  
(26.3%) 
17  
(40.5%) 
27  
(47.4%) 
graduate 1  
(2.6%) 
5 
 (11.9%) 
6 
(10.5%) 
Residence own house 12 
 (31.6%) 
12  
(28.6%) 
24  
(30.0%) 
 
1.88 
rental 26  
(68.4%) 
28  
(66.7%) 
54  
(67.5) 
mortgage  2  
4.8%) 
2  
(2.5%) 
Occupation business only 30  
(78.9%) 
29  
(76.3%) 
59  
(77.6%) 
0.076 
Relevant business 
training 
formal training 9  
(23.7%) 
20 
(47.6%) 
29 
 (36.35) 
 
 
4.98* on-the-job 
experience 
23  
(60.5%) 
17  
(40.5%) 
40  
(50.0%) 
family business 6  
(15.8%) 
5 
(11.9%) 
11  
(13.8%) 
* significant at p<0.10 
Legend:  c2= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of  microcredit without BDS 
   c3= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of BDS without microcredit. 
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5.3 Participants’ Economic Profile [Sample I] 
In this section the economic characteristics of the participants are examined. The focus 
is to describe a clear picture of both the material and human attributes that explain the 
status of MSEs and their owner-managers respectively.  To perform this examination, 
several key parameters are used including participants‟ experience in business, their 
earnings and expenses and possessions, amongst others. Experience is measured in 
terms of the duration for which a participant has been operating the current business as 
well as the total number of years the participant has been involved in business activities. 
Earnings on the other hand are measured in aggregate monthly terms and the same 
applies to expenses. In addition, possessions such as a vehicle or house are used as 
indicators of participants‟ asset bases. These two types of assets are chosen because they 
represent the most common forms of collateral for loan applications. First is presented 
economic profiles of the entire sample and thereafter pair-wise comparisons are made 
between participants who are either users or non users of either of the two support 
services i.e. microcredit and/or BDS. 
Among all 160 participants, the average experience in business is 6.4 years (see Table 
13 below). The standard deviation of 5.25 implies that business experience is widely 
varied across the sample. This variation is further confirmed by the fact that the 
minimum experience reported is 1 year while the maximum is 30 years hence giving a 
range of 29 years. It is important also to note that the majority of participants have less 
than ten years in business as Figure 6 below shows. 
With regard to the duration of operating the current business, Table 13 reflects that the 
average duration is nearly five years (mean 4.68 years) with a standard deviation of 3.9. 
Again this means that there is a wide diversity in business age across all participants‟ 
businesses. A closer look at Figure 7 reveals that most of the businesses represented 
have been operational with the current owner for less than six years. Nevertheless it is 
worth noting that variation in the age of business is evident given the range of 23 years.  
To get a better feel of how established the participants‟ businesses are, it is important to 
look at their branch networks as well as their staff sizes. Table 13 shows that 
participants‟ businesses have between one to six branches. The mean branch size is 1.24 
with a standard deviation of 0.6. This means that there is 68 per cent likelihood that 
most participants‟ businesses have only one branch. In terms of staffing level, Table 13 
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shows that it varies from one to thirteen staff members. On average there are 3.55 staff 
members. The standard deviation around the average is 2.43 implying that 95 per cent 
of participants‟ businesses have between 3 to 4 staff members. 
Table 13: Participants‟ and their respective MSEs‟ economic attributes 
 
    MSE 
Years in 
operation 
Years of 
Experience 
in business 
 MSE 
Number of 
employees 
MSE Number 
of branches 
(N=160) (N=160)  (N=160) (N=160) 
Range  23 29  13 5 
Min    
1 
min 1  min 1 min 1 
max 24 max 30  max 14 max 6 
       
Mean 4.68 6.40  3.55 1.24 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
3.90 
 
5.25 
  
2.43 
 
.60 
 
 
Figure 6: Participants‟ years of experience in business 
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Figure 7: Participants‟ duration of business operation 
 
 
Turning now to material possessions, on average most participants (66 per cent) live in 
rental houses and only about 32 per cent of them identify themselves as living in their 
own house( see Table 14 below). A similar picture presents itself in terms of automobile 
ownership. As Table 14 shows, only 39 (24 per cent) of the 160 participants report to be 
in ownership of a car at the time of the interview.  Given the fact that most participants 
have been in business for on average four and a half years, it is not surprising that 76 
per cent do not have a car for either personal or business purposes. 
 
 Table 14: Participants‟ asset base 
 
Variable (N=160) Number Per cent 
(%) 
Cumulative 
per cent 
Residential 
status 
own 
house 
51 31.9 31.9 
 rental 106 66.3 98.1 
 mortgage 3 1.9 100.0 
Total  160 100.0   
 
Own a car (N=160)    
 no 121 75.6 75.6 
 yes 39 24.4 100.0 
Total  160 100.0   
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The following table, Table 15, presents aggregates of participants‟ monthly income and 
expenses. The figures reveal that three quarters of all participants have a gross monthly 
income of less than KES 50,000, which is equivalent to (AUD) $1000
40
. The Table 
further shows that within this group of participants, 45 per cent earn less than KES 
30,000 (AUD $ 600) per month. With regard to expenses, Table 15 reveals that a large 
majority (81 per cent) of the participants spent less than KES 20,000 (AUD $ 400) on a 
monthly basis. Of all participants, 33 per cent had a monthly expenditure of less than 
KES 10,000 (AUD $200) and only 6.3 per cent identify as spending more than KES 
30,000 (AUD $600) on a monthly basis. Although the cost of living in Kenya may not be 
comparable to most developed countries, the expense budgets of some of the participants 
are only slightly above the World poverty line of a dollar a day. This implies that at least 
some of the participants are engaged in business for survival purposes. 
 
Table 15: Participants‟ gross income and expenditure  
 
Variable    Number (N=160) Per cent 
(%) 
Cumulative  
Per cent (%) 
Income (KES) below 20,000 33 20.6 20.6 
20,000-30,000 39 24.4 45.0 
31,000-40,000 26 16.3 61.3 
41,000-50,000 22 13.8 75.0 
more than 50,000 40 25.0 100.0 
    
    
Expenditure (KES) below 10,000 52 32.5 32.5 
10,000-20,000 77 48.1 80.6 
21,000-30,000 21 13.1 93.8 
more than 30,000 10 6.3 100.0 
 
 
Next economic attributes across the participant categories are examined. First a 
comparison of the economic profile of the participants who use microcredit and those 
who have not used microcredit are examined. Second the economic attributes of 
participants who use BDS and those who do not are examined. In this way a clearer 
picture of all participants is gained with some of the differences that may exist between 
the respective participant categories highlighted.   
 
Table 16 below presents the economic profile of participants who make use of 
microcredit and those who do not use credit from any source. According to the Table, 
although a majority (68 per cent) of the participants live in rental houses, 80 per cent of 
                                                 
40
   The exchange rate at the time of the interviews was (AUD) $1=KES 50. 
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them fall into the group that does not use microcredit. Further, of all participants only 
33 per cent identify as living in their own houses. Of these, a majority (44 per cent) fall 
into the group that uses credit. At a glance it seems participants who use credit are better 
placed in residential terms than those who do not. In general, on the basis of residential 
status there is a weakly significant difference between participants who use microcredit 
and those who do not (Chi² =10.47, p<.10). The difference is more pronounced if we 
disregard mortgage holders and compare participants who live in their own houses and 
those who live in rentals (Chi² =10.13, p<.05).  
 
Besides residential status, as earlier stated ownership of a car is used also to determine 
the material circumstances of participants in this study. Table 16 shows that three 
quarters of the participants do not own a car. The distribution of the participants 
between users of credit and non users is close to even. Within participants who identify 
as not possessing a car, 73 per cent use microcredit while a slightly larger number (78.8 
per cent) are not users of microcredit. As pertaining to occupation, as earlier noted, 81 
per cent of the participants are engaged in business on a full time basis and have no 
alternative employment.  Of these, 84 per cent are participants who do not use 
microcredit while an almost similar number (78 per cent) use credit. Between users and 
non users of microcredit, there are no significant differences on the two economic 
parameters of car ownership and occupation (Chi² =0.85 & Chi² =1.13 respectively).  
 
Examining income, Table 16 further reflects that of the entire sample of 160 
participants, 98 participants (61 per cent) have a gross monthly income of less than KES 
41,000 (AUD $ 820). Close to three quarters (71 per cent) of these participants are non 
users of microcredit while half (51 per cent) are users of microcredit. This may imply 
that participants who are non users of credit are more likely to earn less (in gross terms) 
than participants who use credit. This is even clearer when we observe that of the 62 (39 
per cent of the entire sample) participants who earn more than KES 41,000 (AUD $ 
820) per month, almost half of them (49 per cent) are users of credit while slightly less 
than one third (29 per cent) are non users of credit.  With a Chi² = 8.74, p<.05, there is a 
significant difference between users and non users of credit for participants who earn 
KES 40,000 (AUD $ 800) or less per month. The same is true for all income categories 
taken together (Chi² =15.63, p<.05).  However there is no significant difference between 
the two groups of participants for income brackets KES 41,000-50,000 and KES above 
50,000 (Chi² =0.52) at 95 per cent confidence limit. 
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Turning to expenditure, Table 16 reveals that the expenditure budget for almost half of 
all participants (48 per cent) ranges between KES 10,000 to KES 20,000 (AUD $ 200-
400). Of these cases, 51 per cent are participants who use microcredit, whereas 45 per 
cent are non users of microcredit. Looking at the 52 participants whose expenditure is 
less than KES 10,000 (AUD $ 200) per month, 33 cases (41 per cent) fall within the non 
users of credit group while only 19 cases (24 per cent) are in the credit users group. In 
summary, participants who are non users of microcredit report spending less compared 
to users of microcredit. This is not surprising given that it was noted earlier that 
participants in this category earn less compared to their counterparts who use 
microcredit. Overall across the four expenditure brackets there is a significant difference 
between users and non users of microcredit (Chi² =6.83, p<.10). A similar observation 
is made for expenditure below KES 21,000 (AUD $420) per month. However with a 
Chi² =0.13 there is no significant difference between users and non users of credit for 
monthly expenditure that is either equal to or greater than KES 21,000 (AUD $ 420).  
Additionally Table 16 shows that the average branch network for participant owner-
managers‟ MSEs is 1.34 for participants who are users of credit and 1.14 for non users. 
There is however minimal variation in the number of branches across participants‟ 
businesses (  =0.73 for users of credit and  = 0.41 for non users). In spite of the 
minimal variation in branch networks, the difference between users of credit and non 
users is significant (t-test value =2.14, p<.05). If we look at employee numbers, the 
average is 3.75 for MSEs belonging to participants who use microcredit, compared to 
3.35 for MSEs run by non users of microcredit. In this case however there is no 
significant difference between the two groups (t-test value 1.04).  
As pertains to participants who are users of microcredit, Table 16 also shows that on 
average their MSEs have been in operation for about 5 years (xˉ =4.93) compared to their 
counterpart non-users of microcredit where the average is 4.43 years. With a t-test value 
of 0.81 the difference in the age of participant MSE owner-managers‟ businesses 
between the two groups is not significant. With regard to the participants‟ overall 
experience in business activities, the average period among users of microcredit is 7.18 
years compared to 5.63 years among non users. It can be noted also that with a t-test 
value of 1.90 at p<.10, not only is difference in business experience between users and 
non users of microcredit weakly significant, but it also varies more among users of 
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microcredit ( , respectively). From the above it appears that participant 
MSE owner-managers who use credit are likely to be more experienced in business than 
those who identify as non users of credit.   
 
Table 16: Participants‟ economic profile: pair-wise comparisons – credit users vs. non users, 
     regardless of use of BDS [c1 & c2 vs. c3 & c4] 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
(nominal) 
 Participant category  Total Chi-Square value 
c1and c2  
[credit] 
c3 and c4 
[no credit] 
 
(N) 
 
response 
category 
(n=80) (n=80) 
Residence own house 35 
(44.3%) 
16 
(20.5%) 
(160) 
 
 
 
 
51 
(32.5%) 
 
 
10.13** 
 
 
 
 
10.47* 
rental 44 
(55.7%) 
62 
(79.5%) 
106 
(67.5%) 
mortgage 1 
(1.3%) 
2 
(2.5%) 
3 
(1.9%) 
 
Own car yes 22 
(27.5%) 
17 
(21.3%) 
(160) 
 
 
39 
(24.4%) 
 
0.85 
no 58 
(72.5%) 
63 
(78.8%) 
121 
(75.6%) 
Occupation business only 62  
(77.5%) 
64 
(84.2%) 
(156) 
 
126 
(80.8%) 
 
1.13 
 business & 
professional job 
18 
(22.5%) 
12 
(15.8%) 
 30 
(19.2%) 
 
Monthly 
income 
(KES) 
below  20,000 7 
(8.8%) 
26 
(32.5%) 
(160) 
 
 
 
33 
(20.6%) 
 
 
 
 
8.74** 
 
 
 
 
 
15.63*
* 
20,000-30,000 
 
20 
(25.0%) 
19 
(23.8%) 
39 
(24.4%) 
31,000-40,000 14 
(17.5%) 
12 
(15.0%) 
26 
(16.3%) 
41,000-50,000 15 
(18.8%) 
7 
(8.84%) 
22 
(13.8%) 
 
0.52 
 above 50,000 24 
(30.0%) 
16 
(20.0%) 
40 
(25.0%) 
Monthly 
expenditure 
(KES) 
below 10,000 19 
(23.8%) 
33 
(41.3%) 
(160) 52 
(32.5%) 
 
 
3.48* 
 
 
 
 
6.83* 
10,000-20,000 41 
(51.3%) 
36 
(45.0%) 
77 
(48.1%) 
21,000-30,000 14 
(17.5%) 
7 
(8.8%) 
21 
(13.1%) 
 
0.13 
above 30,000 6 
(7.5%) 
4 
(5.0%) 
10 
(6.3%) 
  
Variable Continuous range mean std. 
dev. 
range mean std. 
dev. 
(N) t- value 
Number of branches 5 1.34 0.73 2 1.14 0.41 (160) 2.14** 
Number of employees 13 3.75 2.37 9 3.35 2.49 (160) 1.04 
Years in Operation 23 4.93 4.10 19 4.43 3.71 (160) 0.81 
Experience in business 
(years) 
29 7.18 5.99 19 5.63 4.29 (160) 1.90* 
*     significant at p<0.10; **  significant at p<0.05 
Legend:   
 c1= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit and BDS 
 c2= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of  microcredit without BDS 
 c3= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of BDS without  microcredit 
 c4= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of neither  microcredit nor BDS 
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Table 17 below presents the economic profile of participants divided into those who 
have made use of BDS and those who have not regardless of whether or not credit has 
been accessed. According to the Table, a majority (66 per cent) of these participants live 
in rental houses. Of these, 79 per cent of these participants do not use BDS while 55 per 
cent identify as being users of BDS. The Table further reveals that about one third (32 
per cent) of the participants live in their own houses. Of these, 42 per cent are in the 
users of BDS group while one fifth (21 per cent) identify as non users of BDS.  
 
In general therefore it appears that participants who use BDS are more likely to own a 
house than those who do not. As far as residence is concerned, the difference between 
participants who use BDS and those who do not is significant (Chi² =11.56, p<.05). 
Disregarding mortgages and taking into account the two residential options of owning a 
house or rental, the difference between users and non users of BDS remains significant 
with a Chi² =8.75 at p<.05.  
 
Turning to material possessions, Table 17 shows that slightly more than one fifth (24 
per cent) of the participants are in possession of a car. Among these about a third (32 
per cent) identify as being users of BDS while 16 per cent are non users. Table 17 also 
shows that slightly more than three quarters (76 per cent) of the participants do not own 
a car, either for business or personal use. Within this category a significant 84 per cent 
of participants belong to the non users of BDS group, while 68 per cent identify to be 
users of BDS. On the possession parameter of car ownership and with a Chi² =5.79 at 
p<0.05, this difference between BDS users and non users is significant. 
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Table 17: Participants‟ economic profile: pair-wise comparisons – BDS users vs. non users, 
     regardless of use of credit [c1 & c3 vs. c2 & c4]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
(nominal) 
 Participant category  Total Chi-Square value 
c1and c3 
[BDS] 
c2 and c4 
[no BDS] 
(N)  
response 
category 
(n=84) (n=76) 
Residence own house 35 
(42%) 
16 
(21%) 
(160) 51 
(32%) 
 
8.78** 
 
 
11.56** 
 
rental 46 
(55%) 
60 
(79%) 
106 
(66%) 
mortgage 3 
(4%) 
 3 
(2%) 
 
Own car yes 27 
(32%) 
12 
(16%) 
 39 
(24%) 
 
5.79** 
               
 
no 57 
(68%) 
64 
(84%) 
121 
(76%) 
Occupation business only 61 
(76%) 
65 
(86%) 
 126 
(81%) 
 
2.16 
business & 
professional 
job 
19 
(24%) 
11 
(15%) 
30 
(19%) 
Monthly income 
(KES) 
below  20,000 10 
(12%) 
23 
(30%) 
 33 
(21%) 
 
 
 
5.92* 
 
 
 
 
 
10.49** 
20,000-30,000 
 
19 
(23%) 
20 
(26%) 
39 
(24%) 
31,000-40,000 16 
(19%) 
10 
(13%) 
26 
(16%) 
41,000-50,000 13 
(16%) 
9 
(12%) 
22 
(14%) 
 
7.13* 
above 50,000 26 
(31%) 
14 
(18%) 
40 
(25%) 
 
Monthly expenditure 
(KES) 
below 10,000 23 
(27%) 
29 
(38%) 
 52 
(32%) 
 
2.07 
 
 
 
 
5.81 
10,000-20,000 44 
(52%) 
33 
(44%) 
77 
(48%) 
21,000-30,000 14 
(17%) 
7 
(9%) 
21 
(13%) 
 
3.68* 
above 30,000 3 
(4%) 
7 
(9%) 
10 
(6%) 
  
Variable Continuous range mean std. 
dev. 
range mean std. 
dev. 
(N) t- value 
Number of branches 7 1.37 0.76 4 1.09 0.29 (160) 3.11** 
Number of employees 17 4.35 2.67 11 2.67 1.78 (160) 4.70*** 
Years in Operation 26 5.54 4.62 21 3.72 2.63 (160) 3.01** 
Experience in business 
(years) 
29 6.67 5.59 22 6.11 4.87 (160) 0.68 
*      significant at p<0.10; **   significant at p<0.05; *** significant at p<0.001 
Legend:   
 c1= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit and BDS 
 c2= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit without BDS 
 c3= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of BDS without microcredit 
 c4= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of neither microcredit nor BDS 
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With regard to participants‟ occupation, (as noted earlier) in total 81 per cent identify as 
being in business on a full time basis while about one fifth (19 per cent) are involved in 
business in addition to having a professional job. In the category of participants who are 
in business as a full time career, 76 per cent belong to the users of BDS group whereas 
86 per cent identify as non users of BDS. With a Chi² value of 2.16 there is no 
significant difference between BDS users and non BDS users as far as occupation is 
concerned. 
 
Making a pair-wise comparison between BDS users and non users, Table 17 reveals that 
as noted in relation to Table 16, the gross monthly income for 61 per cent of the 
participants is less than KES 41,000 (AUD $ 820). Of these participants, 69 per cent 
identify as non BDS users with 54 per cent BDS users. These proportions compare 
closely with the comparison between users and non users of microcredit reported in 
Table 16. Additionally it seems that participants, who do not use BDS just like their 
counterparts who do not access microcredit, are more likely to earn less (in gross terms) 
than participants who use BDS. A closer look at the figures in Table 17 reveals that 
close to two fifths (39 per cent) of all participants earn more than KES 41,000 (AUD $ 
820) per month. Within this category almost half (47 per cent) of them are users of BDS 
and close to one third identify as non users of BDS. It is worth noting that with a Chi² = 
5.92 at p<.10, there is a weakly significant difference between users and non users of 
BDS among participants earning less than KES 41,000 (AUD $ 820).  
 
Taking all income categories into account, there is a significant difference between 
users and non users of BDS (Chi² =10.49, p<.05).  When comparing microcredit users 
and non users, it is noted that there is no significant difference among participants 
whose monthly income exceeds KES 41,000 (AUD $ 820), however this is not the case 
with BDS users and non users. For participants in these groups it is only in participant 
cases where monthly income is greater than KES 50,000 (AUD $ 1000) that significant 
differences are not observed.  In relative terms and with regard to monthly incomes 
below KES 41,000 (AUD 820), differences observed between users and non users of 
BDS are weaker than that those observed between users and non users of microcredit. In 
general, income remains a key discriminator among this study‟s key participant groups.     
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Looking at expenditure, Table 17 shows that the monthly expenditure budget for 80 per 
cent of all participants is below KES 21,000 (AUD $ 420). This incidence is commonly 
observed among participants in both groups, representing 79 per cent of the BDS users 
and 82 per cent of non BDS users.  The Table also shows that of the 31 participants 
whose monthly expenditure is greater than KES 20,000 (AUD $ 400), 17 (67 per cent) 
of them are BDS users while the remaining 14 (33 per cent) identify as non users of 
BDS. There is a weakly significant difference between users and non users of BDS 
among participants with expenditure budgets exceeding KES 20,000 (AUD $ 400) per 
month (Chi² =3.68, p<0.10).   
 
While overall expenditure is found to be a significant discriminator among users and 
non users of microcredit, it is not the case between BDS users and non users. It can be 
observed that with regard to expenditure, results of comparisons between BDS users 
and non users are the reverse of what is observed between users and non users of credit. 
For example, while there is no significant difference between users and non users of 
BDS for overall monthly expenditure it is the case that there is between users and non 
users of microcredit. Additionally, while the difference between participants who are 
users of BDS and those who are not is significant (for monthly expenditures greater than 
KES 20,000 (AUD $ 400)), this is not the case between users and non users of credit.  
Table 17 reflects that the mean branch network for participant owner-managers‟ MSEs 
in the BDS user group is 1.37 while for non BDS users it is 1.09 branches. There is 
however minimal variation in the number of branches across participants‟ businesses 
(  =0.76 for BDS users and  = 0.29 for BDS non users). On this parameter the 
difference between BDS users and non users is significant (t-test value =3.11, p<.05).  
Turning to staffing levels, the average is 4.35 employees for MSEs belonging to 
participants who use BDS compared to 2.67 employees for MSEs owned by non BDS 
users. Again the difference between the two groups is significant (t-test value 4.70, 
p<0.001), this time highly so.  
With regard to participants who are BDS users, Table 17 shows that on average their 
MSE businesses have been operational for close to six years (xˉ =5.54 years) compared 
to an average of 3.72 years for non users of BDS . With a t-test value of 3.01 the 
difference in the age of participants‟ MSEs between the two groups is significant at 
p<0.05. The average experience in business is more than six years for participants in 
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both the BDS user and non user groups. The mean experience in business is 6.67 and 
6.11 years for BDS users and non users respectively.  Although there is no significant 
difference between participants in the two groups (t-test value = 0.68) there is some 
differential variation in business experience among participants (  = 5.99 for users of 
BDS and  = 4.87 for non BDS users). In general it appears that participants with more 
experience in business are more inclined to use BDS than their less experienced 
counterparts. 
In summary, the foregoing shows that the differences in economic attributes between 
BDS users and non users are more pronounced than those between microcredit users 
and non users. Further this observation may imply that there are clearly observable 
differences between participants who are users of microcredit and those who use BDS. 
This is an aspect that is next examined. 
Table 18 below presents pair-wise comparisons of the economic profile between 
participants in receipt of credit without BDS and vice versa. The table shows that 
despite the differences noted earlier, except for income and expenditure parameters, the 
economic differences between participants only in receipt of either microcredit or BDS 
are not significant. The table reveals with regard to gross monthly income below KES 
41,000 (AUD $ 820) that there is a significant difference between participants in receipt 
of microcredit without BDS and those in receipt of BDS without microcredit 
(Chi²=21.39, p<0.05). Table 18 further shows that with a Chi² =11.96 at p<0.05, there is 
also a significant difference between the two groups of participants for monthly 
expenditures less than KES 21,000 (AUD $ 420).  Additionally the Table reveals that 
with regard to employee numbers there is a significant difference between participants 
in exclusive receipt of microcredit or BDS (t-test value = -2.42, p<0.05). In aggregate 
terms however there is no significant difference between participants who use 
microcredit without BDS and vice versa.     
 
It is important to also examine whether there are any significant differences between 
participants in the other five participant categories. The following table, Table 19, 
presents pair-wise comparisons of the economic profile of participants in all six 
respondent categories. 
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Table 18: Participants‟ economic profile: pair-wise comparisons – BDS users vs. non users 
     regardless of receipt of credit [c2 vs. c3] 
 
From the Table it is clear that with a few exceptions there are no significant differences 
between participants in categories c1 (credit and BDS), c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS 
only). This implies that generally, participants who use microcredit as well BDS and 
those who use either of these two support services singly, are not significantly different. 
There is a weakly significant difference between participants in category c1 (credit and 
BDS) and either category c2 (credit only) or c3 (BDS only) with respect to their 
Variable 
(nominal) 
 Category  
 
 
 Chi-Square 
value c2  
[credit only] 
c3 
[BDS only] 
 
 
 response category n=38 n=42  Total  
Residence own house 12 
32% 
12 
29% 
(80) 24 
30% 
 
1.88 
 
rental 26 
68% 
28 
67% 
54 
68% 
mortgage  2 
5% 
2 
3% 
Own car yes 8 
21% 
13 
31% 
(80) 21 
26% 
 
1.01 
no 30 
79% 
29 
69% 
59 
74% 
Occupation business only 30 
79% 
29 
76% 
(80) 59 
78% 
 
0.08 
business & 
professional job 
8 
21% 
9 
24% 
17 
22% 
Monthly income 
(KES) 
below  20,000 3 
8% 
6 
14% 
(80) 9 
11% 
 
 
 
21.39** 
 
 
 
 
1.65 
20,000-30,000 
 
10 
26% 
9 
21% 
19 
24% 
31,000-40,000 8 
21% 
10 
24% 
18 
23% 
41,000-50,000 6 
16% 
4 
10% 
10 
13% 
1.90 
above 50,000 11 
29% 
13 
31% 
24 
30% 
 
Monthly 
expenditure 
(KES) 
below 10,000 8 
21% 
12 
29% 
(80) 20 
25% 
 
11.96** 
 
 
 
2.60 
10,000-20,000 22 
58% 
25 
60% 
47 
59% 
21,000-30,000 4 
11% 
4 
10% 
8 
10% 
 
3.70 
above 30,000 4 
11% 
1 
2% 
5 
6% 
  
Variable Continuous mean std. 
dev. 
mean std. 
dev. 
N t-value 
Number of branches 1.13 0.34 1.21 0.52 (80) -0.83 
Number of employees 2.95 1.85 4.21 2.70 (80) -2.42** 
Years in operation 3.95 2.92 5.26 4.50 (80) -1.53 
Experience in business (years) 7.03 5.75 6.02 4.79 (80) 0.85 
**   significant at p<0.05 
Legend:   
 c1= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit and BDS 
 c2= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit without BDS 
 c3= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of BDS without microcredit 
 c4= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of neither microcredit nor BDS 
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residential status (Chi² =5.73, p<0.10; Chi² =5.96, p<0.10; for c1 vs. c2 & c1 vs. c3 
respectively). However with respect to the branches network of participants‟ MSE 
businesses there is a significant difference between participants in categories c1 (credit 
and BDS) and c2 (credit only) (t-test value =2.58, p<0.05). Similarly with a t-test value 
=3.07 and 2.12 at p<0.05, there is a significant difference between participants‟ MSE 
businesses in these two categories with respect to number of employees and years in 
operation respectively.  
As Table 19 reveals, a high level of differences result when comparisons are made 
between participants in categories c4 (no credit no BDS) or c1 (credit and BDS) and c3 
(BDS only). Indeed there are significant economic differences between participants in 
these categories in almost all the key parameters examined.  For example Table 19 
shows that on residential status, participants who are in receipt of both microcredit and 
BDS (c1) and those who do not use either of the two services (c4) differ significantly 
(Chi² =19.14, p<0.05). Similar significant differences emerge in comparisons between 
participants in exclusive receipt of BDS (c3) and those of neither credit nor BDS (c4) 
(Chi² =6.40, p<0.05). With regard to car ownership figures in Table 19 reveal that there 
are significant differences between participants in category c4 (no credit no BDS) and 
participants in either category c1 (credit and BDS) or c3 (BDS only) (Chi² =5.95, 
p<0.05; Chi² =4.97, p<0.05; for c1 vs. c4 & c3 vs. c4 respectively). 
Turning to comparison on participants‟ incomes, Table 19 shows that there are 
significant differences between participants in most of the participant categories. For 
example a comparison between participants in categories c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 
(neither users of credit nor BDS) reveal a strong significant difference a cross all 
monthly income brackets (Chi² =21.77, p<0.001). Similar significant differences are 
seen in participant comparisons for categories; c2 (credit only) and c4 (no credit no 
BDS) (Chi² =21.74, p<0.001) and, c3 (BDS only) and c4 (no credit no BDS) (Chi² 
=19.17, p<0.05). It is worth noting significant differences are reflected also across most 
participant categories for monthly incomes below KES 41,000 (AUD $ 820) (Chi² 
=10.45, p<0.05 for c1 (credit and BDS) vs. c4 (no credit no BDS); Chi² =14.51, p<0.05 
for c2 (credit only) vs. c4 (no credit no BDS); and Chi² =12.25, p<0.05 for c3 (BDS 
only) vs. c4 (no credit no BDS). However there are no significant differences among 
participants with monthly incomes exceeding KES 40,000 (AUD $ 800) across any of 
the categories. 
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Looking at expenditure budgets, Table 19 shows that in general terms expenditure 
differs significantly especially for participants in category c4 (no credit no BDS) when 
compared to participants in categories c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS only). With a Chi² = 
9.05 at p<0.05, expenditure budgets for participants in categories c1 (credit and BDS) 
and c4 (no credit no BDS) differ significantly. Similarly significant differences in 
expenditure emerge when participants in category c4 (no credit no BDS) are compared 
with their counterparts in categories c2 (credit only) and c3 (BDS only) (Chi² =9.78, 
p<0.05 for c2 (credit only) vs. c4 (no credit no BDS), and Chi² =8.86, p<0.05 for c3 
(BDS only) vs. c4 (no credit no BDS). The significant differences in expenditure across 
most participant categories result more from monthly expenditure budgets below KES 
21,000 (AUD $ 420) than otherwise. For example with a Chi² =5.20, p<0.05, the 
difference in monthly expenditures below KES 21,000 (AUD $ 420) between 
participants in categories c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 (no credit no BDS) is significant. 
Similar results emerge from comparisons between participants in categories; c2 (credit 
only) vs. c4 (no credit no BDS), and c3 (BDS only) vs. c4 (no credit no BDS) (Chi² 
=9.44, p<0.05; Chi² =7.58, p<0.05, respectively). 
As noted earlier there are significant differences in the number of years their MSE has 
been established among participants‟ businesses, though not as pronounced as in the 
case of income and expenditure. Results in Table 19 show that MSEs belonging to 
participants in categories c1 (credit and BDS) and c4 (no credit no BDS) differ 
significantly with regard to branch network, staff size and years in operation (t-test 
value =2.79, p<0.05; t-test value =4.30, p<0.001, and t-test value =3.22, p<0.05, 
respectively).  Looking at participants in categories c3 (BDS only) and c4 (no credit no 
BDS), the number of years of MSE operation differs significantly as well. For example 
for this group the t-test value is 3.57 at p<0.05 for staff levels and t-test value is 2.24 at 
p<0.05 as pertains to years in operation.  From the foregoing it is clear that the 
economic profile of participants in category c4, being owner-managers of MSEs who 
currently do not use either microcredit or BDS, differ significantly from their 
counterparts in the other three categories. This means that, as intended, participants in 
category c4 serve as an effective control group in terms of negating the influence of 
MFI and/or BDS on the performance of participant owner-managers MSEs. 
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 Table 19: Pair-wise comparisons test of differences all categories [c1– c4] (Chi-Square test & independent samples t-test) 
 
 
 
 
Variable (nominal) 
 Participant category 
c1Vsc2 
[credit] 
c1Vsc3 
[BDS] 
c1Vsc4 
[credit and BDS  
vs. non users] 
c2vs c3 
[credit only  
vs. BDS only] 
c2Vsc4 
[credit only vs.  
no credit no BDS] 
c3Vsc4 
[BDS only vs.  
no credit no BDS] 
(n=80) (n=84) (n=80) (n=80) (n=76) (n=80) 
Response category Chi² value Chi² value Chi² value Chi² value Chi² value Chi² value 
Residence own house 5.73* 5.96* 
 
19.14** 1.88 5.07** 6.40** 
rental 
mortgage 
Own car yes 1.51 
 
0.06 5.95** 1.01 1.58 4.97** 
no 
Occupation business only 0.09 
 
0.00 3.71* 0.08 2.66 3.56* 
Business & professional job  
Monthly income (KES) 20,000 and below 0.40 
 
 
0.99 
 
 
0.91 3.38 10.45** 21.77*** 21.39** 1.65 
 
14.51** 21.74*** 12.25** 19.17** 
21,000-30,000 
31,000-40,000 
41,000-50,000 0.13 1.30 0.16 1.90 0.40 1.47 
above 50,000 
Monthly expenditure (KES) 10,000 and below 0.69 
 
 
3.74 
 
 
0.13 3.77 5.20** 9.05** 11.96** 2.60 9.44** 9.78** 7.58** 8.86** 
11,000-20,000 
21,000-30,000 2.54 0.03 2.22 3.70 0.00 1.06 
Above 30,000 
 
Variable (continuous)  t-test 
value 
t-test 
value 
t-test 
value 
t-test 
value 
t-test 
value 
t-test 
value 
Number of branches 2.58** 1.90* 2.79** -0.85 1.19 1.83* 
Number of employees 3.07** 0.45 4.30*** -2.42** 1.36 3.57** 
Years in operation 2.12** 0.54 3.22** -1.57 0.74 2.24** 
Experience in business 0.21 1.06 1.87* 0.84 1.67 0.90 
*      significant at p<0.10; **   significant at p<0.05; *** significant at p<0.001 
Legend:   
c1= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit and BDS 
c2= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit without BDS  
c3= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of BDS without microcredit 
c4= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of neither microcredit nor BDS 
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 5.4 General profile of Participants [Sample II] 
As stated earlier in this chapter, the purpose of the second sample of participants used in 
this study is to triangulate the views elicited from MSE owner-managers with regard to 
the perceived usefulness of access to both BDS and microcredit in their MSEs‟ 
performance. In total the second sample of this study consists of 19 purposively selected 
participants (see a summary of their attributes below). Of these, eight participants are 
representatives drawn from BDS agencies that have MSEs as their primary target, while 
nine participants are representatives of MFIs. The remaining two participants are 
independent researchers in private practice with an interest in Kenya‟s MSE sector.  
 
Among the eight participants representing BDS firms, four come from agencies that 
operate as not-for-profit organisations, while two identify with private limited 
companies. The remaining participants represent BDS firms that are licensed as either 
trusts or partnerships. It is noted that six of the participants come from BDS agencies 
having been in operation for more than ten years. Most of the BDS firms represented 
have a national branch network (this is true for five of the cases), two have regional 
outlook while at least one of the firms represented is an international organisation. 
Almost all BDS agencies represented by the participants in this sample have, as their 
main target market, MSEs across diverse sectors such as agriculture, trade, services, and 
manufacturing, in either rural or urban settings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for representatives of MFIs, three of the nine participants identify with firms licensed 
as limited liability companies, four come from NGO-based MFIs, while publicly listed 
companies and credit unions have at least one representative each. Of the nine MFIs 
Summary of  participants‟ attributes  (Sample II) 
 Legal identify Age of firm 
(years) 
Branch network No. 
 NGO Limited 
Co. 
Other   ≤ 10 
 
> 10 
 
National Regional International  
Representatives of 
BDS firms 
targeting MSEs 
 
4 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
6 
 
5 
 
2 
 
1 
 
8 
MFI 
representatives 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
4 
 
5 
 
8 
 
1 
  
9 
Researchers in 
private practice 
  
2 
Total  19 
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represented in the sample, five are mature having been in operation for ten or more 
years, while the remaining four firms are aged between six and ten years. With the 
exception of one participant whose MFI has a regional outlook all the other participants 
represent MFIs with a national branch network. As expected, MSEs in rural as well as 
urban areas and across all sectors are the main target for all MFIs represented.  Lastly 
one of the two independent researchers within the sample comes from a quasi-
government policy research institution while the other is an author and runs a private 
research firm which consults mainly for NGOs working in the MSE sector. 
  
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a profile description of the two distinct sample participants 
recruited for this study. In particular the chapter offers a detailed analysis of both 
demographic and economic attributes of the participant MSE owner-managers (Sample 
I, being the main sample for the study). The chapter notes that participants across the 
four participant categories (c1 through c4) compare favourably along most social 
attributes, for example, gender, age, level of education, and marital status. However 
significant economic differences are noted between participant MSE owner-managers 
who do not use either BDS or microcredit (category c4) and MSE owner-managers in 
other participant categories (c1, c2, and c3) who use BDS or microcredit or both. Lastly 
the chapter also provides a brief description of the key characteristics of participants in 
Sample II, being representatives of MFI or BDS agencies, and independent researchers 
in the field of microfinance. Next is an analysis of MSE owner-managers‟ perceptions of 
the benefits accruing from access to microcredit and BDS. 
  
   
   
137 
 
6.0 Chapter Six:  Usefulness of Microcredit and BDS – MSE Owner-
managers’ Perceptions 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents analysis of participant micro and small enterprise (MSE) owner-
managers‟ perceptions of the usefulness of both business development services (BDS) 
and microcredit as support services to their enterprises. The analyses presented here 
address, on a univariate basis, Research Questions 1 to 3 and partly 5, which broadly 
relate to assessing the benefits (or otherwise) that might accrue to MSE owner-managers 
given their access to either BDS and/or microcredit, as stated in chapter one. In 
addition, analyses performed in this chapter provide further background to possible 
differential perceived MSE performance contingent on access to BDS and microcredit, 
jointly or singly. This is a subject examined later in chapter seven. The chapter proceeds 
as follows. The first part is devoted to outlining the general attributes that characterise 
MSEs whose owner-managers are users of microcredit and/or BDS. The second part 
describes the participants‟ perceptions of issues surrounding their access to microcredit 
and its use. The third and last part examines issues pertaining to participants‟ access to 
BDS and their use of it.  
 
The usefulness of BDS (in its various forms) is assessed partly on the basis of 
perceptions about its delivery effectiveness and partly on whether current BDS practices 
are perceived to match strategically the skill set needs of MSE owner-managers. In 
relation to microcredit services, emphasis is on perceptions of whether eligibility for, 
access and the terms and conditions linked to its use are meeting the needs of MSE 
owner-managers. The discussions are guided largely by MSE owner-managers‟ 
perceptions as captured by responses to this study‟s structured interview protocol. This 
is in addition to insights provided by representatives of microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
and BDS providers and the independent researchers with an interest in entrepreneurship 
and the MSE sector, during open-ended interviews. Further insights are provided by 
interpreting the results in light of the conceptual frameworks introduced in chapter 
three.  
 
6.2 Nature of Credit and BDS users’ Businesses 
Before moving into detailed analysis of the perceived usefulness of microcredit and 
BDS, it is important to first understand the general characteristics of the MSEs run by 
participants who use microcredit as well as those who use BDS, either jointly or singly.  
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Tables 20a and 20b below present an outline of the key attributes that characterise 
participants‟ businesses for microcredit users and BDS users respectively. The attributes 
examined here include; the nature of business activity, industry affiliation, type of 
ownership and business stage of development, among others.  
 
According to Table 20a, close to half (48 per cent) of the 80 participants in receipt of 
microcredit run businesses involving some aspect of trade.   The same picture is 
reflected (see Table 20b) among their counterparts who use BDS (48 per cent). As a 
classification category, trade covers a wide range of resale activities including; general 
grocery (23 per cent), clothes stalls (16 per cent), hardware (12 per cent), beauty 
products (7 per cent, and electronics (5 per cent), among others (see Figure 8 below). 
Figure 8 reflects that the most popular form of trade is general grocery, representing 
slightly more than one-fifth (23 per cent) of the participants‟ businesses. It is observed 
that these shops retail household goods and are a common feature in most residential 
areas across all four study sites.  
 
Most of the other participants‟ businesses belong to either personal services or 
agribusiness  categories. The personal services business activity represents 19 per cent 
of the cases of participants who use microcredit (see Table 20a) compared to 16 per cent 
of their counterparts who identify as users of BDS (see Table 20b). The agribusiness 
category, according to Table 20a, accounts for 10 per cent of the participants who use 
microcredit and 12 per cent of participants who identify as users of BDS (see Table 
20b).  As in the case of trade, there is wide variation in business activity within these 
categories, especially for the category of personal services (see Figure 9 below). For 
example, in the personal services business category, activity takes the form of barber 
shops, salons, dry cleaning, fashion design, and taxis, among others. Additionally for 
the agribusiness category, participants‟ businesses include various farming activities 
such as dairy, poultry, garden seedlings, fish and fruit farming.   
 
Table 20b, further reveals that there are more businesses (14 per cent) with food related 
activities among participants who use BDS, compared to 9 per cent among participants 
who use microcredit (see Table 20a). Food related activity is mainly in the form of 
cereals stalls, butcheries, and restaurants. In general there are fewer businesses of a 
technical nature (9 per cent) among participants in receipt of microcredit and only 5 per 
cent of participants in receipt of BDS (see Tables 20a and 20b respectively). The nature 
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of technical activity among participants‟ businesses ranges from metal works and 
mechanics to cyber cafe (internet) services. Across most business activity categories, 
the distribution of cases between users and non users of either microcredit or BDS is 
close to even (see Tables 20a and 20b respectively).  In summary, Chi-Square test 
results in Tables 20a and 20b reveal no significant differences between participants who 
are users and those who are non users of either microcredit or BDS (Chi² =2.67 and Chi² 
=3.37 respectively).  
 
In terms of industry affiliation, majority of the businesses (78 per cent) for participants 
who use microcredit (see Table 20a) and (77 per cent) for BDS users (see Table 20b), 
handle goods rather than provision of services. This implies that most of the trade 
activity reported involves resale of tangible goods. In relative terms, trade in goods is 
likely to demand less management skills and attract minimal operating costs compared 
with trade in services. It is likely these features make it more attractive to owner-
managers of MSEs. With a Chi-Square value of 0.04, there is no significant difference 
(in terms of industry affiliation of participants‟ businesses) between users and non users 
of microcredit (see Table 20a). Similarly there is no significant difference between users 
and non users of BDS (Chi² =0.03, see Table 20b). 
 
Turning to ownership structure, Tables 20a and 20b reveal that the legal framework of 
the majority (71 per cent) of participants‟ businesses is as a sole proprietorship. Sole 
proprietorships form 67 per cent of all participants‟ businesses for both microcredit 
users and BDS users.  It is noted that participants may prefer operating as sole 
proprietors because this form attracts minimal legal compliance costs. According to 
these Tables, there are slightly more cases of partnerships reported among participants 
who use BDS (31 per cent) than for participants who use microcredit (29 per cent).  It is 
however noted that most of these partnerships are not partnerships in the strict legal 
sense. Some of them are simply group businesses run either by women on behalf of 
other family members or young adults. The limited liability company form of business 
establishment is not common (2 per cent) within the MSE sector. This is not surprising 
given the comparatively complex compliance and legal issues associated with setting up 
and running a limited liability company. With regard to the legal status of businesses, 
results of Chi-Square tests reflected in Tables 20a and 20b, show no significant 
differences between participants who either use or do not use microcredit and/or BDS 
(Chi² =3.74 and Chi² =1.39). However there is a weakly significant difference between 
140 
 
participants who are users of microcredit and those who are not users with regard to sole 
proprietorships and limited company ownership structures (Chi² =3.43, p<0.10). 
 
According to both Table 20a and Table 20b, more than half of all participants‟ 
businesses (53 per cent for microcredit users and 57 per cent for BDS users) are 
identified as established (i.e. have been in operation for more than five years). The 
Tables further show that 34 per cent of participants who are users of BDS and a similar 
proportion (33 per cent) of participants who use microcredit, identify their businesses as 
newly established (i.e. have been in operation for  between three to five years). In 
general however, more than 85 per cent of all participants‟ businesses have been 
operational for more than three years. Beyond the discovery phase of the business 
growth cycle, Table 20b reveals a weakly significant difference between participants 
who use BDS and those who do not use BDS (Chi² =5.43, p<0.10). Generally however 
across all the four stages of the business growth cycle presented in Tables 20a and 20b, 
there is no significant difference between users and non users of either microcredit or 
BDS (Chi² =2.61 and Chi² =6.15). 
Tables 20a and 20b further show that 84 per cent of participants who use microcredit 
report operating a business account compared to 76 per cent of the participants who use 
BDS. Given that only 51 per cent (see Table 20a) of participants who are non users of 
microcredit report holding a business account, it seems that microcredit users are more 
likely to hold a business account than their counterparts. This observation is not 
unexpected because one would expect that most MFIs would require potential 
borrowers to open an account as a precondition for membership and access to credit 
services. With regard to holding a business account, there is a highly significant 
difference between participants who use microcredit and those who do not (Chi² =18.13, 
p<0.001, see Table 20a). A similar observation is made of the difference between users 
and non users of BDS (Chi² =4.05, p<0.05, see Table 20b). 
Data in Tables 20a and 20b reveal that savings accounts are the most common (62 per 
cent) type of business accounts operated by participants. This is the case for more than 
three-quarters (79 per cent) of the participants who use microcredit, and more than two-
thirds (71 per cent) of the participants who use BDS. According to the data in these 
Tables, current accounts are the second most popular (37 per cent) type of business 
accounts. Among participants who use microcredit, 58 per cent are current account 
holders compared to 39 per cent of participants who use BDS.  
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A comparison of Chi-Square test results in Table 20a and Table 20b, shows that with 
the exception of current accounts (and only for comparisons between BDS users and 
non users), there are significant differences between users and non users of either 
microcredit or BDS across all four types of business accounts examined (i.e. savings, 
current, investment, and fixed deposit accounts). For example, as pertains to savings 
types of business accounts, the difference between users and non users of either 
microcredit or BDS is significant (Chi² =15.74, p<0.001 and Chi² =6.39, p<0.05 
respectively). For fixed deposit types of accounts, there is also a significant difference 
between participants who are users and participants who are non users of either 
microcredit or BDS (Chi² =16.23, p<0.001 and Chi² =9.25, p<0.05). Overall the 
differences between users and non users of microcredit are more pronounced than the 
differences between users and non users of BDS, across the various types of business 
accounts examined.  
 
In summary therefore, participants‟ businesses display almost similar characteristics, 
which is likely indicative of a shared habitus, regardless of whether their owner-
managers use microcredit or BDS jointly or singly. This is the case for most of the 
attributes considered above, with the exception of access to the types of business 
accounts explored. Unlike fixed deposit and other accounts held for investment 
purposes, MSEs‟ savings accounts play a strategic role in that they are often a 
precondition for accessing MFI supplied microcredit and also serve as implicit collateral 
against the same (see Armendariz and Morduch, 2010, Morduch and Haley, 2002). In 
addition, funds held in savings accounts may be drawn on whenever there is need to 
raise additional working capital.
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Table 20a:  Business characteristics: pair-wise comparisons of credit users  
                   and non users [c1& c2 vs. c3&c4] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable (nominal) Response category Participant category  Total Chi-Square 
value c1&c2 [credit] c3&c4 [no credit]  
(N) (n=80) (n=80) 
Nature of business 
activity 
trade 38 
(48%) 
35 
(44%) 
(160) 73 
(46%) 
 
2.67 
 
 
 
 
 
agribusiness 8 
(10%) 
10 
(13%) 
18 
(12% ) 
personal services 15 
(19%) 
12 
(15%) 
27 
(17% ) 
food related 7 
(9%) 
13 
(16%) 
20 
(13% ) 
technical 7 
(9%) 
6 
(8%) 
13 
(8%) 
craft 5 
(6%) 
4 
(5%) 
9 
(6%) 
Industry affiliation goods 62 
(78%) 
61 
(76%) 
(160) 123 
(77%) 
 
0.04 
services 18 
(23%) 
19 
(24%) 
37 
(23%) 
Type of ownership sole proprietorship 50 
(67%) 
59 
(75%) 
(160) 109 
(71%) 
 
3.43* 
 
 
3.74 limited company 3 
(4%) 
 3 
(2%) 
partnership 22 
(29%) 
20 
(25%) 
42 
(27%) 
 
Stage in business 
cycle 
discovery 5 
(6%) 
3 
(4%) 
(79) 8 
(5%) 
 
2.61 
 
 
 
start up 6 
(8%) 
12 
(15%) 
18 
(11%) 
newly established 26 
(33%) 
26 
(33%) 
52 
(33%) 
established 22 
(53%) 
39 
(49%) 
81 
(51%) 
Hold business 
account 
yes 67 
(84%) 
36 
(51%) 
(80) 103 
(69%) 
18.13*** 
Type of business 
account 
savings 49 
(79%) 
(61) 27 
(44%) 
(62) (123) 76 
(62%) 
15.74***  
current 18 
(58%) 
(31) 10 
(23%) 
(44) (75) 28 
(37%) 
9.71**  
 
investment 4 
(24%) 
(17)  (34) (51) 4 
(8%) 
8.68**  
fixed deposit 11 
(46%) 
(24) 1 
(3%) 
(35) (59) 12 
(20%) 
16.23***  
*      significant at p<0.10; **   significant at p<0.05; *** significant at p<0.001 
Legend:   
c1= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit and BDS 
c2= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit without BDS  
c3= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of BDS without microcredit 
c4= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of neither microcredit nor BDS 
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Table 20b:  Business characteristics: pair-wise comparison of BDS users and non users  
        [c1&c3 vs. c2&c4] 
 
  
 
 
 
Variable (nominal) Response category Participant category  Total Chi-Square 
value c1&c3 [BDS]  c2&c4 [no BDS]  
(N) (n=84) (n=76) 
Nature of business 
activity 
trade 40  
(48%) 
33 
(43%) 
(160) 73 
(46%) 
 
3.37 
 agribusiness 10 
(12%) 
8 
(11%) 
18 
(11%) 
personal services 13 
(16%) 
14 
(18%) 
27 
(17%) 
food related 12 
(14%) 
8 
(11%) 
20 
(13%) 
technical 4 
(5%) 
9 
(12%) 
13 
(8%) 
craft 5 
(6%) 
4 
(5%) 
9 
(6%) 
Industry affiliation goods 65 
(77%) 
58 
(76%) 
(160) 123 
(77%) 
 
0.03 
services 19 
(23%) 
18 
(24%) 
37 
(23%) 
Type of ownership sole proprietorship 52 
(67%) 
57 
(75%) 
(154) 109 
(71%) 
 
1.39 
 
limited company 2 
(3%) 
1 
(1%) 
3 
(2%) 
partnership 24 
(31%) 
18 
(24%) 
42 
(27%) 
Stage in business 
cycle 
discovery 3 
(4%) 
5 
(7%) 
(159) 8 
(5%) 
 
 
 
6.15 start up 5 
(6%) 
13 
(17%) 
18 
(11%) 
 
5.43* 
newly established 28 
(34%) 
24 
(32%) 
52 
(33%) 
established 47 
(57%) 
34 
(45%) 
81 
(51%) 
Hold business 
account 
yes 62 
(76%) 
41 
(60%) 
(150) 103 
(69%) 
4.05** 
Type of business 
account 
savings 50 
(71%) 
(70) 26 
(49%) 
(53) (123) 76 
(62%) 
6.39**  
current 13 
(39%) 
(33) 15 
(36%) 
(42) (75) 28 
(37%) 
0.11  
 
investment 4 
(17%) 
(24)  (27) (51) 4 
(8%) 
4.88**  
fixed deposit 11 
(36%) 
(31) 1 
(4%) 
(28) (59) 12 
(20%) 
9.25**  
*     significant at p<0.10; * *  significant at p<0.05; *** significant at p<0.001 
Legend:   
c1= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit and BDS 
c2= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit without BDS  
c3= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of BDS without microcredit 
c4= participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of neither microcredit nor BDS 
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  Figure 8: Type of participants‟ trade activity  
 
  
  
  Figure 9: Type of participants‟ personal services businesses 
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6.3 Usefulness of Microcredit to MSE Owner-managers 
In an attempt to assess the usefulness of microcredit, as economic capital, to the 
participant owner-managers of MSEs, several factors are elicited, namely; the sources 
of credit commonly accessed by  MSE owner-managers, the  motive(s) for taking a 
loan, and the perceived impact on participants‟ MSEs upon receipt of credit, among 
other considerations. The analyses in this section provide answers to Research 
Questions 1, 2 and 3 as stated in chapter one. 
 
6.3.1 MSE owner-managers’ sources of credit  
Table 21a below presents participants‟ responses to a question about the various sources 
of credit they have used. According to this Table, the sources of credit identified by 
MSE owner-managers include; personal savings, family and friends, MFIs, various 
forms of group schemes (e.g. women‟s groups), and government schemes, among 
others.  
 
Amongst the various sources of credit reported, MFIs are the most commonly used 
source of credit among MSE owner-managers, representing almost one third (29 per 
cent) of the total 160 responses. The second most common source of credit is personal 
savings (21 per cent), while commercial banks come third with 18 per cent of the 
participant response cases. Following the popularity of MFI loans among MSE owner-
managers, several mainstream commercial banks have in the recent past introduced new 
loan products targeting the MSE sector, which previously the banks had regarded as 
being too risky to lend to (see chapter two section 2.3). The above results may be an 
indicator that the evolution of microfinance (as a form of banking for MSEs) has 
injected competition in the overall banking sector to the extent that MSE owner-
managers can now, unlike previously, source credit across a range of options (Dellien, 
et al. 2005; Ngugi, 2009). However in view of competing logics driving the practice of 
microfinance (see chapter three section 3.3.2), this development may not be in the best 
interest of the MSE sector. 
146 
 
Table 21a: MSE owner-managers‟ sources of credit 
 
Variable (nominal) Response category   
  
Responsesª 
Number (%) Percentage of 
cases (%) 
 
Source of credit 
personal savings  37 46% 
 (20.6%)  
commercial bank  32 40% 
 (17.8%)  
family & friends  18 23% 
 (10.0%)  
NGO scheme  3 4% 
 (1.7%)  
group scheme  28 35% 
 (15.6%)  
microfinance scheme  53 66% 
 (29.4%)  
government scheme  9 11% 
 (5.0%)  
Total  180 
(100%) 
 
   ª Percentages and totals are based on multiple responses rather than cases. 
 
 
6.3.2 MSE owner-managers’ borrowing motives 
During interviews participants cited various reasons for taking loans, ranging from the 
need to raise working capital, seize an emerging business opportunity, to the need to 
meet household expenses, among others. The following table, Table 21b, shows that 
nearly one third (29 per cent) of the MSE owner-managers cite the need to finance 
acquisition of business assets as one of their reasons for taking credit. The second most 
common motive for taking loans among the participants is the desire to increase stocks 
(27 per cent) while the third most common motive is the need to raise capital (18 per 
cent).   
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A few of the participants identify several other 
reasons for taking loans.  For example some want 
a loan in order to repay another loan (4 per cent). 
A similar proportion (4 per cent) require loans for 
the personal purpose of paying school fees, while 
2 per cent use the loan to meet household 
expenses. These results relate closely to the 
results of interviews with MFI representatives on 
the issue of applicants‟ motives for seeking loans 
(see Text box 1). 
 
Table 21b: Motivation for taking a loan 
 
variable (nominal) Response category Responses  
  Number (%) 
 
a 
Percentage of 
cases (%) 
 
Motive for taking 
loan 
 capital 37 47% 
 18.0%  
acquire assets 
 
59 
28.8% 
75% 
increase stock 55 70% 
 26.8%  
seize opportunity 27 34% 
 13.2%  
repay another loan 8 10% 
 3.9%  
household expenses 5 6% 
 2.4%  
school fees 8 10% 
 3.9%  
other motive for taking loan 6 8% 
 2.9%  
Total  (N=80)   205 
100.0% 
 
   ª Percentages and totals are based on multiple responses rather than cases. 
 
Although the need to start a business is elicited as one of the motives for making loan 
applications, interviews with MFI representatives reveal that most MFIs discourage 
financing start-ups. MSE owner managers who have been in business for a while find it 
much easier to access loans than those starting up. To reinforce this point, in an excerpt 
of interview with one MFI representative, it was stated;  
Text box 1: loan motives 
 
Interviews with MFI representatives 
identified a range of reasons offered by 
loan applicants.  Some of the reasons 
commonly cited include; need to start 
business, finance business expansion 
(i.e. diversify stock), increase working 
capital, repay another loan (often 
stated as „topping up‟ a loan), and meet 
household expenses including medical 
expenses. 
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 “Every banker is afraid of financing start ups, because this is an idea that not 
been tested. But if this individual was actually in a group we will not 
discriminate on whether you are just starting or not. So in that group set up, 
whether you are starting or not, for us that is not a factor. If whatever you are 
doing will enable you to pay and the group members are guaranteeing you, that 
is what counts. When they sign they say that if this person fails to pay we will 
pay. So he just needs to get the consent of the group and he will get the loan 
whether it is start up or not.”  
Given the informality and inseparability of the owner-manager and the enterprise in sole 
proprietorships (earlier noted as the most common legal business form among 
participants, see Table 20b in section 6.2 above), it is not surprising that some of the 
participants cite personal issues (e.g. household expenses, medical bills, and school 
fees) as reasons for taking loans. It is however likely that usually these personal kinds of 
reasons are not stated expressly when filling in loan application forms. Interviews with 
some of the MFI officials on whether there are instances where clients have diverted 
loan funds reveal a passive attitude (see Text box 2). 
 
Text box 2: concern for diverting use of loan 
 
 “It does not bother us whether someone diverts the money or not. Remember the 
structure we have set up. It is action oriented. This person who has taken a loan, 
remember he is still saving weekly. And the loan repayment structure is weekly, so 
whether you divert your loan or not, for us it not a problem. The problem [arises] when 
you start defaulting, then there we actually ….. move in and start taking measures and 
implementing a few things.. but it is usually to detriment of the customer if they were to 
divert. As long as they are continuously paying, the understanding here is ..remember, it‟s 
a social element. In a group it is possible for people to say I know this person, this is 
where he does his business, this is where he lives.. and I feel comfortable to guarantee 
him. If he defaults then I actually to go to him and say: „Hey you are closing my path! 
You have to pay up.‟ So for us the social element is the foundation of everything. As long 
[as] trust is maintained, we expect the members to ensure that their fellow group 
members do not divert their interests, which can work against them.” 
 
The sentiments reported in Text box 2 appear to reinforce the view that suppliers of 
economic capital (MFIs) are increasingly using social capital to mitigate default risk 
regardless of whether microcredit is helping MSE owner managers or not. 
 
6.3.3 Microcredit terms and conditions 
Turning to the terms and conditions of microcredit, Table 21c below shows that, more 
than two-thirds (68 per cent) of the participants report having accessed loans which they 
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have had to secure with various forms of assets. Of the total (80) participants who have 
used microcredit, only 15 (17 per cent) reported having access to unsecured loans. It is 
observed that 5 per cent of the participants‟ loans are specifically „group secured‟.  The 
term secured loan, implies credit that attracts tangible forms of collateral from 
applicants. Besides collateral, the other important condition attached to microcredit is 
the rate of interest. Table 21c reveals that 44 per cent of the participants pay a quoted 
interest rate that is less than 15 per cent per annum on their loans, while close to a 
similar proportion (41 per cent) of participants pay interest rates ranging from 15 per 
cent to 20 per cent per annum. The Table further reflects that 15 per cent of the 
participants report paying interest rates that are higher than 20 per cent per annum. All 
together more than half (56 per cent) of the participants identify to be paying rates of 
interest (on loans) that are higher than 15 per cent every year. Statistics from the Central 
bank of Kenya show that, as at the time of the interviews (January to March 2009), the 
annual base lending rate was 8.7 per cent. In light of this therefore, the interest rates 
reported by MSE owner-managers appear excessive. 
 
Table 21c: Terms and conditions of microcredit as reported by MSE owner-managers 
 
Variable (nominal) Response 
category 
Number (N=80) Percentage 
(%) 
Cumulative 
percentage (%) 
Type of loan asset secured  60 68% 68% 
 group secured 4 5% 73% 
 bank overdraft  9 10% 83% 
 unsecured  15 17% 100% 
 
Quoted annual interest rate  below 15% 35 44% 44% 
 15%-20% 33 41% 85% 
 21%-30% 11 14% 99% 
 above 30% 1 1% 100% 
 
  (N)  Range Mean Std. Deviation 
 
(78) 
min max  
4 
 
2.03 
 
1.12 Term of loan  1 
 
5 
 
Number of loans held previously  (28) 1 4 3 2.82 0.82 
   
MFI loans tend to be short term. Although the average loan term is 2 years ( 1.12), 
most participants (40 per cent) had loans lasting just one year (see Table 21c and Figure 
10 below). According to Table 21c, at the time of the interviews, most participants 
reported having accessed microcredit once, with only 28 out of the 80 (35 per cent) 
participants reporting to have accessed credit previously. Participants in this group, on 
average, report to have used microcredit on 2.83 0.82) occasions previously. 
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As reflected earlier in chapter two, demand for collateral is one of the factors that make 
commercial bank loans inaccessible to MSE owner-managers. Initially, as a form of 
banking microfinance was intended to be collateral free (see discussion in section 3.3 of 
chapter three) specifically to serve the needs of the MSE sector. The results above from 
MFI borrowers however do not appear to be consistent with this. It is noted that the data 
above is based on the reports of structured interviews with MSE owner-managers. It is 
therefore important to examine the views of MFI representatives (as providers of 
microcredit) on the general credit terms, including some of those matters highlighted 
above. The following discussion is based on the views of MFI representatives, elicited 
during open-ended interviews, on credit related issues such as; collateral, interest rates, 
loan term, average loan amounts given, and eligibility, among others.  
 
Figure 10: Term of loan (years)  
 
 
 
Text box 3 presents a list of the common forms 
of collateral identified during interviews with 
MFI representatives. It is noted that the primary 
collateral pledged is a group guarantee, which is 
a form of social capital as described by 
Bourdieu (1977) and expanded upon in chapter 
three in the microfinance context. However this 
may imply that group guarantees appear to serve 
as collateral of the last resort given that only 5 
percent (see Table 21c) of MSE owner-managers cite it as a form of collateral. Used as 
collateral, group guarantees mean that fellow group members agree to pay the loan in 
Text box 3: form of collateral 
 
The acceptable forms of collateral  
vary depending on the sector  where an 
MFI mainly draws its clients from. 
However the following collateral forms 
are reported;   group guarantees, 
chattels, motor vehicles, member 
savings, houses, shares, and execution 
of debentures over assets.  
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total in the event of the borrower defaulting. This may not however mean that a person 
can access a loan on account of being a member of a group. What it may imply is that 
an applicant would probably stand a better chance to secure a loan if a member of a 
group than otherwise. Further it appears that the position initially enjoyed by social 
capital in the field of microfinance has changed, at least in Kenya.  
Beside group guarantees, the second most 
common form of collateral is members‟ 
savings with their particular MFI. 
Interviews with MFI representatives reveal 
that there is a common practice (mimetic 
processes as suggested by neo-institutional 
theory) within the microfinance industry to 
require that a loan applicant must have been 
a member (client of an MFI) for a minimum 
of six months. Additionally, the applicant is 
required to have commenced weekly 
savings for not less than eight weeks before 
applying for the first loan. From the list of 
collateral items in Text box 3 it appears that 
there is no such thing as a collateral free 
loan. As one interviewee (a representative of one of the leading MFIs) put it;  
 “Collateral varies, it could be chattels, cars, house, shares...but you find that 
the loans have to be fully covered.” 
Turning to the amounts of money MFIs issue as loans to successful MSE owner-
manager loan applicants, there is a wide variation (see part (a) of Text box 4) . 
Interviews with MFI representatives indicate that for MSE owner-managers who are 
first time borrowers, the accessible loans tend to be relatively small amounts, usually 
below KES 20,000 (AUD $ 400). In general however, with the exception of MFIs 
involved in wholesale microfinance (MFIs which lend to other MFIs involved in retail 
banking), the interviews reveal that most MFIs in the retail segment of the market tend 
to offer small amounts of money in loan form.   For example at what the MFIs refer to 
as the upper end of the market, the upper limit for loan amounts is KES 100,000 (AUD 
$ 2000).  
Text box 4: amounts, term, and interest 
rates 
 
a) The average loan amounts reported by 
MFI representatives at the lower end range 
from KES 10,000 to KES 40,000 (AUD $ 
200 to AUD $ 500). At the upper end the 
amounts range from KES 50,000 to KES 
100,000 (AUD $ 1000 to AUD $ 2000). 
 
b) The minimum term for loans is 3 months 
while the maximum reported is 36 months 
(3 years). There is no grace period given 
before commencement of loan repayment. 
 
c) The lowest rate of interest rates quoted is 
15 per cent p.a. while the highest is 72 per 
cent p.a. The most commonly reported (3 
out of the 9 MFI representatives 
interviewed) interest rate is 18 per cent p.a. 
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While the amounts of money given may seem modest, the criteria used to determine 
eligibility are fairly stringent. Interviews with some of the MFI representatives identify 
several factors that determine who accesses and who does not successfully access 
microcredit.  
The factors range from applicants‟ 
personality attributes and MSEs‟ cash flow 
streams to group management, among others 
(see Text box 5) for an elicited list of 
possible eligibility criteria (this list is not 
necessarily exhaustive).   
Part (b) of Text box 4 shows that MFI 
representatives report that their loans are 
mainly short term (one year) with the 
longest reported loan term being 3 years. 
The average interest rate charged on loans is 
reported to be 18 per cent per annum (see 
part (c) of Text box 4). These observations 
identify closely with data gathered from 
MSE owner-managers as reported earlier in 
this chapter. Further, interviews with some 
of the MFI representatives reflect that for 
most of the loans, repayment takes place on 
a weekly basis. Although there are 
variations as one interviewee reveals;  
“You see because of the fact that loans are tailor made, there are 
instances of recovering   weekly, depending on the type of loan, or 
monthly or cycle of the source of income.” 
In the statement above, the term „cycle of the source of income‟ is made in reference to 
the seasonal nature of agriculturally related business activity. For example, loans given 
to sugarcane or maize farmers to either buy farm inputs or simply meet farming 
expenses are recovered in full once the crop matures, which may be once or twice in a 
year.  
Text box 5: loan eligibility criteria as 
elicited from MFI representatives 
 
 Businesses‟ ability to pay 
 Constant cash flow streams 
 Sector reliability 
 Credit history of applicant 
 Group cohesion 
 Person‟s character 
 Collateral 
 Attended training for at least 8 weeks 
 More than 6 months in business 
 Evidence of employment  
 Consistency in savings 
 Attendance at group meetings 
 Account activity 
 Account holder 
 Credit worthiness of applicant 
 Above 18 years of age 
 Located within accessible radius 
 Business plan 
 Purpose for loan 
 3-4 years of financial statements 
 Credibility of management 
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Returning again to the interview protocol used with the MSE owner-managers, Table 22 
below presents summary data on MSE owner-managers‟ attitudes towards the terms and 
conditions of credit offered by MFIs in general. According to Table 22, the majority (38 
per cent) of the participants strongly agree and 26 per cent agree that the weekly loan 
repayment mode constrains their business operations whilst 8 per cent of participants 
disagree strongly on this same issue. With a t-test value of -3.41 at p<0.05, there is a 
significant difference between MSE owner-managers who agree and those who disagree 
that frequency of loan repayment is a constraint to their businesses. With regard to 
interest rates, participants‟ opinions seem to be divided, with 44 per cent either agreeing 
or strongly agreeing, 28 per cent neither agreeing nor disagreeing, and 27 per cent either 
disagreeing or strongly disagreeing, that the interest rate charged is affordable. The 
difference between those MSE owner-managers who agree and those who disagree on 
the affordability of interest charged is highly significant (t-test =-6.07, p<0.001). 
Table 22: MSE Owner-managers‟ attitude towards terms and conditions of microcredit  
 
Attitude statement 
 
Response categories Total 
(N) 
 
t-test 
value 
strongly 
agree 
 
agree 
neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
Frequency of loan 
repayment constrains 
business 
30 
38% 
21 
26% 
13 
16% 
9 
11% 
6 
8% 
(79) 
99% 
-3.41** 
Interest rate charged is 
relatively affordable 
12 
15% 
23 
29% 
22 
28% 
17 
21% 
5 
6% 
(79) 
99% 
-6.07*** 
Credit providers willing to 
renegotiate terms 
5 
6% 
7 
9% 
16 
20% 
5 
6% 
46 
56% 
(79) 
99% 
-5.41*** 
Happy to continue with 
loans to finance business 
9 
11% 
18 
23% 
29 
36% 
10 
13% 
13 
16% 
(79) 
99% 
-5.61*** 
*      significant at p<0.10; **   significant at p<0.05; *** significant at p<0.001 
 
The participants‟ ambivalence on the issue of interest rates could be a reflection of the 
difficult situation some of them find themselves in. Such ambivalence could possibly 
point to a need to question the legitimacy of microcredit schemes. Even though 
participants may be in genuine need of credit, they may not have many alternatives to 
source from. This is partly because the terms and conditions of credit in the mainstream 
commercial banks, compared to those of their MFI counterparts, are out of reach for 
most MSE owner-managers (Frank, 2008). Further in an interview with a representative 
from one of the MFIs, the officer states; 
“First and foremost ....forget about what is happening now where banks are 
going outright to get customers, we [have] been able to serve customers who 
would never have been reached by a financial institution! Some of the customers 
do not even have personal bank accounts [only group] and look at the 
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commercial banks now, to qualify for a loan you must be their customer [i.e. 
must have an account].” 
Table 22 further shows that MFIs are not willing generally to renegotiate credit terms, 
with 62 per cent of the participants disagreeing that there could be such a possibility. 
Additionally, a majority of participants (36 per cent) are non committal (i.e. neither 
agree nor disagree) on whether they wish to continue using debt (credit) as a way of 
financing their business operations. With a t-test of -5.41 at p<0.001 and t-test of -5.61 
at p<0.001 respectively, the difference between MSE owner-managers who agree and 
those who disagree, on either MFIs‟ willingness to renegotiate loan terms or their own 
intention to continue using loans as a means of financing business, is highly significant.  
Of the 80 participants who identify as users of microcredit, a significant majority (90 
per cent) hold a perception that their businesses have improved in some way as a result 
of access to credit (see Table 23a).   Opinions vary widely among participants on the 
exact ways in which the performance of their businesses is believed to have improved.   
Table 23a shows that the perceived improvements in performance range from perceived 
increases in profits to increases in staff numbers. For example, according to this Table, 
20 per cent of the participants perceive that their businesses enjoy higher profits after 
the loan, while a further 15 per cent of them perceive increases in either savings or 
assets.  
The Table further reveals that 12 per cent of the participants report to have hired more 
staff since they began to use credit while a similar proportion (12 per cent) perceives a 
reduction in debt. Although the MSE owner-managers‟ perceptions on the impact of 
microcredit on the performance of their businesses appear positive, one has to take 
caution given the fact that most of the judgments could be merely intuitive. As earlier 
noted (see section 6.2 in this chapter) most participants‟ businesses are informal and 
operate as sole proprietorships. As such, most MSE owner-managers probably keep 
basic sales records which may not be sufficiently sophisticated to trace the real impact 
of microcredit on their enterprises.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
Table 23a: Perceptions of how MSEs‟ performance was impacted after accessing loans 
 
Variable (nominal)  Response category Responses 
    Number (N) Percentage of cases (%) 
Performance improved 
with loan? 
yes 72 90% 
 90%  
 
Ways performance 
improved 
higher profits 55 
20% 
76% 
increased savings 43 60% 
 15%  
reduced debt 35 49% 
 12%  
increased liquidity 22 31% 
 8%  
reduced dependence on overdrafts 8 11% 
 2%  
increased investments 17 24% 
 6%  
acquired more assets 42 58% 
 15%  
new branches 19 26% 
 7%  
hired more staff 33 46% 
 12%  
other ways performance improved 
 
8 
2% 
11% 
Total  (N=80) 282 (100.0%)  
   ª Percentages and totals are based on multiple responses rather than cases. 
 
Results of interviews with MFI 
representatives on how microcredit 
is perceived to have helped MSEs 
are full of self praise. Text box 6 
provides a synthesised list of what 
the MFI representatives (as 
providers of microcredit) think is 
their contribution to the MSE sector 
as elicited during open-ended  
interviews with them. A closer 
examination of their perceived 
contribution reveals that MFI 
representatives feel that microcredit has not only helped improve recipient MSE 
performance, but has also helped transform the lives of their clients. For example from 
information in Text box 6, MFI representatives state that some MSE owner-managers 
(clients) have acquired houses, enjoy better standards of living and have increased their 
bargaining power. Similar claims are evident from the account found in Text box 7 of a 
Text box 6: MFI representatives‟ perceptions on the 
impact of credit on their MSEs 
 Established stable businesses 
 Raised standard of living 
 Improved education of children and extended 
families 
 Created higher bargaining power 
 Created a savings culture 
 Facilitated meeting of unforseen emergencies 
 Provided access to credit facilities 
 Provided access to banking services 
  Nurtured entrepreneurial spirit 
 Assisted in acquiring houses 
 Provided access to business premises 
 Provided access to personal counselling services  
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„success story‟ recorded during an interview with a representative of one of the leading 
MFIs. 
Text box 7: case of success story from an MFI‟s perspective 
 
“I will give you an example of a client I started with... this is in a place called „Chogoria‟ in 
„Meru‟. This was in the year 2000, this „mama‟ had a small shop and her first loan was just 
KES 15,000, which she repaid within 6 months, which she used to boost the business. Then 
she came for a second loan of 30,000. She again put it in the shop and again paid in 6 
months, went for 45,000, again paid within 6 months, and then went for 75,000 and when 
she took …..75,000, now she diversified the business and opened a small butchery next to 
the shop. She also repaid the 75,000 within 6 months. After that she also started doing some 
little farming. Then …she took 120,000. Now she bought a dairy cow [to] the home and 
started also planting vegetables on commercial purposes. Then from 120,000 she went to 
150,000 where she diversified again and opened a hotel! And then these three were running 
concurrently and also the farming business. Then from 150,000 we gave her 250,000. She 
repaid within 9 months. She took 300,000, paid within 9 months, went to 450,000 paid 
within 9 months, she took 600,000 and here now at 300,000 she started supplying meat to 
schools around the area. At 450,000 she now bought more dairy cows. As we speak now she 
has 10 dairy animals under zero gracing [non free range form of livestock farming]. She is 
running the shop, the hotel, the butchery, and doing horticultural farming! She has also 
improved her coffee and tea farming. So from 600,000 which she paid within 9 months, she 
took 900,000 which [was] paid also in 9 months, 900,000 she has taken now twice. She has 
finished the last 900,000, she is now asking for 1 million. She has bought a lorry and now 
she is going to „Isiolo‟ to buy animals. 
You find that at the hotel, she [took in] some members [from the] group where she was 
before..she has 10 employees at the hotel, although she is the manager there. At the shop she 
has employed one person, at the butchery she has employed 5 people, and then at home she 
has 6 people working at the farm. So we are talking of more than 20 people employed by 
her. All this has happened within a period of about 10 years!”.  
 
Given the weight of the claims above, it is important to seek an independent opinion of 
the perceived effect of microcredit on MSEs. Asked whether microcredit is helping 
MSEs, evidence from the interviews conducted with independent researchers in the 
MSE sector in Kenya presents a rather different picture. Details of the independent 
researchers‟ views appear in the extracts from interview transcripts presented in Text 
boxes (8a) and (8b). The views held by the two scholars point to one thing, that even 
though microcredit is increasingly becoming accessible to MSEs, its terms and 
conditions have not served to encourage growth of the sector.   
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Text box 8a: views on effect of microcredit on MSEs (researcher - I) 
  
“The simple answer is no. They have helped to sustain some people in their businesses. But to 
a large extent they have not really contributed to growth. Many of the microfinance programs 
that are there have methodologies that in fact at times constrain people from growing. Because 
of the nature of microfinance - that you are lending to people who are high risk, people who 
don‟t have collateral - and therefore you are forced into methodologies that are either group 
based or solidarity group kind of things. And the amounts are small enough that they have 
enabled the few real drivers to breakthrough and do well, but by and large it has simply 
managed to sustain the economies that were already there. And if you were to come back in 
ten years, this is my own hypothesis, and look to that woman trader or man who is doing 
vegetable(s), this and that, you will probably find them in the same place if they are still alive! 
Therefore the question is growth, is it contributing to growth? This is the thing that you are 
asking. The truth is they are not. ” 
 
 
Text box 8b: views on effect of microcredit on MSEs (researcher - II) 
  
“Well you know the concept of microfinance is a good concept, which of course started in 
Bangladesh by that Professor Yunus, but then when that concept was introduced in Kenya, it 
actually did not follow that particular model, the original model. Microfinance institutions in 
Kenya operate more or less like commercial banks. Although they give credit based on group 
lending, but then in addition they require these groups to save with the institution - say up to 
six months, and they need also to have [a] form of collateral. They cannot really get credit 
without collateral. And usually the kind of collateral they want is immovable assets; they do 
not want anything that is movable like machines for example, because people should actually 
be able to use machines as collateral. But then you find that microfinance institutions want 
immovable assets like land and titles, items that most of the micro and small enterprises - they 
do not have. So basically because the bank is close by, whatever little money they get they 
can save, and even if they were to borrow, they just borrow very little amount of money. It is 
not really the kind of money that can make them buy the kind of machines that they may 
want. So then they become impaired in terms credit accessibility… 
..then again of course you may not be able to borrow much. Because if you are able to borrow 
more money, then you can actually wean off yourself from accessing credit from  
microfinance institutions and then you can go to commercial banks where the interest rates 
are low. However because they are only able to borrow a limited amount of money, that may 
not be able to actually push them out [of] that vicious cycle. So they just remain within the 
vicious cycle. So in my view actually they are not better off! Of course microfinance 
institutions make those claims because they want donors to continue giving them money and 
pretend that things are OK. When you ask them the number of enterprises they are giving 
credit to.. they give you a number, but then they do not tell you how many of the enterprises 
they are supporting  have actually grown over time, across the ladder from micro to small to 
medium and even to large. So probably what they do is just keep on giving credit to any 
upcoming enterprises and then they say” „You see we are supporting these guys, we have 
given them money.” But in essence you do not really see the impact that they are actually 
creating to the MSEs.” 
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In summary, from the foregoing evidence it appears that MFI supplied microcredit to 
MSEs comes not only with highly restrictive terms, but also at a relatively prohibitive 
cost. Even though MSE owner-managers perceive that some positive changes have 
taken place in their businesses, this may not be evidence-based and may not hold much 
truth. The data above show that on average, MSE owner-managers are accessing credit 
at an interest rate of 18 per cent per annum or higher. Given the kind of business 
activities (mainly trade in goods, as seen earlier in this chapter in section 6.2) most of 
them are engaged in; it may not be possible that their enterprises are earning a return on 
investment that is higher than their cost of credit. From a neo-institutional perspective it 
could be argued that adoption of the notion of self-sufficiency appears to create 
normative pressure for MFIs, which in return seem to apply coercive pressure (through 
stringent microcredit terms) to MSE owner managers (clients).  On the basis of the 
univariate analysis undertaken in this chapter, the question of whether microcredit is 
useful to MSEs is not fully answered. The following section explores this issue from a 
multivariate perspective using logistic regression. 
6.3.4 Testing for the usefulness of microcredit 
As consumers, MSE owner-managers‟ intention to either borrow and/or continue 
borrowing (repeat buying behaviour), could be influenced largely by their past 
experiences with MFIs‟ terms and conditions of lending. The requirements for 
documentation and demand for collateral associated with commercial banks‟ credit 
access make it not only difficult but also impractical for MSE owner-managers to use 
this source of capital. On the contrary, MFIs with MSEs as their primary market offer 
credit the terms of which are designed to suit this market. Notable among MFIs‟ credit 
access terms is that they attract minimal documentation and more importantly are „free‟ 
of any tangible asset-based collateral. However, some of the other terms, for example, 
the short term nature of loans and the relatively high interest rates (compared to 
commercial bank rates), appear restrictive and exploitative.  MSE owner-managers, 
who perceive microcredit terms as friendly and/or have previously experienced an 
improvement in their businesses following use of microcredit, are likely to look to this 
source whenever they need additional capital. Consistent with Research Question 3 
(cited in chapter one) the following question is proposed for testing; 
 Are participant MSE owner-managers who are likely to continue using 
microcredit to finance their business operations rather than for personal use,  
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more likely to have accessed microfinance rather than a commercial banking 
product, have provided no collateral, have a longer loan term and have 
borrowed previously? 
 
Test-model on MSE owner-managers’ likelihood of continued usage of microcredit 
The logistic regression undertaken in this regard is algebraically expressed as follows;  
Logit (p) = a + β1X1 + β2 X2 + β3 X3 + β4 X4 + β5X5 + β6 X6 + β7 X7 
Where:  
Symbol Variable name Variable label 
Logit (p)  Probability of continuing to use microcredit 
X1  MFILoan MFI source of loan (0/1) 
X2 LoanType Type of loan(0/1) 
X3 LoanTerm Loan term (0/1) 
X4 FirstLoan First business loan(0/1)  
X5 LnMtvBus Loan motive business (0/1)  
X6 IntrstRate Interest rate per annum (normalised) 
X7 SizeBus Size of business (normalised gross income) 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: The dependent variable for the test of the above proposition is 
the intent to continue using microcredit to finance business operations. This is a 
dichotomous variable coded (1) to represent the likelihood of continuing to use 
microcredit and (0) to represent a lack of intent to continue using microcredit.  
Explanatory variables: There are six variables which are considered likely to 
influence participant MSE owner-managers‟ intention of continuing to use microcredit; 
namely source of loan, type of loan, loan term, whether the current loan is the first 
business loan received, the motive for seeking the loan, and the interest rate on the loan. 
Except for loan term and interest rate (Roslan and Karim, 2009, Godquin, 2004), the 
other variables have not been previously tested in the context stipulated here and as 
such are unique to this study.  With the exception of the interest rate the other 
independent variables are binary in nature and the descriptive analysis informs the 
coding, which is as follows: 
Binary variable name Variable label Code 
MFILoan 
MFI source of loan = (1) if MFI, otherwise (0) 
LoanType 
Type of business loan = (1) if secured, otherwise (0) 
LoanTerm 
Term of loan (short-term if term is less than 3 years) = (1) if short-term, otherwise (0) 
FirstLoan 
First business loan = (1) if yes, otherwise (0) 
LnMtvBus 
Loan motive relates to business   = (1) if business, otherwise (0) 
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Originally the variable interest rate was measured on an ordinal scale to permit ease of 
completing the interview protocol and also guide participants when in difficulty to 
recall exact interest rate figures. The scale used ranged from 1 to 4; where (1) = rate less 
than 15 per cent, (2) = rate between 15 per cent-20 per cent, (3) = rate between 21 per 
cent - 30 per cent, and (4) = rate greater than 30 per cent per annum.  Before the 
analysis, this variable is normalised to achieve a mean close to zero and a standard 
deviation of one, to enable correlation-based analysis (Gow, 2010). 
Control variable 
The control variable in this test is size of business. Firm size, often used as a control 
variable (see Akoten, 2007b, Jayawarna et al., 2007), is measured through participant 
owner-managers‟ estimates of their businesses‟ gross income (in KES) guided by an 
ordinal scale. The scale ranges from 1 to 5 with (1) = gross income below 20,000, (2) = 
20,000- 30,000, (3) = 31,000 – 40,000, (4) = 41,000 – 50,000, and (5) = gross income 
above 50,000. Before entering this variable into the analysis the scores are normalised 
to a mean of zero and a standard deviation close to one (Gow, 2010). 
In this test a logistic regression technique is used due to the binary nature of the 
dependent variable. Of the entire sample of 160 cases, there are 80 participant MSE 
owner-managers who use microcredit, which represents the sub-sample used for testing 
this question.  Participant MSE owner-managers‟ intention or otherwise to continue 
using microcredit is the dependent variable, while the independent variables are as 
described above. First, descriptive statistics for all variables are presented, followed by 
correlation and summary logistic regression results.  
 
Table 23b presents pair-wise comparisons of participant MSE owner-managers who 
intend to continue using microcredit to finance business operations and those who do 
not intend to do so. There is a significant difference (t-test =1.80, p<0.05) in interest 
rates reported by participant MSE owner-managers who intend to continue borrowing 
and those who do not. This implies that high cost of borrowing is a deterrent to MSE 
owner-managers who would otherwise wish to source credit to finance their business 
interests. Table 23b also shows that businesses of participant MSE owner-managers 
who do not intend to continue borrowing are larger than businesses of their counterparts 
who intend to continue borrowing (xˉ =0.34,  =1.02, sk =0.52 and xˉ =0.15,  =1.00, sk 
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=0.66, respectively). There is no significant difference between the two groups however 
(t-test =0.78, p =0.220). 
 
Table 23b shows that of the 80 participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit, 
close to three quarters or 56 (71 per cent) intend to continue borrowing, while 24 (29 
per cent) do not. The Table reveals that for two thirds (66 per cent) of the participant 
MSE owner-managers, their source of credit is MFIs. Of these, at least three quarters 
(75 per cent) intend to continue using loans while 25 per cent do not intend to do so. 
The difference is however not significant (Ch
2
 =1.25, p=0.132). In the case of 59 (75 
per cent) participant MSE owner-managers, whose current loans are secured (i.e. 
collateral given to lender), 70 per cent of them express intention to continue using loans 
compared to 30 per cent who do not. With a Chi-square value of 0.22 and a p =0.314, 
this difference is not significant. 
 
Table 23b further shows that there are 53 (67 per cent) of the participant MSE owner-
managers who were servicing a short term loan at the time of the interviews. Of these, 
38 (72 per cent) intend to continue borrowing while 15 (28 per cent) do not intend to do 
so.  There is however no significant difference between the two groups (Ch
2
 =0.05, p 
=0.410). Table 23b reveals no significant difference between participant MSE owner-
managers who intend to continue using loans and those who do  not, where participants 
are in receipt of their first loan (Ch
2
 =0.92, p =0.169). Of the 80 participant MSE 
owner-managers, nearly two thirds (65 per cent) report to be servicing their first loan at 
the time of the interviews. Of these, a majority (75 per cent) intend to continue 
borrowing while 25 per cent do not intend to do so. Turning to borrowing motives, 
Table 23b shows that of the 80 participant MSE-owner-managers in receipt of 
microcredit, a majority (87 per cent) sought it for business rather than for personal 
needs.  Of these, a majority (71 per cent) intend to continue using microcredit while the 
remainder (29 per cent) do not intend to do so. There is however no significant 
difference between the two groups (Ch
2
 =0.01, p =0.474). 
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Table 23b: Descriptive statistics for variables included in testing for the likelihood  
       to continue using microcredit (N=80) 
 
 
Intend to continue using credit to 
finance business operations 
(n=56) 
Do not intend to continue using 
credit to finance business 
operations (n=24) 
 
t-test value 
 
p value 
Mean SD Sk Min  Max  Mean SD Sk Min  Max  
Interest 
rate 
-0.06 0.82 0.85 -0.77 2.42 0.29 0.77 -0.07 -0.77 1.39 1.80 0.039 
Business 
size 
0.15 1.00 0.66 -1.11 2.47 0.34 1.02 0.52 -1.11 2.47 0.78 0.220 
 
 Total 
Chi-
square  
value 
 
MFI loan 39 (75%) 13 (25%) 
52 
(66%) 
1.25 0.132 
Loan type 41 (70%) 18 (30%) 
59 
(75%) 
0.22 0.314 
Loan term 38 (72%) 15 (28%) 
53 
(67%) 
0.05 0.410 
First loan 38 (75%) 13 (25%) 
51 
(65%) 
0.92 0.169 
Loan motive  49 (71%) 20 (29%) 
69 
(87%) 
0.01 0.474 
Total  (N=80) 56 (71%) 24 (29%)   
Legend: interest rate = continuous variable of normalised ordinal rates ranging from below 15 % p.a. to above 30% 
p.a.; business size = continuous variable of normalised estimates of gross income. MFI loan (1/0) = if MFI; loan type 
(1/0) = if secured; loan term (1/0) = if short term; first loan (1/0) = if yes; loan motive (1/0) = if business. 
 
Correlation coefficients for variables involved in testing the likelihood of continued 
usage of microcredit 
 
The following table, Table 23c, presents Pearson‟s correlations between the eight 
variables entered into the logistic regression for the research question stated above. 
According to the Table, with the exception of correlations with MFI sourced loans and 
business size there are low correlations amongst all other variables. The highest 
correlation in the entire set is between size of business and first business loan (r = -
0.417, p<0.05). The negative Pearson correlation implies that businesses belonging to 
participant MSE owner-managers‟ in receipt of their first business loan are small. In 
addition these participants stated business as their key reason for seeking credit (r =-
.276, p<0.05). Table 23c reveals a weakly significant (negative) correlation between 
participant MSE owner-managers‟ intention to continue borrowing and loan interest rate 
(r = -0.196, p<0.10) which means that participant MSE owner-managers whose current 
loan interest is high are unlikely to continue borrowing to finance their businesses. 
 
Turning to source of microcredit, MFI sourced credit has a significant positive 
correlation with type of loan, loan term, and interest rate (r =0.321, p<0.05; r =0.925, 
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p<0.05; and r = 0.203, p<0.10, respectively). This implies that microcredit is mostly 
collateral-based, attracts high rates of interest and is offered for a term not exceeding 
two years.  
 
Table 23c: Pearson‟s correlations for the test on the likelihood  
       to continue using microcredit (N=80) 
 
 MFI source 
of credit 
Type of 
loan  
Loan 
term First loan 
Loan  
motive  
Interest 
rate  
Business 
size  
Type of loan  .321**       
Loan term .295** .031      
First loan -.043 .045 -.079     
Loan motive .130 -.131 -.020 .187*    
Interest rate  .203* -.095 -.183 -.137 .164   
Business size  -.083 .026 .072 -.417** -.276** .024  
Continue using 
microcredit 
.126 -.053 .026 .108 .007 -.196* -.089 
*     significant at p<0.10; **   significant at p<0.05 
Legend: continue using microcredit (1/0) = if yes; MFI source of loan (1/0) = if MFI; type of loan (1/0) = if secured; 
loan term (1/0) = if short-term; first business loan (1/0) = if yes; loan motive (1/0) = if business; interest rate = 
normalised score range from -0.77 to 2.42; business size = normalised score range from -1.11 to 2.47. 
 
 
 
Test results for MSE owner-managers’ likelihood of continued usage of 
microcredit 
 
Logistic regression is performed to examine the influence, if any, several factors 
described previously have on the likelihood of participant MSE owner-managers‟ 
intention to continue to use loans to finance their business operations. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness of fit test shows that the model with all seven predictors is 
statistically significant (Ch
2
 =3.34 (8, N=80), p>0.05). This means that the model is 
capable of distinguishing between participant MSE owner-managers who intend to 
continue borrowing and those do not intend to do so.  The variance in participant MSE 
owner-managers‟ intentions to continue using loans to finance their business operations 
explained by the model ranges between 10.0 per cent (Cox & Snell R Square) and 14.3 
per cent (Nagelkerke R Square). Additionally the model correctly classifies 72.2 per 
cent of the cases.  
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Table 23d: Logistic regression results predicting the likelihood of continuing  
       to use microcredit (N=80) 
 
Intend to 
borrow 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
MFILoan 1.354 .693 3.822 1 .026 3.875 
LoanType -.972 .716 1.840 1 .087 .378 
LoanTerm -.490 .630 .606 1 .218 .612 
FirstLoan .317 .631 .253 1 .307 1.373 
LnTmvBus -.228 .853 .071 1 .394 .796 
IntrstRate -.777 .370 4.403 1 .018 .460 
SizeBus -.097 .301 .104 1 .374 .907 
Constant 1.210 1.094 1.223 1 .135 3.353 
Ch
2  
= 3.34; R
2
 = 10.0% - 14.3% 
Legend: MFILoan (1/0) = Loan source MFI; LoanType (1/0) = Loan type secured; LoanTerm (1/0) = Short-
term loan; FirstLoan (1/0) = In receipt of first loan; LnMtvBus (1/0) = Loan motive is business; IntrstRate 
(normalised score range from -0.77 to 2.42); SizeBus (normalised score range from -1.11 to 2.47). 
 
Table 23d shows that three of the predictors make a significant contribution (though one 
is weak) to the model [MFI sourced loan (p =0.026), type of loan (p =0.087), and 
interest rate (p =0.018)]. The strongest predictor of reporting likelihood of continuing to 
borrow is source of loan being linked to an MFI, recording an odds ratio of 3.88. This 
implies that participant MSE owner-managers whose main source of loan is an MFI are 
almost four times more likely to continue borrowing than participant MSE owner-
managers whose loan source is independent of a MFI, all other factors held constant. 
This does not necessarily mean that MSE owner managers accord much legitimacy to 
MFIs as a source of economic capital. The second strongest predictor of likelihood to 
continue borrowing is the rate of interest charged on loans (odds ratio = 0.460).  Given 
the fact that the odds ratio is less than 1, this means that participant MSE owner-
managers who currently pay higher interest rates on loans are 0.46 times less likely to 
continue borrowing than participant MSE owner-managers who pay lower interest rates. 
This result is in part indicative of the fact that as a form of economic capital, 
microcredit appears overvalued. This result is consistent with previous studies on the 
determinants of microcredit repayment (see Roslan and Karim, 2009). With an odds 
ratio of 0.378, participant MSE owner managers in receipt of collateral-based loans are 
less likely to continue borrowing compared to participant MSE owner-managers who 
are in receipt of collateral free loans. 
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With an observed model Chi-square value of 3.34 (df, 8; p =0.911), against a Chi-
square distribution value of 15.50 (df, 8) at p =0.05, the opinion that participant MSE 
owner managers likelihood to continue borrowing to finance their business operations is 
not influenced by their perceptions of the usefulness of microcredit, does not hold. As a 
result the alternative position that, participant MSE owner managers who are likely to 
continue using microcredit to finance their business operations are more likely to 
perceive microcredit to be useful, holds.  
 
In view of the foregoing results, that perceived usefulness of microcredit is likely to 
lead to higher chances of its increased usage to finance business operations among 
participant MSE owner-managers, it is equally important to examine whether currently 
supplied BDS meets the expectations of the participant MSE owner-managers in 
response to Research Questions 3 and 5 (see section 1.3.2 in chapter one). This is the 
issue addressed next. 
 
6.4 Usefulness of BDS to MSE Owner-managers 
In this section the perceived usefulness of BDS, as cultural capital in the words of 
Bourdieu, to the participant owner-managers of MSEs is examined. Usefulness of BDS 
is assessed broadly using several factors namely; the sources of BDS commonly used 
by MSE owner-managers, types of business advisory services provided by BDS 
agencies targeting MSEs, terms and conditions of BDS delivery, and the perceived 
benefits of BDS to participants‟ businesses, among others. Again the results of analysis 
presented here relate to Research Questions 3 and in part 5.  
 
6.4.1 MSE owner-managers‟ sources of BDS  
The following Table 24a presents participants‟ responses to a question about the various 
sources of BDS they use. According to this Table, the sources of BDS commonly 
identified by MSE owner-managers include; accountancy and audit firms, consultants, 
microfinance schemes, academics and family and friends, among others.  
 
Table 24a shows that of the various sources of advisory services, family and friends is 
commonly identified by most (41.7 per cent) participant MSE owner-managers. The 
second most common source of business advisory services is microfinance schemes 
(17.8 per cent), while accountancy and audit firms (14.7 per cent) rank third. 
Consultants and academics do not seem highly used sources of business advisory 
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services among MSE owner-managers, attracting 9.3 per cent and 2.5 per cent of the 
participant responses respectively. This is does not come as a surprise because, as Berry 
and Sweeting (2006) note, academics are not a popular source of business advice among 
MSE owner-managers. Overall, it is noted that more than half (54.1 per cent) of the 
participant MSE owner-managers‟ responses identify acquaintances (i.e. family, friends 
and business colleagues) as a source of business advisory services.  
 
Table 24a: MSE owner-managers‟ sources of BDS 
 
Variable (nominal) Response category Responsesª 
Frequency (n) Percentage of cases  
 
Source of BDS 
accountants &  auditors 41 
14.7% 
48.8% 
consultants 26 
9.3% 
31% 
family & friends 117 
41.9% 
139.2% 
business colleagues  34 
12.2% 
40.5% 
academics 7 
2.5% 
8.3% 
microfinance scheme  47 
16.8% 
 
56% 
other advisory agents 7 
2.5% 
 
8.3% 
                 Total 279 
100% 
 
ª Percentages and totals are based on multiple responses rather than cases. 
 
While it is understandable that acquaintances are an easy option for advice whenever 
people encounter problems in their daily activities, it is not clear why MSE owner-
managers prefer acquaintances as a source of business advice compared to the more 
professional sources such as consultancy firms. In terms of ease of adoption, advice 
from acquaintances is not likely to come at a fee. One may argue that given the amount 
of social capital accrued between MSE owner-managers and their acquaintances, this 
source is readily accessible for advice compared to the commercial sources of business 
advisory services. Further, commercial sources of BDS are likely to attract contractual 
arrangements with a significant amount of normative pressure that MSE owner 
managers may find incongruent with their social context and habitus. Among other 
terms and conditions, charges by commercial sources of business advisory services may 
make this option inaccessible to most MSE owner-managers. It is important to however 
note that as a source of business advisory services, acquaintances are unlikely to give 
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appropriate and quality business advice. Besides, given the social connections that exist 
between MSE owner-managers and their acquaintances, the objectivity of any such 
business advice is questionable.  
 
Table 24b below presents results of MSE owner-managers‟ responses to a question in 
relation to how they initially became aware of the BDS agents that they use. Participant 
responses identify several factors that play an intermediary role for the initial contact 
with BDS providers, ranging from recommendations by business colleagues and 
friends, to initiatives by either self, MFIs and/or BDS agency staff. According to Table 
24b, most (30.1 per cent) participant MSE owner-managers identify MFIs as the 
intermediary through which they became connected to their BDS providers. The second 
most commonly mentioned intermediary is friends (21.7 per cent), while personal 
initiative (18.1 per cent) by MSE owner-managers is third. Marketing efforts by BDS 
agents and recommendations by business colleagues respectively attracted 16.9 per cent 
and 12 per cent of the responses from the participant MSE owner-managers. Again it is 
worth noting that intermediaries with a social connection or social capital linkage to 
MSE owner-managers (i.e. friends and business colleagues) are a popular source of 
information, jointly contributing to 33.7 per cent of the participant responses. 
 
Table 24b: How MSE owner-managers became aware of their BDS agents 
 
Variable (nominal) Response category   
  
Responses 
 Frequency         
(n) 
Percentage  
 
How I got to know 
the BDS agents 
microfinance institutions  25 30.1% 
recommended by friends  18 21.7% 
personal initiative  15 18.1% 
through business colleague  10 12.0% 
agent‟s marketing efforts  14 16.9% 
other ways (e.g. farmer associations) 1 1.2% 
                   Total (N) 83 100% 
 
Although results of administration of the interview protocol with participant MSE 
owner- managers as to how they became aware of their BDS providers (presented 
above) seem to imply that MFIs are instrumental in linking MSE owner-managers with 
potential BDS providers, this is not confirmed during open-ended interviews with 
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representatives of BDS agencies.   Asked whether they collaborate with MFIs in their  
delivery of services, most BDS representatives‟ responses appear to show that often it is 
their firms which refer clients to MFIs for credit and not the other way round (i.e. MFIs 
do not  often refer their clients to BDS agents for business advisory services). The 
following quotes are examples of BDS representatives‟ responses to a question 
regarding collaboration with MFIs;  
“...we do work with MFIs when it comes to access to finances by 
farmers.         
  It is usually a farmer thing. We work with MFIs to give farmers 
money.” 
 
“We offer information on possible sources of credit to our clients on 
request.” 
 
“When they are applying for loan [from MFIs] they asked to write 
a proposal, then our clients refer them to us.” 
Given the fact that MFIs (according to Table 24a) are identified as possible sources 
of BDS (16.8 per cent), it therefore appears that MSE owner-managers (especially 
MFI clients) are likely to receive business advisory services from MFIs themselves. 
However, it remains to be seen whether this advice is valued by recipients. 
 
6.4.2 Business advisory services received by MSE owner-managers 
As reflected in Table 24c, there is a wide range of business advisory services 
targeted at MSEs. According to the Table, a majority (26.3 per cent) of the 
participant MSE owner-managers identify management facilitation, either in the 
form of general management advice or training, as one of the key business advisory 
services received from BDS providers. The second most commonly reported 
business advisory service is moral support. According to Table 24c, as a business 
advisory service category, moral support attracted 18.1 per cent of the participant 
MSE owner-managers‟ responses. Third, 17.7 per cent of the participant owner-
managers report technical support as yet another business advisory service received. 
Business advisory services that are of a technical nature relate primarily to 
facilitation, either in the identification of possible sources of materials or operational 
issues relating to product development. Additionally 15.7 per cent of the participant 
MSE owner-managers quote support in accessing users‟ markets as one of the 
advisory services received.  
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Results in Table 24c show that some of the advisory services available have 
a clearer link with the operations of MSE owner-managers‟ businesses than 
others. For example, services like management training, facilitation of access 
to materials and markets, and product development are more directly linked 
to enterprises‟ operations compared to other services such as provision of 
moral support and policy advocacy.  Given the diversity in business advisory 
services reflected above, one is bound to ask whether MSE owner-managers 
pay directly for the advisory services they receive and if so, whether they 
choose the specific services they want? These two issues are discussed next. 
 
Table 24c: Advisory services received by MSE owner-managers 
 
Variable (nominal)  
Response category 
  
  
Responses ª 
Frequency (n) Percentage of cases  
 
Support services 
received 
moral support  75 
18.1% 
 
89.3% 
access to markets  65 
15.7% 
 
77.4% 
general management advice  61 
14.7% 
 
72.6% 
management training  48 
11.6% 
 
57.1% 
technical support in product 
development  
 42 
10.1% 
 
50.0% 
sourcing of materials  32 
7.7% 
 
38.1% 
policy advocacy  30 
7.2% 
 
35.7% 
business infrastructure 
development 
 26 
6.3% 
 
31.0% 
compliance with government 
regulations 
 29 
7.0% 
 
34.5% 
                           Total  414  (100)%  
   ª Percentages and totals are based on multiple responses rather than cases. 
 
Results of participants‟ responses to a question on how BDS fees are determined 
(presented in Table 25 below) show that most participant MSE owner-managers may 
not be paying directly for business advisory services.  According to Table 25, although 
33.7 per cent of the participant MSE owner-managers indicate that BDS fees are 
determined through some form of negotiation with the provider, a slightly higher 
proportion (34.9 per cent) state that BDS fees are included in the charges for the 
standard microcredit services.  
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Table 25: Mechanism for determining BDS fees 
 
Variable (nominal) Response category Frequency 
(n) 
Cumulative 
percentage (%) 
 
How is the fee for BDS 
determined? 
negotiate with BDS provider 28 
33.7% 
 
33.7 
going market rate 18 
21.7% 
 
55.4 
part of loan package 
 
29 
34.9% 
 
90.3 
fee paid by third party 
 
3 
3.6% 
 
93.6 
other mechanisms 
 
5 
6% 
 
100.0 
                         Total (N) 83 (100%)  
 
Further, Table 25 reflects that 21.7 per cent of the participant MSE owner-managers pay 
for BDS at a rate equivalent to the existing market rate for similar services, whilst a 
minority (3.6 per cent) state that BDS charges are paid for by third party organisations. 
In most cases it is understood that this implies either donor agencies or NGOs which 
may have an interest in supporting MSE development. Some of the other mechanisms 
(6 per cent) for determining BDS fees reported by participant MSE owner-managers 
include; farmers‟ associations, investment groups, and government departments.  This 
could be interpreted to mean that some of the MSE owner-managers, as members of 
farmers‟ societies and/or investment clubs, are likely to benefit from BDS paid for by 
these societies as a way of promoting members‟ welfare. These results clearly show that 
in most cases MSE owner-managers do not pay for BDS directly. This   scenario is 
further confirmed by results of open-ended interviews with representatives of BDS 
providers (see sample quotes in Text boxes 9a and 9b below).  
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Text box 9a: BDS fees determination – BDS representatives‟ views  
 
“The MSE will pay about 50 per cent of the cost, but they wouldn‟t pay us, they would pay 
towards the cost of the exercise. Because we are not for profit we don‟t receive the money, 
because if we did then we have file returns, ….so they pay the consultant or they cover certain 
costs. So it gets into their books not our books. So it is very discretionary ..typically you find a 
client who doesn‟t have much money, he will probably have [to pay] 20 per cent -30 per cent... 
the range will be 20 per cent-50 per cent [of the cost ], it depends.” 
“Before we sign up for a job we get to meet the client and they explain to us what they want. 
That gives us an impression of the content of the work - the scope of it. We [ then] find out the 
man hours and technical skills required and then on the basis of that we put our  rates [which] 
currently are KES 6000 per person per day for officers, and KES 6,500 for partners.” 
“There are variables; one it depends on the size of the client. Two it will also depend on…like 
for tax consultancy, it depends on the hours spent. So mostly it is size and hours [that determine 
the cost].” 
 
Text box 9b: BDS fees determination – MFI representatives‟ views  
 
“The training fee is in-built within the loan charges.” 
“Most of the training budget is funded by our donors.” 
“..our donor pays for the cost of tuition and the other operating expenses.” 
“ …our centre uses a time sheet system of billing but most of budget is funded by surplus from 
the mother organisation.” 
 
Table 26 below presents the results of the protocol guided interviews with participant 
MSE owner-managers on a question seeking to identify the business decision areas for 
which they frequently need advice consistent with Research Question 2 in chapter one. 
According to the Table, more than half (54.7 per cent) of the participant MSE owner-
managers identify the business decision area of accountancy as their top priority area 
requiring advice from eleven others. More than three quarters (76.4 per cent) of the 
participant MSE owner-managers identify accounting to be among the top three 
business decision areas that they frequently require advice on. The second business 
decision area that MSE owner-managers frequently require advice on is marketing. 
Marketing is named among the top three of eleven decision areas by 74.3 per cent of the 
participant MSE owner-managers. More than half (56.4 per cent) of the participants 
report marketing as amongst the top two decision areas on which they often seek 
advice.   
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Table 26 further shows that 49.3 per cent and 50.1 per cent of the participant MSE 
owner-managers report general business planning and financial planning respectively as 
among the top three (of eleven) decision areas for which they often need assistance 
from BDS providers.  In this regard, financial management is identified as being the 
first of eleven other decision areas by 17.1 per cent of the participant MSE owner-
managers, while, as a top priority, general business planning attracted only 4.1 per cent 
of the participants‟ responses.   
 
Table 26: Decision areas where MSE owner-managers frequently need advice 
 
Variable (nominal)  
Response categories 
Responses ª Total 
(N) Rank out of 11 
1
st
  2
nd
  3
rd
  
 
Decision areas where 
advice is frequently 
needed 
Accounts 
44 
54.3% 
12 
14.8% 
6 
7.4% 
 
(81) 
Financial management 
14 
17.1% 
8 
9.8% 
19 
23.2% 
 
(82) 
Planning 
3 
4.1% 
17 
23.3% 
16 
21.9% 
 
(73) 
Human resources management 
2 
3.2% 
9  
14.3% 
14 
22.2% 
 
(63) 
Marketing 
15 
19.2% 
29 
37.2% 
14 
17.9% 
 
(78) 
Production 
2 
10.5% 
1 
5.3% 
1 
5.3% 
 
(19) 
Technology access & use 
2 
9.1% 
1 
4.5% 
1 
4.5% 
 
(22) 
Government regulations  
2 
6.9% 
3 
10.3% 
9 
31.0% 
 
(29) 
Tax management 
1 
2.6% 
4 
10.5% 
5 
13.2% 
 
(38) 
Legal issues  
1 
3.0% 
6 
18.2% 
8 
24.2% 
 
(33) 
ª Percentages and totals are based on multiple responses rather than cases. 
 
Other business decision areas where MSE owner-managers frequently require advice 
include; human resources management, tax management, compliance with government 
regulations and production and technology, among others. According to Table 26, 48.2 
per cent of the participant MSE owner-managers report requiring advice on compliance 
with government regulations as first among the top three priority areas, while 39.7 per 
cent of the participants report management of human resources on this basis. As a 
business decision area, tax management is not commonly reported as an advisory 
priority area by participant MSE owner-managers. Of the 38 participants who identified 
Tax management as an issue where they often need advice, 13.1 per cent identified it as 
first among the top two decision areas and 25.3 per cent as among the top three decision 
areas. 
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The results presented above, though mostly consistent with literature (see Faoite et al., 
2004) presented in section 3.3.1 of chapter three, could attract varied interpretations. 
Firstly one of the reasons for MSE owner-managers reporting accounting as an area on 
which they often require advice could arise from coercive pressure by their microcredit 
providers. It is likely that MFIs, both as lenders and providers of BDS may require MSE 
owner-managers (as borrowers) to put a lot of attention on keeping accurate books of 
accounts. Such a practice is likely to have some positive effects in that not only would 
the MSE owner-managers keep track of the performance of their businesses, but also 
the MFIs would have evidence on how credit is eventually used. Additionally records of 
account can be very useful when evaluating the financial position (level of economic 
capital) of the enterprise in respect of loan applications in the future. 
  
Secondly, the demand for marketing skills; whilst marketing prowess is recognised as 
one of the key attributes constituting the habitus of a successful entrepreneur, this could 
be due to increased competition in trade in goods. As reported earlier (see section 6.2), 
most participant MSE owner-managers‟ business activity is trade. As a result, good 
marketing skills could be a differentiating factor between MSEs that do well and those 
which do not perform so well. Thirdly as regards the decision area of human resources 
management, it is noted that this area is not among the highly demanded skills among 
MSE owner-managers. This is could be for the simple reason that most MSEs do not 
have many employees to manage.  As earlier reported, the average number of 
employees among participating MSEs in this study is 3.5 (see Table 23).  
 
As pertains to the low priority reported on demand for advice on tax management and 
other compliance related issues, it is likely that the turnover for most participant 
businesses is below the government‟s threshold for withholding tax registration 
purposes. Given this scenario, it is unlikely that participant MSE owner-managers 
would often require advice on tax matters. Additionally, given the informal nature of 
the participants‟ enterprises, staff insurance and other work-place regulations may not 
be applicable to participants‟ enterprises, and are likely to be neglected in cases where 
applicable. 
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Returning to the question on whether MSE owner-managers choose the specific areas of 
BDS for which they require facilitation, a comparison of data presented in both Tables 
26 and 24c, shows minimal convergence. For example, whereas accounting and 
marketing are reported to be decision areas where MSE owner-managers often require 
advice, moral support, information on access to markets and general management 
advice are the business advisory services that participant MSE owner-managers report 
to be receiving.  
 
Given the apparent discrepancy between what MSE owner-managers require and what 
they actually receive, it is unlikely that they choose the business advisory services that 
they receive. Further insights on this issue are likely to be elicited from results of open-
ended interviews with representatives of both MFIs and BDS providers. Results of 
interviews with MFI representatives reported in Text box 10a show that MFIs provide a 
range of training services to MSE owner-managers including: management of group 
dynamics, leadership, bookkeeping and cash flow management, to general skills on how 
to run a business. In comparison, BDS agencies offer a relatively more business-focused 
range of advisory services (see Text box 10b).  
 
Text box 10a: Training services identified by MFI representatives as provided by MFIs 
 
 group dynamics,  
 group management 
 group leadership,  
 group constitution making 
 business management  
 basic accounts, i.e. bookkeeping, and budgeting,  maintaining cash flow 
 technical areas; for example crop farming 
 how to manage credit and knowing what is expected  
 investment opportunities 
 how to run a business 
 
Results of open-ended interviews with representatives of BDS providers, reflected in 
Text box 10b, show that, unlike training offered by MFIs, the range of advisory services 
offered by BDS agencies more closely matches the type of advisory services frequently 
required by MSE owner-managers reported previously (see Table 26). BDS agencies‟ 
services appear to cover most key business management decision areas, for example, 
accountancy, marketing, planning, operations, and general management. In contrast 
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most of the training services provided by MFIs seem to have a bias towards 
management of social capital or group behaviour. This bias is understandable give the 
fact that delivery of microcredit (a core service for most of the MFIs) and effective 
repayment of it, relies considerably on social capital mobilised through MSE owner-
managers‟ groups.      
Text box 10b: Business advisory services identified by BDS representatives as commonly 
provided by BDS agencies 
 
 value addition in terms of distribution networks to farmers 
 sales promotion, product & process design services 
 bookkeeping and accountancy 
 business counseling 
 entrepreneurship seminars on how to start a business and how to manage finances 
 management training  
 group dynamics, skills development, idea generation, 
 marketing and pricing 
 market information liaison  
 tax advice 
 general counselling 
 business planning  
 business expansion & growth 
 rehabilitation 
 hands on mentorships on skills development 
 institution strengthening and capacity building 
 auditing, financial statements, and tax management 
 setting up management operating systems 
 business management consultancy, developing strategic plans 
NB List not necessarily exhaustive 
 
In summary given the above situation where training provided by MFIs does not seem 
to closely match the business advisory services required by MSE owner-managers, and 
the fact that most MSE owner-managers do not pay for MFI provided BDS directly, it 
seems unlikely that MSE owner-managers have the freedom to choose the type of BDS 
they would want from their MFI.  In view of the current scenario where MFIs‟ delivery 
of microcredit appears driven mainly by commercial rather than social development 
logic, this result is not unexpected. After all “he, who pays the piper, determines the 
tune.” 
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6.4.3  BDS delivery; mode, terms and conditions 
This section examines the general terms and conditions surrounding BDS delivery as 
reported by participants in this study. The following Table 27a presents results of 
protocol guided interviews with participant MSE owner-managers on questions relating 
to BDS delivery mode, frequency of meetings with BDS agents, nature of engagement, 
tenure, and BDS charges.  
 
Table 27a: BDS delivery mode, terms and conditions 
 
Variable (nominal)  
  
 Response categories  
Responses ª 
Frequency 
(N) 
Per cent 
of cases 
 
How I access 
business advisory 
services 
Access advisory agents through visits to business site 
 
70 
46.1% 
 
84.3% 
Accessing advisory agents through visits to agency's 
office 
 
25 
16.4% 
30.1% 
Accessing advisory agents through group sessions 
 
40 
26.3% 48.2% 
   
Accessing advisory agents through contracted one off 
assignment 
5 
3.3% 6.0% 
   
Other method of accessing advisory agents 
 
12 
7.9% 14.5% 
                  Total  152 (100%) 183.1% 
 
Frequency of 
meeting with DBS 
agents 
Monthly  
20 
23.8% 
 
Quarterly  
16 
19.0% 
 
Semiannually  
21 
25.0% 
 
Annually  
11 
13.1% 
 
Only when in need 
16 
19.0% 
 
Written contract 
with BDS agency 
 
Yes 
44 
53% 
 
 
Duration used BDS 
agents (years) 
 (N) Min. Max. Range Mean Std. Deviation Skewness 
(82) 1 19 18 3.03 3.13 3.43 
 
BDS rates (KES) 
Hourly (5) 1,000 10,000 9,000 3,100 3863.29 2.23 
Session (28) 100 12,500 12,400 3,225 2762.26 2.31 
Monthly  (10) 250 11,000 10,750 2,625 3177.29 2.44 
Assignment (16) 1,800 18,000 16,200 5,812. 5048.55 1.54 
ª Percentages and totals are based on multiple responses rather than cases. 
 
As reflected in Table 27a, there are several ways through which MSE owner-managers 
access BDS including; business site visits, visits to agents‟ offices, group sessions and 
contracted one off assignments, among others. The Table shows that 46.1 per cent of 
the participant MSE owner-managers report that agent‟s visits to their business 
177 
 
premises is the most common method through which they access BDS. The second 
most common method of BDS delivery reported among MSE owner-managers is via 
group meetings. As a mode of BDS delivery, group sessions are reported by more than 
one fifth (26.3 per cent) of the participant MSE owner-managers. Of all the participant 
responses, 16.4 per cent identify visits to agent‟s offices as one of the methods through 
which they access BDS. Some of the other methods of accessing BDS, reported by (7.9 
per cent) of participant MSE owner-managers include; agricultural exhibitions, farmers 
workshops, and telephone conversations. 
 
Results of open-ended interviews with representatives of BDS providers reveal an even 
wider variety of methodologies used in delivering BDS to MSE owner-managers 
compared to the above list. Group sessions continue to be named among the most 
common methods for BDS delivery. It is important to note that group sessions provide 
an opportunity to mobilise social capital a critical „asset‟ in microfinancing. Other   
methods of BDS delivery include; apprenticeships, mentorships, business incubation 
and one-on-one hands-on coaching, among others.  The following quotations are 
illustrative of these responses to the open-ended interviews with BDS representatives.   
“…mainly group sessions, but sometimes we also do one-on-one 
sessions. I need to mention that we have a strong preference for 
apprenticeships and various aspects of mentorships because they help 
people learn as they go.” 
“We do coaching…we coach the staff of the client and at the end of 
the contract the client‟s staff should have understood and should 
from then move on their own.” 
“We do one-on-one sessions, group sessions, and mentorships.  We 
also expect to start incubation service.” 
From a marketing perspective and from the BDS agents‟ stand point, one could argue 
that agents‟ visits to MSE owner-managers‟ (clients‟) business  premises are probably a 
more effective way of delivering BDS compared to the other options stated above. 
Through such a strategy the BDS agent is able to not only maintain close contact with 
the client, but also keep abreast with developments in the enterprise.  
 
With regard to the frequency of meeting BDS agents, Table 27a shows that 25 per cent 
of the participant MSE owner-managers report to be meeting their agents  once every 
six months, while a close to similar proportion (23.8 per cent) report meeting their BDS 
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agents at least once  per month. Although 13.1 per cent of the participants MSE owner-
managers report to be meeting with their BDS agents only once per year, 19.5 per cent 
of them report meeting their BDS agents either quarterly or only when in absolute need. 
The Table reveals also that 53 per cent of the participant MSE owner-managers report 
having a contractual arrangement for supply of BDS with their BDS agency. The 
remaining 47 per cent of the participant MSE owner-managers undertake their 
engagements with BDS agents informally.  
 
Interviews with both MFI and BDS representatives reveal that whereas the above 
reported frequencies of meeting schedules are valid, there are instances where agents 
meet with MSE owner-managers on a weekly basis for a specified period of time. This 
is especially the case for newly recruited groups that have to undergo basic MFI training 
for potential borrowers. It is understood that frequency of meetings between BDS 
agents and MSE owner-managers (clients) is probably determined by the nature of the 
specific business advisory assignment under consideration, among other factors. For 
example, while a bookkeeping workshop for hoteliers may require meeting on a daily 
basis for a period of one to two weeks, this is not likely to be the case for value added 
tax returns (VAT) which may require that the BDS agent meets the client at least once 
every month.  Additionally whilst coaching on marketing fresh produce may demand an 
intermitted (non programmable) schedule of meetings between the BDS agent and the 
client, meetings for income tax audit services are likely to take place either twice or 
once in a year.  
 
Table 27a further shows that there is a wide range (18 years) of duration for which 
participant MSE owner-managers have made use of their BDS providers. The average 
duration is 3 years (σ = 3.13). With a skewness of 3.43, this means that most 
participants had used their BDS agents for a period of between one and two years. 
Given the average age for most participants‟ businesses is 4.6 years (see Table 23) it 
can be inferred that most participant MSE owner-managers started using BDS either in 
their second or third year of their business operations. 
Charges for business advisory services are levied on either hourly, sessional, monthly or 
on an individual assignment basis.  According to Table 27a, at least for participant MSE 
owner-managers who identify as using non MFI supplied BDS, the average BDS hourly 
rate is KES 3,100 (AUD $ 62) with a standard deviation of 3863.29 and a skewness of 
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2.23. Results in this Table further show that session rates for BDS average KES 3,225 
(AUD 64.5) compared to KES 2,625 (AUD 52.5) per month. On average, a BDS 
assignment is likely to cost MSE owner-managers KES 5,813 (AUD 116). Given the 
fact that the skewness scores for all the BDS rates above are positive, it can be inferred 
that the rates are more likely to be closer to the minimum rather than the maximum rate 
in each category. 
The BDS rates reported here may appear modest as well as contradictory, in that the 
hourly BDS rate is much higher than the monthly rate. One way of interpreting this is 
that the rates apply to different types of business advisory services used by participant 
MSE owner-managers. As such, one would not expect rates for accountancy work (e.g. 
preparation of financial statements) to be similar to the rates for technical product 
design and packaging, whether the two are billed hourly or monthly. Additionally 
results of interviews with BDS representatives clarify that in some cases BDS charges 
are subsidised by donors. This may mean that some of rates reported here are 
understated. Given the moderate nature of figures on BDS rates reported above and the 
relative flexibility in the mode of accessing BDS agents, it might be interesting to 
examine the participant MSE owner-managers‟ perceptions of their BDS agencies. The 
following Table 27b presents results of participant MSE owner-managers‟ perceptions 
of BDS fees, relationships and the competence of staff. 
Table 27b: MSE owner-managers‟ perception of BDS fees, relationships  
       and staff competence 
 
Variable 
(nominal) 
Response category Total 
(N) 
t-test 
value  
How 
affordable 
is the BDS 
fee? 
 
Extremely 
unaffordable 
Unaffordable 
Neither affordable 
nor unaffordable 
Affordable 
Extremely 
affordable 
  
1 
1.2% 
25 
30.5% 
30 
36.6% 
16 
19.5% 
8 
9.8% 
(82) 
100% 
22.47*** 
 
Competence 
rating of 
BDS staff 
Incompetent 
Somewhat 
competent 
Fairly competent Competent 
Don‟t 
know 
  
 
10 
11.9% 
26 
31.0% 
48 
57.1% 
 
(84) 
100% 
-16.88*** 
 
 
How is the 
relationship 
with BDS 
agents like? 
Poor Fair 
Neither good nor 
bad 
Good Excellent   
 1 
1.2% 
8 
 9.6% 
43  
51.8% 
31  
37.3% 
(83) 
 100% 
-12.22*** 
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According to Table 27b, although most (36.6 per cent) participant MSE owner-
managers are non committal on the affordability of BDS fees, nearly one-third (31.7 per 
cent) of them perceive the current BDS fee to be unaffordable. Additionally a close to 
similar proportion (29.3 per cent) of the 82 participant MSE owner-managers perceives 
the BDS fee as affordable. There is a highly significant difference between participant 
MSE owner-managers who perceive BDS fees as affordable and those who perceive it 
to be unaffordable (t-test =22.47, p<0.001). The Table further shows that more than half 
(57.1 per cent) of the participant MSE owner-managers perceive the staff of their BDS 
agencies as sufficiently competent to handle their work. However 42.9 per cent of the 
participant MSE owner-managers perceive staff from their BDS agencies as being less 
competent. Of these, close to one-third (31 per cent) of the participant MSE owner-
managers perceive the BDS staff as „fairly‟ competent while 11.9 per cent perceive the 
staff as somewhat competent. With a t-test value of -16.88 at p<0.001, there is a 
significant difference between participant MSE owner managers who perceive BDS 
agents‟ staff as being competent and those who think otherwise.  
In general, for the majority (89.1 per cent) of the participant MSE owner-managers, the 
relationship with their BDS agents is reported as „good‟.  
The results above appear to suggest that at least in some cases BDS agency personnel 
are not sufficiently competent to meet the demands of their clients. To get more insight 
on this inference, exploration of the entry level qualification for BDS consulting staff 
will assist. Results of open-ended interviews with BDS representatives in the MSE 
sector (see Text box 11a) show that the minimum qualification for BDS staff is a 
tertiary level diploma in a business related field. 
Text box 11a: BDS representatives‟ views on entry level qualifications for BDS staff  
 
“A tertiary level diploma is sufficient but needs to be related to management training.” 
 
“I would imagine that this fellow should have a diploma certificate as a minimum.  It does not 
matter in what field. At least a diploma, because at that level you have the basic skills to 
interpret information. They should be able to conceptualise and interpret  information that they 
collect from clients. …what is important is that any BDS officer must have basic knowledge in 
the area of the service or product that he purports to be involved in.” 
 
“…at the moment nearly half of the staff has university education, the others have tertiary level 
of education in the related areas, for example CPA, ACCA, or a diploma in accountancy and of 
course very high proficiency in IT.” 
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From the quotes in Text box 11a it appears as though most of the consulting BDS staff 
have a relevant education. However this may not imply that they are capable of 
delivering business advisory services to MSE owner-managers. Whereas staff may have 
the relevant education, to be effective in the delivery of BDS they may require some 
practical exposure or experience in running a business. As a prerequisite in handling 
BDS assignments, whereas practical experience is cited by a few of the BDS 
representatives interviewed as desirable, some do not think experience is necessary (see 
sample views from BDS representatives in Text box 11b).  
 
Text box 11b: BDS representatives‟ views on importance of experience for BDS staff 
 
“…oh big time, we usually hire people with private sector experience. They need to have a 
lot of skills and very solid experience from private sector [businesses].” 
 
“…it is, experience is important. I can‟t begin saying that you [know] am doing BDS for 
arts and craft, and yet I have no understanding of where „Akamba‟ hard wood starts and 
ends!” 
 
“…absolutely, people without experience even with good education, don‟t succeed. I can 
tell you, because experience is very important…they get on the job and do it. That is what 
our clients are looking for, they are not looking for big theory and what…they are looking 
for…here is my problem, how do you help me address it?” 
 
“You see most of the advisors they don‟t own businesses of the nature that they are 
advising on. It‟s purely research work and the academic knowledge one has that you are 
able to link the two and advise. I don‟t think experience is important. What I think is 
[important] is [that] one can access information through research….. it is more important 
than just having been in the field.” 
 
“I don‟t think experience matters much. ....let me say this, sometimes you may footballer 
who understands everything but he cannot train a team after he has retired as a player, 
because he is limited in a number of ways; conceptualising the process and 
communicating the instructions to the players. That [is]the thing that might constraint 
the process.  But you may have a theorist who has a high IQ and can make things move 
and because he is working with an entrepreneur who has an idea of where he is going, 
all that was lacking is knowledge.” 
 
From the foregoing it is clear that relevant tertiary level education is important if 
one is to provide BDS consulting in the MSE sector.  However, it seems unclear 
whether practical knowledge gained through involvement in a private enterprise 
is a necessary condition. Notwithstanding this, having discussed the terms and 
conditions surrounding delivery of BDS to MSE owner-managers, it is 
important to examine the recipients‟ perceptions as to the impact access to BDS 
is having on their enterprises. 
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6.4.4  MSE owner-managers’ assessment of benefits, shortcomings and 
 satisfaction with BDS 
Guided mainly by reports of protocol aided interviews with MSE owner-managers, this 
section discusses the benefits and drawbacks accruing from the use of BDS. The section 
also examines the participant owner-managers‟ satisfaction ratings of their experience 
of BDS. The analyses presented here relate mainly to Research Questions 3 and, in part 
5, as outlined in chapter one (see section 1.3.2). In this regard discussions focus on the 
MSE owner-managers‟ ratings of satisfaction with business advisory services targeting 
specific business decision areas. The MSE owner-managers‟ overall judgements on 
satisfaction with BDS delivery are presented also.  
 
The following table, Table 28, presents results of protocol guided interviews with 
participant MSE owner-managers on questions aimed at eliciting their perceptions of 
the benefits and shortcomings of BDS.  According to Table 28, some of the benefits that 
might accrue from using BDS include access to professional input in decision making, 
development of managerial skills and technical and moral support. The Table shows 
that most (72.3 per cent) participant MSE owner-managers report skill development to 
be among the top three (of six) benefits accruing from using BDS. Of these, 24.1 per 
cent identify skill development as being first out of six priority benefits while 54.2 per 
cent of rank it amongst the top two.  
 
The second most commonly reported benefit is access to professional input in decision 
making. Of 83 participant MSE owner-managers, 68.7 per cent rank professional input 
among the top three (of six) benefits of BDS. Of these, 24.1 per cent identify the benefit 
of access to professional input as their number one (of six) priority benefit compared to 
18.1 per cent who rank it second. Table 28 further reveals that moral support and access 
to an independent opinion in decision making are respectively ranked as third and 
fourth benefits of BDS by participant MSE owner-managers. As a benefit of BDS, 
moral support is identified among the top three (of six) by 62.6 per cent of the 
participant MSE owner-managers compared to 50.6 per cent for access to an 
independent opinion. It is noted that close to one-third (30 per cent) of all participant 
MSE owner-manages identify moral support as the top (first of six) benefit of BDS. 
This appears consistent with earlier results (see Table 24c) on the nature of BDS 
accessible to MSE owner-managers. In summary, from a users‟ perspective, given the 
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fact that most (72.3 per cent) of the participant MSE owner-managers cite skill 
development as their priority benefit of BDS, it is likely that MSE owner-managers 
would be more interested in BDS that enhances their cultural capital, which in turn 
enhances opportunity for growth in economic capital, through development of business 
management skills.  
 
Table 28: MSE owner-managers‟ perceptions on the benefits and shortcomings of BDS 
 
Variable 
(nominal) 
 
Response categories 
Responses ª Total 
(N) Rank out of  6 
1
st
  2
nd
  3
rd
  
 
Benefits of BDS  
Access to professional input 
20 
24.1% 
15 
18.1% 
22 
26.5% 
(83) 
Access to independent opinion 
10 
12.0% 
13 
15.7% 
19 
22.9% 
(83) 
 
Access to skills development 
20 
24.1% 
25 
30.1% 
15 
18.1% 
(83) 
Access to technical support 
7 
8.8% 
13 
16.3% 
16 
20.0% 
(80) 
Moral support 
24 
30.0% 
15 
18.8% 
11 
13.8% 
(80) 
Other benefits  
7 
8.3% 
(84) 
 
 
 
 
Drawbacks of BDS 
 
 
 
 
Rank out of  4  
1
st
  2
nd
  3
rd
  
Breach of privacy 
23 
28.0% 
16 
19.5% 
12 
14.6% 
(82) 
Leakage of information 
24 
29.3% 
25 
30.5% 
18 
22.0% 
(82) 
Misleading advice 
13 
16.0% 
21 
25.9% 
30 
37.5% 
(81) 
Dependency syndrome 
15 
19.0% 
13 
16.5% 
17 
21.5% 
(79) 
 
Other fears 
5 
6% 
(84) 
ª Percentages and totals are based on multiple responses rather than cases. 
 
A comparison of the above with results of open-ended interviews with BDS 
representatives reveals a more diverse set of benefits that MSE owner-managers 
are said to have accessed. Although there is some common ground on the 
benefits of BDS, for example skill development (see Text box 12a), some of the 
benefits cited by BDS representatives seem to be general in nature (see Text box 
12b for a selected list). For example, access to information linkages, 
management of change induced by access to credit and opened up for more 
opportunities, among others.  
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Besides benefits, Table 28 above shows that participant MSE owner-managers 
also cited some of the shortcomings of using BDS, namely; breach of privacy, 
leakage of business information, misleading advice and creation of a 
dependency syndrome, among others. Among the shortcomings of BDS, leakage 
of information is the most serious with 59.8 per cent of the participant MSE 
owner-managers identifying it as among the top two drawbacks out of four. The 
second commonly reported shortcoming of BDS is breach of privacy.  
 
As a shortcoming of BDS, breach 
of privacy is ranked first (of four) 
by 28 per cent of the participant 
MSE owner-managers compared to 
16 per cent for misleading advice. 
The fear of dependency syndrome 
is least commonly cited among 
other BDS shortcomings.  Of the 
79 participant MSE owner-
managers, barely more than one-
third (35.5 per cent) ranked 
dependency syndrome among their 
top two (out of four) concerns with 
BDS.  
 
Turning to satisfaction, the 
following table, Table 29, presents 
results of MSE owner-managers‟ 
BDS satisfaction ratings along selected decision areas as well as overall 
satisfaction ratings on the quality of BDS received. The Table shows that in 
most cases, participant MSE owner-managers report being satisfied with 
advisory services received across the key business decision areas. For example, 
the majority (81.5 per cent) of participant MSE owner-managers report 
satisfaction with BDS in accounting while 73.3 per cent identify as being 
satisfied with the BDS in marketing.  
 
Text box 12a: BDS representatives‟ views on skill 
development among MSE owner-managers 
 
“Yes, some skill has been nurtured but more so 
compliance, … compliance with tax requirements, 
financial management standards and practices and 
basically acquaintance with the statutory 
requirements of the business environment. So their 
sense of understanding and acquaintance with 
business requirements, those who deal with us have 
an edge over those that don‟t. [In this regard] some 
skills have been nurtured among those MSEs.” 
“…you [see] this firm has actually grown with its 
clientele. Some are now able to do accounting work 
on their own, we are now mainly involved in audit.” 
“One good thing that this organisation has done is 
that it has contributed to a lot of human development 
in this country.” 
“…they appreciate the skills they have gained. 
[Through] access to quality training they have 
developed management capability.  Some personal 
development e.g. their social skills, have also 
improved.” 
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Unlike human resources management where participants‟ responses on BDS 
satisfaction appear shared evenly (i.e. 36.4 per cent satisfied and 39.3 per cent 
dissatisfied), in the case of BDS in the context of financial management, two-
thirds (65.8 per cent) of participant MSE owner-managers identify as satisfied 
compared to one-fifth (20.7 per cent) who are dissatisfied. Similarly 49.3 per 
cent of the participant MSE owner-managers report to be satisfied with advisory 
services in general business planning while 21.7 per cent are dissatisfied with 
the service. 
 
Across the four key decision areas 
reported above, the difference 
between participant MSE owner-
managers who are satisfied and 
those who are not is highly 
significant at  p<0.001. Among all 
the other decision areas, namely; 
production process design, 
technology use, regulations 
compliance, tax and legal issues, 
the proportion of participant MSE 
owner-managers who are satisfied 
with the respective BDS is greater 
than those who are dissatisfied.  
 
Overall responses on the quality of 
BDS (see Table 29) indicate that most (86.8 per cent) participant MSE owner-
managers evaluate it as „good‟, with 45.8 per cent of them rating it as „very 
good‟. A small number (8), being 9.5 per cent of the 83 participant MSE owner-
managers were non committal, while 3.6 per cent rate the quality of BDS 
delivered as „poor‟. In summary and from a univariate perspective, participant 
MSE owner-managers‟ opinions on the benefits of BDS, satisfaction ratings 
across the major business decision domains and their ratings on the quality of 
BDS appear consistent. In the following chapter however, the issue of assessing 
the effectiveness of BDS delivery in general and MSE owner-managers‟ 
Text box 12b: BDS representatives views 
on benefits of BDS to MSE owner-managers 
 
 Acquired skill to run business 
 Access to credit services 
 Linkages to markets 
 Information linkages 
 Access to counseling during hard times 
 Helped them manage change that comes with 
improved access to credit. 
 Improved business operations 
 Access to credit from MFIs after training  
 Opened them up for more opportunities 
 Got new business ideas 
 Created a platform to share experiences 
 Expand business 
 Built confidence 
 Accessed new markets 
 They have successful businesses 
 Have a network that they call upon 
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satisfaction rating of it, in particular, is examined from a multivariate point of 
view.  
 
Table 29: MSE Owner-managers‟ satisfaction rating of advice on business decision areas 
 
Business 
decision area 
 
Responseª categories Total 
(N) 
 
t-test value highly 
satisfied 
 
satisfied 
neither 
satisfied 
nor 
dissatisfied 
 
dissatisfied 
highly 
dissatisfied 
accounts 
49 
60.5% 
17 
21.0% 
10 
12.3% 
3 
3.7% 
2 
2.5% 
 
(81) 
 
- 11.08*** 
financial 
management 
27 
32.9% 
27 
32.9% 
11 
13.4% 
12 
14.6% 
5 
6.1% 
 
(82) 
 
-14.70*** 
planning 
12 
17.4% 
22 
31.9% 
20 
29.0% 
13 
18.8% 
2 
2.9% 
 
(69) 
 
-13.85*** 
human 
resources  
14 
23.0% 
10 
16.4% 
12 
19.7% 
16 
26.2% 
8 
13.1% 
 
(61) 
 
-15.31*** 
marketing 
25 
33.3% 
30 
40.0% 
13 
17.3% 
5 
6.7% 
2 
2.7% 
 
(75) 
 
-11.35*** 
production 
processes 
3 
15.8% 
6 
31.6% 
1 
5.3% 
6 
31.6% 
3 
15.8% 
 
(19) 
 
technology 
7 
31.8% 
7 
31.8% 
6 
27.3% 
2 
2.4% 
  
(22) 
 
regulations 
compliance 
12 
40.0% 
8 
26.7% 
3 
10.0% 
4 
13.3% 
3 
10.0% 
 
(30) 
 
tax 
management 
2 
5.4% 
11 
29.7% 
8 
21.6% 
10 
27.0% 
6 
16.2% 
 
(37) 
 
legal issues 
4 
12.9% 
8 
25.8% 
7 
22.6% 
7 
22.6% 
5 
16.1% 
 
(31) 
 
 
Satisfaction 
with Quality 
of BDS  
 
Very good Good 
Neither 
good  nor 
bad 
Poor Very poor 
Total 
(N) 
t-test value 
38 
45.8% 
34 
41% 
8 
9.5% 
2 
2.4% 
1 
1.2% 
 
(83) 
 
8.93*** 
*      significant at p<0.10; **   significant at p<0.05; *** significant at p<0.001 
ª Percentages and totals are based on multiple responses rather than cases. 
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6.5  Conclusion  
This chapter presents analysis of participants‟ perceptions of the usefulness of 
microcredit and BDS as support services to owner-managers of micro and small 
enterprises. The chapter begins by providing an outline of the general characteristics of 
the participant MSE owner-managers‟ businesses as consumers of microcredit and 
BDS.  Discussions on the usefulness of microcredit to the participant MSE owner-
managers are guided by several factors including; sources of credit commonly accessed 
by  MSE owner-managers, motive for taking a loan, and the participant MSE owner-
managers‟ perceptions on the impact that microcredit has on their businesses. Similarly 
as pertains to the usefulness of BDS, discussions focus mainly on BDS sources that 
MSE owner-managers commonly use, the types of business advisory services offered 
by BDS agencies and what MSE owner managers frequently need, and the perceived 
impact of access to BDS on participant MSE owner-managers‟ businesses.  
 
In most cases the views of the participant MSE owner-managers on the issues above are 
compared with views of representatives of both the MFIs and BDS agencies as well as 
those of independent entrepreneurship researchers in the MSE sector. In addition 
concepts drawn from both Bourdieu and neo-institutional theories are used to assist 
interpretation of results. Whereas there are concerns about some terms and conditions 
surrounding delivery of both microcredit and BDS, in general the proceedings show that 
participant MSE owner-managers feel that access to microcredit and BDS is having a 
positive impact on their enterprises. A multivariate analytical perspective to the subject 
matter of the thesis follows.
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7.0 Chapter Seven: Data Analysis - Multivariate  
 
7.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this study is to evaluate the association  of microcredit and 
business development services (BDS) with the perceived performance of micro and 
small enterprises (MSEs). While the previous chapter addressed this issue using a 
univariate approach, this chapter examines it from a multivariate and multi-dimensional 
point of view.  
 
This chapter is devoted to discussion of the operationalisation of the variables used in 
testing the various hypotheses (developed in chapter three) and to the tests themselves 
and interpretation of their results. The chapter is organised into two main sections. The 
first section presents results of tests of hypotheses relating to MSE performance, which 
is the key construct in this study.  In this regard four sets of hypotheses (all related to 
Research Question 4, stated in chapter one) are examined. These tests are aimed at 
demonstrating which approach to microfinancing, i.e. social (focusing on human capital 
development) or commercial (emphasising economic capital) is likely to lead to better 
livelihoods for poor MSE owner managers through improved performance of their 
enterprises. All tests are conducted in accordance with the four categories of participant 
MSE owner-managers introduced in section 4.3 (study design), namely:  
c1 = MSE owner-managers in receipt of both microcredit and BDS; 
c2 = MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit without BDS; 
c3 = MSE owner-managers in receipt of BDS without microcredit; and 
c4 = MSE owner-managers in receipt of neither microcredit nor BDS. 
 
The second part of the chapter discusses the results of tests of hypotheses dealing with 
the perceived effectiveness of BDS delivery and the strategic fit between currently 
supplied BDS and the self-expressed needs of MSE owner-managers participating in 
this study in line with Research Question 5. 
 
7.2  Test of Hypotheses dealing with MSE performance 
This section presents discussions of test results related to owner-managers‟ perceptions 
of their MSE performance posed in Hypotheses 1 – 4. The section begins with 
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elaborations on measurement pertaining to both the dependent and independent 
variables used in testing the respective hypotheses. 
 
7.2.1 Measurement of MSE performance and coding of variables 
Before discussing the individual results of tests relating to the MSE performance 
hypotheses it is important to understand how MSE performance (dependent variable) is 
measured. As a construct MSE performance is measured through participant MSE 
owner-managers‟ perceptions of the financial performance of their enterprises. There 
are six financial indicators about which their perceptions are elicited including; growth 
in sales, profit, expenses, savings, cash flow, and stock/service orders. Multiple 
measures, all of which are financial in nature, are used in order to improve on reliability 
and validity of the performance construct (Murphy et al., 1996, O‟Regan et al., 2010). 
MSE owner-manager perceptions rather than absolute figures were preferred for two 
reasons. First participant MSE owner-managers were unlikely to provide financial 
performance figures because they hardly keep such records. Second, even where such 
records do exist their accuracy is most probably questionable. Further, extant literature 
supports the use of perception-based scales to assess MSE performance (see King-
Kauanui et al., 2006).  
 
Guided by a five-point Likert type scale ranging from 1= noticeable decline to 5 = 
noticeable increase, participants recorded a self-rated score on each of the six items 
above.  Before the analysis, scores on expenses were reversed (i.e. 1= noticeable 
increase to 5 = noticeable decline) to ensure consistency in direction with the other 
performance indicators. During the structured interviews, participant MSE owner-
managers were asked to score their perceptions for each of the six performance items 
for their businesses in reference to the previous two years of operations.  
 
The responses are subjected to scale reliability analysis using inter-item correlations, the 
results of which appear in the following tables, Tables 30a and 30b. According to Table 
30a, with the exception of expenses, the other five items measuring MSE performance 
have medium to high Pearson‟s correlations. Consequently, the item „Business 
expenses‟ was dropped from the MSE performance scale. The corresponding Cronbach 
alpha for the remaining five items measuring MSE performance is 0.809 (see Table 
30b). Given that the alpha score is greater than 0.70 (Cohen, 1988), it can be concluded 
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that the items display high internal consistency and are a reliable measure of the MSE 
performance construct. 
 
Table 30a: MSE performance measures - Inter-Item Correlation Matrix  
 
 Growth in  sales Business profits Business expenses Business savings Cash flow 
Business profits .639     
Business expenses -.169 -.417    
Business savings .505 .716 -.459   
Cash flow .389 .311 -.108 .370  
Stock/service orders .358 .452 -.205 .411 .449 
 
 
Table 30b: MSE performance measures- Cronbach's Alpha reliability test 
 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items N of Items 
.809 .810 5 
 
Next the individual scores for the five MSE performance variables outlined above were 
normalised
41
 (Gow, 2010) and labelled as follows; Growth in sales (TRA1_1), Profit 
(TRA2_1), Business savings (TRA3_1), Cash flow (TRA4_1), and Stock/service orders 
(TRA5_1). The sum of scores on each of the transformed variables is taken to yield a 
total performance score which becomes the dependent variable labelled PerfScore [i.e. 
PerfScore= SUM (TRA1_1,TRA2_1,TRA3_1,TRA4_1,TRA5_1)]. Before the 
normalisation of scores on each of the five performance components, assessment of 
missing values in the entire sample of 160 cases was done. The exercise identified 13 
(8.1 per cent) cases with missing data on either one or two variables among the 
measures of MSE performance. Using SPSS‟s multiple imputation procedure, missing 
values were imputed by way of linear regression. Exploratory regression analysis using 
both data sets (with and without imputed data) yielded highly consistent results. 
Therefore all the regression analyses reported in this chapter involve the entire sample 
of 160 cases. 
 
Coding of variables 
 
Dependent variable: As explained above the dependent variable is the MSE  
                                                 
41
 Normalisation involves transforming the item scores into optimal scores by regression yielding a mean 
and standard deviation close to 0 and 1, respectively (Gow, 2010). 
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performance (PerfScore). This is a numeric variable measured on a continuous scale. 
 
Variables of interest: There are four variables of interest (binary in nature) 
representing each of the four participant categories in this study (see Figure 4 section 
4.3 in chapter four) and they create six possible combinations of receipt of microcredit 
and BDS.  The variables are coded as follows; 
 
Variable name Variable label Code 
CDTBDS Participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit  
and BDS.  
= (1) if case applies, otherwise (0). 
CDT Participant MSE owner-managers who use  
microcredit 
= (1) if case applies, otherwise (0). 
CDTEx Participant MSE owner-managers who use 
microcreditwithout BDS 
= (1) if case applies, otherwise (0). 
BDS Participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS  = (1) if case applies, otherwise (0). 
BDSEx Participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS 
without microcredit 
= (1) if case applies, otherwise (0). 
NOCtBS Participant MSE owner-managers who use neither 
microcredit nor BDS 
= (1) if case applies, otherwise (0). 
 
Control variables:  
There are six variables included in the category of control variables namely; gender, 
age, owner managers‟ education, type of business activity, perceived state of business 
establishment (is the business stable and been operational for three years or more?), and 
business family background. Given that women have been found to be better 
entrepreneurs than men (Akoten, 2007a) and that the educated are likely to be more 
skillful in management than the less educated, it is argued here that MSE owner-
manager‟s gender and level of education are likely to influence the performance of their 
enterprise. Similarly, it is likely that the MSE owner-managers who come from a 
business-family background are likely to have acquired some useful experience which 
is likely to be reflected in their decision making. Further as people get older they are 
likely to become more risk averse and more conservative. Therefore younger MSE 
owner-managers are expected to be more aggressive and innovative, attributes that 
could lead to better prospects in their businesses. In addition it is possible that MSE 
performance is influenced by the business activity or industry in which an entrepreneur 
engages (Boter, 2005). The size of a business and its perceived state of establishment 
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are also likely to determine performance in that with stability comes customer loyalty, 
an aspect that could improve sales turnover. According to Masakure et al. (2009) the 
above variables represent contextual factors that mediate the relationship between BDS 
and MSE performance (see further discussion in section 2.4  in chapter two).  
 
Consistent with their previous use (see Jayawarna et al., 2007, Masakure et al., 2009, 
Chi et al., 2008), these  variables are used here as control variables to enable the author 
to explore possible explanations to observed variations in self-rated business 
performance across the four participant categories. These variables are operationalised 
to be binary in nature and the descriptive analysis informs the coding, which is as 
follows; 
 
Variable name Variable label Code 
   
Gender Sex of the participant MSE owner-manager = (1) if female, otherwise (0) 
Age  Participant MSE owner-manager‟s age in years = (1) if aged below 40  years,  
otherwise (0) 
Education  Participant MSE owner-manager‟s level of general 
education 
= (1) if tertiary and above, 
otherwise (0)  
Type of business activity Nature of economic activity undertaken = (1)  if trade related, otherwise (0) 
Business Establishment  MSE owner-manager‟s perception of the establishment 
of their business  
= (1) if perceived as established,  
otherwise (0) 
Business family background MSE owner-manager raised in a family which runs a 
business 
= (1) if raised in a business family, 
otherwise (0) 
 
There are four MSE performance-related hypotheses to be tested, reproduced here for 
convenience from chapter three:    
 
H1 MSEs with no access to either microcredit or BDS perform more poorly, 
 on owner-managers‟ self reported score of performance, compared  to 
 MSEs that have access to both microcredit and BDS. 
 
H2:  MSEs with access to microcredit without BDS perform more poorly, on 
 owner- managers‟ self reported score of performance, compared to MSEs 
 that have access to both microcredit and BDS. 
 
H3: MSEs with access to BDS without microcredit perform more poorly, on 
 owner- managers‟ self reported score of performance, compared to MSEs 
 that have access to both microcredit and BDS. 
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H4: MSEs that have access to either microcredit or BDS perform better, on 
 owner- managers‟ self reported score of performance, compared to MSEs 
 with access to  neither microcredit nor BDS.  
Note that H2 provides an „acid test‟ regarding the two competing logics, from a neo-
institutional perceptive, in the field of microfinance. These include both social and 
commercial logics as discussed in section 3.3.2 of chapter three. The other three 
hypotheses (H1, H3, and H4) test for the differential impact of access to cultural and or 
economic capital on MSE performance. 
 
For the purposes of testing the above hypotheses the notations in following table are 
used. 
Symbol (notation) Description 
P MSE‟s PerfScore 
BDS Access to business development services 
CDT Access to microcredit 
ε  Regression residual or error term 
 
7.2.2  Results of Testing Hypothesis 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The following table, Table 31a, presents descriptive statistics for variables included in 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression used to test Hypothesis 1. According to this 
Table, the mean normalised self-rated score on performance for participant MSE owner-
managers who do not use either microcredit or BDS is -3.15
42
 ( =4.08, sk=0.64) 
compared to a mean performance score of 2.01 (  =2.74, sk=-1.31) for participant 
MSE owner-managers who use both microcredit and BDS. This implies that on a 
univariate basis, businesses run by participant MSE owner-managers who use both 
microcredit and BDS are likely to report better performance scores than businesses 
belonging to participant MSE owner-managers who do not use either microcredit or 
BDS. The difference in self rated performance by participant MSE owner-managers in 
the two groups is highly significant (t-test = 6.69, p<0.001). 
 
In both participant categories, there are more males than females [57 per cent ( =0.49, 
sk=0.57) for participant MSE owner-managers who do not use microcredit or BDS and 
68 per cent (  =0.49, sk=0.51) for participant MSE owner-managers who use 
microcredit and BDS].  With a chi-square value of 0.11 and Pearson‟s score of 0.36, the 
difference in gender distribution between the two participant categories is not 
                                                 
42
  The negative sign against the beta value means that participant MSE owner-managers who have no 
access to microcredit or BDS are likely to experience declining self-rated performance for their 
enterprises, other factors held constant. 
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statistically significant. In terms of age, most of the participants are aged below 40 years 
with 79 per cent ( = 0.41, sk= -1.48) in the category of MSE owner-managers who do 
not use microcredit or BDS and 67 per cent (  = 0.48, sk= -0.73) in the category of 
participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS.  This difference is not 
significant (Ch
2
 = 1.51, p = 0.10). 
 
Pertaining to education, Table 31a shows that the majority (63 per cent,  =0.49,sk= 
0.57) of the participant MSE owner-managers who do not use microcredit or BDS have 
below tertiary level education, while 74 per cent (  = 0.45, sk =-1.12) of the participant 
MSE owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS have tertiary and above level 
education. The difference in education level among participant MSE owner-managers in 
these two categories is significant with a chi- square value of 11.08, at p<0.05. This 
means that participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS have 
relatively higher education than their counterparts who do not use either microcredit or 
BDS. 
 
The type of business activity for half (50 per cent, = 0.50,sk=0.00) of the participant 
MSE owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS is „other than trade‟ compared 
with 58 per cent (  =0.50, sk =0.33) of MSE owner-managers who use neither MFI nor 
BDS and this difference is not significant (Ch
2
 = 0.50, p = 0.23). In both participant 
categories there are few cases of participants raised in a business-family background. 
For example 84 per cent ( =0.37, sk =1.95) of the participant MSE owner-managers 
who do not use either microcredit or BDS did not come from a business family 
background. The same is true for a similarly high proportion (76 per cent) ( = 0.43, sk 
=1.23) of participant MSE owner-managers who use both microcredit and BDS. The 
observed difference in family background is not statistically significant (Ch
2
 = 0.80, p = 
0.37). On the basis of business growth, most of the businesses are viewed to be 
established (that is have been in operation for three years or more). This is the case for 
59 per cent ( = 0.50,sk= -0.40) of businesses run by participant MSE owner-managers 
who use microcredit and BDS, and for 55 per cent ( = 0.50,sk=0.22) of businesses 
belonging to participant MSE owner-managers who do not use either microcredit or 
BDS (Ch
2
 = 1.75, p = 0.09). 
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Table 31a: Descriptive statistics for variables included in testing Hypothesis 1 (N=80) 
 
 
Participant category  
 
 
T-test 
value 
 
 
 
 p 
value 
Users of neither microcredit nor BDS 
(n=38) Users of microcredit and BDS (n= 42) 
Mean SD Skewness Min  Max  Mean SD Skewness Min  Max  
Performance 
score -3.15 4.08 0.64 
-
9.24 5.84 2.01 2.74 -1.31 
-
6.03 5.55 6.69 0.000 
 
 
Mode 
(%)  
Mode 
(%)  
Chi- 
Square 
test 
value 
 
Age 
1 
(79%) 0.41 -1.48   
1  
(67%) 0.48 -0.73   
 
1.51 
 
0.104 
Gender  
0 
(68%) 0.49 0.57   
0 
(57%) 0.49 0.51   
 
0.11 
 
0.364 
Owner-
managers‟ 
education  
0 
(63%) 0.49 0.57   
1 
(74%) 0.45 -1.12   
 
11.08 
 
0.000 
Type of 
business 
activity  
0 
(42%) 0.50 0.33   
0 
(50%) 0.51 0.00   
 
0.50 
 
0.234 
Business 
establishment  
0 
(55%) 0.50 0.22   
1 
(59%) 0.50 -0.40   
 
1.75 
 
0.093 
Business-
family 
background 
0 
(84%) 0.37 1.95   
0 
(76%) 0.43 1.23   
 
0.80 
 
0.180 
Legend: BDS=Business development services; performance score = composite of sum of scores on growth in 
sales (TRA1_1), profit (TRA2_1), business savings (TRA3_1), cash flow (TRA4_1), and stock/service orders 
(TRA5_1); gender (1/0) = female; age (1/0) = aged below 40 years; education (1/0) = tertiary and above; type 
of business activity (1/0) = trade related; business establishment (1/0) = perceived as established (i.e. 
operational for three or more years); business family background (1/0) = raised in a business family. 
 
 
 
Correlation Coefficients for Variables Involved in Testing Hypothesis 1 
The following table, Table 31b, presents results of pair-wise Pearson‟s correlations 
between the nine variables entered into the OLS regression used to test the first 
hypothesis. The two participant categories included in testing Hypothesis 1 jointly 
constitute a total of 80 participant MSE owner-managers. According to the Table, 
generally there are low Pearson‟s correlations amongst all variables. The highest 
correlation recorded is between owner-managers level of education and participants‟ 
self-rated performance score (r = 0.320), which is significant at p<0.05, while the 
lowest correction reflected is -0.356. There is a strongly significant correlation, though 
negative, associated with belonging to the participant category of those who do not use 
either microcredit or BDS and the performance score (r = -0.46, sig. at p<0.001). 
Further the Table reveals significant correlations between performance scores and 
participants‟ general level of education (r =0.32, sig. at p<0.001).
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Table 31b: Pearson‟s correlations (Hypothesis 1) (N=80) 
 
 
Users of 
microcredit 
only 
Users of 
BDS only 
Use of both BDS 
and micro 
credit   
Neither users 
of credit nor 
BDS Gender Age 
Owner-man-
agers‟ education   
Type of 
business 
activity 
Business  
establishment 
 
 
Business-
family 
background 
Neither users of 
microcredit nor BDS 
-1.00
***
 -1.00
***
 -1.00
***
        
Gender -.085 .023 .052 .007       
Age -.043 -.035 -.035 .116 -.007      
Owner-managers‟ 
education 
-.122 .104 .218
***
 -.211
***
 .019 -.184
**
     
Type of business 
activity  
-.010 -.005 .052 -.039 .040 .010 .086    
Establishment of 
business 
-.066 .021 .106 -.066 -.113 -.249
***
 -.001 -.049   
Business-family 
background 
-.016 -.079 .110 -.016 -.027 .082 -.169
*
 -.078 .111  
Performance Score  0.01 0.12 0.31*** -0.46*** 0.12 0.05 0.32*** 0.10 0.10 -0.01 
***  sig. at p <0.001; **    sig at  p  <0.05; *      sig. at  p <0.10 
Legend: BDS=Business development services; performance score = composite of sum of scores on growth in sales (TRA1_1), profit (TRA2_1), business savings (TRA3_1), cash flow 
(TRA4_1), and stock/service orders (TRA5_1); gender (1/0) = female; age (1/0) = aged below 40 years; education (1/0) = tertiary and above; type of business activity (1/0) = trade 
related; business establishment (1/0) = perceived as established (i.e. operational for three or more years); business family background (1/0) = raised in a business family. 
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Regression results for Hypothesis 1 
 
The model used to test Hypothesis 1 is expressed as follows;  
 
Performance score = ƒ (access to microcredit and BDS, access to neither microcredit nor 
BDS, control variables). 
Where the Performance score and control variables are as described in section 7.2.1 of 
this chapter. 
 
Algebraically; P = a + β1CDTBDS + β2 NOCtBS + control variables + ε  
 
Testing Ho:   β1 = β2 =0; against Ha: β2< β1 
 
This test is carried out using an OLS regression procedure and results are presented in 
Table 31c.  Overall the results show that participant MSE owner-managers who are 
users of microcredit and BDS are likely to score higher on self-rated performance  
(beta =1.05, t =1.66, p<0.05) than participant MSE owner-managers who use neither 
microcredit nor BDS (beta =-3.43, t =-5.35, p<0.001), while controlling for factors 
likely to affect self-rated performance.  
 
Table 31c further shows that participants are likely to self-report higher performance 
results if they are aged above 40 years, and have an either tertiary or above tertiary level 
of education. These results are significant at p<0.05. Businesses run by female 
participant owner-managers are likely to be associated with higher self-rated 
performance compared with those of males (beta= 0.97, p<0.05). The results also show 
that participant businesses engaging in trade related activity are likely to record a 0.44 
increase in self-rated performance compared to those engaging in non trade business 
activities. This difference is however not significant at the 95 per cent confidence limit. 
The model has an R
2 
of 0.33 (SEE =3.21, N=80) and is significant (F = 9.37, p<0.001). 
 
In summary, testing for; Ho:   β1 = β2 =0; against Ha: β1< β2, the calculated F test
43
 of 
significance [used to distinguish the overall performance of the regression model and 
the relative contribution of its constituent variables (Gow, 2010)] statistic is 20.05, 
compared with a critical F table value of 3.00 (2,151 degrees of freedom). Given the 
                                                 
43
 The F value reported here is calculated from error sum of squares (ErrSS) for the regression residuals        
    of  both the restricted (variables relating to the two participant categories removed) and the unrestricted  
   (variables relating to the two participant categories entered) versions of the OLS regression. 
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fact that the observed F is greater than its critical value, the null hypothesis that 
participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS and those who use 
neither of the two services have no influence on MSE owner-managers‟ self-ratings of 
performance of their enterprises, is rejected.   With a β1 equal to -3.43 (t = -5.34, 
p<0.001) and β2 equal to 1.05 (t =1.66, p<0.05), β1< β2, the alternative hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 1) that participant MSE owner-managers who do not use microcredit and 
BDS perform more poorly on self- reported performance, compared to businesses 
belonging to participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS, holds  
and thus the evidence supports Hypothesis 1. Therefore from a Bourdieusian view, 
MSE owner managers with access to cultural and economic capital perceive themselves 
as better off (in MSE performance terms) compared to those without. 
Table 31c: Hypothesis 1- Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results (N=80) 
Variable  
Regression 
coefficient  
Standard 
error 
 
T-test p value 
        (Constant) -2.482 0.799 -3.105 0.001 
Users of  both microcredit and BDS  1.046 0.630 1.661 0.049 
Neither users of microcredit nor BDS -3.432 0.642 -5.349 0.000 
Age 1.467 0.583 2.517 0.006 
Gender 0.973 0.533 1.826 0.035 
Owner-managers‟ education 1.793 0.548 3.275 0.000 
Type of business activity  0.438 0.513 .854 0.190 
Business establishment 0.945 0.535 1.765 0.041 
Business-family background -0.143 0.702 -0.204 0.424 
R
2
= 0.34, Adjusted R
2
= 0.29, SEE= 3.21 
a. Dependent Variable: PerfScore =SUM(TRA1_1,TRA2_1,TRA3_1,TRA4_1,TRA5_1) 
Legend: BDS=Business development services; gender (1/0) = female; age (1/0) = aged below 40 years;   
              education (1/0) = tertiary and above; type of business activity (1/0) = trade related; business establishment  
              (1/0) = perceived as established (i.e. established for 3 years or more); business family background (1/0) = 
raised in a business family.             
 
7.2.3  Results of Testing Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis as specified in chapter three seeks to test whether participant 
MSE owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS (consumers of social logic driven 
microfinance) are likely to give a higher performance rating for their businesses 
compared to performance ratings of participant MSE owner-managers who use 
microcredit without BDS (consumers of commercial logic driven microfinance). 
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Starting with descriptive statistics, followed by correlation and regression analysis, the 
results of testing this hypothesis are as follows.  
 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 32a presents descriptive statistical comparisons of the two participant categories 
(i.e. participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS and those using 
microcredit without BDS) across the seven variables (see variable coding in previous 
section 7.2.1) entered in the OLS regression. According to this Table, participant MSE 
owner-managers who use microcredit  as well as BDS are likely to give a higher 
performance rating to their businesses ( xˉ =2.01,   =2.74,sk=-1.31) compared to 
participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit without BDS (xˉ =0.08,   
=3.32,sk =-0.30). The mean difference in self-rated performance scores between 
participants in the two categories is highly significant (t-test = 71.96, p<0.001).  
 
There are more participants aged below rather than above 40 years in the two 
participant categories with 66 per cent (  =0.48, sk = -0.69) reported among participant 
MSE owner-managers who use microcredit without BDS and 67 per cent (  =0.48,sk 
=-0.73) for their counterparts who used microcredit and BDS.  This difference is not 
significant (Ch
2
 = 0.007, p =0. 934). Although both categories have more male 
participants than females, there is no significant difference in gender distribution 
between the two participant categories (Ch
2
 =1.17, p =0.14). Male participants 
constitute 60 per cent (  =0.46,sk = 0.97) of the participant MSE owner-managers who 
use microcredit without BDS, and 57 per cent (  =0.49,sk =0.51) of the participant 
MSE owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS. 
 
Turning to education, Table 32a shows that of the 42 participant MSE owner-managers 
who use both microcredit and BDS, 74 per cent (  =0.0.45,sk =-1.12) have tertiary 
level education or higher. As for the participant MSE owner-managers who use 
microcredit without BDS, 55 per cent (  =0.50, sk =0.22) have below tertiary level 
education. Consequently, the difference in education levels among participants in these 
two categories is highly significant (Ch
2
 =7.03, p<0,001). Additionally there is a weakly 
significant difference (Ch
2
 =1.75, p<0.09) in the perceived level of establishment of 
their businesses between participants who use microcredit and BDS (established =59 
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per cent,  =0.50, sk =-0.40) and those who use microcredit without BDS (not-so 
established =55 per cent,  =0.50, sk =0.22). There is no significant difference in 
affiliation with a business family background between participants in the two 
categories. In both categories most participants do not come from families with a 
business orientation (84 per cent,  =0.37, sk =1.95; and 75 per cent,  =0.43, sk 
=1.23), for participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit without BDS and 
their counterparts who use microcredit and BDS respectively.  
 
From the foregoing univariate analysis it appears that the significant difference in self-
rated performance between participants‟ businesses in the two participant categories 
could be attributed to (among other factors) differences in levels of education and age 
amongst participants. As already stated in the chapter on research method (chapter four) 
and in section 7.2.1 above, these variables are among key control variables used in the 
four perceived MSE performance related hypotheses tests of this study. 
 
Correlation Coefficients for Variables Involved in Testing Hypothesis 2 
 
Pair-wise Pearson‟s correlations results for the nine variables entered into the regression 
appear in Table 32b. In total the two participant categories included in testing 
Hypothesis 2 comprise 80 participant MSE owner-managers. In general most of the 
Pearson‟s correlations are low, implying minimal shared variance between the 
variables. It is important to note that there is a significant medium-sized correlation 
between self-rated performance scores by participant MSE owner-managers and the use 
of microcredit and BDS. Use of microcredit without BDS, and Owner-managers‟ 
education (at p<0.001; r =.306, -.306, and 0.312, respectively). There are also weakly 
significant inverse correlations between; owner-managers‟ education and use of credit 
without BDS; and perceived establishment of the business and age of the owner 
manager. In the first instance, participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit 
without BDS are also likely to be in the class of those with below tertiary level 
education (r =0.296, p<0.05).  In the second case with a Pearson‟s correlation of -0.255 
(p<0.05), participant owner- managers‟ aged below 40 years are likely to rate their 
businesses as not-so well established. Overall the low correlations reported in Table 
32b, indicate low chance of shared variance amongst most of the variables.  
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   Table 32a: Descriptive statistics for variables included in testing Hypothesis 2 (N=80) 
 
 
 
Participant category  
 
 
T-test 
value 
 
 
 
 p 
value 
Users of  microcredit without BDS (n=38) Users of microcredit and BDS (n= 42) 
Mean SD Skewness Min  Max  Mean SD Skewness Min  Max  
Performance score 0.08 3.32 -0.30 -6.21 5.57 2.01 2.74 -1.31 -6.03 5.55 2.84 0.006 
 
 
Mode 
(%)  
Mode 
(%)  
Chi- 
Square test 
value 
 
Age  
1 
(66%) 0.48 -0.69   
1  
(67%) 0.48 -0.73   
 
0.01 
 
0.943 
Gender  
0 
(60%) 0.46 0.97   
0 
(57%) 0.49 0.51   
 
1.17 
 
0.140 
Owner-managers‟ 
education  
0 
(55%) 0.50 0.22   
1 
(74%) 0.45 -1.12   
 
7.03 
 
0.004 
Type of business 
activity  
0 
(55%) 0.50 0.22   
0 
(50%) 0.51 0.00   
 
0.22 
 
0.314 
Business 
establishment  
0 
(55%) 0.50 0.22   
1 
(59%) 0.50 -0.40   
 
1.75 
 
0.093 
Business-family 
background 
0 
(84%) 0.37 1.95   
0 
(76%) 0.43 1.23   
 
0.80 
 
0.185 
Legend: BDS=Business development services; performance score = composite of sum of scores on growth in sales (TRA1_1), profit (TRA2_1), business 
savings (TRA3_1), cash flow (TRA4_1), and stock/service orders (TRA5_1); gender (1/0) = female; age (1/0) = aged below 40 years; education (1/0) = 
tertiary and above; type of business activity (1/0) = trade related; business establishment (1/0) = perceived as established (i.e. operational for three or 
more years); business family background (1/0) = raised in a business family. 
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  Table 32b: Pearson‟s correlations (Hypothesis 2) (N=80) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
Performance 
score 
Use of both 
BDS and 
microcredit  
Users of 
microcredit 
without 
BDS Gender Age 
Owner-
managers‟ 
education 
Type of 
Business 
activity 
Establishment 
of business 
Use of both BDS and microcredit  .306***               
Users of microcredit without 
BDS -.306*** -1.00***             
Gender .096 .121 -.121           
Age .037 .009 -.009 -.025         
Owner-managers‟ education .312*** .296** -.296** .011 -.151       
Type of business activity .040 .053 -.053 .089 -.151 .061     
Establishment of business .203* .148 -.148 -.142 -.255** -.010 -.053   
Business-family background -.004 .100 -.100 -.105 .093 -.102 -.225** .163 
*** sig. at p <0.001; **  sig at  p  <0.05; *    sig. at  p <0.10 
Legend: BDS=Business development services; performance score = composite of sum of scores on growth in sales (TRA1_1), profit (TRA2_1), business savings 
(TRA3_1), cash flow (TRA4_1), and stock/service orders (TRA5_1); gender (1/0) = female; age (1/0) = aged below 40 years; education (1/0) = tertiary and above; 
type of business activity (1/0) = trade related; business establishment (1/0) = perceived as established (i.e. operational for three or more years); business family 
background (1/0) = raised in a business family. 
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Regression results for Hypothesis 2 
 
The second regression can be expressed as follows;  
Performance score = ƒ (access to microcredit and BDS,  
   access to microcredit without BDS, control variables). 
Where the Performance score and control variables are as described in section 7.2.1 of this 
chapter. 
 
Algebraically;  P = a + β1CDTBDS +  β2CDTex + control variables +  ε 
 
Testing Ho:   β1 = β2 =0; against Ha: β2< β1 
 
This test is carried out using an OLS procedure and results are presented in following Table 
32c.  
 
Table 32c: Hypothesis 2- Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results (N=80) 
 
Variable  
Regression 
coefficient  
Standard 
error 
 
t-test p value 
         (Constant) -4.302 0.881 -4.884 0.000 
Use of both BDS and 
microcredit  2.508 0.678 3.698 0.000 
Users of microcredit without 
BDS 1.542 0.684 2.255 0.013 
Age 1.335 0.626 2.135 0.017 
Gender 1.000 0.573 1.745 0.042 
Owner-managers‟ education 2.268 0.584 3.887 0.000 
Business activity  0.465 0.551 .844 0.200 
Business establishment 1.061 0.576 1.843 0.033 
Business-family background -0.135 0.753 -0.180 0.429 
R
2
= 0.23, Adjusted R
2
= 0.20, SEE= 3.43 
a. Dependent Variable: PerfScore =SUM(TRA1_1,TRA2_1,TRA3_1,TRA4_1,TRA5_1) 
Legend: BDS=Business development services; performance score = composite of sum of 
scores on growth in sales (TRA1_1), profit (TRA2_1), business savings (TRA3_1), cash flow 
(TRA4_1), and stock/service orders (TRA5_1); gender (1/0) = female; age (1/0) = aged below 
40 years; education (1/0) = tertiary and above; type of business activity (1/0) = trade 
related; business establishment (1/0) = perceived as established (i.e. operational for three 
or more years); business family background (1/0) = raised in a business family. 
 
The results show that participant MSE owner-managers who use both microcredit and BDS are 
likely to report higher self-rated performance scores for their businesses (beta = 2.51, t = 3.70, 
p<0.001) compared to participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit without BDS 
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(beta= 1.54, t= 2.26, p<0.05). However belonging to either of these two participant categories 
has a positive association with self-rated performance.  
 
Participant MSE owner-managers‟ level of education has a highly significant influence on self-
rated performance. For example, participant owner-managers with tertiary level and above 
education are likely to perceive higher self-rated performance of their businesses compared to 
those with below tertiary level education (beta =2.27, t = 3.89, p<0.001). Other variables 
contributing to significant differential self-rated performance scores include; age, gender and 
perceived business establishment. Participant MSE owner-managers aged below 40 years 
(young adults) are likely to perceive higher self-rated scores on the performance of their 
businesses compared to their older (above 40 years of age) counterparts (beta=1.34, t = 2.14, 
p<0.05). In addition female participant MSE owner-managers are more likely to rate the 
perceived performance of their businesses higher than their male colleagues (beta= 1.00, t = 
1.75, p<05). Owner- managers with high perceptions on the stability of their businesses are 
likely to report higher scores on self-rated performance of their businesses compared to 
participant MSE owner-managers who perceive their businesses as less established (beta=1.06, 
t = 1.84, p<0.5). With a R
2 
of 0.23 (SEE =3.43, N=80) the present model explains 23 per cent 
of the observed variations in self-rated performance scores among businesses of participant 
MSE owner-managers. The model is statistically significant (F = 5.67, p<0.001).  
 
Given the results above, testing for Ho:   β1 = β2 =0; against Ha: β2< β1, the observed value of F 
is 7.53, which exceeds the critical F table value of 3.00 at (df; 2,151). In light of this, the null 
hypothesis that each of the regression coefficients of the two participant categories is equal to 
zero does not hold. Further given that β1=2.51 (t=3.70, p<0.001) while β2=1.54 (t=2.26, 
p<0.05), β2 is less than β1. It is therefore concluded that performance scores for businesses 
belonging to participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit without BDS, perform 
more poorly (on owner-managers‟ self- reported score of performance) compared to businesses 
belonging to participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS. The result is in 
support of Hypothesis 2. This result means that, from a Bourdieusian perspective, MSEs 
belonging to owner managers who concurrently have access to both economic and cultural 
capital enjoy a synergistic benefit compared to MSEs belonging to owner managers with access 
to economic capital singly. The implication of this result is that of the two competing logics in 
microfinancing, social logic driven microfinance is a better approach compared to a 
commercial approach. 
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7.2.4  Results of Testing Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis on MSE performance as formulated in Chapter three tests whether self-
rated performance scores for businesses belonging to participant MSE owner-managers in 
receipt of BDS without microcredit, are lower than those of businesses run by participant MSE 
owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS. Pair-wise comparisons of descriptive results 
for the nine variables (see section 7.2.1 of this chapter for details on variable measures) entered 
into the OLS regression are presented in Table 33a. The results reflect that participant MSE 
owner-managers in receipt of microcredit and BDS are likely to report higher self-rated 
performance for their businesses (xˉ =2.01,   =2.74, sk =-1.31) compared to participant MSE 
owner-managers in receipt of BDS without microcredit (xˉ =0.77,   =3.19, sk =-0.60). The 
difference in the mean self-rated performance scores between the two participant categories is 
significant at p<0. 05 (t-test =1.91). 
 
The distribution of participant age is even across the two participant categories (67 per cent for 
participants aged below 40 years). There is also a weakly significant difference between the 
two participant categories on the basis of participants‟ affiliations to business-family 
background (Chi
2
 =2.03, p<0.10).  
 
Table 33a further shows that between participant MSE owner managers who use BDS without 
microcredit and those who use microcredit and BDS, there are no significant differences either 
on gender or owner-managers‟ education (Ch2 =0.05, p =0.41; Ch2 =0.89, p =0.17, 
respectively). In both participant categories however, there are more male participants than 
females, 69 per cent (  =0.49, sk =0.51) for users of BDS without microcredit and 57 per cent 
(  =0.49, sk =0.51) for users of microcredit and BDS.  Most participant MSE owner-managers 
have a tertiary level education. This is the case for 74 per cent (  =0.45, sk =-1.12) of 
participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of microcredit and BDS, and 64 per cent (  =0.49, 
sk =-0.62) of participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS without microcredit.  Similarly 
no significant differences are observed in perceptions on the state of establishment of 
participants‟ businesses between participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS without 
microcredit and those who use both (Ch
2
 =0.44, p =0.25). 
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  Table 33a: Descriptive statistics for variables included in testing Hypothesis 3 (N=84) 
 
Participant category  
 
 
T-test value 
 
 
p value 
 
Users of  BDS without microcredit 
microcredit(n=42) Users of microcredit and BDS (n= 42) 
Mean SD Skewness Min  Max  Mean SD Skewness Min  Max  
Performance score 0.77 3.19 -0.60 -6.82 6.03 2.01 2.74 -1.31 -6.03 5.55 1.91 0.030 
 
 
Mode 
(%)  
Mode 
(%)  
Chi- Square 
test value 
 
Age 
1 
(67%) 0.48 -0.73   
1  
(67%) 0.48 -0.73   
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
Gender  
0 
(69%) 0.49 0.51   
0 
(57%) 0.49 0.51   
 
0.05 
 
0.411 
Owner-managers‟ education 
1 
(64%) 0.49 -0.62   
1 
(74%) 0.45 -1.12   
 
0.89 
 
0.172 
Type of business activity  
0 
(55%) 0.50 0.20   
0 
(50%) 0.51 0.00   
 
0.19 
 
0.331 
Business establishment  
1 
(52%) 0.50 -0.10   
1 
(59%) 0.50 -0.40   
 
0.44 
 
0.250 
Business-family background 
0 
(88%) 0.33 2.44   
0 
(76%) 0.43 1.23   
 
2.03 
 
0.072 
 
  Table 33b: Pearson‟s correlations (Hypothesis 3) (N=84) 
   
Users of 
microcredit and 
BDS  
Users of BDS 
only Gender Age  
Owner-
managers‟ 
education 
Type of 
business 
activity 
Establishment 
of business 
Business-
family 
background 
Users of BDS only -1.000***        
Gender .024 -.024       
Age  .000 .000 -.052      
Owner-managers‟ education .103 -.103 .011 -.091     
Type of business activity .048 -.048 .063 .118 -.032    
Establishment of business .072 -.072 -.072 -.220** -.075 -.114   
Business-family background .155 -.155 .070 .132 -.091 -.196 .038  
Performance score .206 -.206 .090 .187 .118 .208 .096 .053 
*** sig. at p<0.001; ** sig at p<0.05 Legend: BDS=Business development services; performance score = composite of sum of scores on growth in sales (TRA1_1), profit 
(TRA2_1), business savings (TRA3_1), cash flow (TRA4_1), and stock/service orders (TRA5_1); gender (1/0) = female; age (1/0) = aged below 40 years; education (1/0) = 
tertiary and above; type of business activity (1/0) = trade related; business establishment (1/0) = perceived as established (i.e. operational for three or more years); business 
family background (1/0) = raised in a business family. 
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Correlation Coefficients for Variables Involved in Testing Hypothesis 3 
 
Results of bivariate Pearson‟s correlations among the nine variables entered in the OLS 
regression for Hypothesis 3 are presented in Table 33b. The dataset used to examine the 
correlations constitutes participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS without 
microcredit and participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit as well as BDS 
(the two participant categories of interest in Hypothesis 3). In total there are 84 
participant MSE owner-managers in these two categories. 
 
Except for the correlation (r = -1.00, p<0.001) between the two variables representing 
participant categories (i.e. users of BDS without microcredit and users of microcredit 
and BDS), overall there are small correlations (Pearson‟s r < 0.29) between all variables 
(Cohen, 1988). The highest Pearson‟s correlation recorded is 0.208 between participant 
owner-managers‟ self-rated performance scores for their businesses and the type of 
business activity undertaken. This is however not found to be significant. There is 
virtually no correlation between participants‟ age and either use of BDS without 
microcredit or use of BDS with microcredit (r =0.001). 
 
As previously noted (see Table 32b) there is a small, significant correlation between 
participants‟ age and the perceived state of establishment of their businesses (r =-0.22, 
p<0.05). Although previously participant MSE owner-managers‟ education was seen to 
be significantly correlated with perceived self-rated performance of their businesses 
(see Table 32b), this is not the case for the current categories of participants (r =0.118, 
p>0.05). 
 
Regression results for testing Hypothesis 3 
 
In this section the test hypothesis is that MSEs with access to BDS without microcredit 
are likely to perform more poorly (on owner-managers‟ self reported score of 
performance), compared to MSEs that have access to microcredit and BDS. The OLS 
regression carried out can be expressed as follows;  
 
Performance score = ƒ (access to microcredit with BDS, access to BDS without 
microcredit, control variables). 
Where the Performance score and control variables are as described in section 7.2.1 of 
this chapter. 
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Algebraically; P = a + β1CDTBDS + β2 BDSex + control variables + ε 
 
Testing Ho:   β1 = β3 =0; against Ha: β3< β1 
 
Test results are presented in the following Table 33c.  
 
Table 33c: Hypothesis 3- Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results (N=84) 
 
Variable  
Regression 
coefficient  
Standard 
error 
 
T-test p value 
         (Constant) -4.023 0.835 -4.819 0.000 
Use of both microcredit  and 
BDS  2.777 0.697 3.982 0.000 
Use of BDS without 
microcredit  1.810 0.673 2.691 0.004 
Age 1.206 0.619 1.949 0.026 
Gender 0.817 0.568 1.439 0.076 
Owner-managers‟ education 1.875 0.589 3.181 0.001 
Type of business activity  0.482 0.547 0.882 0.189 
Business establishment 0.862 0.572 1.507 0.067 
Business-family background -0.080 0.748 -0.107 0.457 
R
2
= 0.24, Adjusted R
2
= 0.20, SEE= 3.42 
a. Dependent Variable: PerfScore =SUM(TRA1_1,TRA2_1,TRA3_1,TRA4_1,TRA5_1) 
Legend: BDS=Business development services; performance score = composite of sum of 
scores on growth in sales (TRA1_1), profit (TRA2_1), business savings (TRA3_1), cash flow 
(TRA4_1), and stock/service orders (TRA5_1); gender (1/0) = female; age (1/0) = aged below 
40 years; education (1/0) = tertiary and above; type of business activity (1/0) = trade 
related; business establishment (1/0) = perceived as established (i.e. operational for three 
or more years); business family background (1/0) = raised in a business family. 
 
From the results presented in Table 33c, it appears that participant MSE owner-
managers who use microcredit and BDS are more likely to report higher self-rated 
performance  scores (beta =2.78, t= 3.98, p<0.001) for their businesses, compared to 
participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS without microcredit (beta =1.81, t= 
2.69, p<0.05). Again MSE owner-managers who belong to either of these two 
participant categories are likely to report a positive self-rated performance score for 
their enterprises. This result is consistent with previous results presented in section 
7.2.3. 
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Owner managers‟ education is once again found to have a strong significant association 
with self-rated performance on participant MSE owner-managers‟ businesses (beta 
=1.88, t =3.18, p<0.05). Being a binary variable, the positive regression coefficient for 
education implies that participant MSE owner-managers who have tertiary or higher 
level education are likely to report higher self-rated performance scores for their 
businesses than their counterparts with below tertiary level education.   
 
As noted in the previous section, younger adult participant MSE owner-managers (aged 
below 40 years) are more likely to register higher self-rated performance ratings for 
their businesses (beta =1.21, t = 1.95, p<0.05) than the older (aged above 40 years) 
participant MSE owner-managers. Table 33c further reveals that participant MSE 
owner-managers who engage in trade are likely to report higher self-rated performance 
for their businesses than their counterparts who are engaged in non-trade business 
activity. The difference is however not statistically significant (beta =0.48, t = 0.88, p 
=0.19). Additionally participant MSE owner-managers who perceive their business as 
established are more likely to report higher self-rated performance for their businesses 
(beta =0.86, t = 1.51, p =0.07) than those who perceive their businesses as less 
established. 
 
In general besides access to microcredit and/or BDS, the only other variables that have 
a significant influence on self-rated performance of participants‟ businesses (for the 
current categories of participants), are owner managers‟ level of education, age, and 
perceived state of establishment of participants‟ businesses. The R2 for the present 
model is equal to 0.24 (SEE =3.42, N= 84). The model is statistically significant with an 
F = 6.01 at p<0.001.  
 
Given the results above, testing for Ho:   β1 = β3 =0; against Ha: β3< β1: reveals a F-test 
statistic of 8.68, compared with a critical value of 3.00 from the F– distribution with 
(2,151) degrees of freedom at 95 per cent confidence. Since the F-test statistic of 8.68 
exceeds that critical value of 3.00, the null hypothesis that each of the regression 
coefficients of the two participant categories is equal to zero is rejected. Consequently 
given that β3 has an observed value of 1.81, compared to β1 with an observed value of 
2.77, β3< β1, it is therefore concluded that the alternative hypothesis, Hypothesis 3, that 
participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS without microcredit are likely to report 
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lower self-rated performance for their businesses than their counterparts who use 
microcredit and BDS, holds. Further in Bourdieu‟s words it appears that combined 
provision of cultural and economic capital is likely to lead to better perceived MSE 
performance than supply of cultural capital on its own. 
 
7.2.5  Results of Testing Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 is the last hypothesis dealing with MSE performance. The Hypothesis 
examines whether self-rated performance scores for businesses belonging to participant 
MSE owner-managers in receipt of either BDS or microcredit are higher than 
participant MSE owner-managers who use neither microcredit nor BDS. Pair-wise 
comparisons of descriptive results for the ten variables (see section 7.2.1 of this chapter 
for details on variable measures) entered into the OLS regression appear in Table 34a. 
 
According to the Table, participant MSE owner-managers who do not use either 
microcredit or BDS are likely to report lower self-rated performance (xˉ =-3.15,   
=4.08, sk =0.64) for their businesses compared with participant MSE owner-managers 
who use either BDS or microcredit (xˉ =1.39,   =3.02, sk =-0.90 and  xˉ =1.10,   
=3.16, sk =-0.75, respectively). In both cases the difference in self-rated performance 
scores amongst participant MSE owner-managers is highly significant (t = -6.14, 
p<0.001 and t =5.66, p<0.001, respectively). 
 
Further the Table reveals that there are significant differences between participant MSE 
owner-managers in receipt of either BDS or microcredit, and their counterparts in 
receipt of neither BDS nor microcredit with regard to Age and Education (Ch
2
 =2.86, 
p<0.05 and Ch
2
 =4.37, p<0.05 respectively for Age; Ch
2
 =11.22, p<0.001 and Ch
2
 
=0.54, p<0.05 respectively for Education). Across the three participant categories, most 
participants are aged below 40 years. However there are more cases of participant MSE 
owner-managers with tertiary level and above education in the category of users of BDS 
(69 per cent,  = 0.47, sk =-0.84) and the category of users of microcredit (60 per 
cent,  = 0.49, sk =-0.42), compared to the category of users of neither microcredit nor 
BDS where most (63 per cent,  = 0.49, sk =-0.57) participant MSE owner-managers 
have below tertiary level education.  
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The other variables reported in Table 34a do not reveal any significant differences 
amongst participants within the three categories. In general across the three participant 
categories, there are more cases of male participants than females (60 per cent, 65 per 
cent and 68 per cent for users of neither BDS, users of microcredit and users of neither 
microcredit nor BDS respectively). In addition the business activity for most of the 
participant MSE owner-managers across the three participant categories, is non-trade 
related (52 per cent for each of the categories of users of BDS and users of microcredit, 
and 57 per cent for the category of users of neither microcredit nor BDS). Table 34a 
also shows that most participant MSE owner-managers who are either users of BDS or 
microcredit perceive their businesses as established (56 per cent and 52 per cent 
respectively) while a majority (55 per cent) of participant MSE owner-managers who 
are neither users of BDS nor microcredit perceive their businesses as not so established. 
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 Table 34a: Descriptive statistics for variables included in testing Hypothesis 4 (N=118) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Participant category  
 
 
T-test value 
  
p value 
 
Users of  BDS (n=84) Users of neither microcredit  nor BDS (n=38) 
Mean SD Skewness Min  Max  Mean SD Skewness Min  Max  
Performance index score 1.39 3.02 -0.90 -6.82 6.03 -3.15 4.08 0.64 -9.24 5.84 -6.14 0.000 
 
 Mode   Mode  Chi- Square test value  
Age 1 
(66%) 
0.47 -0.72   1 
(79%) 
0.41 -1.48 1 
(79%) 
0.41  
2.86 
 
0.044 
Gender 0 
(60%) 
0.49 0.45   0 
(68%) 
0.49 0.57 0 
(68%) 
0.49  
0.07 
 
0.393 
Owner-managers‟ education 1 
(69%) 
0.47 -0.84   0 
(63%) 
0.49 0.57 0 
(63%) 
0.49  
11.22 
 
0.001 
Type of business activity  0 
(52%) 
0.50 0.10   0 
(57%) 
0.50 0.33 0 
(42%) 
0.50  
0.32 
 
0.280 
Business establishment  1 
(56%) 
0.50 -0.24   0 
(55%) 
0.50 0.22 0 
(55%) 
0.50  
1.32 
 
0.122 
Business-family background 0 
(82%) 
0.39 1.71   0 
(84%) 
0.37 1.95 0 
(84%) 
0.37  
0.07 
 
0.394 
 
 Participant category  
 
 
T-test value 
 
p value 
 
Users of   microcredit (n=80) Users of neither  microcredit nor BDS (n=38) 
Mean SD Skewness Min  Max   
Performance index score 1.10 3.16 -0.75 -6.21 5.57 -5.66 0.000 
 
 Mode (%)   Chi- Square test value  
Age 1 
(66%) 
0.48 -0.70   4.37 0.012 
Gender 0 
(65%) 
0.48 0.64   0.04 0.422 
Owner-managers‟ education  1 
(60%) 
0.49 -0.42   5.54 0.008 
Type of business activity  0 
(52%) 
0.50 0.10   0.30 0.291 
Business establishment  1 
(52%) 
0.50 -0.10   0.62 0.210 
Business-family background 0 
(80%) 
0.40 1.53   0.30 0.291 
Legend: BDS=Business development services; performance score = composite of sum of scores on growth in sales (TRA1_1), profit (TRA2_1), business savings (TRA3_1), cash flow (TRA4_1), and 
stock/service orders (TRA5_1); gender (1/0) = female; age (1/0) = aged below 40 years; education (1/0) = tertiary and above; type of business activity (1/0) = trade related; business establishment (1/0) = 
perceived as established (i.e. operational for three or more years); business family background (1/0) = raised in a business family. 
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 Table 34b: Pearson‟s correlations (Hypothesis 4) (N=118) 
 
 
Gender Age 
Owner-
managers‟ 
education 
Type of 
business 
activity 
Establishment 
of business 
Business-
family 
background 
Users of 
microcredit 
without BDS 
Users of 
BDS 
without 
microcredit  
Neither users 
of credit nor 
BDS 
Age .045         
Owner-managers‟ education .030 -.215**        
Type of business activity -.038 .053 .117       
Establishment of business -.123 -.275*** -.018 -.092      
Business-family background -.046 .055 -.259*** .025 .093     
Users of microcredit without 
BDS 
-.084 -.069 -.061 .009 -.038 .027    
Users of BDS without 
microcredit  
.052 -.060 .225** .018 .073 -.053 -.512***   
Neither users of credit nor BDS .030 .130 -.170 -.027 -.038 .027 -.475*** -.512***  
Performance score .147 .057 .280*** .121 .049 -.040 .142 .283*** -.432*** 
*** sig. at p<0.001; ** sig at p<0.05; * sig. at p<0.1 
Legend: BDS=Business development services; performance score = composite of sum of scores on growth in sales (TRA1_1), profit (TRA2_1), business savings 
(TRA3_1), cash flow (TRA4_1), and stock/service orders (TRA5_1); gender (1/0) = female; age (1/0) = aged below 40 years; education (1/0) = tertiary and above; type of 
business activity (1/0) = trade related; business establishment (1/0) = perceived as established (i.e. operational for three or more years); business family background 
(1/0) = raised in a business family 
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Correlation Coefficients for Variables Involved in Testing Hypothesis 4 
 
Results of pair-wise Pearson‟s correlations among the ten variables entered in the OLS 
regression for Hypothesis 4 appear in Table 34b. These results are generated from the 
sample of 118 cases of participant MSE owner-managers who are users of either BDS 
or microcredit (n=80) and participant MSE owner-managers who use neither 
microcredit nor BDS (n=38). In general there are insignificant, low correlations 
amongst most of the variables. Though significant, Pearson‟s correlations between 
variables representing participant categories are modest. Correlations amongst these 
variables range from -0.475 to -0.512 once again with negative signs confirming that 
these are mutually exclusive participant categories.  
 
Table 34b further shows a significant modest negative correlation between self-rated 
performance and the lack of use of microcredit and BDS (r =-0.432, p<0.001).  There is 
however a small, positive significant correlation between self-rated performance and 
use of BDS without microcredit (r =0.283, p<0.001). Amongst all the other seven 
variables the largest Pearson‟s correlation recorded is 0.280 between participant MSE 
owner-managers‟ education and self-rated performance of their businesses, which is 
significant at p<0.001. The lowest correlation in the latter group of variables is 0.018.  
 
It is important to note that the correlations between participant MSE owner-managers‟ 
age and perceptions on the state of establishment of their businesses (r =-.275, p<0.001) 
is significant. This implies that participants, who perceive their businesses as 
established, are unlikely to be young adults (aged below 40 years). In addition 
participants who are raised in a business-family background are unlikely to hold tertiary 
level education and above (r =-0.295, p<0.001). Overall the Pearson‟s correlations in 
Table 24b are low and therefore present minimal problems with multicollinearity.  
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Regression results for Hypothesis 4 
 
In this section the Hypothesis being tested (4) is that MSE owner-managers with access 
to either BDS or microcredit are likely to perform better, on owner-managers‟ self 
reported score of performance, compared to participant MSE owner-managers who 
have access to neither microcredit nor BDS. The OLS regression undertaken in this 
regard is expressed as follows;  
 
Performance score = ƒ (access to BDS, access to microcredit,  
   access to neither microcredit nor BDS, control variables). 
Where the Performance score and control variables are as described in section 7.2.1 of 
this chapter. 
 
Algebraically; P= a + β1 BDS + β2CDT + β3 NOCtBS +control variables + ε 
 
Testing Ho:   β1 = β2= β3= 0; against Ha: (β1: β2)>β3  
 
The following table, Table 24c, presents the OLS test results for the fourth hypothesis.  
 
Table 34c: Hypothesis 4- Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results (N=160) 
  
Variable  
Regression 
coefficient  
Standard 
error 
T-test 
p value 
         (Constant) -3.520 1.064 -3.307 0.000 
Users of BDS  1.133 0.751 1.509 0.056 
Users of  microcredit  0.976 0.711 1.373 0.086 
Neither users of microcredit 
nor BDS -2.376 1.028 -2.312 0.011 
Age 1.461 0.586 2.494 0.007 
Gender 0.964 0.536 1.799 0.037 
Owner-managers‟ education 1.776 0.555 3.197 0.001 
Type of business activity  0.439 0.515 0.853 0.197 
Business establishment 0.936 0.539 1.737 0.042 
Business-family background -0.141 0.704 -0.199 0.421 
R
2
= 0.33, Adjusted R
2
= 0.29, SEE= 3.22 
a. Dependent Variable: PerfScore =SUM(TRA1_1,TRA2_1,TRA3_1,TRA4_1,TRA5_1) 
Legend: BDS=Business development services; performance score = composite of sum of scores 
on growth in sales (TRA1_1), profit (TRA2_1), business savings (TRA3_1), cash flow (TRA4_1), and 
stock/service orders (TRA5_1); gender (1/0) = female; age (1/0) = aged below 40 years; education 
(1/0) = tertiary and above; type of business activity (1/0) = trade related; business establishment 
(1/0) = perceived as established (i.e. operational for three or more years); business family 
background (1/0) = raised in a business family.          
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The OLS results appearing in Table 34c suggest that amongst the three participant 
categories used in testing Hypothesis 4, participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS 
without microcredit are likely to report higher self-rated scores on the performance of 
their businesses (beta =1.13, t =1.51, p<0.10) compared to participant MSE owner-
managers who use microcredit without BDS (beta =0.98, t =1.37, p<0.10) and those 
who use neither of the two services (beta =-2.38, t =-2.31, p<0.05). With the exception 
of the latter, these results display weak significance. From this result, it appears that 
MSE owner managers with access to only cultural capital (BDS) compared to their 
counterparts with access to economic capital (microcredit) only, are likely to report 
higher performance for their enterprises. 
 
The other variables which the results show to have a significant influence on self-rated 
performance scores by participant MSE owner-managers include participant MSE 
owner-managers‟ age (beta =1.46, t =2.49, p<0.05), gender (beta =0.96, t =1.80, 
p<0.05), education (beta =1.78, t =3.20, p<0.05), and perceived establishment of the 
business (beta =0.94, t =1.74, p<0.05). The above result implies that participant MSE 
owner managers; aged below 40 years, female, who perceive their businesses as 
established and who hold tertiary level education and above, are more likely than 
otherwise to record higher self rated performance of their businesses. This observation 
is in part consistent with previous results for these variables (see results in sections 7.2.3 
and 7.2.4). The present model is significant (F = 8.28, p<0.001) with R
2 
equal to 0.33 
(SEE =3.22, N=118).  
 
With the result presented above testing for Ho:   β1 = β2= β3= 0; against Ha: (β1: 
β2)>β3, the value of F equal 13.39. The critical value of F as per the distribution table at 
(df; 3,151) is 2.60. Given that the observed value of F is greater than the critical value, 
the null hypothesis that self-rated performance scores by participant MSE owner-
managers in receipt of either BDS or microcredit are not only equal to the self-rated 
performance scores by participant MSE owner-managers who do not use either BDS or 
microcredit, but also equal to zero, is rejected. Further it is observed that the beta 
coefficients for the participant MSE who use either BDS or microcredit are greater than 
the beta for their counterparts who use neither microcredit nor BDS (β1 = 1.13, β2= 
0.98, β3= -2.38).  Given the fact that the value of β3 (-2.38) is significant at p<0.05 the 
alternative hypothesis that participant MSE owner-managers who use either BDS or 
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microcredit are likely to record higher self-rated performance scores than participant 
MSE owner-managers who use neither of the two services, holds and supports 
Hypothesis 4. Therefore for MSE owner managers, as Bourdieu would have it, access to 
either cultural or economic capital has potential to improve the performance of their 
enterprises compared to those with access to neither. 
 
7.3  Implications of test results for Hypotheses dealing with MSE performance 
The main purpose for conducting tests of the hypotheses above is to assess the 
perceived significance of BDS and microcredit to the performance of micro and small 
enterprises. The test results pertaining to Hypotheses 1 and 4 appear to suggest that, as 
expected, businesses that belong to participant MSE owner-managers who do not use 
either BDS or microcredit are likely to be worse off in terms of self-rated performance 
than otherwise. This observation may be as a result of two primary reasons. Firstly it is 
likely that businesses run by participant MSE owner-managers who use neither BDS 
nor microcredit are newly established. This is confirmed by the significant univariate 
results (see Table 12a) which show that most participant MSE owner-managers who use 
neither BDS nor microcredit are younger than their counterparts. 
 
Secondly it appears that the participant MSE owner-managers who do not use either 
BDS or microcredit lack the skills necessary to operate a business as successfully as 
their peers who do access these resources. As seen previously (Table 12a)  most of the 
participants in the former category have less than tertiary level education, a factor that 
has a highly significant impact on the self-rated performance scores of participant MSE 
owner-managers‟ businesses in the multivariate analyses (see Tables 31c; 32c; 33c; and 
34c). 
 
Hypothesis test results further reveal that businesses belonging to participant MSE 
owner-managers who use either BDS or microcredit are significantly better off than 
their counterparts who use neither of the two services, in terms of self-rated 
performance (see Table 24c). However compared to businesses belonging to participant 
MSE owner-managers who use both BDS and microcredit, self-rated performance of 
businesses belonging to participant MSE owner-managers who use either BDS or 
microcredit is less impressive. This implies that businesses whose owner-managers use 
BDS and microcredit (i.e. have access to both cultural and economic forms of capital) 
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enjoy an additional, complementary benefit over and above the benefits that accrue 
from using either BDS or microcredit singly.    From a neo-institutional perspective it 
appears that a social logic driven approach to microfinancing, which integrates 
provision of BDS and microcredit, is a better approach (in terms of perceived MSE 
performance) than a commercial one. This is more pronounced if microfinancing is seen 
as an anti-poverty mechanism. 
 
From a Bourdieusian point of view, it could be argued that access to cultural capital 
(BDS) enables MSE owners to acquire the necessary management skills that can 
enlighten their decision making. For example by using financial advisors, MSE owner- 
managers may over time gain proficiency in making more informed choices on the use 
of financial resources at their disposal. Similarly access to technical business support 
from BDS agents is likely to lead to improved operational efficiency. In general 
therefore, use of BDS among participant MSE owner-managers may not only breed new 
knowledge but also nurture skills. However, without access to economic capital 
(microcredit) most participant MSE owner-managers may not be in a position to access 
quality BDS, let alone to take advantage of their newly acquired knowledge and/or 
skills. In essence therefore the evidence supports the proposition that access to 
microcredit (among participant MSE owner-managers) is a necessary ingredient to 
accessing quality BDS, which in turn enables them to use their resources more 
productively. 
 
Distinguishing between access to BDS and access to microcredit, results from testing 
Hypothesis 4 reveal that participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS are likely to 
report higher self-rated performance compared to their counterparts who use 
microcredit (see Table 34c). Although use of microcredit among participant MSE 
owner-managers is positively associated with self-rated performance, the impact is 
below that of BDS. First it could be argued that the performance differential, which 
currently is in favour of the use BDS in the presence of microcredit, may be due to the 
relatively high cost of microcredit discussed previously in section 6.3.3. Second, as 
reflected above and in Tables 11 and 34a, participant MSE owner-managers who use 
BDS have relatively higher education compared to their counterparts who use 
microcredit. With a habitus informed by the added benefit of higher education, 
participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS are likely to be more skilful in 
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managing their businesses. Third businesses belonging to participant MSE owner-
managers who use BDS appear better established. For example participant owner-
managers of these businesses not only report higher gross income, but also report more 
branches (see Table 17).  Overall, controlling for education and their enterprises‟ state 
of establishment, MSE owner managers appear better off with access to cultural capital 
(BDS) than economic capital (microcredit) singly. 
 
7.4  Tests of Hypotheses dealing with Effectiveness of BDS delivery 
In this second section of chapter seven, consistent with Research Question 5 results of 
tests of hypotheses dealing with the perceived effectiveness of BDS delivery and the 
strategic fit between currently supplied BDS and the self-expressed needs of participant 
MSE owner-managers are presented. 
 
7.4.1 Measurement of effectiveness of BDS delivery and coding of variables 
The construct „effectiveness of BDS delivery‟ is measured through the extent to which 
participant MSE owner-managers‟ express satisfaction with the currently supplied BDS 
in reference to their perceived BDS needs. The extent of satisfaction with BDS is 
reported using a five point ordinal scale ranging from 1= unsatisfactory, to 5= 
satisfactory. There is no neutral point on this scale. 
 
Coding of Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: The dependent variable in this case is satisfaction with BDS. 
Participant MSE owner-managers‟ scores on their perceived satisfaction with BDS, 
guided by the ordinal scale above, are recoded as follows; scores ranging from (1) to (3) 
are jointly recoded (0), indicating „not satisfied‟ with current BDS, while scores 4 and 5 
are jointly recoded (1), indicating „satisfied‟ with current BDS. Therefore the resultant 
dependent variable „SatBDSRec‟ is binary in nature.  
 
Explanatory variables:  
There are six variables which are likely to influence the effective delivery of BDS and 
hence recipients‟ satisfaction with it (see chapter three section 3.3.3 and section 4.6 of 
chapter four for further justification). These variables are all elicited from participant 
owner managers and include; source of BDS (professional versus personal; MFI linked 
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versus independent of MFI), type of BDS, BDS delivery mode, assessed competence
44
 
of BDS agent(s), assessed relationship between BDS agents and their clients, and 
participant MSE owner-managers‟ level of education. These variables can be expected 
to assist in explaining the observed variations in participant MSE owner-managers‟ 
BDS satisfaction ratings.  
 
The control variables are binary in nature and the descriptive analysis informs the 
coding, which is as follows: 
 
Variable name Variable label Code 
BDSSrPrf Professionals (e.g. consultants and accountants ) 
used as main source of BDS 
= (1) if source is professional, otherwise (0) 
BDSSrMFI Source of BDS linked to a MFI = (1) if source is  MFI related, otherwise (0) 
BDSTpTec  Type of BDS is Technical (i.e. relates to specific 
business processes) 
= (1) if technical,  otherwise (0) 
GrpBDSdel Group mode of BDS delivery = (1) if group, otherwise (0) 
CompBDSag Competence rating  of BDS agents = (1) if competent, otherwise (0) 
RelBDSag Relationship with BDS agents = (1) if good, otherwise (0) 
Education  Participant MSE owner-manager‟s level of general 
education 
= (1) if tertiary and above, otherwise (0)  
 
There are two hypotheses (H5 and H6) tested in this section; one relating to the 
effectiveness of BDS delivery and the other relating to perceived „fitness‟ between 
supplied BDS and  participant MSE owner-managers‟ BDS needs.  These hypotheses 
relate to Research Question 5 stated in chapter one. The Hypotheses are reproduced for 
convenience from chapter three:    
H5:  Participant MSE owner managers in receipt of BDS that is perceived to 
be more effectively delivered are more likely to be satisfied with 
currently supplied BDS, compared to participant MSE owner managers 
in receipt of less effectively delivered BDS. 
 
  
H6:   Participant MSE owner managers who are satisfied with currently 
supplied BDS are more likely to report higher self-rated performance 
scores for their businesses, compared to participant MSE owner 
managers who are not satisfied with currently supplied BDS. 
                                                 
44
 Competence of BDS agents is assessed through participants‟ ratings on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 
= incompetent, to 4 = competent. 
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7.4.2  Results of Testing Hypothesis 5 
To test Hypothesis 5 logistic regression is used. Of the entire sample of 160 cases, there 
are 84 participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS, which represents the sub-
sample used in testing Hypothesis 5.  Participant MSE owner-managers‟ satisfaction 
with currently supplied BDS (SatBDSRec) is the dependent variable, while the control 
variables (factors expected to influence effective delivery of BDS) described above are 
the independent variables. First descriptive statistics for all variables are presented, 
followed by correlations and the logistic regression results.  
 
Table 35a presents pair-wise comparisons of participant MSE owner-managers who are 
satisfied with the current BDS delivery and those who are not satisfied. The Table 
shows that of the 84 participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS, slightly more than 
half (45 or 54 per cent) are satisfied with its delivery currently, while 39 or 46 per cent) 
are not satisfied. The table reveals that 40 per cent of the participant MSE owner-
managers use professional sources of BDS. Of these, 44 per cent are satisfied with the 
way it is delivered while 36 per cent are not satisfied. The difference is however not 
significant (Ch
2
 =0.63, p=0.426). In the case of the 43 (51 per cent) participant MSE 
owner-managers whose source of BDS is affiliated to MFIs, 39 per cent of them state to 
be satisfied with its delivery compared to 31 per cent who are not. With a Chi-square 
value of 12.15 at p<0.001, this difference is highly significant. 
 
Turning to the specific type of BDS received, 44 per cent of the participant MSE owner-
managers use technical BDS (see Table 35a). Of these, the majority 69 per cent are not 
satisfied with the current delivery of BDS while about one fifth (22 per cent) are 
satisfied with it. There is a highly significant difference (Ch
2
 =18.73, p<0.001) between 
participant MSE owner-managers who are satisfied and those who are not. Table 35a 
further shows that there is no significant difference between participant MSE owner-
managers who are satisfied and those who are not with the current BDS delivery where 
group mode of delivery is involved (Ch
2
 =0.06, p =0.802). Of the 84 participant MSE 
owner-managers, nearly one half of them (48 per cent) report to have participated in 
group mode BDS delivery. There is an even distribution between participant MSE 
owner-managers who are satisfied with the current delivery of BDS (49 per cent) and 
those who are not satisfied (46 per cent). There is however no significant difference 
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between participant MSE owner-managers who are satisfied and those who are not 
satisfied with the current BDS delivery, whether or not they perceive their BDS agents 
as competent or have had a good relationship with them (57 per cent, Ch
2
 =0.57, p 
=0.449, and 88 per cent, Ch
2
 =0.06, p =0.809, respectively).  
 
Of the 84 participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS, 58 (69 per cent) have either 
tertiary level education or above. Of these, a majority (78 per cent) indicate to be 
satisfied with the way BDS is currently delivered. However 59 per cent are not satisfied 
with the current BDS delivery. With a Chi-square value of 3.56 at p<0.10, there is a 
weakly significant difference between these two groups. Overall it appears that 
participant MSE owner-managers‟ satisfaction with delivery of BDS is highly 
influenced by (among other things); owner-managers‟ education, technical type BDS 
and BDS agents‟ affiliation to an MFI. In contrast, at least on a univariate basis, 
satisfaction with BDS delivery does not seem to be associated with; relations with or 
competence of agents, group mode of delivery, or whether the source is professional or 
otherwise. 
 
Table 35a: Descriptive statistics for variables included in testing Hypothesis 5 (N=84) 
 
Variable Satisfaction with BDS 
delivery  
 
Total 
Chi-square  
value  
 
p value 
satisfied not satisfied 
Professional source of BDS used 20 
(44%) 
14 
(36%) 
34 
(40%) 
0.63 0.426 
MFI related source of BDS used 31 
(69%) 
12 
(31%) 
43 
(51%) 
12.15 0.000 
Technical type BDS received 10 
(22%) 
27 
(69%) 
37 
(44%) 
18.73 0.000 
Mode of BDS delivery 22 
(49%) 
18 
(46%) 
40 
(48%) 
0.06 0.802 
BDS agents competence 24 
(53%) 
24 
(62%) 
48 
(57%) 
0.57 0.449 
Good relations with BDS agents 40 
(89%) 
34 
(87%) 
74 
(88%) 
0.06 
 
0.809 
Owner managers‟ education  35 
(78%) 
23 
(59%) 
58 
(69%) 
3.46 0.063 
                                       
                               Total  (N=84) 
45 
(54%) 
39 
(46%) 
 
Legend: professional source of BDS used (1/0) = if professional; MFI related source of BDS used (1/0) = if MFI 
related; technical type BDS received (1/0) =) if technical; group mode of BDS delivery (1/0) = if group; BDS 
agents competence (1/0) = if competent; good relations with BDS agents (1/0) =if yes; owner managers‟ education 
(1/0) = if tertiary and above. 
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Correlation Coefficients for Variables Involved in Testing Hypothesis 5 and 6 
 
The following table, Table 35b, presents Pearson‟s correlations between the eight 
variables entered into the logistic regression for Hypothesis 5. According to the Table, 
with the exception of correlations with the dependent variable (satisfaction with BDS) 
there are low correlations amongst all other variables. The highest correlation is -0.285 
between MFI sourced BDS and BDS of a technical nature. This is significant at p<0.05. 
The lowest correlation is -0.007 between perceived competence of BDS agents and 
BDS of a technical nature. There are low but significant correlations between MFI 
sourced BDS and group mode of BDS delivery (r =0.263, p<0.05) and between 
perceived competence of BDS agents and the relationship with their clients (r =0.276, 
p<0.05). 
 
Results in Table 35b further reveal that satisfaction with BDS delivery, among 
participant MSE owner-managers, is likely to be associated with BDS source being 
affiliated to an MFI (r =0.380, p<0.001). On the contrary, this is unlikely if BDS is of a 
technical nature (r = -0.472, p<0.001).  
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   Table 35b: Pearson‟s correlations (Hypotheses 5 and 6) (N=84) 
 
 
Satisfaction   
with BDS 
delivery  
Professionals  
source of 
BDS 
MFI- related 
BDS source 
Technical 
related BDS 
Group mode 
of BDS 
delivery  
Relationship 
with BDS 
agents 
Owner-
manager's  
education 
 
Competence 
of BDS agents 
Professional source 
of BDS .087       
 
MFIs related BDS 
source .380*** .174      
 
Technical related 
BDS  -.472*** .050 -.285**     
 
Group mode of BDS 
delivery  .027 .185 .263** -.078    
 
Relationship with 
BDS agents .026 -.071 .009 -.044 .056   
 
Owner-managers‟ 
education .203 -.130 -.087 -.132 -.032 .072  
 
Competence of BDS 
agents -.083 .028 .117 -.007 .103 .276** .097 
 
Performance score .131 -.152 .151 -.099 -.142 .233** .118 
 
.024 
***   significant p<0.000; **     significant p< 0.05 
Legend: professional source of BDS used (1/0) = if professional; MFI related source of BDS used (1/0) = if MFI related; technical type BDS received 
(1/0) =) if technical; group mode of BDS delivery (1/0) = if group; BDS agents‟ competence (1/0) = if competent; good relations with BDS agents (1/0) 
=if yes; owner managers‟ education (1/0) = if tertiary and above. 
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Regression results for Hypothesis 5 
 
The logistic regression undertaken in regard to Hypothesis 5 is algebraically expressed 
as follows;  
Logit (p) = a + β1X1 + β2 X2 + β3 X3 + β4 X4 + β5X5 + β6 X6 +  β7X7 
Where:  
Symbol Variable name Variable label (see section 7.4.1. for coding) 
Logit (p)  Probability of satisfaction with BDS 
X1  BDSSrPrf Professional source of BDS 
X2 BDSSrMFI MFI affiliated source of BDS 
X3 BDSTpTec Technical nature of BDS 
X4 GrpBDSdel Group BDS delivery mode 
X5 RelBDSag Relationship with BDS agents 
X6 EdcOwRec Owner manager‟s education level 
X7 CompBDSag Competence of BDS agency staff) 
 
Justification for and measurement descriptions of both the dependent and independent 
variables used in this test appear in section 3.3.3 in chapter three and section 7.4.1 of 
this chapter. 
 
Logistic regression is performed to examine the influence of a number of factors 
described previously (see section 7.4.1 in this chapter) on the likelihood that participant 
MSE owner-managers report satisfaction with the currently supplied BDS. The model 
contains seven independent variables as outlined in section 7.4.1 above. The model with 
all predictors is statistically significant Ch
2
 =33.91 (7, N=84), p<0.001, which indicates 
that the model is capable of distinguishing between participant MSE owner-managers 
who are satisfied and those who are not satisfied with currently supplied BDS. The 
range of variance in BDS satisfaction explained by the model is between 33.2 per cent 
(Cox & Snell R Square) and 44.4 per cent (Nagelkerke R Square). Additionally the 
model correctly classifies 76.2 per cent of the cases. 
 
Table 35c shows that only three of the predictors make a significant contribution 
towards increased chances of participants being satisfied with BDS, namely: participant 
MSE owner-managers‟ level of education, MFI-affiliated source of BDS, and BDS of a 
technical nature. The strongest predictor of reporting satisfaction with BDS is 
participant MSE owner-managers‟ source of BDS being linked to an MFI, recording an 
odds ratio of 5.90. This implies that participant MSE owner-managers whose source of 
BDS is MFI-affiliated are almost six times more likely to report satisfaction with 
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currently supplied BDS than participant MSE owner-managers whose BDS source is 
independent of MFIs, controlling for other factors. This result however is inconsistent 
with previous observations (see section 6.4.2) where BDS supplied by MFIs does not 
appear to closely match the needs of MSE owner managers.  Therefore in Bourdieu‟s 
words, MSE owner managers‟ reports of satisfaction with MFI supplied BDS would 
seemingly amount to an act of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1977), against MSE owner 
managers, committed by MFIs. The second strongest predictor of satisfaction with BDS 
is owner-managers‟ education (odds ratio = 3.61).  This means that participant MSE 
owner-managers with tertiary level education and above are nearly four times more 
likely to report satisfaction with the current BDS than their counterparts with below 
tertiary level education. With regard to technical type of BDS, the respective odds ratio 
is 0.16, which is less than 1. This implies that participant MSE owner-managers who 
received BDS of a technical nature are 0.16 times less likely to report satisfaction with 
current BDS than participant MSE owner-managers who received BDS of a general 
(non technical) nature.  
 
Table 35c: Hypothesis 5 - Logistic regression predicting the likelihood of reporting                                               
       satisfaction with BDS (N=84) 
 B S.E. Wald df p value Odds ratio 
BDSSrPrf .504 .582 750 1 .386 1.66 
BDSSrMFI 1.775 .621 8.178 1 .004 5.90 
BDSTpTec  -1.863 .561 11.028 1 .001 .16 
RelBDSag .369 .845 .191 1 .662 1.45 
GrpBDSdel -.512 .588 .759 1 .384 .60 
EdcOwRec 1.285 .631 4.138 1 .042 3.61 
CompBDSag 
 (Constant) 
-.870 
-.580 
.588 
1.014 
2.186 
.327 
1 
1 
.139 
.567 
.42 
.56 
Legend:  
BDSSrPrf (1/0) = Professional BDS source; BDSSrMFI (1/0) = MFI linked BDS source; 
BDSTpTec (1/0) = BDS of technical nature; RelBDSag (1/0) = Relationship with BDS 
agent; GrpBDSdel (1/0) = Group based BDS delivery; EdcOwRec (1/0) = Owner manager‟s 
education level; CompBDSag (1/0) = Competence of BDS agency‟s staff. 
 
With an observed model Chi-square value of 33.91 (df, 7) at p<0.001, against a Chi-
square distribution value of 14.067 (df, 7) at p=0.05, the null hypothesis, that effective 
delivery of BDS does not significantly influence participant MSE owner-managers‟ 
BDS satisfaction rating, is rejected. Consequently the alternative hypothesis that 
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participant MSE owner managers in receipt of more effectively delivered BDS are 
likely to be satisfied with currently supplied BDS compared to participant MSE owner 
managers in receipt of less effectively delivered BDS, holds and supports Hypothesis 5. 
 
In view of the foregoing finding, that effective delivery of BDS is likely to lead to 
eventual client satisfaction with supplied BDS, it is important to examine whether 
currently supplied BDS meets the needs and expectations of the participant MSE 
owner-managers. This is the issue addressed next. 
 
7.4.3  Results of Testing Hypothesis 6 
In this section the test undertaken seeks to determine whether participant MSE owner- 
managers who are satisfied with currently supplied BDS are likely to report higher self-
rated performance scores on their businesses compared to participant MSE owner 
managers who are not satisfied with currently supplied BDS. The objective of 
Hypothesis 6 is to examine the strategic fit between currently supplied BDS and the 
self-expressed needs of participant MSE owner-managers. It is likely that in a situation 
where supplied BDS is perceived to serve client‟s needs, then the client is more likely to 
be satisfied with it. It could also be argued that participant MSE owner-managers who 
are satisfied with the BDS currently supplied, have possibly gained skill from it and as 
such are more likely to report higher self-rated performance scores for their business, 
controlling for other factors (see further discussion in section 3.3.3 in chapter three). 
. 
Against the premise above, Hypothesis 6 is tested through a one-way between-groups 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with planned comparisons. The comparisons are made 
on the self-rated performance scores (for details on performance measurement and 
coding of variables see section 7.2.1) between participant MSE owner-managers who 
state to be satisfied with their current BDS and those who are not satisfied. In 
descriptive terms, of the 84 participant MSE owner-managers who use BDS, there are 
45 (54 per cent) who are satisfied with the current BDS against 39 (46 per cent) who are 
not satisfied (see Table 36a).  Table 36a further shows that participant MSE owner-
managers who are satisfied with their current BDS are likely to report higher self-rated 
performance scores for their businesses (xˉ =1.76,   =2.55, sk =-1.05) than their 
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counterparts who are not satisfied (xˉ =0.96,   =3.47, sk =-0.67). The difference is 
however not statistically significant (t-test =-1.17, p =0.245). 
 
Table 36a: Descriptive Statistics for variables included in testing Hypothesis 6 
 
Performance score (N=84) Min. Max. Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness 
Satisfaction with 
BDS 
 not 
satisfied 
39 -6.82 6.03 .96 3.47 -.67 
 (46%)      
 satisfied 45 -6.03 6.03 1.76 2.55 -1.05 
 (54%)      
 
Test results for Hypothesis 6  
 
Results of Pearson‟s correlations (see Table 35b) reveal insignificant low correlation 
between participant MSE owner-managers‟ likelihood of satisfaction with current BDS 
and self-rated performance scores of their businesses (r =0.131, p=0.234). The 
following Table, Table 36b, presents results of a one-way between-groups ANOVA 
exploring the likely impact of participant MSE owner-managers‟ satisfaction with 
current BDS on the self-rated performance scores of their businesses. The table shows 
that overall there is no statistically significant difference at the p<0.05 level in self-rated 
performance scores, between participant MSE owner-managers who are satisfied with 
current BDS and those who are not satisfied (t-test = 1.174, p =0.245). The 
corresponding F value for the observed t is F (1, 82) =1.38, p =0.245.The resulting eta 
squared value is 0.02 which according to Cohen (1988) is considered a small effect size, 
which further confirms the insignificant result in Table 36b.  
 
Table 36b: Hypothesis 6 – results for one-way between-groups ANOVA 
 
  
Contrast 
Value of 
Contrast 
Std. 
Error t df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Performance 
Score 
Assume equal 
variances 
1 .79 .66 1.199 82 .234 
Does not assume 
equal variances 
1 .79 .67 1.174 68.90 .245 
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Given an observed value of F (1, 82) = 1.38, against an F distribution Table value of 
3.92 (1, 82), the observed F does not exceed the critical value. In light of this scenario, 
the null Hypothesis that, participant MSE owner-managers‟ satisfaction with current 
BDS is not related to self-rated performance scores of their businesses cannot be 
rejected. Therefore the alternative Hypothesis that, participant MSE owner managers 
who are satisfied with currently supplied BDS are likely to report higher self-rated 
performance scores on their businesses compared to participant MSE owner managers 
who are not satisfied with currently supplied BDS, does not hold.  
 
These results may have two implications; first „satisfaction‟ with current BDS may not 
be a good estimate for fitness between supplied BDS and client needs, secondly, if there 
is fitness between supplied BDS and client needs, then it could be such a fit does not 
necessarily result in an improvement in self-rated performance. In view of the 
conclusions for Hypothesis 5 above, the latter seems to be a more probable conjecture. 
In general however, the results of Hypothesis 6 appear to be consistent with results 
previous of univariate analysis presented in section 6.4.2 of this chapter. In this case it 
was noted that apparently there is minimal convergence between the type of BDS 
offered (especially by MFIs, which are the main source of BDS among sample MSEs) 
and the BDS needs of MSEs. 
 
7.5  Implications of test results for Hypotheses dealing with effectiveness of 
 BDS delivery 
The last two Hypotheses, Hypotheses 5 and 6, are devoted to evaluating the 
effectiveness of BDS delivery to participant MSE owner-managers. Although test 
results support Hypothesis 5, this is not the case with Hypothesis 6. With regard to 
Hypothesis 5, results of the logistic regression analysis reveal that participant MSE 
owner-managers are likely to be satisfied with the delivery of current BDS if its source 
is perceived to be of a professional nature and/or affiliated to an MFI. The professional 
sources of BDS commonly used by participant MSE owner-managers include 
accountancy firms, audit, and general management consulting firms.  
 
Given the informality of personal sources of BDS (i.e. family, friends, business 
colleagues, and acquaintances) its quality is in no way comparable to that of 
professional sources. Satisfaction with BDS, the source of which is linked to an MFI 
230 
 
(compared to independently sourced BDS) implies that integrating BDS with credit 
appears to improve the effectiveness of BDS delivery.  Additionally, this strategy makes 
the cost of BDS „invisible‟ and hence more likely to be perceived as affordable.  
 
Further, integrating BDS and credit not only increases the contact hours but also is 
likely to raise the commitment level of the BDS clients and their agents. In addition, test 
results for Hypothesis 5 show that currently participant MSE owner-managers are 
unlikely to be satisfied (beta= -1.86, p< 001) if in receipt of BDS of a technical nature 
(see Table 35c). This means that currently, at least for the sample owner-managers who 
took part in this study, technical BDS does not appear to meet their needs. Compared to 
non-technical (general management) BDS, most agents are unlikely to be competent 
enough to deliver technical type BDS, at least in the context examined here. For 
example, in some cases it is unlikely that agency staff may possess the technical 
knowledge, skill and experience needed to advise their clients on layout, operations, and 
process design matters.  
 
According to test results for Hypothesis 5, participant MSE owner-managers with 
tertiary and above level education are more likely to be satisfied with current BDS than 
otherwise. It could be argued that participant MSE owner-managers with relatively 
higher education are in a better position to discern their advisory needs, choose an 
appropriate BDS provider and provide feedback as to whether or not their expectations 
are being met. Moreover participants with tertiary level education are more likely to 
appreciate aspects of the advice provided by their BDS agents and implement it more 
effectively.  
 
Regarding the mode of BDS delivery, the use of groups seems to be unsatisfactory (see 
Table 35c). Although MFIs and their nominated BDS agents would prefer group BDS 
delivery for economic reasons, participant MSE owner-managers are more likely to be 
satisfied with one-to-one BDS delivery. The group mode of BDS delivery may fail to 
tap into the intrinsic needs of individual businesses and their owner-managers. 
Moreover as earlier noted (see Table 28), participant MSE owner-managers may be less 
willing to share business information for fear of breaching privacy.  
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The fact that the test results do not support Hypothesis 6 can be interpreted as showing 
that the quality of currently supplied BDS does not, on average, meet the needs of 
participant MSE owner-managers, a finding previously reported by Matlay (2004). As 
noted earlier in this section, this is especially the case with BDS needs of a technical 
nature. Additionally, as discussed previously (see section 6.4.2) in the case of MFI 
supplied BDS, participant MSE owner-managers do not choose the type of BDS they 
receive expressly.  Additionally the BDS tends to be of a non-technical (general 
management) nature. Having explored the implications of the hypotheses test results, 
the next section provides concluding remarks for this chapter. 
 
7.6  Conclusion 
This chapter uses a multivariate approach to testing the six hypotheses put forward in 
chapter three, consistent with the main objective of this study, which is to evaluate the 
association of microcredit and BDS provision in the perceived performance of micro 
and small enterprises.  
 
Hypotheses 1 through 4 examine whether receipt of BDS and/or microcredit are 
associated with self-rated business performance scores made by participant MSE 
owner-managers. Ordinary least squares regression is used and results support all four 
Hypotheses. These results are consistent with the proposition that participant MSE 
owner-managers who use either or both BDS and microcredit are likely to report higher 
self-rated performance scores for their businesses compared to participant MSE owner-
managers who use neither BDS nor microcredit. In addition, participant MSE owner-
managers who use BDS alone are likely to report higher self-rated performance scores 
for their businesses than their counterparts who use microcredit singly. Overall there is 
evidence of complementary benefits accruing from use of BDS and microcredit jointly. 
 
The other two Hypotheses posited in chapter three, Hypothesis 5 and 6, focus on testing 
the perceived effectiveness of BDS delivery and the fit between currently supplied BDS 
and participant MSE owner-managers‟ BDS needs respectively. A logistic regression 
technique is used to test Hypothesis 5 while Hypothesis 6 is tested using a one-way 
between-groups ANOVA with planned comparisons. The results support Hypothesis 5.  
That is, participant MSE owner-managers are likely to register satisfaction with 
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currently supplied BDS if they perceive its delivery to be effective. However results of 
the ANOVA test do not support Hypothesis 6. This implies that there is an apparent 
discrepancy between currently supplied BDS and participant MSE owner-managers‟ 
needs in relation to BDS. This result is consistent with the univariate analysis reported 
previously in chapter six. In summary, the results of Hypothesis testing reported in this 
chapter support the underlying premise of this study. The next chapter offers concluding 
remarks, limitations, and suggestions for further research. 
 
In terms of the theoretical frameworks underpinning this thesis, these results mean that 
from a Bourdieusian perspective, MSEs belonging to owner managers who concurrently 
have access to both economic and cultural capital appear to enjoy a synergistic benefit 
compared to MSEs belonging to owner managers with access to economic capital 
singly. The implication of this result is that, neo-institutionally, of the two competing 
logics in microfinancing, social logic driven microfinance is a better approach 
compared to a commercial approach. If microfinancing is viewed through an anti-
poverty lens, then this implication is heightened. Further, in Bourdieu‟s words it 
appears that combined provision of cultural and economic capital is likely to lead to 
better perceived MSE performance than supply of cultural capital on its own.  However 
MSE owner managers with access to only cultural capital (BDS) compared to their 
counterparts with access to economic capital (microcredit) only, are likely to report 
higher performance for their enterprises.  From a Bourdieusian point of view, it could 
be argued that access to cultural capital (BDS) enables MSE owners to acquire the 
necessary management skills that can enhance their habitus and consequently enlighten 
their decision making. 
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8.0 Chapter Eight: Conclusion, Limitations and Further Research 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter completes the thesis. Primarily, the chapter offers a conclusion to the study 
seeking to investigate whether there is a perceived complementary benefit associated 
with linking microcredit and business development service (BDS) provision to micro 
and small enterprises (MSEs). This chapter also discusses, in summary, the study‟s 
findings consistent with its research objectives and questions raised in chapter one and 
its underpinning conceptual frameworks discussed in chapter three. In addition, the 
study‟s contribution, limitations and suggestions for further research are presented. The 
chapter begins with a summary which synthesises the discussion and arguments 
presented in the preceding chapters.  
 
8.2 Summary 
This thesis set out to assess the perceived significance of microcredit and the enjoined 
provision of BDS as instruments for promoting the development of MSEs in a 
developing country. This relationship is examined in the context of the current 
worldwide poverty reduction discourse. The fundamental question examined is whether 
inclusion of BDS in a microfinance programme is likely to lead to higher owner-
managers‟ self-assessed performance of their enterprises compared to the situation 
where BDS is not provided.  
 
Discussion of the motivation for examining and the significance of this inquiry pervade 
most of chapter one. According to the latest human development report (UNDP, 2009b)  
Kenya, the context of study, ranks 148
th
 among 182 countries. With a national 
population of close to 39 million people and more than half of them (56 per cent) living 
on less than a dollar a day, MSEs have become a livelihood pattern for many Kenyans. 
The chapter notes that the development agenda behind current poverty alleviation 
campaigns, principal among them the United Nations‟ target to halve the world‟s 
poverty levels by 2015 (United Nations, 2009), promotes the creation of MSEs for self-
employment by the poor and hence development of their economic capital. A similar 
commitment is shared by signatory institutions to the microcredit Summit Campaign, 
which aims to reach 175 million of the poorest families, especially women, with 
microcredit and related business services (Daley-Harris, 2009). The chapter observes 
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that, whereas progress has been made in building microfinance institutions as well as 
reaching MSE owner-managers with constituent services, there are some concerns.  
Firstly, there is a concern as to whether the poor are being reached (see Morduch, 1998, 
Lont and Hospes, 2004) and hence as to whether economic capital is really being 
developed in the category of most need. Secondly, and more importantly in the context 
of this thesis, it is worth questioning whether the adoption of the seemingly popular 
minimalist approach, embracing mainly a commercial logic to microfinancing, come at 
the expense of providing BDS to MSE owner-managers (see Boter, 2005). While the 
chapter outlines the study‟s research questions, it also highlights its key findings and 
contribution. 
 
Attention then turns to discussing theory and the related literature in chapters two and 
three. Specifically, chapter two examines the subject context of the thesis, offering not 
only an exposition on the microfinance industry and MSE development in Kenya, but 
also a review of related literature. In this regard the chapter observes that; although the 
MSE sector is a significant contributor to Kenya‟s economy, its growth and 
development is constrained by several factors including lack of access to affordable 
credit and quality BDS, among others. Further, results of previous studies on the impact 
of BDS on MSE development (most of which are atheoretical and conducted in 
developed countries), appear equivocal (Storey, 2004). Chapter three situates the review 
of literature pertaining to the significance of microfinance and BDS to the performance 
of MSEs within a critical relational framework informed by two conceptions – Pierre 
Bourdieu‟s „theory of practice‟ (Bourdieu, 1977) and  neo-institutionalism (see Scott, 
2008). It is argued that practice variation in microfinancing is notably influenced by two 
contending logics – social and commercial.  
 
It is further noted that contestations for equitable exchanges and valuations between the 
various strains of capital; economic, social, and cultural in particular, are likely to be 
responsible for the „symbolic violence‟ and position-taking behaviour that currently 
engulfs the practice of microfinance. The chapter develops a conceptual model that 
could help in understanding the intrigues that characterise microfinance practice to date. 
Future researchers in this field may find the model useful in conceptualising the field of 
microfinance and its practices in a holistic manner. On the basis of the insights provided 
by the above, chapter three concludes by positing hypotheses for testing.  
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From a functional perspective, chapters four and five focus on discussions relating to 
justification for the choice of study design and statistical description of the study‟s 
sample profile respectively. Specifically, in chapter four it is observed that recent (since 
mid 1990s) impact studies on microfinancing employ different designs that can be 
classified into; scientific, behavioural, and participatory action learning methods 
(Hulme, 2000). Whereas the scientific method is quantitatively oriented, the two other 
approaches take a qualitative character, adopt a longitudinal framework, and by their 
very nature require involvement of multiple parties to be successful. While a 
longitudinal approach could be used, it is arguably inappropriate for this study for the 
main reason that the design would demand a before-after experimental setting, which is 
likely to introduce several validity threats, for example testing, instrumentation, 
maturation, and mortality. Further any involvement of multiple parties (as is common in 
behavioural and participatory learning and action designs), runs the risk of not only 
breeding conflict of interest between collaborators but also breaching the bounds of 
anonymity, one of the key requirements for University Human Ethics Research 
Committee approval for this study. In light of the reasons above, and in view of the 
study‟s focus on practice variation, the cross-sectional approach adopted by this study is 
arguably the most appropriate.  
 
By design therefore this inquiry is scientific in nature. The study uses a Q-Squared 
approach, triangulating quantitative data gathered from structured interviews with 160 
haphazardly sampled participant MSE owner-managers with results from qualitative 
interviews carried out with 19 purposively selected representatives of MFIs, BDS 
agencies and independent researchers with an interest in the MSE sector.  Operationally 
the study takes on a two by two quasi-experimental design (see Shadish, Cook, and 
Campbell, 2002), with participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of neither 
microcredit nor BDS constituting the control group.   
 
The chapter notes that debate on the achievements of microfinance rages (Armendariz 
and Morduch, 2010).  While a section of studies argue that microfinance leads to 
beneficial economic and social impacts (e.g. Remenyi, 1991; Otero and Rhyne, 1994;  
Schuler et al., 1997;) yet another set suggests otherwise (e.g. Buckley, 1997; 
Montgomery, 1996; Rogaly, 1996 and Wood and Sharrif, 1997). With such a scenario, 
further analysis of the impact of microfinance operations on the livelihoods of the poor 
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remains an important subject to academics, development researchers in general, and in 
particular, to poverty alleviation policy-makers. 
 
Further the chapter observes that although some previous impact assessment efforts 
employ a quasi-experimental design, the focus of prior studies has been mainly at either 
the institutional or microfinance program level (e.g. Mustafa et. al., 1996; Hashemi et. 
al., 1996; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Coleman, 1999; Dunn and Aberckle, 2001). It is 
worth noting that this study assesses the impact of access to microcredit and/or BDS at 
the microenterprise level. It is argued that the microenterprise is the basic unit for 
economic empowerment of the poor in their quest to fight poverty. Institutional or 
programme level impact assessments are likely to generate an aggregate picture of 
microfinancing, with minimal detail of how possible access to BDS or microcredit can 
influence the livelihood patterns of the poor. While targeting the MSE level as the unit 
of analysis rather than programme outcomes, this study integrates the notions of impact 
attribution and improving microfinance interventions, aspects emphasised by Hulme 
(2000).  Further, it also allows assessment directly and specifically of the impact of 
BDS and microcredit on the user and from a user‟s perspective. 
 
Chapter five describes key characteristics of the study‟s sample. It is noted that 
participant profile information is critical firstly in achieving the purpose of the study 
and, more importantly, in making meaningful comparisons between users and non-users 
of both microcredit and BDS with regard to self-rated performance of their MSEs.  
Demographically, it is explained in the chapter that the study‟s sample constitutes more 
male participants than females. Most participant MSE owner-managers are aged below 
40 years which implies that, at least in Kenya, the MSE sector is dominated by young 
adults, the majority of whom are married.  Slightly more than 60 per cent of the 
participant MSE owner-managers have tertiary level education. Of these, four in every 
six cases have attained college level education. Regardless, only one third of participant 
MSE owner-managers report having formal business training prior to venturing into 
business. However, slightly more than two thirds of them had on-the- job experience, 
either by directly running their own businesses or, in some cases, through a business-
family background. It is important to note that of the demographic features of the 
sample examined, in the main the education level of participant MSE owner-managers 
is significantly associated with the perceived performance of their enterprises, as is their 
237 
 
gender and age. These attributes appear to wield significant influence on participants‟ 
habitus. 
 
In addition to the social demographics, the chapter notes that the average experience in 
business among participant MSE owner-managers is six years, with the majority of 
them stating to have been in business for less than ten years. Further, slightly more than 
two thirds of the participants‟ businesses have only a single branch and employ between 
three to four staff. Across all four categories of participating MSEs and consistent with 
previous research (see Liedholm, 2002, Richardson et al., 2004, ILO, 2008), trade (in a 
diverse collection of products) is the most common business activity. As pertains to 
income levels, on average most participant MSE owner-managers have a gross monthly 
income ranging between KES 30,000 and KES 40,000 (AUD $600 - 800). In general 
the chapter reveals significant differences in income between users and non-users of 
microcredit and/or BDS. However the modest nature of these incomes implies that 
some of the participants are engaged in business for survival purposes.  
 
In sum the economic profile of participant MSE owner-managers who do not use either 
microcredit or BDS differs significantly from that of their counterparts in the other three 
categories – participant MSE owner-managers who use microcredit and BDS jointly or 
singly. This means that, as proposed, participant MSE owner-managers who do not use 
either microcredit or BDS serve as an effective control group when evaluating the 
correlation of microcredit and BDS with the self-rated performance of participants‟ 
enterprises. Discussion of the results of hypotheses tests from a univariate point of view 
appear in chapter six, and from a multivariate paradigm in chapter seven. A discussion 
of the key findings guided by this study‟s main research questions and hypotheses 
follows. 
 
8.2.1 Summary of findings 
In general across all four MSE owner-manager participant categories, businesses 
display similar characteristics regardless of whether their owner-managers use 
microcredit or BDS jointly or singly. The findings reveal that the most frequent 
participant business activity is trade related, involving resale of a collection of goods, 
and operates as a sole proprietorship rather than on a limited liability company basis. 
This result is consistent with previous studies in this respect (ILO, 2008, Atieno, 
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2001b). Although a significant proportion of participants‟ businesses are perceived as 
established (i.e. been in operation for more than three years), most have been in 
operation for less than ten years. This is an important attribute in an environment where 
it appears few new ventures make it to their second birthday.  
 
Further it is revealed that the need to either raise additional working capital, seize an 
emerging business opportunity, or even harness for personal consumption, among other 
reasons, has lead MSE owner-managers to seek credit from various sources. MFIs are 
the most common source of credit among MSE owner-managers, representing almost 
one third (29 per cent) of the responses. This is followed by personal savings (21 per 
cent), while commercial banks come third with 18 per cent. Given the inseparability of 
the owner-manager and the enterprise in sole proprietorships, it is not surprising that 
some of the participants cite personal issues (e.g. household expenses, medical bills, and 
school fees) as reasons for taking loans. However it is likely that these personal reasons 
for borrowing are not expressly revealed when making loan applications. Besides, the 
findings reveal that MFI representatives do not seem concerned with either fungibility 
of microcredit or possible subversive practices among borrowers. 
 
Significance of microcredit provision to micro and small enterprises  
External credit sources appear to extract unusually high interest rates from borrowers, 
besides applying stringent qualifying rules. Results show that, on average, most 
participant MSE owner-managers report paying interest rates higher than 18 per cent 
annually at a time when the Kenyan Government‟s base lending rate was 8.7 per cent. 
Notwithstanding the high rates, participant MSE owner-managers state that most 
sources of credit, especially MFIs, require applicants to be part of a group, mobilise 
savings, organise chattels, and offer some form of tangible collateral in order to access 
credit. Similar observations have been made previously  (Akoten, 2007b). During an 
interview, one MFI representative stated: “…collateral varies, it could be chattels, cars, 
house, shares...but you find that the loans have to be fully covered.” As reflected in 
discussion of the relevant literature in chapter two, demand for collateral is one of the 
factors that make commercial bank loans inaccessible to MSE owner-managers (see 
Akoten, 2007b) . Initially as a form of banking, microfinance was intended to be 
collateral free, leveraging on social capital to mitigate against the risk of loan default. In 
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essence microfinance was specifically designed to serve the needs of the MSE sector. 
The results from this study appear to be in stark contrast to this intention.  
 
The situation is compounded by the terms and conditions associated with microcredit 
delivery. For example, results show that microcredit is short term, in most cases 
extending only to a maximum of 12 months, with weekly repayments. Additionally the 
eligibility criteria is broad, comprising factors ranging from individual applicants‟ 
personality attributes, enterprises‟ cash flow streams (as per the transactional history), 
to group cohesion and management, among others. A significant proportion of the 
participants agree that credit terms, especially interest rates and the weekly repayment, 
constrain their business operations. Similar views are expressed during interviews with 
independent researchers who point out that even though microcredit is increasingly 
becoming accessible to MSEs, it has helped only to sustain some people in their 
businesses. This is so because the current terms and conditions do not encourage growth 
of the sector. In general however, most participant MSE owner-managers hold a 
perception that their businesses have improved in some way as a result of access to 
credit, though opinions vary.  Among the improvements cited are perceived increases in 
profits, increases in staff numbers, increases in either savings or assets, and reduction in 
debt. 
 
With regard to the likelihood of continuing to borrow, results show that participant 
MSE owner-managers whose main source of credit is MFI-linked are almost four times 
more likely to continue borrowing than participant MSE owner-managers whose loan 
source is independent of a MFI, other factors held constant. Further, participant MSE 
owner-managers who currently pay higher interest rates on loans are 0.46 times less 
likely to continue borrowing than participant MSE owner-managers who pay lower 
interest rates. Moreover with an odds ratio of 0.378, participant MSE owner managers 
in receipt of collateral-based loans are less likely to continue borrowing compared to 
participant MSE owner-managers who are in receipt of collateral free loans. Highlights 
of the findings in relation to the perceived benefits of BDS to MSE growth are 
presented next. 
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Significance of business development services to micro and small enterprises 
Of the various sources of advisory services, the use of acquaintances (family, friends, 
and business colleagues components of social capital) is commonly reported by most 
participant MSE owner-managers. The second most commonly used source of business 
advisory services is microfinance schemes, followed by accountancy and audit firms. 
Private consultants and academics rank poorly as potential sources of business advisory 
services among MSE owner-managers. This is does not come as a surprise since 
academics are noted to be unattractive as a source of business advice among MSE 
owner-managers (see Berry and Sweeting, 2006). Although popular as a source of 
business advisory services, acquaintances are unlikely to give quality business advice. 
Moreover given the social connections the objectivity of any such business advice is 
questionable.  
 
Results further show that among the various aspects of cultural capital, i.e. business 
decision areas, advice on accountancy is frequently needed with more than half of the 
participant MSE owner-managers identifying it as their top priority issue.  Other areas 
such as general business planning and financial planning respectively are among the top 
three (of eleven) decision areas for which MSE owner-managers often need assistance 
from BDS providers. From the supply side however; especially for MFI-linked BDS, a 
majority of the participant MSE owner-managers identify management issues, either in 
the form of general advice or training, as the main advisory service received followed 
by training in the management of group dynamics, and moral support. Though cited, 
technical support in the form of facilitation on sourcing of materials, product- process 
development, and market information liaison, are exceptional cases. It is worth noting 
that results reveal a discrepancy between MSE owner-managers‟ BDS needs and what 
the market (especially MFI-based BDS providers) currently supplies. This result is 
consistent with the findings from previous studies  (Jayawarna et al., 2007, Matlay, 
2004). Whereas accounting and marketing are reported to be decision areas where MSE 
owner-managers often require advice, general management counselling and moral 
support are the most common forms of advisory services that participant MSE owner-
managers report to be receiving, mostly from the MFI-linked BDS suppliers. Given this 
state of affairs it is unlikely that MSE owner-managers are provided opportunity to 
choose the BDS being delivered to them or align it with their need.  
 
241 
 
With regard to the cost of BDS, although most participant MSE owner-managers cite it 
as affordable, results further reveal that in most cases they do not pay for it directly. 
This is partly because it is common practice among MFIs to include BDS fees in the 
standard charges for microcredit. In some other cases, MSE owner-managers state that 
BDS charges are subsidised by third party organisations, for example NGOs with an 
interest in supporting MSE development. In yet other instances, farmers‟ associations 
and investment groups foot the cost of BDS as a way of promoting members‟ welfare. 
 
Results indicate that BDS is commonly delivered by way of business site visits, group 
sessions, visits to agents‟ offices, and to a lesser extent through contracted one-off 
assignments.  Among other BDS delivery modes reported farmer‟s workshops, 
apprenticeships, mentorships, and one-on-one hands-on coaching are included. The 
group mode of BDS delivery, though cost effective, is favoured by MFIs consistent 
with their desire to nurture social capital, a critical factor in marketing their credit 
services. From a marketing perspective and from the BDS agents‟ stand point, one 
could argue that agents‟ visits to MSE owner-managers‟ (clients‟) business  premises 
are probably a more effective way of delivering BDS compared to the other options 
described above. Through such a strategy the BDS agent is able to not only maintain 
close contact with the client, but also to keep abreast of developments in the enterprise.  
 
According to the study‟s results participant MSE owner-managers cite skill 
development as the main benefit accruing from their use of BDS. Other benefits 
reported include; access to professional input in decision making, technical facilitation, 
and information linkages. In sum, from a users‟ perspective, given the fact that most of 
the participants cite skill development as their priority benefit of BDS, it is likely that 
MSE owner-managers would be more interested in BDS that promotes development of 
business management skills (Faoite et al., 2004). The benefits reported here come at a 
cost however. Some participants state fears of a breach of privacy, leakage of business 
information, misleading advice, and creation of a dependency syndrome as drawbacks 
of BDS provision. Among the shortcomings of BDS, leakage of information is noted as 
the most serious concern among participant MSE owner-managers. Summary findings 
on the association of access to microcredit and BDS with the perceived performance 
MSEs follows. 
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Impact of microcredit and BDS on MSE performance 
From a multivariate perspective and in the context of MSEs‟ performance, results show 
that other factors notwithstanding, participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of both 
microcredit and BDS hold better perceptions about the performance of their businesses 
than participant MSE owner-managers who do not use either microcredit or BDS. In 
addition the study‟s findings reveal that participant MSE owner-managers who use 
microcredit and BDS jointly report higher self-rated performance scores for their 
businesses compared to their counterparts who use microcredit and BDS singly. 
Further, results reflect that compared with participant MSE owner-managers who use 
either BDS or microcredit, participant MSE owner-managers who do not use either 
microcredit or BDS report lower self-rated performance for their businesses.  
 
Consequently Hypotheses 1 through 4 of this thesis; that MSE owner-managers in 
receipt of both microcredit and BDS are likely to report higher self-rated performance 
of their enterprises compared to their counterparts in receipt of either or neither 
microcredit or BDS, and that enterprises belonging to MSE owner-managers who use 
either microcredit or BDS are likely to record higher self-rated performance than those 
in receipt of neither microcredit nor BDS, hold. From neo-institutional and Bourdieu‟s 
conceptions, it appears that MSE owner managers in receipt of both cultural and 
economic forms of capital (beneficiaries of a social logic driven microfinance) accrue a 
synergistic value for the performance of their enterprises. This is unlike their 
counterparts (beneficiaries of a commercially oriented microfinance) who only have 
access to economic capital.  
 
It is further revealed that MSE owner-managers‟ habitus, informed by levels of 
education, gender, age, and the extent of establishment of their business, are among 
other factors associated with a significant differential in self-rated performance of 
participant enterprises. These results reveal that young adult women with a tertiary and 
above level education, whose businesses have been operational for more than three 
years, record higher self-rated performance for their businesses than their counterparts.  
This is despite the fact that (as reported in section 5.2) women form only 36.2 per cent 
of the study‟s sample. However, this thesis does not find any significant differences in 
MSE owner-managers‟ self-rated performance as influenced by either the type of 
business activity undertaken or owner-manager‟s affiliation to a business family 
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background. Next are summarised the highlights of results pertaining to MSE owner-
managers‟ perceived satisfaction with current BDS. 
 
MSE owner-managers’ BDS satisfaction ratings  
With regard to satisfaction with delivery of BDS, results show that it is highly 
influenced by participant MSE owner-managers‟ education, technical nature of BDS, 
and BDS agents‟ affiliation to an MFI. It is revealed that participant MSE owner-
managers whose source of BDS is MFI-affiliated are almost six times more likely to 
report satisfaction with currently supplied BDS than if the BDS source is independent 
of MFIs, all other factors held constant. Further, the findings show that participant MSE 
owner-managers with tertiary level education and above are nearly four times more 
likely to report satisfaction with the current BDS than their counterparts with below 
tertiary level education.  Participant MSE owner-managers who received BDS of a 
technical nature are less likely to report satisfaction with current BDS than those in 
receipt of BDS of a general (non-technical) nature. Contrary to popular opinion, MSE 
owner-managers‟ satisfaction with BDS delivery is not found to be significantly 
influenced by good relations with and/or competence of agency staff, group mode of 
delivery, or the source‟s perceived level of professionalism. Therefore the hypothesis 
that participant MSE owner-managers in receipt of more effectively delivered BDS are 
likely to be satisfied with currently supplied BDS compared to participant MSE owner 
managers in receipt of less effectively delivered BDS holds and supports Hypothesis 5.  
 
However, the study does not find significant differences in self-rated performance 
scores between participant MSE owner-managers who are satisfied with current BDS 
and those who are not satisfied. In other words in respect of Hypothesis 6, that 
participant MSE owner managers who are satisfied with currently supplied BDS are 
likely to report higher self-rated performance scores on their businesses compared to 
participant MSE owner managers who are not satisfied with currently supplied BDS, is 
not supported. This means that either satisfaction with current BDS is not a good 
estimator for congruence between supplied BDS and client needs or, if such a fit exists, 
then it could be that it does not necessarily leverage self-rated performance scores on 
participant enterprises. In general however, test results for Hypothesis 6 are reasonably 
consistent with results from the univariate analysis noted earlier in chapter six. In short, 
whereas there are concerns about some terms and conditions surrounding delivery of 
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both microcredit and BDS, in general from either a univariate or multivariate 
standpoint, the findings show that participant MSE owner-managers feel that access to 
microcredit and BDS has a positive impact on their enterprises. In summary the results 
of hypothesis testing reported in this study support the premise of this thesis. The 
findings highlighted above are part of this study‟s contribution to literature and 
knowledge on the practice of microfinancing.  A synopsis of this contribution follows. 
 
8.3 Contribution 
Broadly this thesis offers theoretical and practical contributions, as well as contributions 
to regulatory policy on microfinancing as practiced in developing countries. Informed 
by Pierre Bourdieu‟s critical theory on practice, and neo-institutionalism, the study‟s 
exposition on the contending logics, capital, and position-taking behaviour in the field 
of microfinance is original since most of the closely related previous studies are 
atheoretical (e.g. Pitt and Khandker, 1998, Snodgrass and Sebstad, 2002, Khandker, 
2005). Against the same theoretical framework the study develops a conceptual 
framework that could be useful to other researchers with an interest in the practice of 
microfinance. 
 
Although most previous studies on the relationship between microfinance and poverty 
alleviation utilise a survey methodology (Sharma and Buchenrieder, 2002, Habib, 2008) 
with a focus on institutions or microfinance programmes (see Goldberg, 2005), this 
thesis adopts a user‟s perspective, employing a „Q-Squared‟ methodology to elicit the 
views and experiences of MSE owner-managers while seeking to quantify costs and 
benefits associated with access to BDS and microcredit, jointly and severally, in the 
context of a developing economy.  Whereas individual participants and/or their 
households are commonly used in locating the effects of microfinancing on the poor 
(see Pitt and Khandker, 1998, Khalily, 2004), in this thesis the unit of assessment is the 
micro and small enterprise, the main form of economic activity that poor people use in 
an attempt to improve their economic capital base and livelihoods.  
 
From a practical perspective, whereas empirical literature portrays provision of BDS to 
MSEs as a cost burden worth eliminating, especially by MFIs seeking financial stability 
(Sievers and Vandenberg, 2007), results from this study dispel such claims. Firstly, 
contrary to the views held by Boter (2005), the findings here show that there is demand 
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for BDS among MSEs in developing countries, whether access to BDS is a pre-requisite 
for microcredit or not. Secondly and more importantly, hypotheses test results reported 
here quantify the perceived synergistic value of the use of BDS and microcredit jointly 
in promoting the performance of MSEs, an aspect previously not researched. From a 
neo-institutional view, with current practice inclined towards a more commercial and 
minimalist approach to microfinancing (see Schmidt, 2010), these findings could go a 
long way to inform debate on the demand for and necessity of BDS provision to MSEs.  
This is especially so for those with potential for growth, contextualised in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) policy framework, within developing economies. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the findings may serve as a guide towards the search for a 
better fit between the microfinance mission and practices, they could be instrumental in 
enabling policy makers and practitioners to develop a more efficient and effective 
regulatory policy framework for the delivery of pro-growth microcredit and BDS.  
 
8.4  Implications  
The aim of carrying out hypotheses tests, the results of which were summarised in the 
previous section (8.2), is to assess the perceived significance of BDS and microcredit to 
the performance of micro and small enterprises. The test results of performance related 
Hypotheses 1 through 4 show that, as expected, businesses that belong to participant 
MSE owner-managers in receipt of neither BDS nor microcredit are worse off in terms 
of self-rated performance than those in receipt of one or other or both of these services. 
Further, participant MSE owner-managers in joint use of microcredit and BDS report 
higher self performance ratings of their enterprises than MSE owner-managers who use 
the two services singly.  
  
These results have several implications; firstly the poorer self-scored performance 
ratings of MSE owner-managers who use neither microcredit nor BDS may be due 
partly to the fact that their businesses are newly established, as the univariate analysis in 
sections 5.2 and 5.3 shows. Further this category of participants would appear to lack 
certain aspects of cultural capital, especially business management skills, partly due to 
their low levels of education and lack of access to necessary resources. Secondly 
businesses belonging to owner-managers with a combined access to BDS and 
microcredit (cultural and economic capital respectively) enjoy a complementary value 
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addition over and above the benefits attributable to using BDS and microcredit 
separately.   
 
Thirdly given the fact that MSE owner-managers cite skill development, an indicator of 
enhanced cultural capital, as the key benefit accruing from use of BDS, it is possible 
that access to BDS helps them acquire requisite business management skills that serve 
to inform their habitus and consequently improve their decision making. For example, 
new skills may enable MSE owner-managers to make better judgements on deployment 
of financial resources as well as improving operational efficiency. Fourthly, it is likely 
that access to microcredit not only enables MSE owner-managers to access quality BDS 
but also helps them execute the skills acquired. Therefore, in essence access to 
microcredit becomes a necessary ingredient to accessing quality BDS, which enables 
MSE owner-managers to use their resources more productively. Further, MSE owner 
managers report higher satisfaction with MFI supplied BDS compared to independently 
sourced BDS, which means that integrating BDS and microcredit provision could 
improve the overall effectiveness of BDS delivery. This is because contact hours as well 
as the level of commitment for both BDS clients and their agents are likely to increase. 
Lastly, the fact that MSE owner-managers with tertiary and above level education are 
more likely to be satisfied with current BDS than their less educated counterparts may 
imply that, with the added benefit of higher education, MSE owner-managers are able 
to discern their advisory needs, differentiate between excellent and poor quality BDS, 
choose an appropriate provider or implement advice more effectively.  
 
In view of these findings and their implications, lessons can be learned for better 
targeting and delivery methodology for microfinance services. Consistent with Sievers 
and Vandenberg (2007), Akoten (2007b), and Armendariz and Morduch (2010); and in 
the context of poverty alleviation, the development agenda upon which the legitimacy 
of microfinance hinges, integrating microcredit and BDS provision is likely to improve 
the livelihoods of the poor. As such, neglecting or de-emphasising BDS provision, even 
in the interests of building self-sufficient microfinance institutions, is in the long run 
likely to significantly reduce growth prospects for MSEs – the primary market for 
microfinance services. Therefore there is urgent need for developing countries to 
establish more effective and appropriate regulatory guidelines, within the current 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) policy framework. This needs to be done to 
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ensure that microfinance practitioners keep their promise and „walk the talk‟ and hence 
avoid further deviation from the poverty mission. 
 
Further although women have been the primary target for microfinance, the insight here 
is that success could be leveraged if young adult women with a minimum tertiary level 
education are given priority. This does not however imply that other women from 
different social economic backgrounds or men should be discriminated against, rather 
that MFIs should embrace a product-market strategy broadly in their operations. 
Further, in order to improve the quality and delivery of BDS to MSEs, collaborations 
should be sought from like-minded institutions. Additionally, there is need to institute 
accreditation for all BDS providers and probably for MFIs too, to significantly scale 
down the risk of poor quality and irrelevant training. These issues are part of an agenda 
for future research which is presented next. 
 
8.5 Limitations and Areas for further research  
Authors Hulme (2000) and Khalily (2004) note that microfinance impact studies face 
three key limitations, especially where an experimental design is used; namely 
participant selection bias, credit fungibility, and misspecification of causal relationships. 
The problem of „selection bias‟ arises out of a number of factors such as location 
selection or endogeneity of program placement, existence of „invisible‟ characteristics 
between treatment and control groups, a Hawthorne effect on participants in the 
treatment group, contamination of participants across groups, and fungibility of 
treatment (Hulme, 2000). According to Khalily (2004) the argument here is that for 
impact studies, using an experimental approach may firstly make it difficult to identify a 
control group in a far away location that shares a socio-eco-political environment 
similar to that of the treatment group. Secondly, it is feared that the treatment group 
may possess some „invisible‟ attribute(s) which the control group lacks, and thirdly 
there is the possibility of short-term positive effects resulting from treatment conditions. 
Finally there are concerns about existence of multiple sources of credit which are 
concurrently accessible to MSE owner-managers. It is further argued that once 
accessed, credit may be transferred to other people or used in ways not originally 
intended or disclosed (for example, for personal rather than business use). 
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While it is acknowledged that selection bias is a potential problem, for this study 
attempts are made to minimise the issue. First recruitment of participant MSE owner-
managers is random and haphazard. In addition participation in the study is both 
voluntary and anonymous. This is done in order to ensure that participants across the 
three categories involving use of BDS and/or microcredit, and the control group (use of 
neither), are as equivalent as possible except for the treatment variables. Second 
participants across all groups are selected concurrently from four urban and semi-urban 
sites which possess reasonably similar economic and social environments yet which are 
geographically disperse. Thirdly in view of the random recruitment and placement of 
participants to their respective categories, distribution of any „invisible‟ attributes that 
may confound the treatment effect is likely to be equally random.  
 
Although loan fungibility remains a problem, especially for studies focusing on the 
enterprise (Hulme, 2000, Khalily, 2004), the aim of this study is not to control for 
fungibility in order to „prove‟ impact. Rather the aim is to test for existence of an 
association between use of BDS and microcredit and performance of the MSE owner-
managers‟ business, regardless of how many sources of credit are used or the number of 
times it is used, in order to inform the practice of microfinance. Further as Hulme 
(2000) cautions, this study recognises that microenterprise inputs and outputs cannot be 
measured precisely and, as such, not only uses a control group but also controls for 
business/personal motive in seeking the loan to minimise the possible effect of 
fungibility of microcredit. 
 
The misspecification of underlying causal relationships arises out of the assumption that 
causality is a one-way movement. In the context of this study, such an assumption can 
imply that access to microcredit and BDS among MSE owner-managers leads to an 
increase in the performance of their enterprises and not the reverse. As Hulme (2000) 
notes, the problem of causal misspecification can be overcome through a number of 
ways, namely conceptualising causation as a two-way process; tracing dropouts from 
treatment as well as control groups; enlisting participants from  mature programmes 
only; and conducting in-depth interviews with clients retrospectively.   
 
In this study, a cross-sectional rather than longitudinal or process-oriented analytical 
framework is used so dropouts are not an issue.  Further, the preliminary interview 
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checks upon which categorisation into treatment and control groups depended, 
established that the non-control group participants belonged to well-established 
microfinance institutions as members.  In addition, this study used in-depth interviews 
with microfinance clients to elicit the data, as suggested by Hulme (2000). Hence, it is 
important to note that causality or rather its specification is not a major concern for this 
study.  As stated above, the aim of this study is to examine the relationship between use 
of microcredit and/or BDS on the one hand and perceived performance of MSEs on the 
other.  
 
However it may be argued that MSE owner-managers who manage to access 
microcredit and/or BDS are likely to repeat such access because of positive experiences, 
and, as a result, their businesses are likely to perform better than those accessing either 
service singly or those with no access at all. It is worth noting that this study employs a 
two by two quasi-experimental (field) design and uses multiple regression techniques to 
analyse quantitative data, controlling for differences in characteristics of the owner-
manager and the enterprise as well. In addition, the study triangulates MSE owner-
managers‟ data with views elicited from qualitative interviews with MFI and BDS 
representatives, and independent researchers. As such these efforts minimise the 
possibility of correlation and/or causal misspecifications. 
 
Other limitations pertain to the adoption of correlation-based analytical methods when 
many of the study‟s variables are either categorical or ordinal in nature. The use of a 
quantitative multivariate approach is preferred due to its efficiency to concurrently 
handle multiple explanatory and control variables when modelling effects on an output 
variable, a case obvious to this study. It is important to note that the validity of all data 
collection instruments used in this study is tested through piloting and peer review. 
Further although normality is not assumed, before any possible transformations of 
categorical data to permit correlation analysis are carried out, the necessary tests of 
reliability are first undertaken. 
 
Areas for further research  
An important conclusion drawn from this study is that use of BDS has a catalytic effect 
on perceived performance of MSEs, especially those in receipt of microcredit. While in 
aggregate this study measures its output variable, being MSE owner-manager 
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perceptions on the performance of their enterprises, using an index generated from 
scores on a Likert-type scale; future research may investigate the hypothesis by way of 
actual financial indicators of firm performance. This may, for example involve use of a 
ratio like return on investment (ROI).  However, because of the paucity of financial 
records kept by most MSEs in developing countries, this approach was not considered 
appropriate here. 
The study finds evidence of demand for and use of BDS, whether its source is affiliated 
to or independent of microfinance institutions. Further research may investigate 
determinants of demand for BDS, especially in the context of the value chain of the 
common MSE activity clusters found in developing countries. In the same vein, 
investigations could attempt to map out the best regulatory framework and options for 
collaborative BDS and microcredit provision to MSEs.  This study finds some 
independent BDS sources (for example, private consultants and academics) unattractive 
to MSE owner-managers. Given the important role academics play in the education 
system in any country, future research could explore the factors behind this 
predisposition and suggest innovative mechanisms through which academics and 
private consultants could contribute towards more effective delivery of BDS to MSEs.  
Further the study finds no significant correlation between; on the one hand relations 
with and/or competence of BDS agency staff, group mode of BDS delivery and 
perceived professionalism of BDS source; and on the other, MSE owner-managers‟ 
satisfaction with BDS delivery. Future research might aim to clarify the basis for this 
unexpected relationship. In addition results of this study reveal that seemingly there is a 
gender-based performance differential among MSEs, in that young adult women owner-
managers report higher self-performance ratings than their male counterparts, regardless 
of access to microcredit or BDS. Even in the unlikely event that there could be a 
confounding factor inherent in the female cohort of the study‟s sample (for example, a 
personality type willing to be recruited), further research could seek to explain the 
gender paradox implied in the results. This is especially important given that males are 
more frequently represented among owner-managers in Kenya (Liedholm, 2002, ILO, 
2008). In addition, given the apparent influence owner-managers‟ level of education has 
on perceived performance of their enterprises; future research on BDS may target 
countries with lower education levels than Kenya. Among other areas for future 
research is the need for exploratory research on the adoption of modern information 
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technology in enhancing delivery of BDS, as well as microcredit under the emerging 
agency and internet-based practice of microfinance.  
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Annex 1 – Map of Kenya reflecting selected study sites 
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Annex 2 – Interview Protocol – MSE Owner-manager 
  
A: Business Profile variables 
 
A1: 
 
State the product(s)/services that you sell 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
A2: Industry affiliation: Manufacturing □ Services □ 
 
A3: 
 
 
Type of ownership: 
 
 
 
sole proprietorship □ 
 
limited company □ 
 
partnership □ 
 
 
A4: 
 
 
S 
Stage in the business cycle: 
 
 
 
discovery □ 
start-up □ 
newly-established□  
established □ 
 
A5: 
 
Age of business (years): 
 
 
 
less than 3 □ 
7-10 □ 
3-6 □          
more than 10 □ 
 
A6: 
 
Employees: 1-2□  3-5□        6-9□       10 or more □ 
 
A7: 
 
Branches: 
 
1 only□   2-3□      4-5□    more than 5 □ 
 
A8: 
 
Target market served:                                             
 
 
immediate neighbourhood □                           
surrounding markets□                                                                                    
national market □                                                            
regional market □                                                                            
international market □ 
B: Credit Services 
 
B1: 
 
Do you have a business bank account?                         yes □         no □ 
 
 
B2: 
 
Check all the types of business accounts you run from the following 
options 
               savings □   current □             investment □ fixed deposit □ 
                    fund □           other (specify) □ 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
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B3: Which sources of credit has your 
business benefited from? (tick all 
that apply)                                                     
 
personal savings  □ 
 bank loan □                                     
family & friends  □                  
NGO loan □                                                           
     group scheme □                
microfinance scheme □                                           
government scheme □                                                  
other (specify) □ 
 
B4: 
 
What type of business loan do you currently have? (tick all that apply) 
secured loan□     unsecured loan□     bank overdraft□ 
 
B5: How many repayment periods 
does the loan have? (years) 
 less than 1 □ 
1-2 □ 
3 or more □ 
 
B6: 
 
What is the 
approximate interest 
rate per year? 
                                     
 below 15% □    
                                         15%-20% □      
                                        21%-30% □  
 more than 30% □ 
 
B7: 
 
Is this your first business loan? 
 
 
yes □        no □ 
 
 
B8: 
 
What made you take 
the loan? 
 
 
capital to start business □ 
acquire business asset □ 
increase stock □ 
seize a business opportunity □ 
repay another loan □ 
personal/household expenditure □ 
pay school fees □ 
other (specify) □ 
_______________________________________ 
 
B9a: 
 
Has the performance of your business improved since you took the loan?   
                                                                          yes □           no □ 
 
B9b: 
 
If no (above), state the reasons why? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
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B9c: In what ways has the 
business  performance 
improved?(tick all that 
apply) 
 
increased sales □ 
higher profits □ 
increased savings □ 
reduced debt □ 
increased liquidity □ 
less dependence on overdrafts □ 
more investments □ 
acquired more assets □ 
set up new branches □ 
hired more staff □ 
other (specify) □ 
 
 
 
 
C: Business Development Services 
C1: Which business 
advisory service agents 
have you used to 
facilitate business 
management decisions? 
(tick all that apply) 
 
accountants/auditors □ 
consultants □ 
family □ 
friends □ 
business colleagues □ 
network contacts □ 
academics □ 
staff from microfinance scheme □ 
bank staff □ 
other support agencies (specify) □ 
_________________________________
_________________________________ 
C2: What form of support 
have you received from 
the agents stated 
above? 
market access □ 
infrastructure □ 
policy advocacy □ 
input supply   □ 
management training □ 
technical assistance in operations □ 
product development□ 
regulatory compliance □ 
business counselling □ 
moral support □ 
other (specify) □ 
____________________________________
____________________________________ 
C3: How would you rate 
the competence of the 
advisory agents used?                               
 
incompetent □    
somehow competent □     
fairly competent  □    
competent □ 
don‟t know □ 
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C4: 
 
How often do you use 
business advisory 
agents? 
 
 
at least once every month □ 
once in three months □ 
once in six months □ 
once in a year □ 
only when in absolute need □ 
 
C5: 
 
For how long have you 
used the current 
advisory agents? 
 
 
less than 3 years □  3-7 years □ 
more than 7 years □ 
 
C6: 
 
Which business 
decisions areas do you 
frequently require 
advice? 
 
 
keeping books of accounts □ 
financial literacy & credit use   □ 
business planning □ 
human resource management  □ 
sales & marketing □ 
production  process design □ 
access to technology □ 
regulations & standards □ 
tax management □ 
legal services □ 
other (specify) □ 
____________________________________ 
 
C7: 
 
List any business decision areas where you are unable to get satisfactory 
advice. 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________  
 
C8: 
 
How would you rate 
your relationship with 
the advisory agents? 
 
poor □        fair □       good □       excellent □ 
 
C9: 
 
How would you rate the 
quality of services 
provided by your current 
advisory agents? 
 
very unsatisfactory □      
unsatisfactory  □    
satisfactory □    
very satisfactory □ 
 
C10: 
 
How did you get to 
know the agents you are 
using? 
 
 
through a microfinance scheme □ 
recommended by friends □ 
personal initiative  □ 
through business colleagues □ 
agent‟s own marketing efforts □ 
other (specify) □ 
__________________________ 
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C11: 
 
In which ways do you 
access advice from your 
advisory agents? 
 
 
contracted regular visits to business site  □ 
contracted regular visits to agent‟s offices □ 
contracted group sessions □ 
contracted one off project assignment □ 
other (specify) □ 
____________________________ 
 
C12: 
 
What benefits have you 
enjoyed from engaging 
external advisors? 
 
 
 
access to professional input □ 
independent opinion on critical decisions □ 
skill development □ 
technical support □ 
moral support □ 
other (specify) □ 
______________________         
______________________       
 
C13: 
 
What drawbacks might 
accrue from engaging 
external advisers? 
 
 
breach of privacy □ 
leakage of business information/secrets □ 
misleading advice □ 
dependency syndrome □        
other (specify) □ 
_________________________
_________________________ 
D: Business Performance 
[reference made to the immediate period after loan] 
  
For the last two years of operation, assess the performance of your 
business in the following parameters; 
            noticeable 
                decline: 
steady 
decline: 
 
no change: 
steady 
increase: 
noticeable  
increase: 
Sales growth: □ □ □ □ □ 
Profit: □ □ □ □ □ 
Expenses: □ □ □ □ □ 
Savings □ □ □ □ □ 
Asset base: □ □ □ □ □ 
Cashflow: □ □ □ □ □ 
Stock level:    □ □ □ □ □ 
E: Personal profile variables 
 Age (in years):  below 30 □     30-40 □    41-50 □      above 50 □ 
 Gender:        female □   male □ 
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 Education:            primary level □    
high school □    
vocational training □                                   
college □          
graduate□ 
 Marital status:  single□   married□  divorced□     windowed□ 
 Family size:   
 
2 members □      
3-4 members □       
5-6 members □  
7or more members □ 
  
Residence:    own house □   rental □       mortgage □ 
  
Mode of transport used: 
       
own car □         public transport□ 
  
Occupation:   
 
business only □ 
business and professional job □ 
  
Gross monthly Income (KES): 
 
below 20,000 □ 
20,000 – 30,000 □    
31,000-40,000 □    
41,000-50,000 □ 
more than 50,000 □ 
  
Monthly household expenses 
(KES):    
 
below 10,000 □ 
10,000-20,000 □ 
21,000-30,000 □  
more than 30,000 □ 
  
How many years have you been in 
business? 
 
 
less than 3 □ 
3-6 □  
7-10 □            
more than 10 □ 
  
What training did you have prior to 
venturing into business? 
 
 
relevant formal training □ 
on-the-job experience □ 
family business □ 
  other (specify) □ 
_________________________        
_________________________ 
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Annex 3 – Interview Protocol – Microfinance Institution 
A: Microfinance Institutional Profile  
 
A1: 
 
What services does your institution 
offer to micro and small enterprises?  
 
credit □  
training □  
microleasing □  
insurance □ 
other (specify) □  
 
A2: 
 
Sate the legal identify of 
your institution 
 
limited liability company □ 
    partnership  □  
     listed company  □ 
        non-governmental organisation □ 
                other (specify) □       
_______________________________ 
 
A3: 
 
For how many years have 
you operated in Kenya? 
 
less than 3 □ 
 3-6 □ 
7-10 □ 
more than 10 □  
 
A4: How geographically spread 
is your network? 
national □ 
 regional □  
international □  
global □ 
B:  Target Market  
 
B1:  
 
In municipal terms, state 
where most of your clients 
are located (tick all that 
apply); 
 
 
urban market centres □ 
semi-urban markets □  
rural market centres □ 
B2:  What special reasons do you have for targeting micro and small enterprises in 
the settings stated above? 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
B3: 
 
In which sector would you 
classify most of your clients? 
 
agriculture □ 
manufacturing □ 
services □ 
general trade □ 
 
C:   Credit Delivery   
C1: What is the average size of loan 
do you offer? (KES) 
below 20,000 □  
20,000-49,000 □ 
50,000-100,000 □ 
more than 100,000 □ 
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C2: 
 
For what purposes do most of 
your clients take loans? 
 
start business □  
acquire business asset □ 
increase stock □ 
seize a business opportunity □     
repay another loan □ 
household expenditure □                             
pay school fees □ 
other (specify) □ 
_________________ 
 
C3: 
 
What interest rate do you charge 
per month? 
 
below 1% □ 
1-2% □ 
3% or more □ 
 
C4: 
 
How long in the term for most of 
your loans? 
 
less than 6 months □ 
6 -12 months □ 
more than 12 moths □ 
 
C5:  
 
What form of collateral does 
your institution require?   
 
savings □ 
car log book □ 
land □ 
building □ 
business machinery □ 
group affiliation □ 
guarantors □ 
other (specify) □ 
__________________________________ 
 
C6: 
 
How often is the loan 
repayment? 
 
weekly □ 
fortnightly □  
monthly □  
other (specify) □ 
____________________ 
 
C7:  
 
Where do you source most of the 
funds lent out as loans? (tick all 
that apply) 
 
 
deposits □ 
commercial bank loan □  
donor loan □  
government funds □  
trust funds □  
rotating group funds □ 
other (specify) □ 
__________________________________ 
 
C8: 
 
Overall how would you rate the 
reliability of loan repayment by 
your clients? 
 
very                                 very  
satisfactory :                    unsatisfactory: 
1    2      3        4            5 
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C9: Overall how would you rate the 
financial sustainability of your 
MFI‟s loan portfolio? 
very                                   very   
satisfactory:                       unsatisfactory: 
1    2      3        4            5 
 
 
C10: In what ways does your MFI 
deliver/administer credit 
services?  
 
 
__________________________________
_________________________________ 
 
C11:  
 
How does your MFI assess the 
credit worthiness of loan 
applicants? 
 
__________________________________
_________________________________ 
 
C12: 
 
In what ways have the MFI 
clients benefited from the credit 
services? 
 
__________________________________
__________________________________ 
 
C13: 
 
What challenges does you MFI 
face in serving micro and small 
enterprises? 
 
__________________________________
__________________________________ 
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Annex 4 – Interview Protocol – BDS Agency  
  
A: BDS Agency Profile 
A1: What services does your 
organisation offer to micro 
and small enterprises? (tick 
all that apply)  
management training □                                                             
market information liaison □  
distribution □ 
sales promotion □                                             
production process design □                                                  
product design □  
packaging □ 
accounting/book keeping □ 
tax advice □ 
 general counselling  □ 
other (specify) □ 
__________   
 
 
A2: 
 
Sate the Legal identify of 
your organisation 
sole proprietorship □ 
limited liability company □ 
partnership □  
listed company □ 
non-governmental organisation  □ 
      other (specify)? □ 
___________________              
A3: For how many years have 
your organisation operated in 
Kenya? 
less than 3   □ 
3-6   □ 
7-10  □ 
more than 10  □ 
 
A4: 
 
How many branch offices does your organisation have in Kenya?__ 
 
A5: 
 
How geographically spread is 
your organisation‟s branch 
network? 
 
                             national   □       
regional   □ 
international   □ 
global   □ 
B: Target Market  
B1: In municipal terms, state where 
most of the organisation‟s clients 
are located (tick all that apply) 
urban market centres □ 
semi-urban markets □ 
rural market centres □ 
 
B2: 
 
What special reasons does the organisation have for targeting micro and small 
enterprises in the settings stated above? 
 
 
B3: 
 
In which sector would you 
classify most of the 
organisation‟s clients? 
agriculture  □ 
manufacturing  □ 
services  □ 
general trade □ 
other (specify) □ 
________________________________ 
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C: Service Delivery  
C1: How does your 
organisation contact clients 
for the first time? 
through direct selling □ 
 referral by other clients □ 
referral by industry acquaintances □ 
referral by microfinance institution □  
other (specify) □ 
_____________________ 
 
C2: 
 
Please rank (on a scale of 1 - 4) each of the following management aspects 
based on the frequency of advice required? ( 1= high priority aspect; 4 least 
priority aspect) 
  
 
 
keeping books of accounts □ 
financial literacy & credit use □ 
         business planning □ 
human resource management□ 
sales & marketing □ 
production process design□  
access to technology□  
regulations & standards □ 
tax management□  
legal services□  
other (specify) □ 
___________________ 
 
C3: 
 
Through which mode does 
your organisation delivery 
its services? (tick all that 
apply) 
 
one-on-one sessions □ 
group sessions □ 
mentoring □ 
 apprenticeships □ 
vocational training □ 
incubator facility □ 
other (specify) □ 
_______________________ 
 
 
C4: 
 
In its operations, how does your organisation collaborate with         
microfinance institutions?   
 
C5: 
 
In which ways does your organisation secure commitment of your clients? 
 
C6: 
 
How often does your staff 
get to meet clients? 
 
weekly □ 
fortnightly □ 
monthly □ 
other (specify) □ 
_____________________ 
C7: 
 
 
 
 
 
What mechanism does the 
organisation use to 
determine the service fees? 
 
flat rate □ 
market rate □ 
time sheet system □ 
commission system □ 
other (specify) □ 
 
273 
 
 
 
C8: Overall how would you 
rate the commitment of the 
organisation‟s clients to 
training? 
 
very                              very  
satisfactory:                   unsatisfactory: 
1      2        3        4      5    
D: Competence  
 
D1: 
 
What level formal 
education is adequate for 
staff consulting in this 
field? 
 
tertiary level diploma □ 
graduate □  
post graduate □ 
 
D2: 
 
What other special qualification should one have to work effectively in this 
field? 
 
D3:  How important is 
experience in operating a 
business, to training 
clients? 
very                                 not 
important:                       important: 
1        2         3         4           5 
 
D4: 
 
In a case where your 
organisation lacks internal 
capacity to handle a 
client‟s assignment, what 
do you do? 
 
 
decline to contract □ 
refer client to an associate □ 
subcontract industry colleagues □ 
hire part time staff □ 
 
E: Benefits  
E1: In your opinion, in what ways have owners of micro and small enterprises 
benefited from the services provided by business development service 
agencies? 
 
F:  Challenges   
 
F1: 
 
What challenges does your organisation face in serving micro and small 
enterprises? 
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Annex 5 – Interview Protocol – Independent Researcher 
1. What academic interests do you have in the micro and small 
enterprises sector? 
 
2. How would describe the nature of businesses activities undertaken in 
the micro and small enterprises sector? 
 
3. What are some of the impediments to the development of micro and 
small enterprises in Kenya? 
 
4. Currently what are the key development issues of concern in the micro 
and small enterprises sector? 
 
5. A lot of microfinance institutions have been set up to offer credit to 
micro and small enterprises; in your opinion do you think this form of 
credit is helping micro and small enterprises? 
 
6. What would you want to see microfinance institutions doing that they 
are not currently doing? 
 
7. Business development services agents claim to offer various forms of 
human capital development, in your opinion what skills are needed 
most by micro and small enterprises? 
 
8. What advice would you give to the business development services 
agents targeting the micro and small enterprise sector? 
 
9. From a cost- benefit perspective, who seems to be gaining more from 
the current state of affairs between micro and small enterprise owner-
managers, microfinance institutions and business development services 
providers? 
 
10. In the medium term, how do you see the future of the micro and small 
enterprises sector in Kenya?  
 
11. What issues should further research in this field focus on? 
 
 
 
 
